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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to place in a political context interwar developments in criminal 
justice policy. The first part takes issue with the dominant position of much of the 
traditional historiography that crime was not a political issue. Instead, it argues, both 
at a 'high' political level and at the level of 'low' politics, criminal j ustice was always 
intensely political. The second and third parts of the thesis seek to recontextualize the 
history of criminal justice between the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. In 
particular, statistical evidence is used to argue that criminal justice was supply-led 
and not demand-led. In other words crime, including murder, was budgeted and 
rationed by managers. Part 11 examines the connections between the public cost of 
prosecutions, the emergence of the new police, and the introduction of the new series 
of criminal statistics after the mid-nineteenth century. The final part of the thesis 
explores the effect escalating police costs and intense public parsimony had on 
criminal justice after the First World War. It argues that in a significant number of 
areas this period was fundamentally discontinuous with the earlier period. The 
conclusion raises basic issues concerning the methodology of some of the social 
sciences, the nature of British democracy, and suggests that a far more critical 
approach should be adopted by researchers towards official rhetoric and, in particular, 
towards official statistics. 
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Figurel. 1 'Crimes Known to the Police' (1857-1995). Calculated from the Criminal 
Statistics. 
The central character in this thesis is the graph of crimes recorded by the police 
(Figure 1.1 )'. It reveals, firstly, that a fundamental discontinuity occurred in criminal 
justice at the end of the First World War. Secondly, because of its regularity it 
'The run of Victorian statistics were created retrospectively to 1857 by the 
Home Office in the mid- I 890s. See below, chapter VI. 
(1) 
suggests that since at least 1857, criminal justice was not responding to changing 
levels of crime in the real world,, as much of the historiography has traditionally 
assumed, but was, instead, responding to policy. In other words, criminal justice was 
being led by supply and not by demand. 
The thesis argues that reports of crime, including murder, were budgeted and 
rationed'. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as in any other branch of business or politics, 
Whitehall bureaucrats, politicians, police, court and prison managers periodically 
made costings and set budgets, quotas and targets for the amount of crimes and 
criminals they could afford to feed into the machine. Again, as in many other 
branches of business and politics, managers rigged the statistics in order to provide 
whatever 'facts' were necessary to support their policies, prejudices and bids for more 
resources. Home Office bureaucrats presented the statistics of these supply-side 
manoeuvrings and manipulations to the public and to politicians as if they were 
authentic social 'facts' from which they had formed impartial policies on criminal 
justice. Consequently, after having closely examined the series of Criminal Statistics, 
this thesis has been unable to use them for any purpose other than as evidence of 
these. supply side policies. Nonetheless, they are very revealing of those policies. 
One way of looking at the Criminal Statistics is as the shopping list for the 
institutions of criminal justice. The Home Office, chief constables and police 
authorities decided the type of crime, the quantity and, probably, some of the 
'See below, chapter VII. 
(2) 
individual criminals they wanted each year and selected them as if they were goods 
on the shelves of an almost limitlessly stocked supermarket of crimes. Many types 
of crimes, such as certain murders and frauds, were left on the shelves because they 
were well beyond the reach of criminal justice's limited budget. Instead, criminal 
justice tended to buy cheap, young and in bulk, allowing itself the odd spectacular 
luxury to impress the public and to suggest its budget was far greater than it was. 
Similarly, the courts and prisons planned in advance how the ingredients selected by 
the police would be cooked. 
Politics shaped criminal justice, yet this has traditionally been denied or regretted in 
much of the historiography. A major aim of this thesis, then, is to advance the 
politicization of criminal justice history. The first part of the thesis explores some of 
the reasons the historiography has denied a dominant political context to criminal 
justice. It distinguishes the state's high political purposes in maintaining a 
legitimizing, demand-led, apolitical image of justice, appropriate to the image of a 
leading imperial democracy, from the low politics of funding a limited justice for 
plebian criminals and their unimportant victims, whom bureaucrats often regarded 
as at best merely 'normal' and frequently as inefficient or defective. This basic 
distinction, it argues, between the normative, apolitical image and the political 
realities of justice, should be made more explicit in the historiography. The thesis 
also examines the strategies used by bureaucrats and politicians, particularly in the 
interwar period, to avoid scrutiny and political debate about justice. 
(3) 
Part 11 examines the low politics of criminal justice between the mid-nineteenth 
century and the First World War. This was a period when modern police forces and 
the modern series of statistics were being created. The aim is to provide a partial 
repoliticization of the nineteenth century historiography, from the supply side. This 
is necessary in order to provide the context for Part III which examines the responses 
and changes of criminal justice to a tightening of the economic screws in the interwar 
period and suggests this period represents a fundamental discontinuity with the earlier 
period. 
Parts 11 and III show how little real influence and control Westminster exercised over 
the workings of the criminal justice machine after 1857. The policy speeches and 
legislation of politicians and reformers rarely changed the course of British 
institutions as shown in their statistics. Policies were simply side-stepped. Instead, 
budgets, expenditure and routine administration were the salient forces. As the 
statistics show, after the First World War it was changes in these forces that exerted 
a fragmenting influence on the relatively stable balance achieved between the 
institutions of criminal justice in the nineteenth century. This led directly, it will be 
argued, to a loss of optimism and a crisis of faith in criminal justice that began to 
develop in the interwar period and has accelerated in the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
(4) 
Part 11: Politics and the Historiography of Criminal Justice 
Chapter 1: Politics and Criminal Justice History 
I 
Until recently, academic historians had not much concerned themselves with crime 
or criminal justice policy. Criminal law predominantly concerns the plebeian 
population and traditionally historians have confined themselves to high politics and 
the doings of those individuals regarded as influential, educated and informed enough 
to create laws and bring about historical change. Popular obedience to the law was 
assumed to have been the ahistoric duty and consensual choice of the traditionally 
deferential and "law-abiding" British race. Consequently, crime or disobedience to 
lawful commands has usually been dismissed by historians as the irrational violence 
of the "mob" or else has been individualised and chronicled anecdotally as examples 
of plain stupidity or "simple inhumanity and greed"'. 
For eNample, in the late 1950s, Maurice Cowling, the Peterhouse historian who has 
also been influential in Conservative think-ing, demonstrated this traditional historical 
'Kitson Clark, George Sidney Roberts, The Making of Victorian England, 
Methuen, 1962, p. 12. 
(6) 
disdain for plebeian issues. He dismissed the need for research into crime and, when 
the Institute of Criminology was set up at Cambridge, he asserted that "the causes of 
crime are so much what they always have been that they are unlikely to be removed 
by being given different names. "'. Cowling's ahistorical attitude towards criminals 
was in stark contrast to his attitude towards his academic contemporaries. In his 
Religion and Public Doctrine in Modem England, Vol 1, he meticulously charted the 
nuanced strands of their individual religious and political thought'. Unlike plebeian 
criminals,, his colleagues appear to have been distinguished individuals who merited 
close historical attention. 
In the 1970s a sustained interest developed in the history of crime. This came first 
from social historians who discovered that by examining the records of criminal 
justice administration they could systematically reconstruct "the lives of the poor and 
the socially disadvantaged"'. A number of these accounts were written applying a 
Marxist analysis of economic conflict such as that developed by Eric Hobsbawm in 
'A leader article in the Daily Telegrqph, 18 August 1959, reproduced and 
attributed to Cowling in Radzinowicz, Sir Leon, The Cambridge Institute of 
Criminology: Its Background and Scope, H. M. S. O., 1988, p. 39 ff. and Appendix 7. 
'Cowling, Maurice, Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England, Vol. 
I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
'Emsley, Clive, 'The History of Crime and Crime Control Institutions, c. 1770- 
19451,, in Maguire, M., Morgan, R., Reiner, R., (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook of 
CriminolQ-gy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 149. 
(7) 
his pioneer studies of social banditry'. Hobsbawm's influence upon Douglas Hay et 
al., was quite clear when they wrote, "There are 'good' criminals, who are premature 
revolutionaries or reformers, forerunners of popular movements 
- 
all kinds of rioters, 
smugglers, poachers, primitive rebels in industry. This appears as 'social crime'. And 
there then are those who commit crime without qualification... "'. 
Such an analysis inevitably met with fierce attempts from conservatives within the 
historical profession who sought to delegitimize any such overtly political 
interpretation of crime. For example, G. R. Elton was obviously concerned about the 
dangers of this "history from below". The vehemence of his language makes it very 
doubtful that it was principally whiggery that he had in his sights when he demanded 
that historical analysis must not be applied to present-day politics; "Historians must 
set their faces against the necessarily ignorant demands of 'society'. 
-- 
the 'usefulness' 
of historical studies lies hardly at all... in the understanding of specific present 
problems from their prehistory" 
7. 
'Hobsbawm, E. J., Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social 
Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1957; Hobsbawm, E. J., Bandits, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. 
'Hay, D., Linebaugh, P., Winslow, C., Rule, J. G., ThomPson, E. P., Albion's 
Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, Allen Lane, 1975, p. 
14. 
'Elton, G. R. 
, 
'Second thoughts on history at the universities', cited in Tosh, 
J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study o 
(continued... 
(8) 
His political stance is made clearer in an introduction to a 1977 book of essays on 
early modem crime. He cautioned against "preconceptions about class relationships" 
and belittled the utility of social theory 
- 
"nothing is gained by pulling long-worded 
faces". To emphasise his point he asserted, in surprisingly axiomatic terms for what 
he accepted was a new area of research, "the fact that the law protected all property, 
not only that of the rich"'. To effect political closure, he adopted a traditional 
legalistic approach that excluded any such concepts as 'social crime'. This 
implantation of the tenets of traditional jurisprudence into the historiography required 
historians to abandon "concepts of social norms, social justice and antisocial 
behaviour"'. These social concepts had previously been used to great effect in works 
such as E. P. Thompson's'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd"'. Nonetheless, 
Elton insisted that historical analysis should be restricted to "contemporary categories 
based on legal definition"". This potentially conceded to Parliament and to the 
judiciary the right to set the boundary of historical research. Over the next decade, 
'( 
... 
continued) 
Modern History, Longman, 1984, p. 18. 
'Elton,, G. R., 'Crime and the Historian% in Cockburn, J. S. (ed. ), Crime in 
England 1550-1800, Methuen, 1977, p. 13. For a counter assertion see Hay, D., 
'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law' in Hay, D. et al. Albion's Fatal Tree, p. 
37. 
'Elton, G. R., 'Crime and the Historian', p. 6. 
"Thompson, E. P., 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 
Eighteenth Century', Past and Present, 1971, Vol. 50, pp. 76-136. 
II Elton, G. R. Crime and the Historian', p. 6. 
(9) 
many social historians accepted these legalistic constraints by limiting their research 
to the working definition "that crime is something defined by the law"". The political 
nature of this closure was made explicit when, in order to maintain the "cohesion" of 
the subject matter, Elton called for the exclusion from study of "the near-criminal 
legislation... to regulate manufacture and commerce"". This dubious distinction 
exempted what many considered to be the crimes of the wealthy. Yet, what presented 
itself to Elton as the natural "cohesion" of the criminal law around the offences of 
ordinary people, presented itself to W. G. Carson as the "ambiguity" in the law 
whereby the wealthy were exempted from the consequences of their offending. For 
example, Carson showed how Victorian manufacturers could hide behind strict 
IlEmsley, C., 'The History of Crime', p. 149; Sharpe, J. A., 'The History of 
Crime in England c. 1300-1914: An Overview of Recent Publications', British 
Journal of Criminology, 1988, Vol. 28 (No. 2, Spring 1988), pp. 254-267, @ p. 257. 
The strict legal positivist definition of crime had long been the subject of criticism 
in the legal literature and few academic jurists accepted, as Elton appears to have 
done, that there was any intrinsic coherence to acts legally defined as crimes. 
Therefore it seems an extraordinary restriction for historians to have applied to their 
research. See, for example, one of the standard textbooks on criminal law, Kenny, 
C. S. Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1962, p. 5, where, fifteen years before Elton was writing, it was admowledged 
"no one has yet succeeded in formulating a completely satisfactory definition of 
crime". 
"Elton, G. R., 'Crime and the Historian', (1977), p. 6. 
(10) 
liability legislation in order to "deny any real criminal guilt on their own part, while 
continuing to profit from factory crime"". 
Effectively, Elton and other traditional historians were drawing tight boundaries 
around the area of study to prevent Marxist political interpretations. As John Brewer 
noted, this diverted historical "investigations in two directions: towards a quantitative 
and numerical analysis of crime 
- 
who did what and when 
- 
and towards a case study 
approach"". The result was that the many researchers who were influenced by 
conservatives such as Elton were excluded from making many of the social and 
political linkages between crime and wider conflicts such as deviancy, class, social 
protest and control, the poor laws, or economics. Elton was quite explicit about this. 
He used a natural law argument to further restrict research from considering the 
political role of the State in defining crime. He declared "unlawful" to mean "contrary 
14 Carson, W. G., 'White-collar Crime and the Institutionalisation of 
Ambiguity: the Case of the Early Factory Acts' in Fitzgerald, Mike, McLennan, 
Gregor, Pawson, Jennie, (eds. ), Crime and Society: Readings in History and Theo 
, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul in Association with the Open University, 198 1, p. 144. 
For a fuller discussion see Norrie, Alan, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical 
Introduction to Criminal Law, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993, pp. 87 ff. 
"Brewer, J., 'An Ungovernable People? Law and Disorder in Stuart and 
Hanoverian England. ', History Today, 1980, Vol. 30, (January 1980), pp. 18-27, 
20. 
(11) 
to principles at least believed to be eternal and not socially conditioned" ". Alan 
Norrie has justly criticised such a view as unhistoric "because for it the principles 
upon which the criminal law is founded are natural and unhistoric in the sense that 
they are never seen as the product of a particular kind of society generating particular 
forms of social control peculiar to itself "' 
Despite the efforts of Elton, by the late 1970s, many left-wing social historians had 
made some of these wider connections, but were still failing fully to locate their work, 
within a wider political context because of the limitations of their case study 
approach and their focus on history from below. As the radical criminologist Ian 
Taylor explained in his Marxist analysis, their focus on case studies displaced "the 
class struggles that are constantly occurring in capitalist societies over commodities 
into disputes between individual legal subjects"". To put it less ideologically, there 
was a parallel with criminology's traditional depoliticised focus on the individual 
criminal and its acceptance, rather than questioning, of the role of the state in 
defining, processing, and controlling crime". If the historiography was to develop, 
"Elton, G. R., 'Crime and the Historian', p. 3. 
"Norrie, Alan, Crime Reason and History, p. 9. 
"Taylor, I., Law and Order: Arguments for Socialism, Macmillan, 1981, 
180, (emphasis in the original). 
"Reiner, R., 'British Criminology and the State', British Journal of 
Cri linQl"y, 1988, Vol. 28, (No. 2, Spring 1988), pp. 268-288. 
(12) 
the institutions of criminal justice, themselves, would need to be examined rather 
than just the individuals who were targeted by them. 
11 
By the late 1970s, in both the historiography and in criminology a new strand was 
becoming salient concerning "the social relationships of authority which are 
expressed and contested in crime and the law. "". Radical works such as Douglas 
Hay's essay'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law'and E. P. Thompson's Whigs 
and Hunters invited historians to move away from case studies of criminals, and 
examine the practices and ideologies of class control and legitimization deployed 
through the law and the institutions of criminal justice". Nonetheless, much of this 
new work could be located within a traditional left-wing class analysis of "the 
ideology of the ruling oligarchy" and its defence of property". However, its primary 
"Bailey, V., 'Crime, Criminal Justice and Authority in England: A 
Bibliographical Essay', Bulletin of the Socie1y for the Study of Labour History, 1980, 
Vol. 40, (Spring 1980), pp. 36-46, @ p. 36. For developments in criminology see, 
Young, J., 'Radical Criminology in Britain: the Emergence of a Competing 
Paradigm', British Journal of Criminolny, 1988, Vol. 28, (No. 2, Spring 1988), pp. 
289-313. 
"Hay, D., 'Property Authority and the Law'; Thompson, E. P., Whigs and 
Hunters: the Origin of the Black Act,, Peregrine, 1977. 
22 Hay, D., et al., Albion's Fatal Tree, p. 13. 
(13) 
importance was, as J. A. Sharpe has observed, "to suggest that historians of crime 
should turn away from their archives for a while and think of some of the broader 
implications of their subject. "". 
Thompson was well aware that his examination of the Black Act entailed a radical 
break with the past historiography and presuppositions of traditional academic 
historians. This was very much in line with a wider intellectual movement in the 
1970s to question the social and political assumptions of the disciplines. 
Consequently, Thompson stated, "I have avoided, until late in this book, any general 
description of that society which could have come to me from the constructions of 
other historians. "". The antipathy this work aroused in the traditionalist establishment 
was evident when,, in his review,, Professor John Cannon forecast it "will pervert the 
historiography of eighteenth century England for a generation"". These historians 
were rejecting the traditional arguments of historians such as Elton for a limited, 
depoliticised history of crime and they argued, instead, for much wider 
contextualization. As V. A. C. Gatrell put it, "no discussion of 'crime' can sensibly 
proceed which does not first discuss how, by whom and why attitudes and policies 
towards crime are formed,, and what often covert purposes those policies serve" 26 
23 Sharpe, J. A., 'The History of Crime in England, p. 262. 
"Thompson, E. P. Whigs and Hunters, p. 16. 
"In a review of the book. Cited in the postscript to Thompson, E. P., Whigs 
and Hunters, p. 3 11. 
"Gatrell, V. A. C., 'Crime Authority and the Policeman State, in F. M. L. 
(continued 
... 
) 
(14) 
After the late 1970s, the broadening of the analysis, particularly concerning the 
history of penality, began to stimulate a quality of critical work which, in the opinion 
of Bill Forsythe, had "few parallels in other areas of social studies"". For example, 
David Garland, in a work much influenced by Foucault", but also building on the 
earlier insights of Gareth Stedman Jones", brilliantly analysed "the social, political 
and ideological conditions" which underpinned Victorian and Edwardian penality and 
has examined their sources in "criminology, eugenics, social work and social 
security"". Martin Wiener widened the net further to encompass cultural, religious, 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Thompson (ed. ), The Cambridge Social History of Britain, 1750-1950 Vol. 3, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 199 1, p. 243. 
"Forsythe, W. J., 'The Garland Thesis and the Origins of Modem English 
Prison Discipline: 1835 to 1939', The Howard Journal, 1995, Vol. 34, (No. 3, August 
1995), pp. 259-273, @ p. 259. 
"Although his status as a historian should be questioned, Michel Foucault's 
writings, particularly Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, Allen Lane, 
1977, has been an inspiration for much revisionist historiography. 
"Jones, Gareth Stedman, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationsh 
between Classes in Victorian Society, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. 
IOGarland, David, Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies, 
Aldershot, Gower,, 1985, p. ix. 
(15) 
legal and moral discourses upon criminal policy. He also widened the range of source 
material consulted to include more literary material and wider fora of debate' I 
Foucault had made the connection between welfare and penal policies and the 
development of a form of power, governmentality, focusing on the population, and 
utilising new techniques and knowledges, such as statistics and psychiatry, to 
increase the utility of the population to the state. In this analysis, the family and the 
individual became the instruments of population management and regulation 
-a 
"biopolitics 1132 
. 
For Foucault, plebeian management, including regulation through 
criminal law, was a central concern of government after the Enlightenment". 
"Wiener, M.,, Reconstructing the Criminal Culture, Law and Policy in 
England. 1830-1914, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
"See also, Donzelot, J.,, The Policing of Families, Hutchinson, 1980. 
33 A number of historians have cast doubt on Foucault's historical accuracy. 
For example, J. M. Beattie's thorough researches show that the Enlightenment did not 
mark the decisive change in penal methods and he instead suggests a much earlier 
origin. Beattie, J. M., Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1986. More importantly, Foucault's account is rendered 
historically inadequate by his lack of description of the mechanics of power and 
policy-formation. For a discussion of the significance of Foucault see Weeks, J.,, 
'Foucault for Historians', History Workshop Journal, 1982, Vol. 14, pp. 106-119. See 
also, Garland, D., 'Criminological Knowledge and its Relation to Power: Foucault's 
Genealogy and Criminology Today', British Journal of CriminolQa, 1992, Vol. 32, 
(continued 
... 
) 
(16) 
The development of these insights inevitably led to a new focus for historians on 
institutional and policy areas previously charted only by practitioner historians. Most 
new research concentrated on penality but there still remained great scope for 
historians to extend the analysis to the other areas of criminal justice administration. 
Furthermore, as the Oxford Handbook of Criminology showed, recent criminological 
literature offered historians many important insights into the working of the criminal 
justice system". Perhaps it was time, as J. A. Sharpe shrewdly observed, for historians 
to adopt a more interdisciplinary approach and commence the "exciting... interplay 
between criminological theory and historical materials"35 
. 
III 
There remained much work- for academic historians to do, for, because of their long 
neglect, the historiography of the institutions of criminal justice had been dominated 
by practitioner historians. Their work traditionally produced a self-contained, 
depoliticised and decontextualized historiography. This was partly due to their close 
involvement with institutional practice, where crime tended to present itself as an 
objective series of cases or files to be classified according to pre-conceived notions. 
"( 
... 
continued) 
(No. 4, Autumn 1992), pp. 403-423; Smart, B., 'On Discipline and Social Regulation: 
A Review of Foucault's Genealogical Analysis', in Garland, D. and Young, P. (eds. ), 
The Power to Punish. 
34 Maguire,, M., et al., The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 
"Sharpe, J. A., 'The History of Crime', p. 262. 
(17) 
Thus, Sir Leon Radzinowicz's methodology was to begin preparation for his 
monumental History of English Criminal Law by first classifying the historical 
collection of State Papers into 130 "given problems 1136 
. 
He was assuming, in common 
with much of the practitioner historiography and with contemporary criminological 
theory, that crime is "an objective fact that constitutes a problem, and criminal 
policy... [is] a more or less straightforward response to that problem. 1137 
In addition to adopting an uncritical problematization of criminal justice, the 
practitioner historiography often made the associated assumption that politicians and 
external events do not bring about change but, instead, change results from the good 
sense and experience of practitioners and administrators in their day to day grappling 
with the eternal problem of crime". As Radzinowicz argued, "The empirical approach 
to any changes which is so characteristic of England can also be seen in the way in 
which reforms were introduced into the administration of criminal justice... all 
[innovations] evolved gradually, after numerous attempts and continuous experiments 
"Preface to the 'Catalogue of Parliamentary Papers' quoted in Radzinowicz, 
Leon, 'Some Sources of Modem English Criminal Law Legislation', Cambridge Law 
Journal, 1943,, Vol. 8, (No. 2), pp. 180-194, @ p. 192. 
"Wiener, M., Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 6. 
"This tendency has been described by Habermas as the "scientization of 
politics" or "technicism", see Harden, 1. and Lewis, N., The Noble Lie: the British 
Constitution and the Rule of Law, Hutchinson, 1986, p. 21. 
(18) 
had yielded an accumulation of valuable experience. "". Administrators then passed 
the 'objective' results of experience on to politicians so that they could frame 
legislation to further perfect the machine and make best practice general. 
However, by placing the politically "neutral" expertise of practitioners and 
administrators at centre stage, the historiography has frequently offered justification 
for the expanding role of the State and its bureaucracy". It has highlighted and 
legitimized the scientific and managerial 'expertise' of officials and practitioners 
while downgrading political input as'unhelpful'. Consequently, ideological and party 
political debate has been presented as undesirable and almost illegitimate since it 
threatens the existence of 'rational', 'consensual', 'coherent', and long-term 
bureaucratic control. Recently, Tim Newburn, the Head of Crime, Justice and Youth 
Studies at the Policy Studies Institute, expressed the disappointment of many 
administrators following more direct political control of criminal justice policy, 
"Crime and criminal justice policy is now accepted as being a major political issue. 
That is, not only do we expect politicians to spend a lot of their time talking about 
crime and criminal justice, but we expect them to disagree. It was not always 
1141 thus... 
"Radzinowicz, L. 'Present Trends of English Criminal Policy. An Attempt 
at Interpretation', in Davis, Seabome, et al. The Modern Approach to Criminal Law, 
Macmillan, 1945, p. 28. 
IN. A. C. Gatrell,, 'Crime Authority and the Policeman State', p. 245. 
"Newburn, T., Crime and Criminal Justice Policy, Longman, 1995, p. 172. 
(19) 
In other words, the practitioner historiography has largely confined itself to a 
narration where, as David Garland put it, "technique and administration neutralise 
and castrate the political 
- 
they represent the political as irrelevant, the ideological as 
non-ideology"". Politically, A. J. P. Taylor has located such writing within the broad 
strand of "Tory history", although this does not imply that all the writers would have 
described themselves as Conservatives. However, "The Tory spirit in history is 
shown by an emphasis on administration, by getting ideas out of history and putting 
humdrum personal motives and office routine in... when you tak-e ideas out of history 
you put Toryism in"43 
There is another strand to the practitioner historiography that co-exists with, and 
overlays, its contingent empiricism and gives it direction 
- 
that of a Whiggish 
progressivism, strengthened, and given scientific authority, by the legal and social 
positivism which dominated theory until at least the 1960s. Sean McConville 
explained, "Institutional histories are particularly vulnerable to distortion... This is 
because of a belief, abroad at least from the Enlightenment, that institutions are 
perfectible. Their history, it follows, must be the story of progress attempted and 
thwarted, with a strong tendency to see the most recent developments as the most 
"Garland, David and Young, Peter'Towards a Social Analysis of Penality' in 
Garland, David and Young, Peter (eds. ), The Power to Punish: Contemporary 
Penality and Social Analysis (1983), Aldershot, Gower, 1989, pp. 4-5. 
"Taylor, A. J. P. (edited by Chris Wrigley), From Napoleon to the Second 
International. EssUs on Nineteenth-Century Europe., Hamish Hamilton, 1993, p. 47. 
(20) 
desirable"". Whiggish historical narratives can be used to provide a self-serving 
institutional underpinning for current theory or practice by suggesting a linear 
development from the barbarism of the past to the scientific Imowledge of the 
present. David Garland has observed of some of the historical accounts in 
criminological textbooks, it "can be profoundly misleading if they are taken as real 
history, rather than as a kind of foundational myth, developed for heuristic rather than 
historical purposes" 
45 
. 
Whiggism serves covertly political ends. Its form of narrative denies the importance 
of political contest by portraying its subject as located within an inevitable "meta- 
narrative of reason, progress, and humanitarian reform"". Sir Leon Radzinowicz, the 
foremost practitioner historian, was openly Whiggish. In his opinion, "Lord 
Macaulay's generalisation that the history of England is the history of progress is as 
"McConville, Sedn., English Local Prisons 1860-1900: Next Only to Death, 
Routledge, 1995, p. 3. 
"Garland,, D. 'Of Crimes and Criminals: The Development of British 
Criminology', in Maguire, M., Morgan, R., Reiner, R., (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994, pp. 21-22. For a general discussion of the 
development of paradigms in the social sciences and their effect on the internal and 
external historiography of criminal justice see Young, Jock, 'Radical Criminology in 
Britain', pp. 295 ff. 
4'Morrison, W., Theoretical Criminology: from Modernity to Post- 
modernism, Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 1995, p. 189. 
(21) 
true of the criminal law of this country as of the other social institutions of which it 
is a part"". Radzinowicz's immediate historical concern was to wave the flag in the 
wake of the Second World War. By tracing the humanitarian evolution of present 
institutions and practices, he wished to show "clearly what England has already 
achieved in this field. "". He confidently shared with Maitland the belief that, 
"Constitutional history should, to my mind, be a history, not of parties but of 
institutions, not of struggles, but of results; the struggles are evanescent, the results 
are permanent"". 
Thus,, it was only because Whig and Tory histories each stripped out the deep social 
and political context that they were able to co-exist in a seamless historical narrative 
- 
a cautious, humane, and scientific evolution presided over by a decent, sceptical, and 
pragmatic British administration. Perhaps a more fruitful way of understanding their 
political symbiosis was to see the Whig strand as a narrative that gives retrospective 
unity and a sense of pride to contingent administration and ad hoc policy making, or, 
adapting Stephen Humphries' revisionist Marxist analysis, an ameliorative Whig 
"Radzinowicz, Sir Leon, A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750, Vol. 1 'The Movement for Reform, Stevens and Sons,, 
1948, p. ix. 
"Radzinowiez, L., 'Some Sources of Modern English Criminal Law 
Legislation', p. 189. 
"Ibid., P. 184, note 7. 
(22) 
"flower of democracy" legitimising the Tory "bureaucratic response to the 
imperatives of class control"". 
"Humphries S., Hooligans or Rebels? An Oral History of Working-Class 
Childhood and Youth 1889-1939, Oxford, Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, p. 2. 
(23) 
Chapter 11: The Political 'Castration' of Criminal Justice 
I 
To appreciate how the institutional historiography succeeded in the "castration" of 
the political aspects of criminal justice policy it is necessary to understand the way 
many histories were constructed. Methodologically, the historiography has an 
overwhelming, and frequently uncritical gravitation towards official sources 
supplemented by the writings of influential campaigners and practitioners. For 
example, Gordon Rose based his work largely on the archives of the Howard League 
supplemented by official publications, while Victor Bailey's, like Radzinowicz's, 
source material comes almost exclusively 'from above'; from those who formulated 
and implemented policy'. 
The sources used have a rhetorical tendency to represent ideology, compromise, and 
pork barrel politics as if they were matters of disinterested and high-minded principle. 
'Rose, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform: The Howard League-and its 
Predecessors, Stevens for the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency, 
1961. Finlayson, G., review of 'Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship', History, 
1992, Vol. 77, p. 161. 
(24) 
They have had an accompanying tendency to support existing institutions, to 
disregard low status or politically weak groups and to focus on the disagreements, 
illogicalities and wealmesses, rather than the strengths of oppositional positions. As 
Sean McConville put it, "the raw materials from which the story is constructed are 
the publications of those who sought or opposed change. These pre-select data,, 
compress arguments, assist the scholar to find and handle material, and are 
convenient stays for arguments. But reformers and campaigners, and their opponents, 
are only a part of past discourse and activities... "'. This is why Stephen Humphries, 
in his oral history of work-ing-class childhood, had good reason for issuing a warning 
that a one-sided reliance on professional and official sources for the history of 
juvenile delinquency, would lead to a portrayal of the "history of working-class youth 
that... [was] mainly a catalogue of ignorance and immorality testifying to the struggle 
of the state to rescue youth from the destructive effects of its culture and 
enviro=ent"'. 
In effect, by relying on the official (and quasi-official) record, much of the 
historiography has done little more than provide a context for, and a coherent 
narrative to rationalise administrative prejudice and decisions, while continuing to 
exclude alternative formulations and Imowledge. Thus, the official record has been 
endowed retrospectively with a cogency, necessity and completeness that it never 
'McConville, S., English Local Prisons, p. 3. 
'Humphries S., Hooligans or Rebels?, p. 3. 
(25) 
possessed'. In less able hands, this has led to the impression that there was only one 
agenda because, for example, "the similarities of thought and feeling between 
officials and reformers" meant that there ceased to be fundamental differences in 
approach, and the debate became almost entirely over the question of pace rather than 
over politics'. 
The scholarship of Sir Leon Radzinowicz was highly reverential towards the official 
record and revealed an almost Hegalian conviction that official inquiries must 
necessarily disclose 'Truth'. Although he was said to have had "an acute judgement 
of people and political possibilities" and, as a Home Office policy consultant, he 
should also have had an informed opinion of how politics interacted with criminal 
justice policy', in the 1940s his understanding of the political process was more than 
a little naYve. He wrote, "Of course this parliamentary activity does not arise 
'Thus,, after examining the official sources, Victor Bailey concluded that it 
was welfare "ideology, not pragmatism" that influenced the policies and procedures 
of English criminal justice. Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship: Reclaiming the 
Young Offender, 1914-1948, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 4. For evidence of 
this continuing neglect in the criminological literature of alternative perceptions see 
Parker, H., Casburn, M., Turnbill, D., Receiving Juvenile Justice: Adolescents and 
State Care and Control, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, chapter 1. 
'Rose,, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform, pp. 283,284. 
Martin, J. P.,, 'The Development of Criminology in Britain', British Journal 
of Criminology, 1988, Vol. 28 (No. 2, Spring 1988), pp. 165-174, @ p. 167. 
(26) 
spontaneously but is in its turn the product of powerful and diverse forces which 
operate within society and which are set in motion by the conflict of interests and 
aspirations that eventually force themselves upon the attention of one or other of the 
two Houses"'. The results of these 'social forces' were then fed into Parliament 
through Parliamentary inquiries, which elicited "truth" and produced consensus by 
a dialectical process; "Strong partisans on each side were Imowingly and advisedly 
chosen, in order that truth might be elicited from the conflict of opposite, and it might 
be interested, opinions"'. The report of Parliamentary inquiries with their 
accompanying papers supplied the historian with "immensely rich information" on 
which to base the facts of his argument'. The "truth" that inevitably emerged became 
enshrined in legislation since "A very considerable part of the penal enactments were 
defacto nothing more than a statutory expression of the essential recommendations 
formulated by certain important commissions of inquiry"". Since each inquiry 
unfolded an aspect of the "truth" it is not surprising that Radzinowicz found that each 
Parliamentary Committee shared with the others "a definite criminal policy" and he 
concluded that the resulting Acts were "all the product of an identical conception" 11. 
'Radzinowicz, L., 'Some Sources of Modern English Criminal Law 
Legislation', p. 183. 
'Radzinowicz quoting Sir George Lewis, ibid., p. 187 note 21. 
'ibid., p. 187. 
"ibid., P. 188. 
"Radzinowicz, Leon, 'Present Trends of English Criminal Policy, pp. 27,3 1. 
(27) 
The politics of crime, therefore, merely represented an imperfect manifestation of the 
official "Truth" that would eventually inform the legislation" 
11 
As well as adopting an often far less than critical attitude towards the official sources, 
the historiography has often failed to acknowledge, let alone cross, the many 
powerful barriers, ideological and political, in the way of a free expression of opinion 
about criminal justice. This has again encouraged historians to deny criminal justice 
history its political context. For example, the provincial barrister, Charles Muir, who 
was writing in the mid- 193 Os, observed, 
The atmosphere in which legal problems are discussed plays a large part in 
the conclusions reached. It appears to be a tradition of English High Court 
Judges to attend the banquets of rich and learned societies and there to extol 
the merits of the English Legal System. It is not apparently good form to 
"Some of Sir Leon's later works, such as The Growth of Crime, display a 
considerably more critical attitude although his Whiggism is never far below the 
surface. Radzinowicz,, Sir Leon, The Growth of Crime: The International Experience, 
Hamish Hamilton, 1977. See also Martin Wiener's perceptive review; Wiener, M., 
'The March of Penal Progress? ', a review of Radzinowicz, L., and Hood, R., 'The 
Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian England', Journal of British Studies, 1987,, 
Vol. 26,, 83-96. 
(28) 
criticize the legal system at these functions and the Judges' speeches almost 
invariably display an extreme complacence. The average diner goes home 
thanking a beneficent Providence that he lives under the English legal system 
and that he has such wonderful Judges to administer the law. 
The circumstances in which justice is discussed in an unemployment centre 
are wholly different. Very few persons have dined even frugally. High Court 
Judges are not present and only little-Imown lawyers are available to defend 
the system... if he can convince his audience that the legal system has not 
contributed to the deplorable condition in which many working men find 
themselves he will have achieved a considerable feat. " 
Muir was arguing that the working classes were quite open in their condemnation of 
British justice. Unfortunately, this important, and informed, component of public 
opinion, often from "the receiving-end perspective", has traditionally "evoked much 
indignant rejection from the legal profession" and has rarely been seriously 
investigated or recorded 
14 
. 
13 Muir,, C., Justice in a Depressed Area, A Critical Study, George Allen and 
Unwin, 1936, pp. 191-2. 
"Parker, H.,, et al., Receiving Juvenile Justice:, p. 7. For the importance of 
balancing the official view see also Humphries S., Hooligans or Rebels?, p. 3. 
(29) 
Turning to the numerically much smaller middle classes, Muir suggested it was 
considered bad form publicly to criticize the legal system. This particularly applied 
to lawyers". Claud Mullins, a prominent inter-war magistrate, described how the 
legal critic was regarded by his profession as "the naughty child of his group" 16 
. 
These observations are of importance since, as David Sugarman has shown, lawyers 
occupied such a prominent role in Parliament, in politics generally and, it should be 
added, in all debates about crime". 
Greater obstacles in the way of raising criminal justice matters existed in Parliament. 
Often criminal policy failed to materialise as a political issue because it was 
presented in such a way that political debate was diffused into other arenas such as 
"For a sample of the uncritical, misty-eyed reverence with which the English 
judiciary spoke of British justice see Denning, Justice A., 'The Spirit of the British 
Constitution% The Canadian Bar Review,, 195 1, Vol. XXIX,, 195 1, pp. 1180-1197. 
Some lawyers may have been profoundly moved by such sentiments, others may 
have thought this to be the most profound humbug, but it is easy to understand how 
they and public officials might have been intimidated by such a language of power 
and tradition into staying silent or into hiding behind nom-de-plumes such as 
'Solicitor' and'A Barrister'. 
"Mullins, C.,, Fifteen Years Hard Labour, Victor Gollancz, 1949, p. 9. 
"Sugarman, D., 'Simple Images and Complex Realities: English Lawyers and 
Their Relationship to Business and Politics, 1750-1950', Law and History Review, 
1993, Vol. 11, (No. 2, Fall 1993), pp. 257-301. 
(30) 
the distressed areas or the welfare of the family which were outside the 
responsibilities of the Home Office. This has encouraged Victor Bailey to argue that 
criminal justice "shares, much more than historians have allowed, a similar 
intellectual heritage with the better Imown measures which comprise the modern 
welfare state" ". When it did emerge, the Home Office sought to portray its actions, 
which were often repressive or ineffective, in the best possible light. The outspoken 
civil libertarian Josiah Wedgwood complained, "I feel myself a pariah. Every 
Member of this Committee gets up and devises fresh schemes for perfecting the 
machine, I do not like the machine... the Home Office always seeks to hide its 
arbitrary authority under the disguise of grandmama" 19 
Wedgwood could see that the Home Office was using strategies to disguise the full 
political dimension. David Garland has studied these strategies when applied to penal 
policy. He concluded "British penology legitimises itself both by denying its status 
as ideology and more simply, by fudging issues. "". In every area contradictory 
principles operated such as deterrence and rehabilitation; uniform discipline and 
individual treatment; psychiatric assessment and individual responsibility. Like the 
curate's egg, most shades of political opinion could find something to approve of. So, 
by giving prison the twin concurrent primary objectives of deterrence and 
"Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 4. 
"Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 304, (16 July 1935), pp. 959-60, (Home Office 
Supply Estimates). 
"Garland,, D. and Young, P. 'Towards a Social Analysis of Penality', p. 3. 
P" 1) 
reformation, a wide spectrum of divergent political opinion was accommodated, and 
the politics effectively hidden by this strategic ambiguity". Through fudging, the 
Home Office could appear in different guises; as reformative "grandmama" to a 
tender MP, while for a tough MP it could reveal its more authoritarian and deterrent 
side,, all the while maintaining the appearance of political consenSUS22. Since "the 
machine" accommodated such divergent philosophies it was not surprising that all 
shades of opinion believed they could devise fresh schemes to perfect it. However, 
this should not suggest that there really was consensus on the ideological basis or on 
the political meaning of such schemes. 
Ambiguity and strategic manoeuvring were not the only ways in which dissenting 
MPs were politically marginalised. Political argument was obstructed by the 
labyrinthine structure of the Home Office which enabled the Government and 
officials to avoid direct responsibility. A right wing critic, Lord Edward Percy, 
described the Home Office in 193 )1 as 
a congeries of Departments, a receptacle of miscellaneous duties loaded on 
the Home Secretary. Parliament requires the Home Office Estimates to be 
presented in a form closely corresponding to this strange organisation. Thus, 
"See Fox, Sir Lionel W., The Modem English Prison, George Routledge and 
Sons, 1934. 
"For a lucid analysis of the strategies deployed in the formation of pre-First 
World War penal policy see Garland, D. Punishment and Welfare, chapter 7. 
(32) 
the Home Secretary accounts separately to Parliament, for Broadmoor 
Criminal Lunatic Asylum, for reformatory and industrial schools and all the 
other matters within the scope of the Department. It is therefore impossible 
to have a general debate on the state of crime in this country". 
Time and again, the Parliamentary Debates show how very easy it was (and still is) 
for Home Secretaries and officials to avoid political debate and accountability by 
diffusing and denying responsibility. Policing matters outside London were the 
responsibility of local authorities; the judiciary were independent and came under the 
responsibility of the Lord Chancellor; approved schools were educational institutions 
and could not be debated with prisons; prison matters needed to be discussed with the 
Prison Commissioners who were civil servants and so could not answer in 
Parliament; Broadmoor stood by itself, the Attorney General was and was not a 
political officer, and so forth. Calls to unify responsibility under a Ministry of Justice 
were always non-starterS24. 
Thus, the Home Office was in the enviable position of being able to co-ordinate 
policy, lay down service conditions, inspect establishments, withhold grants, veto 
appointments, arrange conferences and dispatch memoranda to the various organs of 
"Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 255, (28 July 193 1), p. 2157. 
"For, the arguments in favour see, for example, Report of the Machinery o 
Government Committee, P. P. 1918 [Cd 923 0], X11. I.; Haldane Club, A Committee 
of the, A Ministry of Justice, New Fabian Research Bureau, 1933. 
(33) 
enforcement of criminal policy whilst largely remaining constitutionally irresponsible 
for its policy, its implementation or its effect". Additionally, it was widely known 
that Home Office officials were adept at side-stepping Parliamentary scrutiny. 
Aneurin Bevan complained; "the policy is always made by the chief officials in the 
Home Office. There is no Department of the Government where the civilian authority 
has less control over policy than in the Home Office. "" Unsurprisingly, the result was 
that political opposition was often rendered ineffective, ill-informed and, frequently, 
inadmissible in Parliament, and this greatly contributed towards the appearance that 
crime was not a matter of political controversy. 
III 
The blockage of political debate about criminal justice policy went deeper. It was 
almost portrayed as a merit of the Constitution that political scrutiny and debate 
"See, for example the use which Michael Howard made of Home Office 
irresponsibility during his recent period as Home Secretary; Lewis, D. Hidden 
Agendas: Politics, Law and Disorder, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1997, passim. 
"Parliament. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 279, (26 June 1933), p. 1214, (Metropolitan 
Police Bill, Report Stage). Ironically, Bevan was giving ammunition to the right wing 
who were arguing that the extent of collectivist legislation meant that policy being 
devolved to unaccountable civil servants and that Parliament was being marginalised. 
It was most influentially expressed by Lord Hewart. See Hewart, Lord Gordon H., 
The New Despotism, Ernest Benn, 1929. See below chapter V. 
(34) 
should be rendered ineffective. The inability of Parliament to challenge the Home 
Office and the institutions of justice was legitimised by "the noble lie" of the rule of 
law and the separation of powers, which inoculated the State against accusations of 
political bias in the administration ofjustice". As Harden and Lewis have argued, the 
constitution has often been used as a "blank-et certification" of the source of political 
power without providing the means to scrutinize it in the light of performance" 
Thus, the comforting argument, as Downes and Morgan put it, that "law and order 
were. relatively insulated from the world of party politics", has too often been 
justified, not as a result of a close examination of performance, but simply because 
"once laws are enacted... their enforcement is the preserve of the police and the 
judiciary" 29 
. 
Almost a priori in the twentieth century it has been asserted by the 
judicial establishment that what they did was necessarily above politics, since their 
"Harden,, 1. and Lewis, N.,, The Noble Lie. Of course,, the senior judiciary, 
were not entirely monolithic in outlook. For example, in Lord Greene's view, the 
constitutional separation of the legislature, administration, and judiciary should be 
seen as "functional, not part of some system of checks and balances,, but rather "as 
being the elements of one machine serving a single purpose", see Griffith, J. A. G., 
Judicial Politics since 1920: A Chronicle, Oxford, Blackwell,, 1993, pp. 56 ff. 
2'Harden, 1. and Lewis, N., The Noble Lie, p. 28. 
"Downes, D., and Morgan, R., 'Hostages to Fortune? The Politics of Law and 
Order', in Maguire, M., Morgan, R., Reiner, R., (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994, p. 184. 
(35) 
constitutional role was as an impartial check on the Executive 
- 
and woe betide the 
"naughty boy" who suggested otherwise" 
The police, like the judiciary, evolved their own, more blatant, 'noble lie' which they 
used to legitimise their actions. In 1901, Captain Melville Lee, a police historian, 
referred to a theory of policing by consent that had been formulated during the 
previous century, 
The basis upon which our theory of police ultimately rests, is the assumption 
that every lawful act performed by a police officer in the execution of his 
duty, has the sanction and approval of the great majority of his fellow 
citizens; and under our constitution it would be impossible for any 
constabulary force to continue in existence, if its actions persistently ran 
counter to the expressed wishes of the people". 
"At the end of the day the legal establishment had enormous power over its 
members. For a more recent example of the vicious lengths the legal establishment 
has gone to, in order to deal with the really "naughty boys" and prevent their 
criticisms being made public, see the angry introductory note to Baldwin, Jolu-i and 
McConville, Michael, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty, Martin 
Robertson, 1977. 
"Lee, Capt. W. L. Melville, A History of Police in England, Methuen and Co., 
1901, pp. 328-329. 
(36) 
Over the next half century, this quasi-constitutional assumption became transformed 
into some mythical set of "sacred" principles which were said to be "absolute 
safeguards against oppressive or dictatorial government"". As with the judiciary, 
these 'principles' presented the police as a non-political body concerned solely with 
the impartial enforcement of the law. In other words, like the judiciary, the police 
argued there was no need for scrutiny because whatever they did was necessarily 
right, impartial and non-political. If not, the constitution and public opinion would 
mystically and automatically have intervened; "the support of the approval of public 
opinion, even when this has been opposed to them in particular local areas... their 
principles, methods and constitution make it impossible for them to oppose the will 
of the people, and enforce laws in the face of sustained public refusal to observe 
them"". Consequently, a legal fiction was maintained that the police were merely 
citizens paid to perform a duty incumbent upon every other citizen. As with the 
institution of lay magistrates, it was put to the people "that the police are the public 
and that the public are the police" 
34 
. 
"Howgrave-Graham, H. M., Light and Shade at Scotland Yard, John Murray, 
1947!, 128. For the origins of the 'Principles' and the enonnous uncertainty of leading 
police officers as to their content see Appendix 1. 
"Reith, C., British Police and the Democratic Ideal, p. 10. 
"Ibid., p. 4. 
(37) 
IV 
To a considerable extent, the historiography has accepted the normative myth that a 
nebulously conceived 'public opinion' exercised great power within the state. It has 
frequently accorded to this 'public opinion' a role of scrutiny, control and even policy 
making that it has denied to more specifically political forces. The practice, of course, 
was qifferent. Public opinion mattered to the administration of criminal justice not 
because in a democracy it needed to be respected and obeyed, but because, if the state 
was to call itself a democracy, the institutions of criminal justice needed to persuade 
the public to acquiesce and accept their legitimacy. As Richard Crossman later 
argued, in his paraphrase of Bagehot; "Good government depends on the discovery 
of some device for inducing into the masses a respect for their superiors, and 
persuading them not to use the power of the ma ority in order to overthrow law and i 
order 1135 
. 
Thus, for the maintenance of law and order, although it was rarely felt 
necessary to listen to dernotic public opinion, it was frequently felt necessary to 
instruct it with correct opinions. 
"Publicity became, in fact, an indispensable part of our armoury and we did not limit 
our activities to the daily press", noted Sir Harold Scott, a civil servant and postwar 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police". Scotland Yard "assisted" in the 
35 Quoted in Harden, I. and Lewis, N., The Noble Lie, p. 30. 
"Scott, Sir H. 
, 
Scotland Yard, pp. 90- 1. Lord Trenchard, when Commissioner, 
relied on "the right people" in the media to follow his line (Boyle, Andrew, 
(continued 
... 
) 
(38) 
production of periodical articles and in the production of BBC broadcast materials. 
Sir Harold was particularly pleased to co-operate closely with studios to produce 
films like The Blue Lamp, which introduced the character of Dixon of Dock Green. 
He suggested that the film "gave a faithful picture of the policeman's life and work 
This film has been shown all over the world and has been a valuable means of 
spreading a Imowledge of the efficiency and high traditions of the Metropolitan 
Police" 37 
. 
On the negative side, by avoiding discussion and close scrutiny of performance,, 
particularly in Parliament, it was always possible to present injustice and delinquency 
in the administration of justice as the result of a few bad apples, particularly if the 
press was compliant enough to turn a blind eye. If an editor rashly suggested an abuse 
of power more systematic than the allowable few bad apples, the chief constable 
could threaten him with the libel laws". Generally the press were very supportive. 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Trenchard, Collins, 1962, p. 630). 
37SCott 
, 
Sir H.,, Scotland Yard, pp. 90-1. 
"For example, the editors of Workers' Weekly were convicted of a libel on 
the Durham Police after producing an account of a procession over the Chester-le- 
Street guardians. The Lord Chief Justice in summing up, said that the duty of the 
defendants was to make clear that they were referring to the actions of an individual 
officer and not the force as a whole. He said "there was an allegation of police 
brutality and not brutality by individual policemen, and a clear suggestion that the 
(continued ) 
(39) 
Howgrave- Graham, the Secretary of the Metropolitan Police, recalled how, after a 
number of allegations of police corruption and the use of the "third degree" led to the 
setting up of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, Lord 
Riddell", Chairman of the Newspaper Proprietor's Association, obtained the 
agreement of Fleet Street to refrain entirely from reporting Metropolitan Police 
disciplinary cases for the next two years". Although the "frequent" letters from the 
public about corruption, which in the opinion of Lord Trenchard, the next 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, were merely "the tip of the iceberg" 
31( 
... 
continued) 
police, so far from doing their duty, had allowed themselves to be animated by the 
basest motive and had done something which was entirely wrong. ". This constituted 
libel. Justice of the Peace, 1927, Vol. 91, (12 March 1927), p. 184. 
19 
-' 
Riddell was an ideal choice. He had previously rendered similar services to 
Lloyd George when he manipulated the press, Wrigley, Chris, Lloyd GeQjge, Oxford, 
Blackwell,, 1992, p. 149. As chairman of the Medico-Legal Society Riddell took a 
personal interest in crime, particularly the cost to the community in rates and taxes, 
see,, for example, Transactions of the Medico-Legal Soýt 
, 
1931-2, Vol. XXVI, pp. 
24-5. 
"Howgrave-Graham, H. M., Light and Shade at Scotland Yard, pp. 16-17. See 
also Kingsley Martin's suspicion of the "Scotland Yard inspiration" behind much of 
the reporting of the Royal Commission. Martin, Kingsley, 'Public Opinion: Crime 
and the Newspapers', Political Quarterly, 193 1, Vol. 2, pp. 428-32, @ p. 43 1. 
(40) 
continued to flow in, little was done". The usual practice was to "destroy" a 
significant number of the complaints "straight away"". What mattered principally 
was that they were not reported and that the complaint statistics were kept low. So, 
instead,, of public opinion being allowed to demand close scrutiny of practice, the 
press was muzzled and propaganda was put out to instruct public opinion that the 
police observed their principles, behaved themselves, and were politically neutral. 
V 
While the historiography has glossed over the difficulties inherent in any discussion 
of 'public opinion', it has accorded it a more important role than politics in the policy 
process. Vic Gatrell warned, "Loose assumptions about public opinion and popular 
consent in the law often take the place of hard research"". Nonetheless, Lord 
Macmillan in his Foreword to the first volume of Radzinowicz's influential History 
(1948), said that the work's main purpose was "to display the gradual growth of 
public opinion which has led to the reforms brought about by modern criminal 
"Boyle, A., Trenchard, p. 609. 
"Evidence of Brigadier-General Sir W. F. T. Horwood, former Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police, Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, p. 
52. 
"Gatrell, V. A. C., The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 7. 
(41) 
legislation"". The whole issue of public opinion has been a thorny one for the 
historiography and generally it has adopted an uncritical attitude towards it. Like 
almost every writer on the subject, the former Labour Home Secretary, Herbert 
Morrison, drew a distinction between the mass "predominant public opinion" and 
"infon-ned bodies of opinion entitled to respect and consideration"". This distinction 
has been fundamental throughout the writing on criminal justice, with the views of 
the masses often dismissed as an ill-informed, "populist punitiveness , 46 or as 
Compton MacKenzie disrespectfully put it, "the great weight of unimaginative 
opinion, that huge constipated mass of human mediocre brains"" as distinct from the 
informed,, and progressive "public opinion" of some educated elite of society. This 
is partly because of the implicit Dicean conception of the functioning of the political 
process that still informs so much of the writing. Harden and Lewis argue that 
"Radzinowicz, Sir Leon,, A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750,, Vol. 1 'The Movement for Reform', Stevens and Sons, 
1948, 
"Morrison, Herbert, Government and Parliament: A Survey from the Inside, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 168. 
"See for example, Bottoms, A. E., 'The Philosophy and Politics of Sentencing' 
in Clarkson,, C. and Morgan, R., The Politics of Sentencing Reform, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 39-40. 
"Epilogue by Compton MacKenzie in Macartney, Wilfred F. R., Walls Have 
Mouths: A Record of Ten Years Penal Servitude, Left Book Club Edition, Victor 
Gollancz, 1936, p. 437. 
(42) 
"although Dicey's work is perhaps known only to a small proportion of the 
population... there is a marked tendency to accept the contours of his investigation 
and with them many of the hidden theoretical assumptions. "". Because his 
assumptions are implicit they are never examined or acknowledged in the 
historiography, and are passed from one writer to another. In particular, there is a 
tendency to accept many of Dicey's assumptions about the existence of a consensual 
public opinion which has substituted itself for politics as the engine of change. 
Even the most critical writers on the subject still pay unacknowledged homage to 
Dicey and to the force of public opinion. For example, Sean McConville wrote in 
Dicean terms about how public opinion was transmitted; "It is not true of everyone, 
but a great many people have set in intellectual and moral moulds by their mid- 
twenties... Certain generational anxieties and certainties also leave their imprint, 
although it would be nonsense to suggest that each generation has only one set of 
guiding beliefs and objectives by which it uniformly acts. "". Dicey had argued that 
a dominant "body of beliefs, convictions, sentiments, accepted principles, or firmly- 
rooted prejudices" formed a legislative public opinion which identified a broad 
historical phase of social and legal development". Although there were often 
"Harden, 1. and Lewis, N., The Noble Lie, p. 4. 
"McConville, S., English Local Prisons, p. 1. 
"Dicey, A. C., Lectures on the Relation between Law and Opinion in England 
During the Nineteenth Century, Macmillan, 1919, pp. 19-20. Radzinowicz used this 
periodization for his History, Radzinowicz, L., 'Some Sources of Modern English 
(continued 
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) 
(43) 
"counter-currents" of opposition from earlier periods and "cross-currents" of opinion 
from interested groups which modified legislation, nonetheless the dominant 
conception informed the legislation and gave unity to each era". Thus, for 
Radzinowicz, and for much of the historiography, the politics of criminal justice was 
about the creation of a dominant consensus in public opinion and not about the 
"evanescent" counter- and cross-currents of class and "party struggles". 
Since the traditional historiography has so resolutely maintained that informed public 
opinion was central to the legislative process, how then was it ascertained? Few 
writers have shared Radzinowiczs almost total faith in the ability of Parliamentary 
Committees to discover all shades of opinion". Herbert Morrison acknowledged in 
a democracy the "art ofjudging public opinion is not an easy one. The most desirable 
requisite was an extensive knowledge of the outlook of the people in various walks 
of life and an understanding of how their minds work"". However, there was no 
shortage of other distinguished people involved in the administration of criminal 
justice who felt themselves similarly skilled, and that their informed opinions should 
weigh more than others. 
11( 
... 
continued) 
Criminal Law Legislation', p. 193. Radzinowicz was also acquainted with the 
writings of Lawrence Lowell, the American writer on public opinion (p. 188). 
'Dicey, A. C., Lectures, pp. 36-41. 
"See above, p. 26. 
"Morrison, H., Government and Parliament, p. 167. 
(44) 
For example, citing their constitutional and supposed political independence and, the 
breadth of their judicial experience, members of the judiciary often arrogantly 
regarded themselves as the very embodiment of public opinion. Many judges 
subscribed to the view of Alfred Denning that the public "all have the same outlook 
on fundamental matters"". Naturally, they assumed the public outlook coincided with 
their own experience, politics and opinions. Therefore, the senior judiciary's highly 
individualistic, conservative, condescending and often muddled opinions were 
advanced as "an important basis of public opinion" 
- 
more important than mere "party 
bias". Writing in the wake of the explosion of regulations of the Second World War 
and after the election of a socialist government, Justice Denning argued, 
freedom of discussion involves, of course, freedom to criticise the 
government. Now experience has shown that govenunents are very sensitive 
to criticism. The reason is of course because governments are ultimately 
dependent for their power on the support of public opinion... In Parliament 
discussion runs on party lines. So it does in the press and in broadcasts, and 
nowadays also in municipal elections. Indeed many sources of criticism are 
to be discounted by reason of party bias. But there is one source which is not 
to be discounted. It is criticism by the judges. Observations by them may 
form an important basis of public opinion... If matters come before them 
where injustice is being done, they are entitled to point it out so that the 
public may form an opinion upon it... The judges are able to see how the acts 
"Denning, Justice A., 'The Spirit of the British Constitution', p. 118 1. 
(45) 
of Parliament work in practice and when defects appear in them, their 
observations may be a great help to those responsible for making or amending 
the law... ". 
Of course, Denning was using public opinion from within his armoury of political 
rhetoric. Far from respecting the role of public opinion within the 'Constitution', 
Denning effectively created his own convenient formulation of public opinion in 
order to make a play for judicial oversight of the political process, as in the good-old 
common law days of English law, and so undermine the modern Constitutional 
separation of powers. In this light, his use of "public opinion" was anything but 
unbiased or politically neutral. Nonetheless, Denning's rhetoric was that the judiciary 
were merely offering their politically neutral experience and drafting skills to the 
service of Parliament. 
Thus, at best, 'public opinion' was such a vague, manipulated and ill-defined term that 
it was unsafe to draw conclusions about it. In its inclusive sense it lacked the social 
status to carry any weight within the rigid social hierarchy of Whitehall. In its more 
limited and influential sense it meant no more than the personal views and prejudices 
of the select few who enjoyed sufficient social, economic and political clout to gain 
entry to the policy making process. 
"Ibid., pp. 118 0-1197, passim. As with much judicial writing, the bones of 
his argument has to be prised with great difficulty from the entangling web of 
complacent homilies and empty rhetoric. 
(46) 
vi 
So. when the shibboleth of 'public opinionwas taken away from the historiography, 
it should have come as no surprise that what was left was bureaucrats, politicians and 
influential individuals and organisations mak-ing policy behind closed doors 
- 
at local 
and national level. Even so, when the traditional historiography had arrived at this 
level of particularity in the policy-making process, it still frequently dismissed the 
importance of the politics of these individuals. The process of policy formation has 
been made to appear as a civilised exchange between the wise, the great and the good. 
For example, Gordon Rose, a member of the Executive of the Howard League for 
Penal Reform, and author of a major work on the history of penal reform provided 
a deppliticized description of how "Senior civil servants and some Home Secretaries, 
plus changes in the situation to be met and the interplay of pressures between the 
executive and the judiciary, with the intervention of a number of influential men, 
were the immediate instruments of the main changes" 56 . 
Individual conscience,, religion and personal biography and not class or politics, has 
been used to explain attitudes towards criminal justice. Terence Morris wrote, "While 
penal reformers were for the most part drawn from a middle-class intelligentsia, their 
political views could be highly divergent. "". Hermann Mannheim, who was more 
"Rose, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform, p. 282. 
57Morris, Terence, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1989, p. 32. 
(47) 
aware of the political aspects of crime than most criminologists, still saw policy as 
largely determined through the instrumentality of individuals, "Even those who 
regard ideas and movements as all-important will wish to know how and why certain 
men were chosen as their instruments"". Sometimes the narrative has almost lapsed 
into an hagiography of the character of these great reformers and administrators, and 
by so doing avoided discussing the political forces which these great men 
characterise. As Gordon Rose wrote, "It would be pleasant to ascribe changes in 
penal methods and legislation directly to the influence of reformers, but it would only 
be partially true 
... 
11.59 
. 
The reverse of this tendency towards reverence has been that 
many politicians, ideologies and individuals have been dismissed or left out of the 
narrative who, although contributing to the debate on crime, were not responsible for 
piloting reforming legislation, or who actually opposed it" 
"Mannheim, H. (ed. ), Pioneers in Criminology, Stevens and Sons, 1960, p. 
7. 
"Rose,, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform, p. 282. 
"See, for example, the following brief assessments; Clynes ("never seemed 
to Imow, or to care, about the subject") in Rose, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform, 
p. 269; Gilmour ("his term of office was undistinguished") in Bailey, V., Delinquenýgy 
and CitizenLhIip, p. 130; Sir John Simon ("not responsible for any major legislative 
reforms") in Dutton, D., Simon, A Political Biography of Sir John Simon, Aurum 
Press,, 1992, p. 228; Herbert Samuel ("dormant") in Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, A 
Political Life,, Oxford,, Oxford University Press, 1992; 345. Hoare ("genuine family 
and personal commitment... to be associated with major domestic legislation") in (continued 
... 
) 
(48) 
Recent work has also often concentrated on individual biography. Terence Morris 
believed "that the shape of British criminology during the period irnmediately before 
and immediately after the Second World War owes almost everything to the 
important figures who dominated the scene. "". Victor Bailey has identified 
Alexander Paterson, a leading Prison Commissioner, as the "Beveridge of penal 
reform"". In his opinion, for the historiography "an abstract analysis of official 
discourses... has its place, but it should not be undertaken at the expense of 
personalities and pressure groups"". Thus,, the historiography has too frequently 
allowed the normative myths of the constitution, the narrative and selective memory 
of the official record, the strategic manoeuvrings of politicians and administrators, 
and the vanities and conceits of high status individuals to obscure the political in 
criminal justice. 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Cross, J. A., Sir Samuel Hoare; A Political Biography, Jonathen Cape, 1977; 280. 
"Morris, T., 'British Criminology: 1935-48', British Journal of CriminolQgy, 
1988, Vol. 28, (No. 2, Spring 1988), pp. 150-164, p. 15 1. Morris noted that an earlier 
version of the paper had been criticised "for being a kind of 'history of the kings and 
queens of England sort of account"' 
"Victor Bailey, Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 4. 
"Bailey, V., review of Garland, D., 'Punishment and Welfare'in American 
Historical Review, 1986, Vol. 91, pp. 925-926, @ p. 925. 
(49) 
Chapter III: The 'High' and 'Low' Politics of Interwar Criminal 
Justice 
I 
General strictures on the depoliticization of the historiography of criminal justice 
institutions apply with particular force to the inter-war and immediate post-war 
period. In a 1988 overview of recent publications on 'The History of Crime in 
England', J. A. Sharpe dismissed this period with a footnote, "Work on the history of 
crime and related matters after 1914 is not developed as for some earlier periods, and 
hence has been excluded from this essay. "'. So far, with a few notable exceptions, the 
period has been largely ignored by academic historians'. This has left the field open 
to practitioners and policy-makers eminent in their fields, to provide the bulk of the 
historiography using their contemporary accounts and memoirs (which were often 
'Sharpe, J. A., 'The History of Crime in England', p. 254. 
'These notable exceptions must include; Bailey, V., Delinquency and 
Citizenship; Forsythe, W. J., Penal Discipline, Reformatory Projects and the Englis 
Prison Commission 1895-1939, Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1991; Morgan, J., 
Conflict and Order: Labour Disputes in England and Wales 1900-1939, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press,, 1987; Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the World. 
(50) 
intended to be definitive), theoretical works and textbooks, as well as by writing more 
overt history. So far these have been allowed to carry great weight and authority, 
particularly when the author participated in the contemporary policy process and had 
access to insider lu-iowledge normally unavailable to academic historians'. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the period suffers from an uncritical and very poorly 
contextualized history. 
Perhaps as a result of this dominance of the administrative viewpoint, the period has 
been dismissed as a rational but unimaginative, relatively stable, but financially 
constrained,, interlude between the Gladstone Committee (1895) on prisons, with its 
subsequent "transformation of penality in the early 1900s", and "the explosion of 
criminality in the last thirty years"'. For example, in the important issue of central 
control of the criminal justice system, the inter-war period was held not to compare 
with "'the forty years after 1870 [which] present themselves as a major period of 
'For example, the works of Hermann Mannheim and Sir Leon Radzinowicz. 
See also Fox, L., The English Prison and Borstal System, Routledge, 1952; Critchley, 
T. A.! ý A Histoly of Police; Morris, Terence, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945. 
'Garland, D.. Punishment and Welfare, p. viii; Bailey, V., 'Crime in the 20th 
Century', History Today, 1988, Vol. 38, (May 1988), pp. 42-48, p. 42. The 
periodization of criminal justice history has tended to follow Dicey's periodization 
of history in general, see Radzinowicz, L., 'Some Sources of Modem English 
Criminal Law Legislation', p. 193. 
(51) 
innovation. "'. Similarly, a study of the evolution of the police service between 1829 
and 1965 concluded "the police service changed less during the inter-war years than 
did many other aspects of British life. "'. Again, a review of social work practice 
decided that the inter-war period was "stagnant" and characterised by a search for 
"security" and "stability"'. These judgements tend to support Paul Addison's general 
conclusions about "the frustrating circumstances that afflicted reform between the 
wars 
iv8 
. 
According to this traditional historiography of criminal justice administration, politics 
only entered criminal justice after the large increase in the volume of crime in the 
1950s and 1960s9. Before then,, in the inter-war and immediate post-war period, 
politicians' attitudes to criminal justice were often said to be characterised by 
"neglect, apathy and lack of interest"". The public at this time, it is argued, although 
perennially interested in true crime stories, also did not see crime as a significant 
'Gatrell, V. A. C., 'Crime Authority and the Policeman State', p. 262. 
'Maitin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police, A Study in Manpower: The 
Evolution of the Service in England and Wales 1829-1965, Heinemann, 1969, p. 36. 
'Halsey, A. H., Traditions of Social Policy: Essays in Honour of Violet Butler, 
Oxford,, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 96. 
'Addison, P.,, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, 
Quartet Books, 1977, p. 23. 
'Bailey, V., 'Crime in the 20th Century', p. 43. 
"Rose, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform, pp. 271-272. 
(52) 
political issue. David Downes and Rod Morgan have suggested that there was a wide- 
spread belief about "that crime, like the weather, is beyond political influence; and 
that the operation of the law and criminal justice should be above it"". Moreover,, like 
the weather, crime was held to affect all, rich or poor alike, and this has led some 
writers to conclude that "there is no evidence that then (or indeed now) particular 
attitudes were characteristic of any social group or class"". Consequently, the 
historiography has rarely bothered to consider that there might have been a political 
dimension to crime in the interwar and postwar period. In the opinion of a leading 
criminologist, Terence Morris, "it would be difficult to see precisely what kind of 
partisan gloss could have been put on the matter. "". 
11 
Not surprisingly, in view of the difficulties of expressing and recording opposition, 
and the uncritical use of the official material consulted, the traditional Whiggish 
analysis that crime was a consensual, unproblematic and apolitical issue can easily 
be underpinned by a wealth of contemporary rhetoric. For example, in 1931 the 
Conservative MP, Oliver Locker Lampson, painted a non-contentious image of Home 
Office business; "Everybody will agree that the Home Office has been less open to 
I 'Downes, D., and Morgan, R., 'Hostages to Fortune? ', p. 184. 
"Morris, Terence, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945, p. 32. 
"Ibid., p. 27. 
(53) 
criticism than any of the other Departments of His Majesty's Government"". The 
former Labour Home Secretary, JR. Clynes, appears to have shared his view. During 
the 1938 debates on the Criminal Justice Bill, he commented on progress achieved; 
"It is interesting to note how many are the penal questions in which there are no party 
considerations. A Home Secretary of one colour starts a movement, a Home 
Secretary of another colour carries the movement a stage further"". Twenty years 
later Harold Scott, a senior Home Office official, used almost identical official 
language when he included within the ambit of political consensus most of the 
functions of the Home Office; "Normally it makes very little difference whether the 
Home Secretary is of this or that political colour, for the Home Office is not usually 
concerned with things that divide the parties"". Even as late as 1964, George Brown, 
the then Chairman of the Labour Home Policy Committee, could introduce the 
Longford Report by noting that "crime was not a subject on which there is great Party 
political conflict"". 
14 Parl. Deb, 5th ser., Vol. 255, (28 July 193 1), p. 2121. 
"J. R. Clynes, Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 342, (29 November 1938), p. 279,. 
This statement anticipated the passage of the 1938 Bill which was introduced by the 
Conservatives but then withdrawn at the outbreak of the War. Re-introduced by 
Labour in substantially the same form, it became the 1948 Criminal Justice Act. The 
Bill was deliberately drafted to be acceptable to both Labour and Conservatives, see 
Cross, J. A., Sir Samuel Hoare: A Political Biography, Jonathan Cape, 1977, p. 280. 
"Scott, Sir Harold, Your Obedient Servant, Andre Deutsch, 1959, p. 53. 
"Cited in Gelsthorpe, L. and Morris, A., 'Juvenile Justice 1945-1992' in 
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Recently a number of historians and criminologists have become more sensitive and 
questioning of the political nature of criminal policy making. However, because of 
the widespread assumption that there is an apparently daunting lack of evidence of 
overt political expression they have directed their attention beneath the surface and 
outside the political domain. For example, Loraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris 
concluded that debates about juvenile delinquency "are rooted in civil society... rather 
than in the political realm", and so (quoting J. Clarke) carry a "deeper message 
about social and political changes, without actually employing or engaging in an 
overtly political discourse. "". Applying this analysis, Terence Morris' imagery of a 
"partisan gloss" might be more accurately expressed if put the other way around. 
Rather than trying to find a gloss that "could have been" applied to the contemporary 
policies to give them a partisan appearance, it might have been more useful to have 
stripped the gloss from the policies themselves in order to discover the deeper 
political message beneath. 
Downes and Morgan have reached similar conclusions about law and order, again 
without seriously challenging the assumption of an overtly non-political public 
opinion and a bi-partisan consensus on crime. They, too, maintain that there were 
deeper politics beneath; "the nature of the consensus itself was both complex and far 
from apolitical. This was, however, a politics more of nuance and inflection than of 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Maguire, M., Morgan, R., Reiner, R., (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 
p. 954. 
"Ibid., p. 949. 
(55) 
explicit difference. "" Yet, historically, how legitimate is it for revisionists to read 
political meaning into the account of interwar and postwar criminal justice when so 
many contemporary politicians, criminologists and other assorted insiders have failed 
to discern any significant political dimension? It is one thing to argue that there were 
barriers against political debate about criminal justice or that historians have 
traditionally been uncritical in their readings of sources and that political debate 
should have taken place. It is quite another thing to demonstrate that political debate 
actually took place. Why should the evidence, which all sides seem to assume 
supplies scant evidence of any "overtly political discourse", be combed for "nuances", 
"inflections" and "deeper meanings"? Why should it not be taken at face value? 
Put this way, the solution revisionists have found to the problem of the political 
reinterpretation of twentieth century criminal justice policy, might seem to have some 
affinity with the Marxist conception of false consciousness. By embracing the 
traditional assumption of traditionalists that there was no overt politics, revisionists 
have set themselves the demanding task of demonstrating that, nonetheless, some 
underlying "deeper" political realities existed, perhaps vaguely sensed by 
contemporaries, which were possibly located within wider discourses. These deeper 
political realities are said to have existed despite the optimistic cross-party consensus 
in the political realm, and a non-political public opinion in civil society. 
"Downes, D., and Morgan, R., 'Hostages to FortuneT, 1994, p. 184. 
(56) 
III 
Of course, if evidence could be adduced that both revisionists and traditionalists have 
too readily dismissed the salience of "overt" politics to interwar criminal justice, and 
that contemporaries, themselves, actually appreciated it as being intrinsically 
political, then the revisionists would be in a far stronger position. There is evidence 
to suggest this was the case in the interwar period. This evidence also provides an 
overt political explanation for why the state was so concerned to depoliticise crime 
in the interwar period. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, "Everybody" did not agree with Locker Lampson's 
expressions of satisfaction with the Home Office". The left-wing Labour MP, lawyer, 
and one-time chairman of the Howard League, D. N. Pritt, claimed the Home Office 
was, principally through its control of the police, engaged in "steadily crushing the 
ordinary freedom of expression of political views". He went on to say, "it is upon 
matters of the police and administration of the law that the most tremendous 
differences occur. In general the middle classes say, and I think, believe, that police 
administration is well nigh perfect. In general, and almost without exception, working 
class opinion about the police is completely unprintable"" 
- 
Pritt's overt political 
analysis directly contradicts Terence Morris' assertion that particular attitudes were 
"See above, p. 53. 
"Parl. Deb., 5th Ser., Vol. 314, (17 July 1936), pp. 1547-1548, (Home Office 
Supply Estimates). 
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not "characteristic of any social group or class"". Similarly, Herbert Samuel's 
complacent view as Home Secretary that in 1933 criminals "bear the police no ill 
will, and the police bear them no animosity" 23 was not shared by the rightward- 
leaning 'Solicitor', who had written the previous year, that the working classes were 
now trending towards an "active disbelief in the fairness with which our laws are 
administered"". Similar official complacency prompted Compton MacKenzie's angry 
outburst in 1936 against the damaging effect of party politics on prison 
administration,, "Inertia soon set in again. The list of Home Secretaries during the last 
fifty years is a catalogue of ambitious mediocrities, political failures, and party 
buffoons" 25 
. 
'A Barrister' was even more politically explicit; 
JUSTICE IN BRITAIN 
There can be no true justice in a capitalist country. " 
22 See above p. 53 
2'Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 278, (23 May 1933), p. 982. 
241 Solicitor, English Justice, 2nd ed., George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1932, 
viii. 
"Comment to Chapter XII by Compton MacKenzie, Macartney, W. F. R., 
Walls Have Mouths, p. 271. 
26v A Barrister', Justice in England, Victor Gollancz, 1938, p. 10. 
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Looking over their shoulders towards Russia, Conservatives,, such as Sir Vivian 
Henderson MP, countered such attacks with their own political argument that 
socialism caused crime; "disrespect for property is also due, to some extent, not to the 
War, but to the extreme Socialist teaching which has arisen as a result of the War"27 
In the light of such statements, it becomes a little hard to appreciate why the 
historiography has had such difficulty in finding evidence of a party political, or even 
an overt political "gloss" to put on the issue of interwar criminal justice policy. 
Indeed, it is easy to see that criminal justice was regarded not merely as a political 
issue but as a matter of the highest politics since it was so closely involved in the 
legitimacy of the State. Obviously, governments had a vested interest in upholding 
the 'rule of law' since they could rule only for so long as the public yielded to the laws 
they created. The inculcation of respect for the criminal law was fundamental to their 
rule since it used as the Leviathan of the legal system". This was spelled out by the 
Criminal Law Commissioners as early as 1843; 
The high and paramount importance of the Criminal Law consists in this 
consideration, that upon its due enforcement the operation of every other 
branch of the law, be it preventive or simply remedial, whether it concern the 
safety of the State, or the lives and fortunes of individuals, directly and almost 
"Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), pp. 1165-6. 
"Hobbes, T. Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-wealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil, Everyman's Library, 1950. 
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solely depends... the knowledge of which can tend more effectually to 
convince all ranks of Your Majesty's subjects that the laws are founded on 
just principles, having regard to the protection of all, and equally binding on 
all, and consequently to impress the duty and induce the habit of prompt 
obedience". 
This was especially true in the tense atmosphere of the 1930s when there was, as a 
senior police officer tried to explain, "all over the world to-day 
-I can hardly describe 
it 
-a sort of feeling of unrest" that made all those concerned with enforcing obedience 
to the law extremely uneasy". The Chief Constable of Cambridge, Mr R. J. Pearson, 
argued that "Public morale could be preserved only if the public had confidence in 
the Goverm-nent, and in the minds of most people in times of crisis, government, 
which meant law and order, was represented by the police... For this reason there was 
need for full confidence in the representatives of law and order and a special need for 
caution in criticizing the machinery of government"31. 'Solicitor', himself a 
Conservative,, feared that there was an imminent danger of a loss of respect for the 
criminal law; "It should be unnecessary to emphasise the importance of confidence 
"Seventh Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Law, P. P. 1843 
(448), XIX. 1, p. 4. 
"Evidence of Colonel d'E. Coke, the Chief Constable of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, H. M. S. O., 2 vol., 1929, p. 305. 
"Times, 22 June 1939, p. 5. 
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in the administration of justice. This confidence has made our revolutions 
comparatively bloodless... lack of confidence in the administration of justice is 
growing. That such lack of confidence constitutes a grave peril to the State is 
obvious. " 32 . 
Thus, great efforts were made in the interwar period to bolster public confidence in 
criminal justice for fear of bloody revolution if the law fell into disrepute. The 
international situation intensified the sense of danger. 'Solicitor' believed that 
crimma justice was already held so much in contempt by the working classes that he 
feared "the mischief' had been done. He argued that if the upper and middle classes 
did not now do something to reform the system of English justice then the only 
remedy open to the lower classes was "destruction"". From the left, 'A Barrister' 
produced a similar, but more sinister explanation for "the touchiness displayed by the 
Government when any criticisms are advanced" of criminal justice administration. 
In his view, "The time is one of capitalist decay and revolutionary ferment... The 
courts are really an admirable weapon. They start with a good reputation among the 
middle class; those who say 'It can't happen here' will go on saying 'It isn't happening 
here' all the time it happens 104 . 
32v Solicitor', English Justice, p. viii. 
331bid., pp. viii-x. 
341 A Barrister', Justice in England, 
, 
p. 282. 
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These analyses support the suggestion made earlier that the apolitical public 
presentation of criminal justice administration was, in itself, high politics, intimately 
connected with the legitimation and continuance of the State. For 'Solicitor%, the 
confident appearance of unity on the administration of criminal justice was necessary 
to protect and legitimise the old order; forA Barrister', it was a front to disguise from 
the public the establishment of a new, possibly fascist order. Thus the maintenance 
of the public appearance ofjustice, rather than the provision ofjustice itself was what 
ultimately mattered. 
Moreover, the high political salience of criminal justice was heightened by the 
example of other countries after the First World War. What was going on in Italy, 
Germany and Russia, all of whom were busy codifying and reshaping their criminal 
laws, encouraged people to look upon the criminal law as a potential engine for the 
political and social reconstruction of the State". For example, the legal academic, 
F. C. Auld looked admiringly towards the principles underlying the new German 
criminal law; 
The criminal law is be to built up on broad lines of defence of the strong and 
proved and capable element of the German people as against the morally ill 
and unworthy elements of social decadence. The identity of law and morals 
"Across Europe political changes were bringing about major revisions of 
criminal law. See the series of articles on 'Recent Developments in Law, 
Constitutions and Administrations', Political Quarterly, 1932-7, Vols. III to VIII. 
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must be restored, that is, it must replace the un-German contrast between 
morality on the one hand and the feeling for law and order. The wrongdoer 
in a criminal sense must be the wrongdoer in a social sense... society must not 
any longer wait to act until an unworthy member of its group has begun a 
wrongftil act; the dangerous element in society must, as early as possible, be 
forestalled by preventive measures. " 
Even more worrying, for governments were those who looked to the new Soviet 
Criminal Code for its "re-thinking of the entire system of values" 37 and in particular 
to its democratically elected judges and magistrates, People's Courts and to a law that 
protected social, rather than individual property. ". The values enshrined in criminal 
law had the potential to become the subject of the most profound and dangerous 
political debate. They raised such questions as should the law be used to protect 
individual or social goods? Should it enforce equality? What standards of morality 
should be enforced? Should society deny life itself to those, such as bastards and 
mental defectives who, it feared,, might become a burden to others? Should the 
enforcement of the law be left to the police and judiciary or should behaviour be 
"Auld, F. C., Law Reform in Germany', The Canadian Bar Review, 1934, Vol 
XII, (No. 1, Jan 1934), pp. 26-29, @ p. 26. 
37Man-nheim, H., Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1946, p. 2. 
"See, for example, Millner, R., Soviet Justice, W. H. Allen and Co., 1943. 
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regulated and treated by panels of experts acting for the common good? Or should 
ordinary people be trusted to set and enforce the law? Who should be obeyed? 
So. in the interwar, the viability of alternative values seemed to turn every criticism 
of the fairness and the consensual nature of English criminal justice into a potential 
weapon to be used in a revolutionary attack, from either left or right, against 
individualism, deference and property rights which were the foundation of the law 
and were the basic principles that British liberal democracy defended. Only in the 
short period of the reconstruction debates after the Second World War, and before the 
Cold War set in,, were a number of these questions were debated with an openness 
that was rarely expressed in the interwar period" 
IV 
America, the bastion of liberal democracy, was also contributing to a general 
undermining of the confidence in criminal justice. Unlike Europe, which followed 
Roman law, the American legal system was the common law child of England. 
Therefore its administration of justice shared many of the merits and demerits of its 
parent. When in 1930 the President set up the Wickersham Committee to investigate 
the apparent failure of the American system he declared that "our law enforcement 
machinery is suffering from many infirmities arising out of its technicalities, its 
circumlocutions, its involved procedures and, too often, I regret, from inefficient and 
31H. Mannheim, Criminal Justice, p2 
(64) 
delinquent officials"". DesPite the many differences between the countries, there 
were enough similarities in the administration of criminal justice to fear similar 
parallels being drawn here. 
More importantly still, criticism of justice at home threatened to undermine the 
foundation of British governance in the Empire. As Mike Brogden has observed, 
"Criminal law followed commercial law to secure the colonising ascendency". " To 
legitimise the law (and for the indigenous colonial population this largely meant 
criminal law) London needed to persuade the population that British judicial practices 
were more advanced, civilised and fairer than their own. For this it was necessary to 
maintain confidence in the impartiality of British justice. Writing from the colony of 
Ceylon during the Second World War, Ivor Jennings, a constitutional authority, 
cynically explained that "the psychology of government is more important than the 
forms of government. "". 
"National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, No. II, Report 
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, Washington, United States Govermuent 
Printing Office, 193 1, p. 1. 
4113rogden, M., 'An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire 
and the Origins of the Professional Police', International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law, 1987, Vol. 15, pp. 179-208, @ pp. 1891,185. 
4'Jennings, W. I., The Law and the Constitution, 3rd ed., University of London 
Press, 1943, p. xxxi. 
(65) 
At the very least, London needed to avoid supplying colonial independence 
movements, particularly in India which was in perpetual crisis, with explosive 
evidence that the British people found their own institutions unjust and partial". Nor 
did governments want the Empire to believe that crime and lawlessness was an 
example they could imitate from the Metropolitan population. Instead, it wished to 
inspire the Empire, and the world, with the belief that British people were the most 
orderly nation on earth and that Britain's justice traditions, unlike her colonial rivals', 
fitted her to be the moral policeman of the world. The police historian, Charles Reith, 
who was much admired and cited by the Home Office, was surely addressing the 
Empire more than the domestic market, when he delivered this homily in British 
Police and the Democratic Ideal. He informed readers of "the influence of police 
principles and the standard of stem and unbiased justness and fair-mindedness, good- 
hurnour and individual heroism set by the police for a century in the slums and over- 
crowded areas of the towns, among people who have only recently been taught to 
read and write. " 
44 
. 
Again, it was the high political consideration that the Mother Country should set "the 
example for the Empire to folloWI145 , that led Herbert Samuel, when presenting the 
43 For the importance of the police in India see Anderson,, D. M. and Killingray, 
D., Policing and Decolonisation: Politics Nationalism and the Police, 1917-1965, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992, chapter 3. 
44 Reith, C., British Police and the Democratic Ideal, p. 4. 
"The King's Gold Medal winning essay for 1929; Peake, John, The Co- 
(continued ) 
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19'32 Home Office Supply Estimates, to muse on the need for more censorship to 
maintain standards,, "not only for our influence in the world, but for the sake of our 
influence in our own Commonwealth. I often wonder what are the impressions of 
certain aspects of life 
- 
in London, for example 
- 
upon visitors to the capital of the 
Empire, from India, the Dominions or the Colonies. "". Sir Harold Scott, a 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, provided concrete examples for why the 
faith in the impartiality of British justice had to be maintained, "In Ireland before the 
Treaty, and recently in Malaya, we have seen the difficulties of a police force 
surrounded by a hostile or an intimidated population. Without public backing no 
force. can hope to do its work successfully. It takes a long time to gain such 
confidence, but it could be lost very quickly"" 
V 
Rarely is there smoke without fire. Set against official statements of complacency 
about criminal justice, were the views of informed insiders such as Pritt, 'Solicitor' 
and'Barrister'who argued that criminal justice,, in practice, was blatantly class biased, 
unfair and in urgent need of reform. They suggested that the numerous statements of 
official confidence were prompted by a fear that the tarnished reality of criminal 
45( 
... 
continued) 
operation between the Police and the Public in the Detection and Prosecution of 
Crime, PoliceJournal, 1930, Vol. 3, pp. 383-411, p. 410. 
"Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), pp. 1165-6. 
"Scott, Sir H., Scotland Yard, p. 99. 
(67) 
justice might become widely known and expose (as tarnished) the fair image of 
criminal justice that officials had been so sedulously and falsely cultivating. 
Behind the scenes, 'Solicitor' found a mood of general pessimism about criminal 
justice that has rarely been reported in the historiography; "the Junior Bar, 
Missionaries and Probation Officers, Reporters and Prison Warders have no illusions 
in their private conversations... whenever I have been among men and women who 
know the facts behind our fair-seeming judicial machinery any story I have told has 
been capped by others far worse. "". A close reading between the lines of the 
historiography and in the memoirs of the period gives support to 'Solicitor's' 
assessment, that disillusionment with practice and policy existed to some extent at 
all levels,, within all institutions of criminal justice administration, and across the 
political spectrum. In the interwar period, this disillusionment appears increasingly 
to have manifested itself in the form of opposition to official policy. For example, 
Harold Scott recalled the effort officials took to win over the right wing Sir John 
Gilmour when he was appointed Home Secretary in the National Government; "I had 
frequent interviews with him in which I tried to explain the principles which we were 
following in our administration. It was not easy, for Sir John had evidently come to 
the Home Office well primed by the critics of prison reform, but eventually I 
succeeded.... and from then on, indeed, I found Sir John Gilmour as reasonable as he 
had been difficult before"". It is not Imown how Sir John was eventually induced to 
48v Solicitor', English Justice, p. viii-x. 
4'Harold Scott, Your Obedient Servant, pp. 75-6. 
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become "reasonable" but, clearly, criminal justice policy had its political opponents 
from left and right who, according to Harold Scott, were capable of "well priming" 
Home Secretaries against Home Office officials. 
The historiography has had enormous difficulty in comprehending anything other 
than 
-the official or 'advanced' view. Gordon Rose, the historian of the Howard 
League, accepted that there was opposition to the "consensus" view yet he dismissed 
its significance without ever understanding it. In his opinion, "its case is rarely well 
stated. "". However, he admitted,, "Despite an acute consciousness of the need to 
bring out the nature of this opposition... I doubt if I have been successful in doing 
so. t0l 
. 
Others appear to have found the opposition to criminal justice policy similarly 
baffling. For the criminologist Max GrUnhut, it represented "blind reaction and 
petrified tradition" 52. George Ives, a member of the inter-war committee of the 
Howard League, quoted Sir Edward Clarke, "It was the peculiar province of clever 
people to arouse intense antipathy and bitter antagonism amongst the stupid"". 
"Rose, G., The Struggle for Penal Reform, pp. 271-272. 
"Ibid., P. 272. 
52 Grtinhut,, M.,, Penal Reform: A Comparative SLudy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1948, p. 1. 
53 Ives, George, Obstacles to Human Progress, George Allen and Unw1n Ltd., 
1939, p. 63. 
(69) 
Victor Bailey, a recent historian of the policy on young offenders made a real attempt 
to understand the opposition in the 1930s but ultimately remained in the mainstream 
of the historiography when he discussed the opposition in a chapter headed 
'Reformers and Reactionaries'. 54 According to him an almost Manichwan struggle has 
continued to the present day; "the two camps 
- 
reformist and retributivist 
- 
are now 
contesting the shape of modern criminal policy. The pessimists have not yet 
demolished the system". " His presentation of the politics of the criminal justice 
system in this way, as a two-dimensional contest between those who were 
constructive and those who were destructive, obscured more than it elucidated. 
So,, although the size,, composition and politics of the "bitter antagonism" to criminal 
justice policies was not fully analysed, understood or made explicit, it has, 
nonetheless, almost always been dismissed to the "unprogressive" margins of the 
historiography. This dismissal was accompanied by a tendency to portray official 
policy at "the progressive centre" of some general political consensus". With official 
policy safely occupying the consensual "centre", the opposition to it has been 
dismissed as extreme or reactionary rhetoric". Consequently, there has been a 
tendency to portray policy progressing in a linear and apolitical direction, with an 
"Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, chapter 5. 
"Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, 308. 
"Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 4. 
57 As a standard and long-serving tactic used in political rhetoric this should 
have raised historians' suspicions. 
(70) 
accompanying tendency to dismiss opposition as an ignorant reaction attempting to 
stop the inevitable. 
However, the "centre" that the "consensus" occupied has never been shown to be 
larger than its "extremist" opposition and unless that can be done it seems unfair to 
dismiss the opposition as marginal. So, how great was the opposition to the 
"consensual centre"? Did it merit attention in the historiography? According to Rose's 
own account the "body of opposition" against penal reform in the interwar and 
postwar period extended far beyond Parliament. It consisted of "the Lords... the 
higher judiciary, in a substantial section of the legal profession, the police, the 
majority of the Tory politicians and their supporters... [and for good measure] some 
of the higher officials at the Home Office"". Others have added "the press and public 
opinion", "Law Lords", "some of the lay magistracy", "prison officers", "prison 
chaplains" and many of the senior "bishops", to the list of opposition against this 
otherwise apolitical "centrist", "optimistic", "cross-party consensus"". 
"Rose, G. The Struggle for Penal Reform, pp. 271,272. 
'9Scott, P. D., 'Public Opinion and Juvenile Delinquency', British Journal of 
Delinqugncy, 1950-1, Vol. 1, pp. 56-59; Gardiner, G., and Curtis-Raleigh, N., 'The 
Judicial Attitude to Penal Reform', Law Quarterly Review, 1949, Vol. 65, (April 
1949), pp. 196-219, p. 8.; Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 118 ff., 
Thomas,, J. E., The English Prison Officer since 1850: A Study in Conflict, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 166 ff.; Potter, H., Hanging in Judgement, SCM Press, 
1993. 
(71) 
On occasion the opposition could be so powerful, according to Victor Bailey, "that 
the Home Office were required to fight a rearguard action"". It is surprising, then, 
that in Bailey's judgement, the reformers, a force of "Fabian welfarists, professional 
social workers and liberal administrators" although enjoying considerable support 
from sections of the Home Office, should have triumphed by establishing an 
optimistic consensus, both legislatively and ideologically, against such massed forces 
of "reaction". Geoffrey Finlayson found his argument, that they did, unconvincing; 
"Despite Bailey's aclmowledgement that there were counter-arguments to the 
welfarist approach, there is a somewhat Whiggish tone to the book, which tends to 
be the story of a victory... for the forces of enlightenment and rationality 1161 . 
But was it such clear-cut a victory? Politically, was the direction of criminal justice 
policy really as progressive and linear as it was presented? Is there no evidence of u- 
turns and bifurcations that reflected the strength of the opposition? If the full range 
of policies concerning the institutions of criminal justice are taken into consideration, 
perhaps what Rose had identified as "inchoate" opposition turns out to be something 
else 
- 
something approaching the antithesis of consensus 
- 
fragmentation. In other 
words, it may be that those involved in criminal justice issues, when looked at in toto, 
were deeply divided amongst themselves along a number of class, political, 
ideological, institutional and geographical axes and that the official policies also 
reflected their divisions. 
"Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 118. 
"Finlayson, G., review of'Bailey, V., Delinguency and Citizenshid, P. 161. 
(72) 
This could have been missed by the historiography since so much of it has concerned 
itself solely with tracing the progressive strand of penal reform within the web of 
criminal justice policy as a whole. It has been assumed that punishment was the end 
product of the criminal justice system and consequently disclosed the system's aims. 
As Stan Cohen has argued, "For it is punishment 
- 
in both its dimensions of ban and 
enforcement 
- 
which is at the core of criminal politics and always has been"". The 
important task that has so often been neglected, is then to examine the place of this 
strand of penal reform within the structure of the web of criminal justice. 
Consequently, from a detached historical perspective, the big political picture of 
criminal justice might actually be nuanced, highly complex and display no clear 
direction. 
This possibility has been given short shrift in the historiography. Occasionally, 
contemporary accounts of criminal justice have discussed "the nature of what more 
orderly minded people are bound to regard as a haphazard and anomalous system" 63 
. 
Such accounts have,, in general, then gone on either to declare these perceptions to be 
mistaken,, since criminal justice administration was, to conservative eyes, "the very 
"S. Cohen, 'Guilt,, Justice and Tolerance: Some Old Concepts for a New 
Criminology', in David Downes and Paul Rock (eds), Deviant Interpretations, 
Oxford,, Martin Robertson, 1979, p. 25. 
"Lieck,, A., 'The Administration of Criminal Justice', in Penal Reform in 
England- Introductory--ELss-aY-ýoinl-sO-mlg-a-sýPgc-ts-. ýlf-E, 
-n-. 
g., IiSL. 
-C-riLmi-nalIP-01-i-CY, 
English '11 
Studies in Criminal Science, vol. 1, P. S. King and Son Ltd, 1940, p. 45. 
(73) 
embodiment of commonsense"". while to progressive eyes, it emphasised some 
unifying and modernising "trend clearly recognizable by those who will pull from 
their eyes the wool of tradition and complacency"". The effect of both arguments, 
conservative and reformist, has usually been to affirm the existence of a clear order 
and purpose to criminal justice which enjoyed such widespread support that the 
political divisions became insignificant. Thus, even when it was accepted that there 
really were divisions in the administration of criminal justice, the historiography has 
still dismissed these divisions as "reactionary" remnantS66, shortly to be swept away 
by the emerging truth underlying some "definite criminal poliCy, 167 
Of course, for many writers, this "definite policy" has been an evolving variation of 
the Whiggish "meta-narrative of reason, progress, and humanitarian reform"". More 
recently, other writers have begun to identify the unity coming, instead, from the 
repressive and growing central dictatorship from Westminster and Whitehall that 
determined "what policemen, magistrates and even judges had to do even in remote 
64Morrison, A. C. L. 9 Some Principles of the 
Criminal Law, Justice of the Peace 
and Local Government Review, 1930,, Vol. XCIV, (8 Mar. 1930), pp. 152-154, 
153. 
I'Lieck, A., 'The Administration of Criminal Justice, p. 44. 
"i. e. Dicean " counter- currents and cross-currents of legislative opinion". 
Dicey, AN., Lectures, pp. lxx ff. 
"Radzinowicz,, L.,, 'Present Trends of English Criminal Policy', p. 27. 
"Morrison,, W., Theoretical Criminology, p. 189. 
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areas of the country"". Even so, from left, right or centre the analysis has almost 
invariably been that throughout the twentieth century, criminal justice administration 
has slowly overcome its accidental origins in historical circumstance and, for good 
or bad, modernised and rationalised around an emerging consensual, or at least 
dominant,, teleology. 
vi 
By the 1960s, so pervasive was the belief that criminal policy was following some 
clear development or teleology, that the unifying concept of the 'criminal justice 
system' came to supplant 'criminal justice administration' as "the dominant paradigm" 
for discussing the state's response to crime". In the 1980s and 1990s, the Home 
Office decided to employ systems theorists to carry further the rationalisation of 
criminal justice management. It was their job to identify the purpose, or teleologies 
of the 'system', as it existed in practice, and facilitate Home Office managers to 
realise them. Effectively, the Home Office had sponsored a sophisticated test of 
whether, or not,. criminal justice had really followed some "definite policy". The 
research "exposed a great deal of divergencies in the way that agencies approached 
particular problems and showed that the policies followed by one agency often 
undermined or were at cross-purposes with those followed by other agencies... Some 
"Gatrell, V. A. C., 'Crime Authority and the Policeman State', p. 262. 
"Raine,, J. V. and Willson, M., Managing Criminal Justice, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 61. 
(75) 
of those who first sought to apply systems concepts to criminal justice were less 
impressed with the linkages among criminal justice agencies, however, than with 
their fragmentation. "". Or as Raine and Willson explained; "Without a systems 
approach, it would have been much more difficult to persuade the various parties to 
negotiate their agencies' inter-dependencies and to forge substantial inter-agency 
agreements given their differences of interest. "" 
These quotes focused on the non-consensual, almost post-modem, language of 
"fragmentation", "cross-purposes" and "differences of interest"". To borrow David 
Garland's image of the social realm, criminal justice,, instead of revealing itself as a 
system, appeared to be "a multi-layered mosaic, the product of layer upon layer of 
organizational forms, techniques and regulatory practices, each one partial in its 
"Feeney, F., Interdependence as a Working Concept, in Moxon, D. (ed. ), 
Managing Criminal Justice: A Collection of Papers, Home Research and Planning 
Unit, HMSO, 1985, pp. 8-9. 
"Raine, J. V. and Willson, M., Managing Criminal Justice, p. 61. 
7'A similar conclusion was reached about criminal justice administration 
overseas. See, Steyn, Mr. Justice J. H., 'The Punishment Scene in South Africa 
- 
Developments over the Past Decade and the Prospects for Reform', in Hood, R. (ed. ), 
Crime, Criminology and Public Policy: Essays in Honour of Sir Leon Radzinowicz, 
Heinemann, 1974, espec. note 1. For the emergence of fragmentation as a dominant 
post-modem paradigm see Harvey, The Condition of PostModemijy: An Enquiry into 
ural Change, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990. 
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operation, each one dealing with the residues and traces of previous strategies as well 
as its contemporary rivals and limitations. "". This analysis fitted in well with other 
work in the social sciences which emphasised the essentially contradictory or 
dilemmatic nature of ideologies and discourses". 
So, if for decades, as much of the historiography has argued, criminal justice had 
followed "a definite policy", directed under central control, why, then, at the close of 
the century, was it suddenly discovered to be so fragmented? The obvious answer 
was that fragmentation and differences of interest had long been present. The work 
of systems theorists suggested that it was not merely the opposition, but the entire 
"Garland,, D. Punishment and Welfare, p. 155. The same imagery has been 
employed by Harden and Lewis, to describe the British Constitution as "a mosaic of 
enactments customs and conventions" representing "divergent ideas" see Harden, 1. 
and Lewis, N., The Noble Lie, p. 34. This is a far more powerful and subtle analysis 
than the usual two-dimensional, often Marxist, conflict theory that has traditionally 
opposed consensual interpretations. In this, crime and criminal justice policy are seen 
to result from a power conflict which is usually economically determined. For an 
historical discussion of the application of conflict and consensus theories to crime and 
criminal policy see McDonald, L., The Sociology of Law and Order, Faber and 
Faber, 1976. 
"See, for example, Billig, M., Condor, S.,, Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, 
D., Radley, A., Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinli"i 
, 
Sage Publications, 1988. 
(77) 
1systern'that was "inchoate" and illogical. As Rev. William Temple had argued half 
a century earlier, "There are no clear principles, no co-ordination, and no person or 
Department of State to co 
-ordinate"". 
Did this mean that, after all, no 'meta-narrative', no coherent 'big-picture' could be 
constructed to explain the evolution of criminal justice policy? " Was there no 
progress and nothing left for the historian to tell except how different ideologies and 
interests clashed over time and left behind them a fragmented and disunified field of 
criminal institutions and legislation? Did nothing give unity to the whole except the 
pragmatic high political concern of the state to use the image of ajust and consensual 
criminal justice to legitimise itself and control the population? 
There was a need for a new way of looking at criminal justice policy. Westminster 
politicians were "more often interested in changing policies than in seeing existing 
ones correctly implemented 1178 
, 
yet historians have tended to look first to policies 
made at Westminster to inform their understanding of criminal justice and to provide 
them with guidance to discover the 'definite' direction it took. For example, Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz failed to see this problem, 
"Temple, Most Reverend William, The Ethics of Penal Action, the First 
Clarke Hall Lecture,, Kent, Stanhope Press, 1934, pp. 15-16. 
"Morrison, W., Theoretical Criminology, chapter 18. 
7'Brown, R. G. S., The Administrative Process in Britain, Methuen, 2nd ed., 
1979, p. 202. 
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It is in the House of Commons, or the House of Lords, that we can find the 
explanation of the circumstances which have led to the setting up of a 
Commission of Inquiry or to the demand for an Account or Paper. It is there 
that the necessity or the superfluity of such a decision is discussed... And it 
is there that, generally upon the findings of the State Paper, steps are taken to 
bring in new laws with the purpose either of eliminating the evil brought to 
light by the paper in question or of stimulating further improvement in some 
state activity or machinery" 
. 
In other words, the historical meta-narratives of criminal justice derived from 
readings of policies and official rhetoric and not from practice. However, if instead 
of looking to the policy made at Westminster for evidence of a teleology - of how 
politicians were perfecting "the machine"", if they looked instead to the 
administrative practices of criminal justice 
- 
to the supply side 
-a very different 
picture emerged" 
"Radzinowicz, L., 'Some Sources of Modern English Criminal Law 
Legislation', p. 183. 
"Josiah Wedgwood, quoted above, p. 3 1. 
"This thesis shares, as David Garland put it, "the Foucauldian tendency to 
move from institutional detail to broader social pattern" - rather than vice versa - 
[that] mark it of from other traditions in this field". Garland, David, Punishment and 
Study in Social ThýLory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990,, 
p. 131. There are parallels, but at a more concrete level, with Foucault's examinations (continued 
... 
) 
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At the Home Office,, the proper implementation and direction of Westminster policy 
was not an overiding concern; "The tyranny of case-work and short-term crisis 
management can all too easily drive out the long-term in the everyday life of the 
Home Office... A great deal of Home Office work is keeping-the-show-on-the-road 
management and administration of huge enterprises"". So 
, 
in terms of practical 
administration, criminal justice was not slowly being perfected by changes in policy, 
nor was it really trying to perfect itself. It had limited funds to live up to the 
normative myths surrounding it, and it was supplied with a paucity of resources to 
realise the high ideals that a handful of politicians fondly attributed to their pet 
policies for crime and criminals. 
The so-called inter-party consensus that was meant to have existed about crime for 
most of the twentieth century should be viewed in this light. This 'consensus' was not 
based primarily upon high-minded humanitarian motives, or concern for the well- 
being of criminals, or even upon an optimism that crime was being eradicated. 
Political views were divided on these issues. It was based, instead, on down-to-earth 
expediency and low political considerations. 'Consensus' merely implied, as Dennis 
Kavanagh and Peter Morris have argued of political consensus in general, "a set of 
parameters which bounded the set of policy options regarded by senior politicians and 
"( 
... 
continued) 
of how institutions constructed their own "Imowledges" and how these "Imowledges" 
fed policy through to the creation of discourses. The "Imowledge" derived from the 
Criminial Statistics is clearly a particularly crude example of a more subtle process. 
"Hennessy, P., Whitehall, Secker and Warburg, 1989, p. 460. 
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civil servants as administratively practicable, economically affordable and politically 
acceptable"". In other words, whichever party was in power there would still only be 
very limited funds available and, whatever their policy might suggest, things could 
not change very much. 
Parts two and three of this thesis seek to provide a new political context for criminal 
justice history after 1857 that recognizes politics was much more about Whitehall 
maintaining the status quo and " keeping-the 
- 
show- on-the-ro ad" than it was about 
Westminster politicians "perfecting the machine". For the bureaucrats who controlled 
the machine, keeping it running and avoiding change appears almost to have been 
purpose enough for them to justify their function. Once the institutions were set up, 
like the grey-faced kitchen scrubbers of Gormenghast, loyal generations of these 
Home Office bureaucrats kept their faces close to the walls and rarely questioned the 
wider worth of what they did". That the public and the historiography should have 
believed otherwise was, it argues, the product of official, nonnative rhetoric and self- 
serving misinformation, backed up by falsely produced Home Office statistics of 
crime. This created the false expectation, and the deterrent bluff, that criminal justice 
was administered on a far more encompassing scale than it was in practice. 
"Kavanagh, D. and Morris, P., Consensus Politics from Attlee to Th-atcher, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 13. 
"Peake, Mervyn, Gormenghast, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1950. 
(81) 
Part III: Stabilizing the Machinery of Justice: 1857-1918 
Chapter IV: The Political Economy of Criminal Justice 
I 
Assize and Quarter Session Trials (1857-1913) 
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Figure IVA Higher Court Trials of Indictable Offences (1857-1913). Calculated from 
the Criminal Statistics. 
The picture being officially painted before the end of the nineteenth century was that 
England and Wales were enjoying "an exceptional immunity from crime"'. This was 
officially confirmed in the Criminal Statistics, which, after their revision in 1893, 
'Judicial Statistics, 1905, P. P. 1907 [Cd. 3315], XCVII. l, p. 12. 
(83) 
"began to play an increasingly important role in the shaping of penal policy"'. In 
1893, a number of new tables were added and retrospectively recalculated to 1857 
when the new series of Criminal Statistics had begun. Across the range of indices, 
crime was falling away relative to population. Of course, the statistical evidence only 
implied a diminution of crime if it was actually determined by the demand side (i. e. 
the amount of crime in the real world) rather than by the supply side (i. e. the quantity 
of resources allocated to crime control). 
'Radzinowicz, Sir Leon, and Hood, Roger, A History of English Criminal 
Law and its Administration from 1750, Vol. 5, 'The Emergence of Penal Policy in 
Victorian and Edwardian England' Oxford, Clarendon Press,, 1990. 
107. 
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Summary Hearings of Indictable Offences 
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Figure IV. 2 Surnmary Hearings of Indictable offences (1857-1913). Calculated from 
the Criminal Statistics. 
Before 1893,, the principle index of crime for much of the nineteenth century was the 
number of higher court trials for indictable offences. This seemed to show that per 
100,, 000 population serious crime had fallen dramatically in the second half of the 
century (Figure 1.1 ). However, it was widely known that this was not a reliable 
measure and that much of this fall was due to the transference of many higher court 
cases to the police (later to be renamed magistrates') courts. By the end of the 
century, magistrates were hearing about four or five times more indictable cases than 
Quarter Sessions and Assizes. After 1893, when a table of summary hearings of 
indictable offences since 1857 was included in the statistics, it was shown that the 
(85) 
number of hearings in police courts had also fallen relative to population (Figure 1.2 
The same story was true for 'Offences Known to the Police' which was the only 
available indicator of the amount of crime committed. Before the 1893 revision, the 
table had not existed and was it created by the dubious methodology of adding 
together several columns from the old statistics relating to prosecutions. 
Unsurprisingly, this table fluctuated in line with prosecutions and so also seemed to 
confirm that crime was diminishing (Figure 1.3 
, 
Figure 1.3 
But compare with Figure 1.4 for a very different presentation of the same 
figures when the absolute number of offences is plotted, rather than the number 
relative to population. This shows that the figures were kept constant and so were 
independent of the rise in population. 
(86) 
'Crimes Known to the Police' (1857-1913) 
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Figure IV. 3 'Crimes Known to the Police'(1 857-1913). Calculated from the Criminal 
Statistics. 
11 
To an extent, the curve of crime followed the trade cycle and the curves of litigation 
and social phenomena generally'. Sir John MacDonnell, a Master of the Supreme 
Court and the editor of the Civil Judicial Statistics commented, "in examining curves 
delineating social phenomena, such as litigation, banluuptcy, pauperism, marriages, 
&c., one finds that any very great disturbance recorded in one curve is reproduced 
See for example Pigou, A. C. Industrial Fluctuation, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 
1929. 
(87) 
more or less in the others"'. Probably its underlying pattern resulted from the 
influence of the trade cycle on the budget for local government and social 
expenditure. The cyclical pattern in the long-term is obvious after the small annual 
fluctuations are smoothed out by plotting a moving average of the current year and 
2 years either side (Figure 1.4 ). This technique, for smoothing out the short-term 
irregularities in the curve, was in use in the Home Office before the end of the 
nineteenth century6. 
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Figure IV. 4'Crimes Known to the Police'(Moving Average) (1857-1913). Calculated 
from the Criminal Statistics. 
'Judicial Statistics, (Pt. 11 Civil), 1894,, P. P. 1896 [C. 8263], XCIV. 207, p. 20 
and Diag. I- 
6JUdiCial StatiStiCS, 1897, P. P. 1899 [913 5] CVIII. 1, p. 11. 
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However, although crime shared the fluctuations of other social phenomena, it was 
diminishing faster per head of population than many of the others such as litigation 
and pauperism. This was because, if absolute figures of trials and reported crime were 
used the figures stayed within close numeric limits, thus maintaining a fixed average 
over time since 1857 (Figure 1.5 ). Until the 1930s, with the exception of 1926, the 
General Strike year, between 1857 and 1931 the number of indictable prosecutions 
undertaken in any year was never less than 49,000 and never more than 67,000, or, 
for most of the period, around one per policeman per year'. The principal change in 
practice during this period was the vast majority of indictable prosecutions were 
shifted away from the expensive jury trials of the higher courts and into the far 
cheaper summary courts. So like the curve of the general cycle of litigation, which 
it closely resembled, the trend of the criminal statistics remained numerically static 
despite the rise in population. 
judicial Statistics. 
(89) 
Recorded Crime and Prosecutions (1857-1899) 
Showing Bands 20% Above and Below the Average 1857-1899. 
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Figure IV. 5 Recorded Crime and Prosecutions (1857-1899) 
III 
In some ways this seemed to confirm the theories of Adolphe Quetelet, the pioneering 
Belgian statistician who, in 1835, noted a constancy in the French and in other 
European crime statistics which he described as analogous to a fixed budget; 
In everything connected with crime the same numbers repeat themselves with 
a regularity there can be no mistaking, even in the cases of crimes which, it 
would appear, must entirely be beyond all human foresight,, such as murders 
This regularity with which the same crimes are repeated annually in the same 
order and are visited with the same penalties in the same proportions is one 
(90) 
of the most curious facts taught us by the statistics of the courts... There is a 
budget which is defrayed with terrifying regularity by the prisons, the 
bagnio's, and the scajfold... We can tell in advance how many people will 
stain their hands with the blood of their fellows, how many will be forgers, 
how many will be poisoners. ' 
By 1848, Quetelet had refined this observation into a general mathematical 
description of social statistics. His 'law' of accidental causes stated that among 
"organized beings... all elements vary around a mean state, and variations which arise 
from accidental causes, are regulated with such harmony and precision that we can 
classify them in advance numerically and by order of magnitude, within their limits"'. 
The English and Welsh crime curve appeared to obey this law since it always kept 
'within its limits', which, was about 20 per cent either side of the norm. 
IV 
So why, unlike many other social phenomena, did the crime figures not rise with 
population after the mid-century? The answer had a lot to do with the economics of 
'Bonger, W. A. (tr. Van Loo, E. ), An Introduction to Criminology, Methuen, 
1936, pp. 51-2. 
'Quetelet A., The Social System, 1848. Translated by David Landau in 
Kruskal, W. H. and Tanur, J. International Encyclopaedia of Statistics, New York,, 
The Free Press, 1978, v. 2 p. 829. 
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criminal justice. The publication of national criminal statistics first began in 18 105 
and because it coincided with rising prosecutions, it helped to create a feeling of 
"unrelieved pessimism" amongst the public". Crime figures were increasing 
nationwide and this emphasised the national dimension to crime more than the large 
differences in local 'co-efficients of crime"'. Since the statistics encouraged national 
trends to dominate debate, the traditional "sound principle of municipal law... that 
crime should in its pecuniary consequences be a local burthen" came under attack as 
ratepayers started to call for central government to bear the costs of crime". 
Since neither central govermnent nor local govenu-nent wished to fund prosecutions, 
in 1836, the Exchequer compromised and took on half of the burden of the costs. This 
gave the Treasury, who were following "the narrow path of strict public parsimony" 
partial control over prosecution CoStS13. In 1846, Peel, as part of the settlement made 
"Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy, p. 113. 
"See Mannheim,, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars, 
Allen and Unwin,, 1940, pp. 55 ff. 
"Re-Dort of the Royal Commission on County Rates., P. P. 1836 [58], 
XXVIT. 1, p. 24, quoted in McConville, Sean, A History of English Prison 
Administration. Volume 1: 1750-1877, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981,257. See 
also pp. 256 ff. For the influence of ratepayer pressure on the decision to nationalise 
the prisons in the 1870s see pp. 468 ff. 
"Roseveare,, H., The Treasury: The evolution of a British Institution, Allen 
Lane, 1969, p. 187. 
(92) 
to landowners towards the cost of repealing the Corn Laws, arranged a Parliamentary 
Vote for prosecutions of f 100,000 in order to transfer "the whole of the remainder of 
that charge" to the Exchequer. Part of his aim was to gain more control over costs. 
He told MPs "you will be amply repaid, in a social point of view, by acquiring that 
increased control over any sum you may grant. "". Peel's offer was very much less 
generous than it appeared. The previous year the Exchequer contribution had been 
f 113!, 181 for haýfthe costs and so f 100,000 for the whole costs of prosecutions was 
clearly intended to signal that cuts were expected. However, because no method of 
audit was in put place, local authorities sent in their prosecution vouchers and these 
were,, at first, paid in full by the Treasury so that by 1849 the Vote had risen to 
f4571,213". 
To discourage prosecution, the Treasury began to disallow some claims and to 
distinguish allowable prosecution expenses from non-allowable expenses incurred in 
detention, apprehension etc. By 1854 the Vote had been cut to f270,000". In 1856, 
Wilmot Seton was appointed as the Treasury Clerk dealing with prosecutions. He did 
14 Parl. Deb., 3rd series, Vol. LXXXIII, (27 January 1846), p. 273. 
"Table of Treasury contributions 1838-1859; Report of the Royal 
Co=ission on Costs of Prosecutions, the Expenses of Coroners' Inquests, etc. with 
Minutes of Evidence, P. P. 1859 Session 2 [2575], XIII Pt 1.13, pp. 2, vii. Some of 
this increased cost would have been due to prosecutions Chartists. 
"Evidence of Wilmot Seton, One of the Principal Clerks in the Treasury, 
ibid., pp. 10- 11 
- 
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not accept that the Treasury was responsible for the "whole cost" of prosecutions, in 
the sense of paying whatever local authorities wanted. Instead, he insisted that 
prosecution expenses were cash limited. He did "not apprehend that in distributing 
the grant of Parliament, we are subject to any law. If the Vote did not pass, there 
would be an end of the question, but the claim on local funds would remain". From 
that date,, he claimed, the Treasury exercised "the strictest economy consistent with 
due administration of justice"". By 1859 he had brought the Vote down to f 145,000. 
This low level of Exchequer funding forced local authorities to become as concerned 
as the Treasury about holding down prosecutions since extra expenditure over and 
above the Vote had to come from the rates. 
The Treasury continued to attack prosecution costs across a number of fronts. 
Throughout the Victorian and Edwardian period, a succession of official committees, 
with a strong Treasury input, examined and re-examined the scales of costs allowed 
to prosecutors and witnesses". Although these allowances had never been over- 
generous 19 
, 
the scales were fixed at a low level in 1858 and remained unchanged until 
"Ibid., pp. vii, 11. 
"For a brief history see Report of Departmental Committee, on the 
Allowances to Prosecutors and Witnesses in Criminal Prosecutions, P. P. 1903 [Cd. 
16501, LVI. 357, pp. 377 ff. 
""there is hardly a prosecution of any importance but what [sic] the 
prosecutor has to pay something out of his own pocket", evidence of R. Hankins, Law 
Clerk at the Treasury, Report of the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure (continued 
... 
) 
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the twentieth century20. Seton's attitude was that there was no scale of allowances 
anywhere in the country "so low as to have caused a failure of justice 1121 - By 1860, a 
correspondent in the Law Times was complaining "the small allowances to 
prosecutors and witnesses, for loss of time and expences, have made the performance 
of their duties a serious, and often ruinous tax 1122 
. 
By 1870, the Law Times, had 
noticed that the crime statistics were not being increased in line with population 
growth; "crime does not increase in proportion to the increase of population 
- 
there 
are fewer prosecutions than fon-nerly. Most true. But wherefore? Not because crime 
and criminals are fewer, but because there are not so many Prosecutors. If there had 
been a systematic design to encourage crime by giving impunity to criminals, it could 
not have been accomplished more effectually"". 
"( continued) 
with Minutes of Evidence, P. P. 1847-8 [54' )] XVIII Pt. 11.1, QQ. 5755-7. 
"Report of Departmental Committee, on the Allowances to Prosecutors and 
. 
Witnesses in Criminal Prosecutions, (1903), pp. vii-viii. 
"Evidence of Wilmot Seton,, One of the Principal Clerks in the Treasury, 
Report of the Royal Commission on Costs of Prosecutions, (1859), p. 13. 
"Law Times, 1859-60, Vol. 29, (7 January 1860), p. 178. The opinion of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions in 1928 was that "Many persons, I have no doubt, 
think it better to cut their losses and abstain from prosecuting... consequently, many 
offences... go unpunished. " Bodkin, Sir A., 'The Prosecution of Offenders', Police 
Journal, 1928, Vol. 1, pp. 350-68, @ p. 354. 
23Law Times, 1870-1, Vol. 50, (10 December 1870), p. 94. 
(95) 
The financial screws were also applied against professional witnesses. For example, 
police courts in Leeds refused to allow medical witness fees. Other courts awarded 
witness costs only if the defendant was committed for trial24. The result was that by 
the early twentieth century "the whole of the medical men in certain towns" refused 
to have anything to do with crimes of violence because the cost and inconvenience 
of a court attendance invariably put them out of pocket". Similarly, in cases of fraud, 
the Metropolitan Police would not pay for the evidence of accountants, while the 
Clerk of the Peace for Manchester knew locally of "no fund" from which an 
accountant might be paid, other than, perhaps, by special application to the Director 
of Public Prosecutions. As a result, frauds of complexity were "practically not 
punished... The cost of prosecution is too great, the results before a jury are too 
dubidus"". Lower down the scale, pawnbrokers, whose evidence was vital for many 
theft prosecutions, would "not come to the police court for the money you allow 
them" 
- 
which was Is 6d for a day in the police court". 
"Evidence of Nelson Hardy, FRCS on behalf of the BMA, Report of 
Departmental Committee on the Allowances to Prosecutors and Witnesses in 
Criminal Prosecutions, (1903), p. 13. 
"Hardy cites the case of a child who was indecently assaulted at Bury St 
Edmunds but no doctor would could out to examine her for fear of being called as a 
witness if a prosecution resulted. Ibid., p. 12. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1904, P. P. 1906 [Cd. 2871], CXXXV. 1, p. 17. 
"Evidence of Blanchard Wontner,, Head of Wontners, Solicitors to the 
Metropolitan Police and F. Ogden, Clerk of the Peace, Manchester, Report of 
(continued 
... 
) 
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Other cost-cutting measures included Treasury taxing officers reftising to allow costs 
for more than one charge to be brought against a prisoner". More importantly, there 
was a widespread exclusion of (over-)expensive legally qualified personnel from the 
criminal justice process and their replacement by cheaper police advocacy". In 1847, 
in the opinion of the Law Clerk at the Treasury, poor prosecutors rarely used 
solicitors and in as many as two-thirds of Quarter Session cases no professional 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Departmental Committee on the Allowances to Prosecutors and Witnesses in 
Criminal Prosecutions, (1903), pp. 60, pp. 42-3. In 1907, the Judicial Statistics, noted 
"Some crimes, probably very common, are practically not punished. Frauds of 
complexity are among them. The cost of prosecution is too great, the results before 
ajury are too dubious", Judicial Statistics, 1905, P. P. 1907 [Cd. 3315], XCVIII. 1, p. 
17. 
"Law Times, 1861-2, Vol. 32, (21 December 1861), p. 102. This practice 
persisted. See, for example, the case at the Old Bailey where "For reasons of 
economyll a prisoner was indicted on only one charge out of 23. Times, 14 October 
193 1, p. 17. 
"By 1935, this policy was little changed. Sir Arthur Dixon, the head of the 
Home Office Police Department argued, "the employment of a solicitor or counsel 
in every case, however simple, would, in my submission, involve a wholly 
unjustifiable expenditure of public money". Since defendants were usually 
undefended he stressed the police should not present "only the one side" in bringing 
out facts. Dixon, A. L., 'Police Procedure in Courts of Summary Jurisdiction, 
Magýjstrate, Vol. 4, (November 1935), pp. 963-66, @ p. 966. 
(97) 
lawyer was involved". In the country, it became the custom first to obtain the 
permission of the bench of magistrates before allowing the use of counsel. In the 
Metropolitan Police District, until 1880, when the Director of Public Prosecutions 
took over the responsibility, costs were so tightly controlled that the permission of 
the Under Secretary of State at the Home Office was required before prosecuting 
counsel could be employed 31 
. 
By the late 1850s, Judges were increasingly 
complaining that for the most serious charges there was often no one in court, except 
themselves, able to examine witnesses. In the police courts examination was often 
shared between the police, the magistrates' clerk and the magistrates". 
Of course,, the economy measure with the most far-reaching effect was the enormous 
shift to summary 'police court' hearings". This reduced the number of jury trials that 
"Evidence of R. Hank-ins, Law Clerk at the Treasury, Report of the Select 
Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure, (1847-8), Q. 5 776 ff. 
'Evidence of Sir John Maule,, Director of Public Prosecutions,, Report of the 
Committee on the Public Prosecutor, with Minutes of Evidence, P. P. 1884 [C. 4016]ý 
XXIII. 309, p. 7. 
"Report of the Royal Commission on Costs of Prosecutions, (1859), p. x.; 
Williams, G. W., 'Advocacy by Police and Justices' Clerks', Criminal Law Review, 
1956, pp. 169-74. For an example where a magistrate refused to act as "as both judge 
and prosecuting counsel" see Justice of the Peace, 1928, Vol. 92, (10 November 
1928), p. 725. 
"Contrary to the assumption of some of the historiography, this did not 
(continued 
... 
) 
(98) 
took place and those that did take place were increasingly held at cheaper Quarter 
Sessions before magistrates rather than at Assizes before judges". Overall, summary 
hearings in 'police courts' became the norm for indictable offences. This was an 
enormous economy because counsel and solicitors were so rarely employed in police 
courts, procedure there was more simple (and not uncommonly extra-legal), the 
standards of evidential proof were lower, convictions easier to obtain, fewer 
witnesses were called, transport costs were greatly reduced, so that the average cost 
of a summary trial was just over fI compared with Quarter Sessions trials which cost 
over 
f 935 
. 
The savings in Assize trials were far greater where average costs, in some 
counties, were over E35 
36 
. 
"( 
... 
continued) 
increase the total number of indictable offences that were prosecuted after 1857. For 
the run of statistics for the half century following 1857 see Judicial Statistics, 1906. 
34Quarter Session and Assize trials declined from 27,816 to 16,674 between 
1849 and 1859. By 1913 this figure had fallen to 12,511 trials and by 1929 it was 
down to 7,072 with Quarter Sessions occupying an ever increasing proportion of the 
higher court cases; Judicial Statistic 
. 
"Tartt,, W. M. 'On Subjects connected with Crime and Punishment', Journal 
of the 5tatistical Socie1y of London, 1859, Vol. XXII, pp. 35-43, @ p. 36. This cost 
differential, of about eight to one, continued into the inter-war period and beyond, 
jish Justice, chapter 5. 'Solicitor,, Eng 
"Report of the Royal Commission on Costs of Prosecutions, (1859), p. vii. 
(99) 
Various means were used to effect the large-scale shift from jury trial to police courts. 
Clerks of Assize were "instructed by the Home-office to sit in judgement upon the 
proceedings of the committing magistrates, and to refuse the costs of prosecution in 
cases. which, in their opinion should not have been sent for trial. "" More importantly, 
the Criminal Justice Acts of 1855 and 1879 enabled a greater proportion of 
apparently less serious indictable offences to be dealt with summarily before 
magistrateS38 
. 
These Acts greatly encouraged a practice, probably already of long- 
duration, of reducing charges to bring cases within the jurisdiction of magistrates, so 
that5 for example, a burglary became a larceny of goods under E5 value. This practice 
helped to encourage the belief that crime was "taking a milder and milder form" 39 
Moreover, because the charges were reduced to minor offences more criminals could 
be fined,, or at least be given shorter and cheaper prison sentences at less cost. 
V 
It was in the late 1850s, while the Treasury and local authorities were making their 
"Great efforts... to check the expenditure" on prosecutions that the new systems of 
3'Law Times,, 1861-2, Vol. 32, (21 December 186 1), p. 102. 
"See, for example the opinion of T. Chambers that the saving of expense 
"was obviously the great point" of the Act; Parl. Debs., 3rd ser., Vol. 139, (6 August 
1855), pp. 1867-8. 
19Frederic Hill in 1853, quoted in Radzinowicz, Sir L., and Hood, R., The 
Emer P. 11 
. 
(100) 
national policing and national crime statistics were coming on streaM40. When 
measured by the fixed yardstick of the total number of indictable prosecutions it is 
clear that the police did not have "an ever-strengthening determination to extend the 
arm of the law ever more deeply into the dark area of crimes actually committed"" 
From the start, police supporters had wooed the public with predictions that the cost 
of introducing preventive police would be offset against expenditure savings of 
upwards of f2,000,000 per year 42 
. 
Edwin Chadwick claimed that public expenditure 
on prosecutions would halve and that prison expenditure would fall because the 
police would shift the balance from "the prosecution of crime to the prevention of 
crime 1143 
"Report of the Royal Commission on Costs of Prosecutions, (1859), p. vii. 
"Gatrell, V. A. C., 'The Decline of Theft and Violence in Victorian and 
Edwardian England', in Gatrell, V. A. C., Lemnan, B. and Parker, G. (eds. ), Crime and 
the Law, the Social Histojy of Crime in Western Europe Since 1500, Europa, 1980, 
p. 249. Despite its somewhat optimistic assumptions, this remains the best analysis 
of the pre-First World War criminal statistics. 
"Chadwick's evidence, Second Report of the Select Committee on a Uniform 
System of Police in England and Wales, P. P. 1852-3 [715,715-1 ], XXXVI. 161,345, 
p. 87; He had previously mentioned this figure in 1839; First Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Constabulary Force in Counties of England and Wales, P. P. 1839 
[ 169], XIX. 1, p. 186. 
43 he Select Committee on a Uniform System of Police 
(1852-3), p. 85. 
(101) 
The newly fonned Inspectors of Constabulary, who assessed police efficiency, were 
aware that police funds were in direct competition with prosecution funds. They 
ensured that more police did not lead to more expensive indictable prosecutions, 
particularly at central goverm-nent expense. In 1861, one of the Inspectors wrote, "If 
it were possible to throw back the expenses of the prosecution upon the local 
authorities... where the force was inefficient crime would predominate, and the 
punishment of neglect or supineness would fall upon the proper quarter. "" The 
Inspector was overstating his case,, since this shift of expenditure back to local 
authorities was already happening. Because in most areas central government was 
neither paying the full costs of investigations or prosecutions, substantial charges 
were accruing to local authorities for each prosecution undertaken. This did nothing 
to lessen the intense parochialism which had characterised the old constabulary and 
watch. For example, in Liverpool in the early 1860s if a constable was required to 
give evidence in another borough, his pay was stopped while he was outside the 
City's boundaries since the City authorities would not subsidise other authorities' 
rates. Consequently, police officers were reluctant to apprehend offenders because 
they feared they personally would be out of pocket when called as witnesses". The 
attitude towards the police was best summed up by a magistrate in 1880, "Let them 
44 Inspectors of Constabulary, 1859-60, P. P. 1861 [671, LII. 64 1, p. 9. 
"Evidence of Henry Waller, Prosecuting Solicitor, Liverpool, Report of the 
Sel rosecution Expenses, P. P. 1862 [401], X1.1, p. 5. 
(102) 
reward as far as they could those districts and those policemen where there was no 
crime, rather than reward those who detected crime. "" 
Yet, although the police had great disincentives to prosecute, they became, 
effectively, public prosecutors". Before 1856, the larger forces were undertaking the 
ma . ority of indictable prosecutions". Injured parties went to the police because they J 
came to personify for the public 'The Law' and its enforcement". People could see 
that "vagrants, drunIcards, prostitutes, street traders and noisy teenagers" were 
prosecuted in large nurnbers and this policing of non-indictable public order offences, 
"Captain Verney, R. N., Transactions of the National Association for the 
Pronl'otion of Social Science, 1880, Longmans, Green and Co., 1881, p. 336. A 
pioneer police historian endorsed this view; "The absence of crime will be considered 
the best proof of the efficiency of the police. " Lee, Capt. W. L. Melville, A History 
of Police in England, p. 242. 
"In the eighteenth century, private prosecutions accounted for 80 per cent of 
all indictable prosecutions, by the 1950s the police prosecutions accounted for 88 per 
cent of the total; Hay, D., 'Controlling the English Prosecutor', Osgoode Hall Law 
Joumal, 1983, Vol. 21, (No. 2), pp. 165-86, @ pp. 167,173. 
"Report of the Select Committee Public Prosecutions,, P. P. 1856 [206], 
VII. 347, p. xix. 
49 Cohen, P., 'Policing the Work-ing Class City', in Fine, B., Kinsey R., Lea J. 
,, 
piciotto, S. and Young, J., Capitalism and the Rule of Law, Hutchinson, 1979, pp. 
120 ff. 
(103) 
may have given injured parties the expectation that the police would also prosecute 
serious crime at the public expense". 
Nonetheless, as the police and police authorities gained control of the prosecution 
process they were able to set policy on the numbers and range of offenders and 
offences that would normally be prosecuted in what they decided was the 'the public 
interest'. This enabled police authorities to put a cap on prosecutions. In the majority 
of crimes they were able to decide; 
a) whether or not to prosecute; 
b) the seriousness of the charge preferred, and hence 
i) whether the case would be heard cheaply in a police court and, 
ii) the likely cost of punishment; 
d) the amount, if any, of legal expenses incurred; 
e) the number of expensive witnesses called. 
"Jones, D. V. 'The New Police, Crime and People in England and Wales, 
1829-18881ý 
- 
Royal Historical Society, 5th series, 1983, Vol. 33, 
pp. 151-68, p. 161. 
(104) 
James Monro,, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, complained bitterly in 
1890 that "the duty of prosecuting was put on the police". He saw his police funds in 
competition with prosecution funds; "The police were very hardly and unfairly 
handicapped in the matter of prosecution. It was not legally the business of the police 
to prosecute offenders... the police had no funds at all for the purpose, and 
furthermore their position as prosecutor was not recognised by law... many cases 
were conducted before magistrates without any legal assistance whatever"". 
A number of authorities cut down the costs "below a proper amount, out of a desire 
to save public money", and prevented the possibility of, not only private, but police 
prosecutions as well 52 
. 
As an Inspector of Constabulary said, "where the police 
authority avoids every possible expenditure of money, the police often have to do the 
same as the injured person 
- 
nothing"". Only the wealthy and larger businesses 
usually brought private prosecutions, tradesmen and other respectable members of 
"Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1890, Vol. LIII, p. 414. Court work 
was seen as a waste of police time "which could well be devoted to other work", 
Magistrate, Vol. 4, (March-April 1936), p. 1001. For a description of the scale of 
police involvement in the'police court' see Justice of the Peace, 1949, Vol. CXXVIII, 
(14 May 1949), pp. 3 10-11. 
"For example, Justice of the Peace, 1934, Vol. CXIII, (21 July 1934), p. 472. 
"Evidence of Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence. Committee on the 
Police Service of En land Wales and Scotland, P. P. 1920 [Cmd. 874], XXII. 573, p. 
86 
(105) 
the lQwer orders had to rely on the police. Speaking from long experience in 1929,, 
Sir Charles Rafter, the Chief Constable of Birmingham City Police, did not think 
"any poor persons start criminal prosecutions on their own. They generally come to 
the Police. The persons who have started prosecutions have been, as far as I 
remember, mostly rich persons, or limited companies, or something of that sort"". 
Normally, private prosecutions were either on a trivial scale or, with the larger 
concerns, particularly in industrial and mining areas, tended to fluctuate within limits,, 
so that they usually created little variation in the overall crime figures except in the 
periods of industrial troubles, such as around 1908 or the General Strike. These 
private prosecutions were conducted on an altogether different scale to police 
prosecutions; "The care with which the case for the prosecution is prepared, the 
amount of money which may be expended in investigating the facts, ensuring 
competent evidence, employing the services of experts, and instructing trial counsel, 
depends necessarily upon the sum the private prosecutor is able and willing to 
expend... where the private prosecutor is a wealthy corporation, bank-, or commercial 
house, no expense is spared"". 
54 Sir Charles Rafter, Chief Constable Birmingham City Police. Minutes of 
Evidenceofthe ', oyal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, (1929), p. 247. 
"Howard, P. 'Criminal Prosecution in England; I- Police Prosecutions' 
view, 1929, Vol. 29, pp. 715-47, @ pp. 721-22. 
(106) 
So, far from leading to increased activity against crime, police control of the 
prosecution process enabled costs to be pared down to a minimum and the annual 
number of prosecutions effectively rationed and subjected to tight budgetary control. 
One consequence of this may have been to emphasise the seasonality of crime. In 
1857, the Judicial Statistics observed that "the larger number of the commitments and 
the more serious cases, on which the costs of prosecution are the highest, have 
usually fallen at the end of the year. " 
56 
. 
vi 
Parsimony in prosecution, the fixing of prosecution expenses to three year averages 
and annual inspection of the police together tended to peg the number of 
prosecutions, which were the leading index of criminal justice administration, to the 
levels they had started at in 1857. If the statistics showed that a chief constable had 
not prevented crime in his district, or that he had allowed it to go undetected, then the 
Inspectors of Constabulary held he had failed in his primary duty. On the other hand, 
if there was suddenly a large drop in crime then the Inspectors accused him of 
inefficiency in the detection of crime. 
56JUdiCial StatiStiCS, 1857, P. P. 1857-8 [2407], LVII. 383, p. xlx. For the 
seasonality of crime see Judicial Statistics, 1893, P. P. 1895 [C. 7725], CVIII. 1, pp. 
92 ff. 
(107) 
Centrally, the instructions issued to the police for recording crimes in the nineteenth 
century ensured that little crime could be reported above the small amount actually 
prosecuted. Forces were ordered to include only "such cases as, in theirjudgement, 
from the circumstances attending them, would, if discovered, be sent for trial" and to 
exclude the rest of the indictable offences reported to them". Since few crimes would 
'in their judgement' (and Imowledge), be tried, few were reported. The statistics for 
the number of 'Crimes Committed, the forerunner of the figure of 'Crimes Known to 
the Police, fell absolutely until 1892 when the table was removed from the Judicial 
Statistics. This was because any indictable cases heard summarily were deemed not 
to have been tried and so were not recorded as having been committed. So as the 
number of higher court trials fell, the number of 'Crimes Committed' necessarily fell 
too". 
Consequently, chief constables were forced to cover-up and do nothing about the true 
extent of crime in their localities. To maintain the public illusion that crime did not 
pay, they produced figures of recorded crime that seemed to confirm the tiny number 
"Hammick, 'On Judicial Statistics, with Special Reference to the Criminal 
Mums%. Joumal of the Statistical Society of London, 1867, Vol. XXX, pp. 375-426, 
p. 393 
"When, after 1893, the Home Office retrospectively added the number of 
summary hearings to the number of 'Crimes Committed' it was found that the 
resulting figure of 'Indictable Offences Known to the Police' had remained virtually 
constant. 
(108) 
of prosecutions they were normally allowed to bring". As Hermann Mannheim 
observed, "The Police Chief capable of turning a blind eye upon a yawning gulf 
between'Number of Crimes Known' and 'Persons Convictedin his district would be 
more than a paragon"". For example, it is unbelievable to read that in the D. Division 
of the Metropolitan Police, which contained one of the most famous police stations 
in detective literature, Bow Street, in 1869 "the felony books denote that a week, a 
fortnight or even three weeks can pass at Hunter Street without a single felony 
reported, nearly the same at George Street, and even at Bow Street there are intervals 
of two, three,, and four days. 1161 
If the true figures of crime reported to the police had been put down, then the 
deterrent effect would have been corroded by the public realisation of the enormous 
extent of crime that went undetected. It was therefore, far,, far cheaper, and reflected 
far more credit on the institutions concerned, to maintain the public illusion that 
about the same number of crimes were committed each year, and that most offenders 
were caught and punished, rather than to suggest to the public that vastly more 
offences were committed and came to the Imowledge of the police, but that most 
criminals got away with it. 
'91nspectors of Constabulary, 1920-21, P. R 1922 (5), X. 303, p. 12. 
"Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England, p. 39. 
61 e Police of the Metropolis, 1869, P. P. 1870 [C. 150], 
XXXVI. 46 1, p. 3 7. 
(109) 
Although the 'true' extent of Victorian indictable crime can never be known, an 
estimate was given in 1860 by a lawyer critic of the new series of Criminal Statistics. 
He plausibly suggested that if police forces were correct in saying they knew of 
134,922 criminals at large, then if each committed one crime a week that would make 
"about seven millions" serious crimes each year rather than the 57,868 recorded in 
the statistics 
- 
this would have made Victorian crime levels a higher than that reported 
in the 1990s". In other words, he was suggesting that according to the Criminal 
Statistics, Victorian police forces may have been under-reported indictable crime by 
a staggering 12,000 per cent This was only the tip of the iceberg since he was only 
including the crime committed by'Imown criminals'. A lower estimate was provided 
in 1867 by the Head Constable of Liverpool. 'Normally' the City recorded about 
4,792 indictable crimes. However, he admitted that if he were to include just the full 
total of robberies known to the police the figure would be about 16 '00063. Obviously 
the total number of indictable offences would have been very much higher still had 
every class of offence been fully recorded. 
Vil 
It is now possible to appreciate more fully the political and administrative 
mechanisms that led Quetelet to reach his conclusions. There was a simple reason the 
"Law Times, 1859-60, Vol. 28, (7 January 1860), p. 178. 
631 Discrepant Criminal Statistics', Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 
1868, Vol. XXXI, pp. 349-352, @ p. 351. 
(110) 
crime figures varied "around a mean state" and this was that the Treasury, the Home 
Office and local police authorities kept costs under control by ensuring that their 
figures in most years, in the commonplace phrase of the Select Committee on 
Miscellaneous Expenditure 1847-8, did "not exceed the usual average 1164 
. 
The new 
series of Judicial Statistics commenced in 1857 and were one aspect of a new 
initiative of central control over criminal justice. The statistics, and the new 
Constabulary Inspectors, allowed the Home Office to monitor more closely the inputs 
and outputs of the new police authorities. About the same time the criminal statistics 
were introduced, the Treasury perfected its control over prosecution costs and 
introduced its own mechanisms to retain that control. In nineteenth century public 
administration, once a suitable level of expenditure or output was obtained, control 
often involved maintaining that output at a fixed average without allowing for 
population growth. So, as public offices changed from payment by fees to payment 
by salaries, the tendency was to base the salary upon the average amount of work in 
previous years and to keep to that average. For example, when coroners changed to 
salaries these were based on a three year average. Consequently, salaried and waged 
officers,, including police officers of all ranks, maintained the average level of output 
that they were paid for. This applied to all levels of bureaucracy. Many officials Imew 
the average number of letters they received each year, and these tended to remain 
fairly constant. In 1929, the Director of Public Prosecutions said he received about 
"Report of the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure, (1847-8), 
xxiii. 
(111) 
2,300 cases "Year in and year out"". In all probability, this was because the chief 
constables and other government departments that corresponded with him were all 
sending him their 'usual average' number of cases. This corresponded to bureaucratic 
notions of convenience and efficiency in public service. 
In a variety of ways, central government, and in particular the Treasury, Inspectors 
of Constabulary, and the Home Office were keeping a watchful eye that police 
authorities neither exceeded nor reduced their'usual averages'. As George Grosvenor, 
the Home Office clerk responsible for compiling the Judicial Statistics, revealed, in 
1890, the figures were closely monitored by the Home Office and "any marked 
variations observed from year to year are at once noted, and an explanation required" 
by officials". 
So, apparently unaware of the routine realities of the small closed world of European 
state bureaucratic administration, over the next century and a half generations of 
social scientists followed Quetelet in framing social laws based upon official 
statis#cs. They refined their elaborate social theories based on the belief that official 
"Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, (1929), p. 97. 
66 Pellew, J. The Home Office 1848-1914: from Clerks to Bureaucrats,, 
Heinemann Educational, 1982, pp. 53-4; Grosvenor, G., 'Statistics of the Abatement 
in Crime in England and Wales, during the Twenty Years ended 1887-8', Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, 1890, Vol. LIII, pp. 377-419, @ p. 381. 
(112) 
statistics somehow reflected, or attempted to reflect, social reality. That is to say that 
they believed the statistics reflected demand not supply. Effectively, their theories 
became little more than smoke-screens justifying bureaucratic practice and the 
economies of the European Treasuries. 
For example, influenced by Quetelet, Henry Rhodes, a criminologist of the Lyons 
school, argued, in 1939, that crime was a mass and not an individual phenomenon. 
This led him to a logical, bureaucratic and utterly absurd conclusion; 
The really vital importance of this is that it put the individual into proper 
perspective in the social landscape. From the classical point of view, the 
nature of the criminal act is inevitably link-ed up with a particular individual. 
That is to say, if the individual did not exist, the crime would not be 
committed. From the statistical point of view this conclusion is quite wrong 
It is a matter of observation that it takes place all the same. This means that 
some other individual... commits the crime instead. 
67 
The mistaken belief that the routine inputs and outputs of state statistics reflected 
demand had led to the false expectation of a "regularly and similarly-returning 
distribution of human inclinations and propensities... [becoming] one of the 
"Rhodes, Henry, T. F., The Criminal in Society: A Review of the 
Fundamentals of Criminol"y, Lindsay Drummond, 1939, p. 87. 
(113) 
postulates of criminal sociology; and, as a matter of fact, of the science of sociology 
as a whole"". 
Perhaps Quetelet's fundamental wealmess (and individual merit) was that he 
examined the statistics from the disinterested standpoints of a professional 
mathematician and astronomer who wanted to find the truth, and not from the 
position of a police authority or a Whitehall bureaucrat. From his optimistic position 
he canvassed plans to standardise the crime statistics of Europe because he falsely 
believed officials wanted the phenomenon to be properly studied, understood and 
controlled from the demand side". His disinterest as a scientist was qualitatively 
different from the disinterest of the Treasury whose view was minimalist 
- 
the less 
found out, the less spent. A Treasury minute of 1882 warned Departments, "the 
collecting and digesting of public statistics is a duty that should be carefully watched 
and guarded in order that it may not degenerate into extravagance"". By the 1930s, 
"the Treasury point of view" had not shifted. It still avoided the extensive use of 
"Bonger, W. A. (tr. Van Loo, E. ), An Introduction to CriminolQgy, Methuen, 
1936, p. 121. 
"See Lecuyer, B-P, 'Probability in Vital and Social Statistics: Quetelet, Farr, 
and the Bertillons',, in Kriiger, L., Daston, L., and Heidelberger,, M., (eds. ), The 
Probalistic Revolution:, Vol. I,, Ideas in History, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1987. 
70 P. R. O., H045/11787/B32589/2, Treasury Minute, 21 April, 1882, quoted 
in Davidson, R., Whitehall and the Labour Problem in Late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain., Croom Helm, 1985, p. 169. 
(114) 
professional statisticians and required the bulk of Government statistics to be limited 
to low-paid civil servants "capable of handling the first four rules of arithmetic"". 
Similarly, Whitehall's complacent, hierarchical and mechanical bureaucracy often 
appeared to be wilfully impervious to outside intelligence in the widest sense of the 
word unless it came from sources of high enough status to demand audience". To put 
it mildly, the Department lacked Quetelet's curiosity. Frequently, its function 
appeared to be the administration of the status quo, using an elaborate system of 
precedent 73 
, 
and the obstruction of any change in case it cost money or affected 
personnel and Departmental status. So, the Home Office shut out information about 
the workings of the criminal justice system and the true extent of crime. In his 
evidence to the Gladstone Committee in 1895, Sir Stephen Lushington, the head of 
the Home Office, explained that "changes do not come from inside". The only 
recognized mechanism for change was for improvements from the "general 
civilization" gradually to "win their way into... administration". Before any changes 
71 Mr Macrosty, a fonner civil servant. 'Discussion on the Quantity and Quality 
of Official Statistical Publications', Journal of the Royal Statistical Socie1y, 1932, 
Vol. 95, p. 297. 
"As Mr H. B. Simpson, Assistant Secretary Home Office explained in 1920, 
"l think- when you get a big organisation under an office in Whitehall the result is 
rather apt to be that it gets into a sort of groove. " Minutes of Evidence, Committee 
on the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, (1920), p. 5. 
7'McConville, S., English Local Prisons 1860-1900, pp. 520 ff. 
(115) 
were allowed in, a committee, of course, had to be set up to take the "broad view" 
into consideration. Curiosity to receive outside views was not the distinguishing 
quality of the Home Office; "philanthropists" did not understand the "machinery", 
From the prisoners of course they learn nothing... From the warders who are 
mere subordinates, who have strictly to obey all orders, they can learn little 
more... Superior officers of course have greater knowledge and might mak-e 
useful recommendations; but I am sure they would think twice, and three 
times,, before they venture to a strong-minded and strong-willed executive 
suggestions of a larger character which would involve an important alteration 
of machinery or serious addition to the expense 
74 
. 
This evidence rebuts Radzinowiczs traditional Whiggish interpretation of the 
evolution of criminal justice; "The empirical approach to any changes which is so 
characteristic of England can also be seen in the way in which reforms were 
introduced into the administration of criminal justice... all [innovations] evolved 
gradually, after numerous attempts and continuous experiments had yielded an 
accumulation of valuable experience"". 
"Evidence of Sir Stephen Lushington, Report of the Departmental Committee 
on Prisons, P. P. 1895 [C. 7702ý 7702-1], LVI. 1,55, p. 395. 
7'Radzinowicz, L., 'Present Trends of English Criminal Policy', p. 28. 
(116) 
Vill 
To sum up, during the first half of the nineteenth century, principally under utilitarian 
influence,, the state gingered up criminal justice and developed alternatives to 
execution or transportation. It built prisons, set up police forces and offered rewards 
and encouragement to private and police prosecution. For a time it appeared to 
moving towards a more demand-led system. Then it became apparent that costs and 
numbers were getting out of control, at least in the Treasury's view, and that the new 
police, if not strictly controlled, might escalate prosecutionS76. 
By mid-century, rising prosecution costs, the completion of the Gladstonian system 
of Treasury control accompanied by a shift to central funding, led to a policy of strict 
economy over prosecutions based on the traditional assumption that; "The 
punishment of every crime that is committed is clearly unattainable... The only 
attainable object is example... I should not, therefore, think, it advisable, by the 
appointment of a public prosecutor, or by any other means, to interfere with the 
present system. After all, crime would not cease to be committed, though the 
examples of punishment might be multiplied. "" As the statistics show, by the mid- 
"For an influential argument that neglects this economic dimension see, 
Foucault,, M., Discipline and Punish. 
"Evidence submitted by J. Starnmers, barrister-at-Law, Eighth Report of the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Law, P. P. 1845 [656], XIV. 161, App. 1, no. 6, Q1, 
pp. 214-5. 
(117) 
nineteenth century the reform of the administration of justice had lost had its 
momenturn. In most respects 
, 
inputs and outputs would remain static until after 1919. 
Criminal justice administration had become a modern, routinised bureaucracy. 
(118) 
Chapter V: Changing Definitions of Crime and Policing 
I 
During the course of the nineteenth century, the Home Office took more control over 
the nature of the crime selected for the courts by focusing more strongly on indictable 
crimes. While much of the traditional historiography has only remarked upon the 
growth of central control and the increased efficiency and effectiveness of the police 
in dealing withcrime, it has not ftilly appreciated how much, and why the definition 
of 'crime' changed and how it was affected by wider political forces. Consequently, 
it has attributed changes in police duties and organisation unproblematically to an 
obvious need for a 'modernization' of the service. What has tended to be left out of 
this teleological discussion, has been an appreciation that the goalposts, defining what 
constituted crime and crime control, were moved. 
While some underlying teleology is sought to explain policy, the purpose for 
introducing the new police in the second quarter of the nineteenth century will 
necessarily remain an issue of uncertainty and considerable historical controversy' 
'For recent reviews of the debate see Emsley, C., The English Police: A 
Political and Social HiatQry, 2nd ed., Longman, 1996; Reiner, R., The Politics of the 
(continued 
... 
) 
(119) 
What is clear is that although improved policing of crime was a logical corollary of 
Peel's rationalisation of the criminal laws, the Government was less concerned with 
the 'low policing' of crime than it was with its 'high policing' commitment to defend 
the ReaIM2. In practice this meant it was concerned to ensure that an adequate number 
of police were distributed in London and the provinces to contain serious 
disturbances without recourse to the army'. Unsurprisingly, many local authorities 
viewed the introduction of the police with suspicion. Apart from their traditional fears 
of a central authority and, particularly, of the police becoming a military force, they 
resented central attempts to burden ratepayers with the costs of, what seemed to them,, 
a problem that should be funded centrally'. 
Governments therefore tried to find ways to encourage local authorities to employ 
police in sufficient numbers to meet the needs of national security. One way was to 
'( continued) 
Police, 2nd ed, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, chapter 1. 
'Emsley, C. Policing and its Context: 1750-1870, Macmillan, 1983, chapter 
4; Brogden, M., 'The Emergence of the Police 
- 
The Colonial Dimension', British 
Journal of Criminolggy, 1987, Vol. 27, pp. 4-14, @ p. 8. 
'Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, chapter 3; 
Steedman,, C, Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English 
Provincial Police Forces 1856-80, Routledge, 1984, Part 1. 
Radzinowicz, L., A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration 
from 1750, Vol. IV, pp. 167 ff. 
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keep police pay JOW5 
, 
another was to allow authorities to use the police for other 
duties in order to economise on existing staff. The policy of Col. Charles Rowan, a 
founding Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, was, in the 1830s, "to relieve the 
parishes of any expense that they could, by making the police work for the parishes; 
and that has been one of the objects gained by allowing the police to act as inspectors 
under the local Acts; the parishes being thereby relieved from the expense of 
employing officers to act under the local boards. "I 
As the provincial forces developed in the 1830s and 1840s, propaganda increasingly 
stressed the savings to be made by employing police across a wide range of local 
serviCes. By the 1850s, some Chief Constables, most notably Captain M'Hardy of 
Essex, made it appear that "a really well-managed force could be made self- 
supporting"'. A variety of extra duties were advocated for the police, for example, 
acting as firemen, delivering correspondence while on the beat, particularly rate and 
other summonses and,, more importantly, duties of inspection or surveillance'. Many 
'Martin,, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police, A Study in Manpower, pp. 15 ff. 
'Col. C. Rowan, Report and Minutes of Evidence of the Select Committee 
Appointed to Inquire into the Police of the Metropolis and the State of Crime, 1834, 
P. P. 1834 [600], XVIA, p. 30. 
'Lee, Capt. W. L. Melville, A History of Police in England, pp. 301 ff. 
To some extent, these miscellaneous duties have affinities with the wider 
European "consideration of crime in relation to wider questions of state, legal order 
and political economy". Reiner, R., 'British Criminology and the State', p. 269. 
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of these, it was argued, had some bearing on crime control since they provided the 
police with information about the disreputable characters in the neighbourhood and 
gave them additional powers of search and inspection'. Most commonly, their duties 
were inspecting common lodging houses, nuisances, weights and measures, roads and 
bridges, and acting as poor law relieving officers". Because of this, the distinction 
between police work and general local administration was blurred from the outset. 
11 
Moreover, justice and local administration in the early- and mid-Victorian period 
were not always functionally divided because magistrates, who controlled the police 
and many of the other constitutionally separate units of local government often drew 
little distinction in practice between their two functions of running local affairs and 
providing justice. Although various legislation, from the 1835 Municipal 
Corporations Act to the 1888 Local Goverm-nent Act, was said constitutionally to 
have "almost completely severed the two functions of administration and justice", 
justices continued to exercise "a considerable amount of power" in local 
'The close working relationship between the police, the master of work-house, 
the prison officer and relieving officers is evident in the literature of the Victorian 
period. Scotson, T., An Examination of Crime and Criminal Justice in the Literary 
Utopias of 1880-1.914, Ph. D Thesis, University of Leicester, 1994. 
"Steedman C., Policing the Victorian Community, p. 41. 
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administration throughout the inter-war period (and beyond)". This confusion 
between the requirements of administration and ofjustice had an enormous influence 
on the way people were treated by local authorities, and in particular by their police 
forces. 
The result was that the police came to be seen less as impartial enforcers of the 
national law, than as the general servants of local authorities and wealthy ratepayers 
who enforced their local byelaws and their other local interpretations of the law. 
Policemen were ordered "to look up to their immediate local superiors", and, 
frequently through the use of tips and private hire agreements, a policeman was 
encouraged to "think himself the servant of the individual instead of the servant of 
the community"". Typical of this attitude was a Gloucestershire magistrate who, in 
1876, proprietarily described "our police, appointed, paid, and managed by gentlemen 
residing in the country"". Fifty years later, in 1920, Sir Leonard Dunning, an 
"Evidence of Mr I. G. Gibbon, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Health, 
Minutes of Evidence for the Royal Commission on Local Government, Part 1, 
H. M. S. 0,1923, p. 4. 
"Captain Verney, R. N., Transactions of the National Association for the 
Promotion of Social Science, 1880, p. 336; Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, 
Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales and 
Scotland, (1920), p. I 10. 
"Barker, T. B. Ll., 'Address on the Repression of Crime', Transactions of the 
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1876,, Longmans, Green 
(continued 
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Inspector of Constabulary was fully aware that, "people regard the policeman more 
as a servant of the rich man than the poor man, and I am afraid the policemen very 
often regard themselves in the same way. " 14 
. 
Ultimately, wealthy ratepayers treated the police as if they were a private insurance 
policy taken out to prevent "the 'lower classes' from interfering with the owners of 
property" ". In addition to police patrols to protect their property from crime, 
respectable local 'opinion' expected the police to "keep their beats clear of those 
nuisances most offensive to the public", such as prostitutes, beggars, costermongers 
and drunks, and create "an improving standard of public decorum in the streets" M. For 
13( 
... continued) 
and Co., 1877, pp. "309-23, @ p. 311. This proprietorial control of the police may go 
some way towards explaining the decline of private prosecution societies. 
"Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police 
Service of England Wales and Scotland, (1920), p. I 10. 
"Maud,, J.,, Local Govenunent in Modem England, Butterworth, 1932, p. 19. 
For the police as insurance see, Steedman C., Policing the Victorian Community, pp. 
59 ff, 'Brogden, M., The Police Autonomy and Consent, Academic Press, 1982, p. 71. 
Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-1, p. 3. 
"Forrest, J-H, Orders and Instructions Framed for the Guidance of the 
Nottinghamshire Constabulary, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire Constabulary, 1855, 
p. 17; Evidence of Leonard Dunning, Head Constable of Liverpool, Minutes of 
Evidence for the Royal Commission on the Duties of the Metro-politan Police, P. P. 
(continued... 
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the middle classes during the nineteenth century, the working class who often lived 
in fairly close proximity, were "the subject of constant observation and 
surveillance"". As well as moral satisfaction,, the major benefit to ratepayers from 
this surveillance was a hoped for reduction in rates and taxation from the removal of 
pauperism, an improvement of the tone of residential areas and hence a substantial 
increase in the value of property brought about by police protection". 
In common with other local government agencies, the police tended to focus their 
efforts on that 'residuum' of the working class who were a frequent charge on the 
rates'9. There was a traditional argument was that "crime was often perpetrated by 
itinerants who preferred an idle life of vagrancy and theft to one of useful toil", or as 
an M. P. and chairman of the North Riding County Council stated, "Loafing is the 
beginning of all vices"". Therefore, it could be argued conveniently that little 
"( 
... 
continued) 
1908 [Cd. 4261], LIA, p. 900. 
"Savage, A. and Miles, M., The Remaking of the British Working Class: 
1840-1940, Routledge, 1994, p. 58. 
"Lee, Capt. W. L. Melville, A History of Police in England, p. 302. 
"The police concentrated on the three related dangers of "the criminal class, 
the vagrant and 'the unreformed working classes"'; Jones, D. V. 'The New Police, 
Crime and People in England and Wales, 1829-1888', p. 157. 
"Emsley, C., The English Police, p. 5 1; Mr John Hulton, M. P., Minutes of 
L P. P. 1906 Evi Lence and AWendices fior the De artm ntal CoýmrniLttee (o Va rancy (continued 
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practical difference need be drawn between the judicial and administrative functions 
of policing potential criminals and potential charges on the Poor Rates. A "policeman 
supervising him [a vagrant] was seen to be efficiently and cheaply performing a 
police and an administrative function, both at once"". Similarly, both the workhouse, 
where magistrates sat as ex officio members, and the local prison which they 
controlled and managed until 1877 were often viewed by magistrates as alternative 
instruments of deterrence for the repression of the linked problems of pauperism and 
crime 
22 
. 
Since an aim of the police was to deter paupers from committing crime, and the aim 
of the Poor Law was to keep down the rates by deterring all but the destitute from 
gaining relief23, the benefits to ratepayers were considerable when the police were 
also allowed to act as deterrent auxiliaries to an already deterrent Poor Law". In 
"(... continued) 
[Cd. 2891,2892], C111.131,639, p. 51; Ritte, R., Poverty and Deviance in EaLly 
Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 143 ff. 
21 Steedman C., Policing the Victorian Community, p. 53. 
22 Captain Verney, R. N., Transactions of the National Association for the 
Promotion of Social Science, 1880, p. 336. 
"2 ff. "Thane, P. The Foundations of the Welfare State,, Longman, 1982, pp. ') 
"It had been the intention of Edwin Chadwick, a major influence in both 
police and poor law reform, to place provincial police forces under Poor Law 
Guardians rather than magistrates. Brundage, A., England's "Prussian Minister": 
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1853, Mr Bun-iardiston, the chairman of the Essex Quarter Sessions,, calculated that 
on the basis of each vagrant costing fl, payers of the poor rate had been saved 
thousands of pounds by the police who had "practically annihilated vagrancy"". 
Between 1848 and 18495 the Essex Constabulary claimed to have reduced indoor 
vagrants by ninety per cent and outdoor by seventy-seven per cent". 
Although there were probably as many local variations of police administration as 
there were of Poor Law administration, particularly between urban and rural areas, 
there were also many common practices. In many areas the cheapest policing option 
was simply to lump together the poor, street traders, casual labourers, drunk-s, 
vagrants and other disreputable characters, as a class, and keep the streets 'clean' by 
preventing them from staying in situations where they might cause trouble, or annoy 
ratepayers. Non-nally, a warning or the threat of close police surveillance was enough 
to keep the streets 'clean', although sometimes it had to be accompanied with 
"( continued) 
Edwin Chadwick and the Politics of Goverment Growth, 1832-1854,, Pennsylvania, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988, chapter 4. See also Donajgrodzki, A. P., 
"Social Police' and the Bureaucratic Elite: A Vision of Order in the Age of Reform, 
in Donajgrodzki, A. P. (ed. ), Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, Croom 
Helm, 1977; p. 71. 
"Second Report of the Select Committee on a Uniform System of Police in 
England and Wales, (1852-3), p. 79. 
"Lee,, Capt. W. L. Melville, A History of Police in England, p. 303. 
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violence". The police aim was, as a Luton magistrate said, to make those who 
gathered on the streets "as miserable as idle men about town suddenly deprived of 
their clubs' '28 
.A Liverpool policeman said, "We were pretty heavy with individuals 
on the street. We never allowed two or three to gather on the corner. We just moved 
them on. " 
29 
. 
III 
This blend of judicial and administrative practices of the nineteenth century 
policeman, which was focused on the lowest classes, was usually described as 'the 
prevention of crime'; 
"As H. B. Simpson, a Home Office official observed, "a large part of the 
policeman's prestige depends upon his being usually a more powerful man physically 
than the average offender against the law... [and he] has a very handy weapon to use 
when it comes to the using of physical force". Minutes of Evidence for the 
Departmental Committee on the Duties of Women Police, P. P. 1921 [Cmd 113 3 ], 
XVI. 73, p. 3; Ernsley, Clive, 'Thump of Wood on a Swede Turnip: Police Violence 
in Nineteenth Century England', Criminal Justice History, 1985, Vol. 4. 
"Law Times, 1870, Vol. 32, (5 November 1870), p. 5. 
"Brogden, M., On the Mersey Beat: An Oral History of Policing Livelpool 
between the-Wars, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp, 97,99. 
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To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of 
person and property, the preservation of the public tranquillity, and all other 
objects of a police establishment will thus be better effected than by the 
detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in 
committing the crime... The absence of crime will be considered the best 
proof of the efficiency of the police. In the divisions where this security and 
good order have been effected, the officers and men belonging to it may feel 
assured that such good conduct will be noticed by rewards and promotion. 'O. 
The practice of preventive policing allowed constables to act against suspect types 
without having to waste their time investigating any crime in particular. The reporting 
and detection of indictable crime, therefore, usually came very low in police 
priorities. Because officers had to be mindful of all aspects of ratepayer's property 
and expenditure, they were given little incentive to burden the rates by attempting to 
use the difficult and expensive criminal law, or even to report crime to their superiors, 
unless they Imew substantial local interests were involved. Officers were only too 
aware that there were often insufficient funds and a well-Imown "local unwillingness 
actually to pay for supporting its police in court"". The investigation and prosecution 
of the bulk of 'petty' crimes committed against ordinary petty people was simply too 
expensive and troublesome to justify, other than in a sample number of cases either 
IOLee,, Capt. W. L. Melville, A History of Police in England, pp. 241-2. 
"See for example Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-21, p. 3; Steedman C., 
policing the Victorian Communi1y, p. 149. 
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for the purpose of general deterrence or to deal with a particularly troublesome local 
'ringleader'. 
Revealing the Imown extent of serious indictable crime committed on most beats was, 
therefore, not the path to promotion; crime looked bad in the statistics and attracted 
the disapproval of the Inspectors of Constabulary; it required the expenditure of time, 
money and effort; and it reduced the protection of property since it took officers away 
from their beat and, if a prosecution failed or if it was recorded or not prosecuted, it 
also suggested to criminals that crime succeeded. Investigation was also unlikely to 
succeed, since it was at best a very uncertain attempt to prove that a particular offence 
had been committed by a particular offender usually when no police officers or 
persons of adequate social standing had been present to witness it. 
So, instead of devising ways to perfect the techniques of detection, the police were 
encouraged to develop their 'nose' for suspect characters. Consequently, when the 
police resorted to the law, they usually charged suspects with minor, non-indictable 
street offences, such as drunkenness or vagrancy. In other words, they were charged 
for who they were or appeared to be, rather than what they had done. This was 
cheaper and "simpler than an indictment" because most non-indictables relied for 
their legal proof largely on the easily obtainable direct observation and Imowledge 
of the police, or on the proven bad character of the accused which was often easily 
(130) 
established or inferred by the police as part of their other duties". Therefore, in 
practice, the legal basis of much policing lay far less in establishing the specific actu, y 
reus and mens rea of criminal law textbooks and indictable crime, than in testifying 
to the behaviour or general character of 'social pests' under the Poor Law, Licensing 
Acts, Gaming Laws, Vagrancy Acts, Byelaws and other miscellaneous local powers 
and duties of inspection. Thus, the practical and economic difficulties of detection 
and prosecution reinforced the focus of policing on the potential criminality of the 
lower classes in general and on the residuum in particular. 
Both for crime control and for local administration, Chief Constables found the 1824 
Vagrancy Act particularly helpful. They continually sought to make it more wide 
ranging, and this further blurred the legal distinction between the specific criminal 
act and the pauper life-style". The Criminal Statistics admitted as much in 1896 when 
it revealed the police often used the Act as "a convenient means of dealing with 
32 Justice of the Peace, 1930, Vol. 94, (5 July 1930), p. 423. 
33 See for example, the comments of the Chief Constable of Bradford; 
Grauhan, F. W., 'Certain Causes Tending to the Increase of Crime', Transactions of 
the National Assoc. iation for the Promotion of Social Science, 1859,, John W. Parker, 
1860, pp. 466-70, @ p. 469. See also the Vagrancy Act Amendment Act of 1898 in 
Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian and 
Edwardian England, Clarendon, Oxford, 1990, p. 696. The Act covered "many 
offenders who are in no sense of the word vagrants", Report of the Departmental 
Com iittee on Vagrancy, (1906), p. 3. 
(I -) 1) 
known thieves against whom no evidence could be obtained sufficient to support a 
prosecution for any more serious offence"". For example, it could be applied equally 
to someone for 'failure to maintain his family' and to someone found in possession 
of housebreaking implements such as a screwdriver etc., or loitering with intent, or 
being on premises for an unlawful purpose". In 1919, an assistant secretary at the 
Home Office described the Act as 
almost the foundation of social order. It hits not only tramps and beggars, but 
all professional criminals 
- 
pickpockets, housebreakers and so on. It is the 
best hold the policeman has over people who live by crime, and also 
whenever Parliament wants to hit a new form of social pest, the most 
convenient way of doing it is to put him under one of the categories of the 
Vagrancy Act" 
A major advantage of the Act was that it could be applied "oppressively", in the form 
of 'three strikes and out', to force people to leave the district when there was not a 
great deal in the way of evidence against them. An offender progressed up a hierarchy 
each time he was convicted; becoming first 'idle and disorderly', then a 'rogue and 
vagabond' and finally an 'incorrigible rogue'. When this stage was reached, as the 
34 Judicial Statistics,, 1896, P. P. 1898 [c 8755], CIV. 1, p. 3 1. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1933, Vol. 97, (9 December 1933), p. 787. 
"H. B. Simpson, Minutes of Evidence for the Departmental Committee on the 
Duties of WVomenPOlice, (192 1), p. 3. 
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Lord Chief Justice noted in 1934, "there is an impression abroad... the only duty of 
the court is to pass on him the maximum sentence of twelve months' imprisonment 
with hard labour"37 
. 
Few people were finally sentenced as incorrigible rogues, since 
it was put about that someone with a vagrancy conviction "by moving into another 
district practically escapes all chance of identification and is able to pose as a first 
offender. "" Banishment was a more economical way of dealing with crime than long- 
term imprisonment. To underline the practical purpose of the Act, in many areas 
magistrates made it the formal condition of discharge that the offender would leave 
town 39 
Just 4s the major intention of many of the nineteenth century slum clearances was to 
drive down the poor rates by driving away the poor, so, as the Chief Constable of 
Berkshire said in 1906,, many police forces attempted "to drive vagrants from one 
place to another in order to lessen the rates"". For all these reasons, throughout the 
nineteenth century, culminating in the 1906 Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, 
"Magistrate, 1934, Vol. 111, (November 1934), p. 840. This resembles the 
modem American system of "three strikes" and you're out. 
"Minutes of Evidence and Appendices for the Departmental Committee on 
Vagrancy, (1906), p. 58. 
"Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, (1906), p. 5 1. 
"Major AR Poulton, ibid., p. 164; For slum clearances see Jones, Gareth 
Stedman, Outcast London, chapter 8. 
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a number of attempts were made by local authorities to place all vagrants under 
police surveillance" 
Therefore, rather than the true mass of serious indictable crimes appearing in the 
statistics that had been committed outside the view of the police, a massive number 
of people appeared instead, who might or might not have committed crimes, but who 
looked idle or suspicious enough to warrant arrest for minor non-indictable street 
offences. Over 700,, 000 a year were prosecuted in the Edwardian period for minor 
non-indictable offences such as gaming, vagrancy and drunkenness. Very few 
ratepayers of substance were prosecuted". Thus, the legacy of the early years of the 
new police was to create in constables a'zero tolerance' of anyone who looked like 
he might at some time upset ratepayers. At the same time it created a helpless 
tolerance of most indictable crime. Consequently, from the start of the new series of 
criminal statistics in 1857, indictable prosecutions remained at an almost fixed level, 
while non-indictable prosecutions rose considerably faster than the increase in 
"Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrangy, (1906), p. 3 6, see also 
pp. 1,10. 
"V. A. C. Gatrell has analysed the statistics of non-indictable offences for the 
year 1908. Out of 689,, 000 proceedings, 29 per cent were against drunks; 16 per cent 
were under the Police Acts and bye-laws; 10 per cent were under the Vagrancy Acts; 
7 per cent were assaults; 9 per cent were for highway offences (nonnally the working 
class drivers of carts rather than the owners). Gatrell, V. A. C., 'Crime Authority and 
the Policeman State', p. 269. 
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population. They grew at roughly the same rate as growth of the police 
establishment". Probably, this was because nineteenth century local police managers 
expected an average output of non-indictable prosecutions from each constable to use 
as a measure of that officers' performance". 
Thus Victorian policing practice developed in intimate connection with local 
administration and had a focus on the deviant behaviour of the residuum in the belief 
that this 'zero tolerance' was the most efficient way to prevent, or at least manage 
serious indictable crime. Police numbers rose steadily until the First World War and 
by 1914, ratepayers were benefiting from preventive policing at its peak- The well-to- 
do generally appear to have received a cheap and considerate service that protected 
their property and pockets from considerably more than just crime. For the rest of the 
population, in the opinion of S. Petrow, by 1914 "the English judicial systern'came 
very near to as total a regulation of even petty - let alone serious - deviance as has 
ever been achieved""'. The caveat was that for many reports of the more serious 
crimes the odds were that nothing would or could be done. 
"Normally between 16 and 18 non-indictable prosecutions per officer per 
year. Calculated from the Judicial Statistics. 
"See the evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence,, Committee 
on the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, (1920), p. 86. 
"Petrow,, S., Policing Morals: The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office 
1870-1914, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 294. 
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IV 
The wide range of local and municipal duties undertaken by the police came under 
closer scrutiny as central government becarne more involved in financing the service 
during the course of the nineteenth century. This led the service to become more 
specific about its core functions. The 1856 County and Borough Police Act (19 and 
20 Vict. Cap. 69) had first introduced an element of central funding through an 
Exchequer grant of one quarter of the cost of pay and clothing, which was Paid in 
respect of those forces certified efficient by a newly appointed Inspectorate of 
Constabulary". This gave the Home Office, as the junior paymaster, some control 
over policing practice. At first the Home Office used the threat of withholding the 
certificate of efficiency mainly to ensure that sufficient numbers were maintained" 
Gradually, during the course of the nineteenth century, as police numbers rose to 
levels more adequate to maintain public order, the Home Office became concerned 
that its Departmental Vote was expended only on appropriate police duties and was 
not wasted generally subsidising the local rates or the work of other Government 
Ministries. The Home Office sought more control. In 1874, one of the Inspectors of 
Constabulary called for greater powers for the Secretary of State, "so that his rules 
and regulations should be binding on all police officers and constables throughout the 
46 Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 115. 
4'Emsley, C., The English Police, p. 92. 
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Kingdom"". To help achieve this, in that year, the Treasury grant was increased to 
one half the cost of pay and clothing" 
The problem facing the Home Office was that Departmental control, which sought 
a limited and economical use of taxes, necessarily conflicted with the basic practices 
of preventive policing which had always used the police across a range of local 
services for the general benefit of ratepayers. So at the same time as the Home Office 
was trying to limit police duties there was also going on, as Caroline Steedman has 
described it,, an "inspection fervour" with witnesses to various Select Committees in 
the 1860s and 1870s recommending large extensions in police duties. These included 
the inspection of factories, employed children, midwives and also truantslo. Similar 
calls to expand policing continued to be made throughout the nineteenth century. 
Meanwhile, the Home Office was forming a narrower notion of which duties were 
appropriate uses of the central grant, and which were not. By the early 1870s, 
according to Caroline Steedman, "there already existed an idea of what constituted 
the 'proper' duty of the police, and to make local police forces into the executive arm 
of local boards of guardians was no longer seen as an appropriate use of policemen" 51 
. 
411nspectors of Constabulary, 1874-5, P. P. 1876 (30), XXXIVA, p. 206. 
"Emsley, C., The English Police, p. 92. 
I'Steedman, C., Policing the Victorian Community, p. 54. 
p. 58. 
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However, not all local authorities accepted this limitation and continued, at least into 
the 1870s, to designate as policemen a number of their outside officials. 
For example, in 1873, W. P. Elgee, an Inspector of Constabulary, declined to grant a 
certificate of efficiency to the Nottingham police until extra officers were appointed 
to deal with crime in Radford and Sneinton. Samuel George Johnson, the Town 
Clerk, was authorised by the watch committee to reply; 
an addition of the number of men which you require to the Police Force 
would cause considerable dissatisfaction among the ratepayers... I am desired 
to call your attention to the fact there exist a number of Constables who are 
not as in other towns placed on the Police Force. The following persons are 
Constables in the employ of the Council, paid out of the Borough Fund, viz, 
- 
3 Watchmen at the Shambles, 5 Sanitary Inspectors, 3 Market Inspectors, 
Bath Keeper, 2 Inspectors of Weights, 3 Park Keepers, The Mayor's Sergeant, 
The Town Clerk's Messenger. These are performing kindred duties to those 
performed by the Police, and, in fact, are really acting in a secondary capacity 
as a Detective Force in the Town. I trust that under these circumstances you 
will feel justified in reporting that the Police Force is in a state of efficiency. " 
"Nottingham Borough Watch Committee, Report of the Watch Committee 
as to the ffirren-ie of the Police Force, Nottingham, Borough of Nottingham, 1873, pp. 
6-7. 
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Central and local government had become more functionally specialised in the 1870s 
than they had been at mid-century when many forces were founded. Legislation, such 
as the Public Health and Education Acts and the establishment of the Local 
Government Board in 1871 gave impetus to the creation of new offices and the 
functional separation of services and responsibilities". In other words, the growth of 
government encouraged, as the Webbs' were later to suggest in the Minority Poor 
Law Report, services being "organized around the kind of service rendered,, not 
around the type of person using that service" 54 . 
Because of this,, it was becoming increasingly difficult to use the police for the 
general and largely indiscriminate supervision of the residuum. Consequently, when 
Mr Elgee replied (in a less inflated lowercase), he informed the Town Clerk that a 
number of the 'police duties' enumerated by the Town Clerk had been compulsorily 
transferred to other departments and officers, such as Public Health; 
with respect to the duties of watchmen of the shambles, sanitary inspectors, 
market inspectors, park keepers, inspectors of weights and measures, bath 
keeper, &c., the inspection of weights and measures is the only one amongst 
them that the police are permitted to under-take. Market inspection has always 
"Evidence of Mr I. G. Gibbon, Minutes of Evidence for the Royal 
Commission on Local Government, pp. 4 ff. 
54 Searle, G. R., The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics 
and Political Thought, 1899-1914, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 239. 
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been prohibited, and since the passing of the Public Health Act, Government 
does not sanction the police acting as sanitary or nuisance inspectors". 
V 
The Home Office increasingly questioned the involvement of the police with at least 
two of its basic client groups, the vagrant and the drunk. These were coming to be 
problematized as cases of destitution, or even as medical concerns, and so remote 
from crime and the maintenance of order. By 1893, the Departmental Committee on 
the Criminal Statistics had moved towards the notion that they were not the proper 
responsibility of the Home Office; "the most common of all summary offences 
- 
drunkenness 
- 
is not in itself injurious either to persons or property, but it is a 
condition which tends to produce crimes against both persons and property. The 
offences against the Education Acts are still more remotely removed from the 
ordinary heads of crime. " 
56 
. 
By 1906, Troup had hardened his position against vagrancy and was arguing that "we 
don't want a Tramp Department in the H. O. "'. The Home Office had made the clear 
"Nottingham Borough Watch Committee, Report of the Watch Committee 
as to the Increase of the Police Force, p. 7. 
"Re-Dort of the Departmental Committee to revise the Criminal Portion of the 
Judicial Statistics, P. P. 1895 [C. 7725], CVIII. 1, p. 28. 
"Sir Edward Troup to Gladstone, April 13 1906, H. O. 45/10520/138276/2 
(continued ) 
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distinction between its core target group and the rest of the pauper class. The purpose 
of the Home Office was to deal with crime control, the Guardians were to deal with 
pauper control. In this view, crime and pauperism were neither synonymous nor 
interchangeable and nor was their funding. So, by 1898 the Criminal Statistics had 
decided, "It is possible that pauperism and crime are alternate episodes in the lives 
of some, and that of certain families some members become criminals, others receive 
poor relief, but there is no reason to believe that vagrants are 'essentially a criminal 
class""' 
Yet, the identification of crime with vagrancy had been one of the major reasons 
deployed in order to persuade counties to adopt police forces in the 1850s and only 
because of this identification had it been possible to portray crime as prevalent in 
rural areas". So by limiting the scope of crime largely to the indictable property 
offences, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, crime became increasingly 
focused in urban areas, while country areas found that their notions of what 
constituted crime control in a rural setting was increasingly disowned by the Home 
Office. Thus,, the dichotomy in the system of policing whereby the statistics of 
pauperism abounded in the counties, and particularly the South West, while 'real' 
"( 
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quoted in Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian 
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"Judicial Statistics, 1898, P. P. 1900 [Cd 123], CIII. 1, p. 5 1. Emphasis added. 
"Royal Commission on the Constabulary Force in Counties of England and 
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indictable crimes tended to be found in the towns and cities, increased". Since the 
workhouse was available and still locally controlled at the end of the nineteenth 
century, it was used as a rural alternative to prison. 
The politics and composition of local authorities also changed during the nineteenth 
century. Geographically by 1900, the elite urban middle classes were moving in large 
numbers into the suburbs, away from working class areas and so no longer had such 
a close interest in enforcing elite standards of decorum in the towns and citieS61 
Nationally, after 1884 and 1918 and, most decisively, locally after 1894" the 
franchise and the property qualification for civic office were greatly extended to the 
working classes. In some areas the social status of councillors declined and some 
working men and women were elected. As a result of these changes, some councils, 
particularly in urban areas became more sympathetic in their treatment of the newly 
enfranchised working classes. The moral stigma of pauperism increasingly came to 
be seen in the less blameworthy terms of unemployment. At the same time, it was 
becoming harder for the police to identify as a discrete entity a troublesome 
'residuum' of the working class. The upper and lower strata of the working class were 
becoming more unified by changes in the structure of the labour market, making the 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, P. P. 1900 [659], LXXXIX. 1, pp. 51-4. 
61 Savage, A. and Miles, M., The Remaking of the British Working Class, 
chapter 4. 
"Wiener,, M., Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 191. 
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distinction have less meaning". This was particularly true during the First World War 
when the size of the under-employed residuum greatly contracted 64 . 
vi 
Unsurprisingly, a parallel process of classification, individualization and of 
separating out groups according to service need, from what had been previously been 
a largely undifferentiated 'criminal class' was occurring simultaneously within the 
slow 'break up' of the Poor Law. Particularly after the late Victorian period, client 
groups were gradually removed and passed over to specialist departments such as 
education or the Board of Control". For example, within the pauper population as a 
whole,, the proportion classified as "insane and idiot persons", who were to be dealt 
with by specialist services, rose from 5.8 per cent to 11.4 per cent in the period 1873 
- 
1903 66 
"Savage, A. and Miles, M., The Remaking of the British Working Class, 
chapter 2. 
64 Thane, P. The Foundations of the Welfare State, p. 169. 
"Wiener,, M., Reconstructing the Criminal, chapter 5; Thane, P. The 
Foundations of the Welfare State, chapter 3. 
"Anon., 'The Cost of Government', Quarterly Review, 1906, Vol. 204, pp. I- 
25, @ pp. 14. 
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These alternative institutional developments were bolstered by the ideology of social 
Darwinism and were perhaps hastened by the persistent allegations of corrupt 'rings' 
of architects and builders pushing programmes of asylum and hospital building, and 
of the rapid growth of new vested interests of high-status central and municipal 
officers and allied professionals". Consequently, preventive policing, which was 
largely based upon the general repression and deterrence of a readily identifiable, and 
largely undifferentiated residuum, by low-status policemen had to hive-off sections 
of its client group to these powerful specialist agencies, many of whom actually 
wished to increase their clients and statistics rather than simply drive them away. 
The process of increasing functional specialisation continued into the twentieth 
century, partly under the impetus of the national efficiency movement, culminating 
in the Report of the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of Government in 1919" 
However, many local authorities still continued to see themselves less as providers 
of a range of specific services each working within parameters defined by 
functionally discrete central Departments, and more holistically as the general 
governors of their local area. Consequently, they wished to be responsible to one 
general Ministry of Local Government and to continue using the police as their 
'strong right arm"'. Haldane wanted to create a functionally discrete Ministry of 
6'lbid., pp. 18-20. 
"Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, P. P. 1918 [Cd 9230], 
xii. l. 
"Webb, S. & B., English Poor Law History, Part 11, 'The Last Hundred 
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Justice. Although, for political reasons this never came about, in the years after the 
First World War policing became more closely focused along judicial lines. As the 
police were moved away from being cheap servants of the local ratepayers, they 
appeared, to more traditionalist local authority leaders such as Harcourt Samuel, the 
Chairman of Ramsgate Civil Defence Committee, to be turning into "A cold soulless 
machine for the detection and prevention of crime as against the warm, helpful, 
strong right arm of the Chief Constable and his force"". 
Vil 
The Home Office was also accommodating itself to wider changes in legal and 
administrative thought. However, the judiciary and the legal profession were 
concerned that administrative measures did not go too far. From the end of the 
nineteenth century, Martin Loughlin has identified a dominant "normativist" model 
of the common law tradition,, of which Dicey was the exemplar,, which was based on 
a timeless vision of limited government, linking legality with traditional morality, 
and rooted in the authority and social cohesion of the pre-democratic, pre-industrial 
era. Against this, a "functionalist" model of the law was developing more in tune with 
modern bureaucratic growth. Functionalists offered an administrative challenge, 
which looked positively to the future,, supporting the evolving role of the state,, 
advocating a scientific approach to public affairs, and linlrdng law creatively with 
`( 
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social outcomes, rather than with morality. Loughlin sees "an almost complete lack 
of consensus between them"". 
Loughlin argues it was the normativist legal establishment, "operating hierarchically, 
defensively, and complacently", who held the dominant position within the legal 
profession, and they were "rooted in a belief in the ideal separation of powers and in 
the need to subordinate government to law. "". "Indeed, it could be argued that it is 
only problems which are set within this framework that are viewed by the legal 
community as being properly legal. "". As C. K. Allen later put it; "To any but those 
who desire to see a Sidney Webbian England it is essential that the bureaucratic mind 
be confined to its proper function, which is that of the lieutenant, not the captain"74 
. 
By the 1890s, the Civil Service was becoming a professional career. Within the 
Home Office,, a far smaller proportion of senior officials were from a legal 
background than had previously been so". Thus, within the Department career 
"Loughlin, M., Public Law and Political Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1992, pp. 59,240 ff. 
"Ibid., pp. 139,60. The following arguments have been influenced by chapter 
7 
73 Ibid., p. 139. 
"Quoted in ibid., p. 164. 
"Pellew, J. 'Law and Order: Expertise and the Victorian Home Office', in 
Macleod, R. M., Government and Expertise: Specialists, Administrators, and 
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bureaucrats, such as Sir Edward Troup, rather than lawyers, became "the captains" 
and this encouraged the functionalist, administrative model, that placed efficient 
management above morality or strict legality, to come to the fore. Of course, Home 
Office officials, being so closely involved in the administration and legitimation of 
the law, could not run the risk of provoking the legal establishment into complaining 
that they either lacked respect for the law or acted as if they were above it. 
Nonetheless, they saw little Litility in invoking the majesty and cost of the law for or 
against the majority of injured parties and offenders who to them appeared to be petty 
and insignificant individuals across most of the measures of social and individual 
functionality that had been developed in the nineteenth century. 
Martin Wiener has charted the intellectual and cultural shifts of Victorian and 
Edwardian criminal justice policy and how these produced a weakened and less 
responsible image of the criminal that was more amenable to administration than 
justice; 
Both the humanitarian and the social control tendencies of post-Victorian 
penal policy were crucially shaped by the replacement of a Victorian image 
of humanity by a less potentially dangerous but also less powerful image; the 
human material with which the mak-ers of policy had to deal appeared both 
weaker and less autonomous. This shift in images linked criminal policy with 
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general social policy, itself increasingly preoccupied with national 
inefficiency". 
The growth of their power led bureaucrats to feel "A new confidence" in their "ability 
to reconstruct successfully the character of deviants in the everyday life of society,, 
1177 with less use of penal institutions or even criminal sanctions 
. 
The utility of 
criminal justice appeared, to them, more marginal to the well-being of society than 
it had been when the foundations of the modern police service were completed in 
1857. Bureaucrats felt themselves safely in control of the population and this allowed 
the image of criminals to appear less dangerous, allowing other Departments and 
services to train, contain, or otherwise dispose of them without the cumbersome 
intervention of the criminal law. 
However, for the judiciary, the concept of moral guilt and strict individual 
responsibility was still very much alive. A "lack of consensus" between the legal 
'normativists' and the 'functionalists' developed in criminal justice. By the mid- 
twentieth century, it was clear how far apart the camps had become. For example, the 
conservative barrister Herber Hart argued that the role of criminal justice to be the 
enforcement of the traditional English individualistic "moral feelings and sympathies 
of the people", against morally responsible offenders in the courtS78. On the other 
"Wiener,, M. 
, 
Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 381. 
77 Ibid., p. 374. 
7'Hart,, H. L., The Way to Justice: A Primer of Legal Reform, Geor e Allen 9 
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hand, functionalists, such as Glanville Williams, wished to make the law reflect 
modern administrative ideals, by passing socially protective legislation, and by 
preventing or treating crime scientifically through the increasing use of medicine, 
psychology, social work, treatment tribunals and expert sentencing boards". The 
implication was that many crimes, particularly by juveniles, were the result of 
wealmess and individual inefficiency and should be decriminalized, removed from 
the courts and from moral opprobrium and treated as a problem of moral welfare. 
Yet the main clash between the two camps did not explicitly involve criminal law. 
It concerned the growing practice of Departmental bureaucrats to govern using 
delegated powers to avoid the checks of Parliament and the courts when they 
introduced new regulations. Particularly as a result of the local government reforms 
of the 1880s and 1890s, and the rise of Labour in the twentieth century, much of the 
content of the conflict was also about social legislation delegated to local authorities 
who were coming under Progressivist and then Labour control and were using their 
powers for, what the conservative legal hierarchy considered to be illegitimate 
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collectivist or socialist ends". The problem for the Home Office was the reaction of 
politicians, the public and the judiciary if the police became deeply embroiled and 
were closely identified as "the strong arm and the advance guard of municipal 
reform" 
81 
. 
This had become a distinct possibility by the late nineteenth century, as more and 
more novel regulatory and administrative legislation was introduced by Ministries 
that was outside the traditional moral ambit of the common law yet was subject to 
enforcement under the criminal law and by the police. This legislation was 
denounced by the judicial hierarchy as being not really criminal but was portrayed 
instead as only some illegitimate technical or administrative criminality 
- 
mala 
prohibita. The normativists wanted to keep the fixed and traditional moral base of the 
traditional common law crimes and little else, while functionalist administrators 
wanted much wider powers made available to them to control public behaviour, and 
for managers to be able to exercise those powers with a discretion and flexibility alien 
to the normativist legal tradition. 
Yet,, within the Criminal Department of the Home Office,, there was scope for 
compromise. Peter Hennessey has described the Home Office as "Whitehall's 
charlady mopping up the pools of activity that did not fit tidily into any other 
institutional container. As activities grew, they were spun off into separate 
. 
"See Hewart, Lord, The New Despotism. 
"Cohen, P.,, 'Policing the Working Class City', p. 120. 
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departments or transferred to others"". By the 1890s the Home Office was already 
spinning off non-indictable work and attempting further to limit the Criminal 
Department to indictable crime". So, if the number of police prosecutions and the 
label of criminality could further be reduced from non-indictable offences it would 
remove the police from the risk of judicial criticism; inhibit progressive local 
authorities from using the police to enforce their novel collectivist regulations; avoid 
Home Office money being applied to the functional work of other Departments and 
local authorities; allow many drunks, layabouts and other inefficients to be treated, 
trained or detained by functionally appropriate specialists rather than the law; and 
enable the Criminal Department to do its core work- more efficiently as well as cut 
down on prison expenditure for non-indictable fine defaulters. This would have the 
added benefit of appearing to keep the Home Office, the police and the criminal law 
out of politics. 
Moreover,, the Home Office could argue that it was not necessarily suggesting that 
the courts were not appropriate institutions to deal with much of the work it was 
shedding since it was still open to individuals and corporate bodies to prosecute 
offences in the civil courts, usually as a tort; often "both criminal and civil 
proceedings arise from the same incidents or acts... The community's remedy is 
"Hennessy, P., Whitehall, p. 28. 
"See chapter VI. 
(151) 
criminal; the individual's civil"". Sir John MacDonnell gave an insight into the 
official thinking. 
Crime and litigation are, it has been suggested, so closely connected that there 
must be similar fluctuations in both... Nor will this surprise anyone who 
Imows how capricious are the divisions between many parts of the Civil and 
Criminal law, how often law suits have an origin similar to that of many 
crimes, and how much of an accident it may sometimes be whether a dispute 
will end in the Central Criminal Court or the Royal Courts of Justice". 
Research needs to be done to discover if any overt compromise was reached between 
the Home Office and the legal establishment to forestall the clash between 
normativists and administrators over criminal law, that was developing between the 
judiciary and other Departments. By and large, the police did not become involved 
in these clashes since, despite perennial police protests in the twentieth century of 
being over-loaded with miscellaneous duties, it became the normal practice for 
Ministries and local authority departments to employ their own inspectors and 
enforcement officers to investigate and institute prosecutions for regulatory 
offences". 
"Giles,, F. T., The Magistrates' Courts, Penguin, rev. ed., 195 1, pp. 3 9,40 
"Macdonnel, J. 'Statistics of Litigation in England and Wales', Journal of the 
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861, But call the policeman an enforcement officer, give him no specific training (continued 
... 
) 
(152) 
The growth of inspectors and enforcement officers also addressed the problem of how 
to apply new criminal laws, which often dealt with employers or people of social 
standing who had to be treated with respect. Although a number of 'regulatory' 
offences could involve deaths and maimings of employees and the public, the use of 
police officers in these circumstances would have been regarded insulting and 
inappropriate by high status offenders. As Alan Norrie argued, "It is as difficult to 
imagine a general system of law enforcement of the lower social classes, based upon 
advice,, consultation and warning as it is to imagine an orthodox label of guilt being 
imposed on factory owners by a system of vigourous policing. 1187 . 
Many functionalists agreed with non-nativists that traditional methods of policing and 
the criminal courts were inappropriate for of the newly legislated modern crimes. 
They, too, felt that the scope of the criminal law should remain limited, but they 
disagreed with nonnativists by arguing that the good of society would often be better 
protected by "other agencies" in addition to the criminal courts. The membership of 
these bodies might be composed of administrators and'experts' rather than lawyers". 
Suitable subjects for these "other agencies" might include anti-social business 
"( 
... 
continued) 
in his responsibilities, keep him out of uniform, make him a civil servant without 
local control, free him from the supervision of A Chief Constable and a Watch 
Committee 
- 
and, then, for some reason, he may be entrusted with infinitely more 
power. ". Economist, 1950, Vol. 159, (25 November 1950), p. 866. 
"Norrie, A., Crime, Reason and History, p. 89 
"Mannheim, H. Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction, p. 3 
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practices, industrial relations,, monopolies and the social aspects of family life. These 
fields would become the preserve of experts and planners, with the criminal law only 
being invoked in exceptional circumstances. However, these agencies would often 
come under other Departments and so would not affect the Home Office which could 
continue to manage the decaying, common law side of criminal business. 
So generally, with the support of both sides, the police, although technically 
responsible, were kept away from new legislation. Apart from wartime regulations, 
the major escalations of police enforcement of non-indictable laws in the interwar 
period were of eugenicist standards of street morality, anti-gambling and 
administrative regulation of road traffic. In these instances, it could be argued that the 
police were merely extending their traditional duties. Nonetheless, the Home Office 
was subjected to normativist criticism over them. As the Metropolitan magistrate, Sir 
Chartres Biron put it; "Whenever any serious attack is made upon the police it almost 
always arises out of acts made offences by the law but not regarded as such by a large 
number of the population 1189 - 
For the Home Office, the bottom line for cutting back the policing of non-indictable 
offences was economic. Figures given in 1902 indicate quite clearly that in terms of 
increased funding, criminal justice was becoming the poor relation of education, the 
poor law and even the insane asylums, all of whom now took over some of the 
"Biron, Sir C., 'The Public and the Police: A Magistrate's View', Police 
Joumal, 1930, Vol. 3, pp. 164-175, @ p. 170 
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traditional client groups of the police". In Lancashire, for example, the police, as a 
percentage of county revenue expenditure, declined from 39.9 per cent in 1890-91 to 
17.4 per cent in 1904-05". Education, in particular was a formidable competitor. The 
Home Office, therefore, was forced to focus its very limited criminal justice resources 
on very limited goals. It had to suggest "that public sentiment no longer insists so 
much as it did formerly on the punishment of offences"" and that the police spent too 
much of their time pro secuting 'non-crime' related duties. Although it was impossible 
to give a complete costing of crime, it said, "as to the public expenditure in the 
detection or punishment of crime, it is to be noted that duties only remotely 
connected with crime may be included in the figures usually quoted, for example, in 
figures as to the cost of the police, a very large proportion of whose duties does not 
in any way relate to the detection or suppression of crime"". The economic argument 
in favour of decriminalization of 'minor' offences was strengthened by the opinion of 
the former head of the prison service, Sir Edmund du Cane, who suggested that 
reducing non-indictable commitments would reduce the prison population" 
"Judicial Statistics, 1902, P. P. 1904 [Cd 2010], CVII. I, p. 50. 
"Davie, A. F., 'Police to 1929' in Marshall, J. D. (with the assistance of 
McClintock, M. E. ) ed., The History of Lancashire County Council: 1889-1974, 
Martin Robertson and Co., 1977, p. 417, n. 17. 
91ludicial Statistics, 1898, p. 25. 
"Judicial St istics, 1902, p. 50. 
94judicial Statistics, 1898, p. 22. 
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Vill 
Until after the First World War, the pace of change in policing was slow. Year after 
year, growing numbers of Victorian and Edwardian policemen had hoped to reassure 
the public by walking the same beats at the same slow pace, by moving on or 
arresting a few drunk-s and vagrants, by reporting almost the same number of 
indictable crimes (and 'cuffing' the reports of far more), and by prosecuting about the 
same number of people (often prosecuting the same persons, year after year, for 
pretty much the same offences), all the time complacently claiming great 
effectiveness in reducing crime on the unrelated basis that the population was 
growing". Yet, by the inter-war period, the Home Office, and also many local 
authorities, found it hard to accept that a policeman "was good enough if he could 
rope in a few tramps each week and if he could lock-up a few drunken persons"96 
. 
The s harper distinction being drawn between indictable crime, which was considered 
the real work of the Criminal Department of the Home Office, and most non- 
indictable offences, which were not, was placing traditional preventive policing under 
"The Judicial Statistics for 1906 demonstrates the constancy of policing 
activity providing comparative tables of offences known and prosecuted for each year 
since 1857. For a considerable number of offences the figures are almost identical for 
1857 and 1906. Judicial Statistics, P. P. 1906 [Cd 3929], CXXIII. l. 
961 Aytee'writing in the Howard Journal, 1942, Vol. 6, (No. 2, Autumn 1942), 
pp. 112-15, @ p. 114. 
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threat and beginning to shift the balance away, in the long-term, from preventive 
policing towards fire-brigade policing of indictable offences and their detection. 
(157) 
Chapter VI: The Statistical Revision of 1893 
I 
When the Criminal Statistics were up-dated in 1893 following a public campaign 
originating within the Home Office', one aim was to produce a series of statistics of 
comparable prestige to continental productions. But, fundamentally, the purpose of 
the new form of the statistics was, as H. B. Simpson, an Assistant Secretary at the 
Home Office wrote in an pseudonymous letter of propaganda to the Times, to 
"corroborate the decrease in crime 
- 
prove in fact, that it is a decaying branch of 
business"'. Ironically, the timing of Simpson's letter may partly have been due to the 
ending of Treasury control as a result of merging the separate Exchequer grant for 
prosecutions into general local authority receipts following the 1888 Local 
Government Act. Prosecutions, which had being falling since the last peak in 1882, 
looked as though they might continue to decline indefinitely now that local 
authorities were able to transfer their prosecution funds elsewhere. If public 
'Radzinowicz, Sir L., and Hood, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy in 
Victorian and Edwardian England, p. 104. 
'Letter from H. B. Simpson, Assistant Secretary, Home Office, Times 1 
February 1892, p. 9. 
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confidence in criminal justice was to continue, and if deterrence was to be 
maintaine 
, 
some central control had to be reapplied over prosecutions. 
As previously argued, the Home Office wanted to reduce the scope and discussion 
of 'real' crime largely to the indictable offences 
- 
matters that concerned "the Criminal 
Department of the Home Office"' so Edward Troup, then a senior clerk, urged in 
1891 that the Department needed to draw a firm line "between crimes and mere 
police offences"'. Effectively this implied decriminalizing some, or cutting back on 
the prosecution of other non-indictable offences. Moreover, the tighter identification 
of crime with indictable offences was intended to confound the critics who said crime 
was rising and who called for more expenditure on the grounds that the huge increase 
in non-indictable offences in the Victorian and Edwardian period more than cancelled 
out the fall in indictable offences'. 
Since a major component of the 1893 revision was to make the indictable statistics 
fit to use as the leading indicator of crime one of the primary statistical chores was 
retrospectively to produce a series of indictable proceedings back to 1857 that 
included summary cases as well as cases heard in the higher courts. The Home Office 
also created the modern run of statistics called 'Crimes Known to the Police' which 
'Judicial Statistics, 1901, P. P. 1903 [Cd 1441], LXXXIII. I, p. 11. 
Comments on memorandum on Prison Acts amendment Bill, 1891, HO 
45/9840/B10768/1. Quoted in Wiener, M., Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 333. 
'Ibid., p. 333. 
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was again taken back to 1857, by adding together various figures contained in the 
earlier statistics, although this obviously did not find any of the extra crimes that had 
been known to the police in the past but had not been prosecuted or reported at the 
time'. Consequently, until after the First World War, this series did little more than 
confirm the efficiency of the police by mak-ing it appear that for most offences,, in 
most years, there were only approximately one third more crimes known to the police 
than there were indictable prosecutions'. Consequently, the Criminal Statistics, 
wamed that the statistics for committals were more reliable than the police statistics'. 
11 
So, the new format of statistics provided the Home Office with a much greater degree 
of control over the 'facts' of crime, and a platform to justify policy in the long 
introductions to the statistics. The increasing focus on indictable crime moved 
criminal justice further than before towards property crime. This was because 
technical and financial difficulties with the burden of proof, the rules of evidence' and 
Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Revise the Criminal 
Portion of the Judicial Statistics. 
'See the comment, for example, Judicial Statistics, 1898, p. 14. 
'Radzinowicz, Sir L, and Hood,, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy in 
Victorian and Edwardian England, p. 105. 
'Judicial Statistics, 1894, pp. 26 ff. See also Williams, G. W., The Proof of 
Guilt,. 
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with summary jurisdiction and the expense of witnesses, made it very difficult to 
bring indictable prosecutions for anything other than property crimes 
- 
if there was 
to be a high chance of success. This is why most assaults, if prosecuted, were treated 
as non-indictable offences. As the main focus of criminal policy was cut back to a 
core of indictable crime, although "the number of acts committed that may constitute 
an assault in law is indefinitely large" 10, the number of criminal prosecutions for 
assaults became increasingly small. Offences of violence and in particular assaults, 
were slowly bled out of the system 11. By 193 7, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police was arguing that "Statistically, indictable crime is practically synonymous 
with theft or stealing in the broadest sense of the words" 
12 
. 
The official line was that offences of violence were declining not because of 
difficulties in bringing indictable prosecutions, or because non-indictable 
prosecutions were being cut back, or because property crime was considered more 
important, but because the nation was generally becoming more civilized. The main 
specific factor influencing violence was always said to be drink, but as late as 1893, 
"Judicial Statistics, 1895, P. P. 1897 [8352], C. 1, p. 13. 
"For the present-day reluctance of the police to prosecute assault see Cretney, 
A., Davis, G., Clarkson, C., and Shepherd, J., 'Criminalizing Assault: The failure of 
the Offence Against Society Model', in British Journal of Criminology, 1994, Vol. 
34, pp. 15-29. 
"Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1937, P. P. 1937-8 [Cmd 5761], XIV. 561, 
p. 6. 
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the Rome Office also said drunkenness "is a condition which tends to produce crimes 
against both persons and property"". By 1899, the policy had changed. It now argued 
crimes against property "would not be affected by drunk-enness" ". This severed a 
major connection between the statistics of indictables and non-indictables and 
encouraged the expectation that it was normal for them to rise and fall independently 
since the bulk of indictable offences did not involve violence or drink. 
In this reading of official policy there is little hard evidence to support the traditional 
Whig historiography that a civilising 'evolution' of crime away from violence and into 
less brutal indictable property offences was inevitable. There was, however an 
economic and bureaucratic logic to it. During the 1890s, recorded crime in England 
reached fell while in Scotland it rose. This was partly because the English statistics 
through their narrowing focus on indictable crime, which was effectively offences 
against property, had removed from the debate what was thought to be the major 
category of crime in Scotland 
- 
disorder and drink-. In all probability England was no 
more 'civilised'than Scotland, itjust produced different statistics by classifying crime 
in a more limited way. 
"Report of the Departmental Committee to revise the Criminal Portion of the 
Judicial Statistics, p. 28. 
14 Judicial Statistics, 1899, P. 17. 
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III 
For the first six years of its existence, the figure of 'Crimes Known to the Police' fell, 
from 86,396 in 1893 until it reached its all-time low of 76,025 at the end of 1899. 
During 1899 the police statistics fell in every month, compared with the previous 
year, and in December, the final month of the century, they fell by a massive 18 per 
cent compared with the average for 1894-8 to reach their all-time low". For the first 
time since their creation, the introduction prioritised 'Crimes Known to the Police' 
-bove the number of committals as the leading index of crime. Although the figures au 
had not existed a decade earlier, it described the police figures as "a much better test 
than it was twenty or even ten years ago" ". No explanation was given to justify this 
conclusion. This appeared to be a spectacular vindication of the Home Office policy, 
as the century closed, that "crime is diminishing" 
17 
. 
The figures were all the more surprising since in Scotland that year there was an 
"immense increase" in criminal work. In complete contrast to the English and Welsh 
experience, where there was the lowest number of crimes recorded, 1899 was the 
record year for crime in Scotland with the highest number of crimes ever recorded". 
Altogether, these circumstances suggest that the 1899 figure of 76,025 crimes had 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 11. 
'6lbid., p. 11. 
17 Ibid. p. 71. 
"Judicial Statistics, Scotland, 1899, P. P. 1900 [Cd 407], C111.645, p. 6. 
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been set as a management target, particularly since this figure was just 2 crimes less 
than exactly three-quarters (75.00 per cent) of the all-time peak figure of 10 1,3 69 in 
1868. 
The convenient distribution of the figures suggests that they were faked centrally at 
the Home Office. 4,, 002 out of the total 6,401 fall in the number of crimes in England 
and Wales between 1898 and 1899 came from just two areas; the Metropolis and 
Lancashire". This conveniently left exactly 1,999 crimes for the rest of the police 
forces to share out between themselves. Although there should be no logical 
connection between the two, the Metropolitan reduction of 1,559 crimes was almost 
exactly four times a figure given in the previous year's statistics for the crime rate per 
100,000 for a Metropolitan area (3 91.5 6x 4= 1566 see below p. 17 1). Similarly, the 
Lancashire fall of 2,443 crimes was exactly four times the crime rate for a seaport, 
such as Liverpool (611.10 x 4=2,444). 
How were these remarkable figures achieved? Some forces reduced the number of 
crimes reported in 1899 by slashing the ratio of reported crime to prosecutions. This 
may in part have been related to a new Home Office instruction to report all cases 
except where it turns out that a crime was "not committed"". Following this, the new 
chief constable of Manchester introduced a new system of book-keeping in 1899 
which allowed him to "strike out every case of reported crime where they are not 
19judicial. Statistics, 1899, P. 13. 
"Judicial, Statistics, 1900, P. P. 1902 CXVII, p. 17. 
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satisfied that a crime was actually committed". As a result, the proportion of crimes 
prosecuted in Manchester to the number of crimes reported for the years 1893,1898, 
1899 and 1900 was 53 per cent, 48 per cent, 68 per cent and 105 per cent. In 1898 
Manchester reported 3,484 'Crimes Known to the Police', by 1901 this had slumped 
to 1,705 crimes. However, indictable prosecutions actually rose in that period from 
1,649 to 1,783. By 1900 the Manchester police were, therefore, reporting less crimes 
than they were prosecuting". These figures seem also to have been used by the local 
watch committee to justify their attempt to reduce manpower in Manchester". 
IV 
Although the Victorian and Edwardian public believed the crime figures to be 
accurate,, effectively, the new figure of 'Crimes Known to the Police' appears to have 
been set up in the 1890s to act as an easily read, recalibration of the officially- 
approved thermometer of the state of crime. The Home Office argued that the figures 
should not be used to reach any conclusion on the "amount of crime actually 
committed" but "it is now generally recognised that no surer method is available for 
arriving at a conclusion" whether crime was increasing or decreasing23 
. 
Thus, the 
absolute figures did not matter, what was important, officials stressed, was whether 
"Ibid., p. 17. 
"Redford, A., The History of Local Government in Manchester, Vol. 3, 
Longmans, 1940,3 Vols. pp. 15 ff. 
23 Judicial Statistics, 1896, p. 11. 
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they went up or down. Perhaps this idea for a recalibration occurred when the 
statistics of 'crimes Imown to the police' were retrospectively reconstructed and it was 
discovered that the maximum reached in 1868 was virtually 100,000 crimes. This 
appears to have tempted officials to establish an equally memorable lower limit at 
about 75,, 000 crimes to coincide with the end of the century. The obvious analogy is 
with the recalibration of the thermometer from Fahrenheit to more easily understood 
centigrade. So the number of crimes recorded by the police appear to have been 
designed to range between 'crime frozen out' (75,000 crimes) and 'boiling point' 
(100,000) passing through 'normal' at just below 90,000 crimes. 
These clear upper and lower limits made the 'crimes known' much simpler for the 
public to understand than the total figure of indictable prosecutions, which could only 
be discovered after both summary hearings and trials had been added together. It also 
suggested to the public that the overall extent of the problem of crime was Imown to 
the police and under their control. So while the number of prosecutions continued to 
be regarded officially by the Home Office as the definitive index of crime, 'crimes 
Imown to the police', so long as it confirmed the total number of prosecutions, was 
used as a popular alternative to guide the average uninstructed subject, or politician, 
towards whatever conclusions officials suggested in the new discursive Introduction 
to their Statistics. 
With one major proviso, the scale on the thermometer was only symbolic; had the 
public been habituated always to expect, say, the present-day figure of 5,000,000 
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crimes a year (and it sounds no less fantastic to suppose that, on average, each of the 
40,000 or so late Victorian policeman heard of over two crimes a week, rather than 
the official figure of two a year), the public would probably have read the 
thermometer in much the same way. What mattered was that there was a "normal" 
level of crime and this was always contained within well-established upper and lower 
limits. 
The proviso is that to provide a general deterrence, prosecutions and punishments 
could not appear to fall far short of the number of offences committed. Throughout 
the Victorian and Edwardian period, there were normally about three indictable 
crimes reported as Imown to the police for two prosecutions". Had the figure been 
5,000,000 crimes known to the police, the cost to the Victorian ratepayer and 
taxpayer of policing, trial, and punishment, would have been far greater. Yet, even 
had prosecutions somehow been made to rise in line with increased crime reporting, 
officials might have felt that the policy was no more effective. Criminal justice policy 
was ultimately based on bluff and deterrence, and officials already believed the public 
had accepted their propaganda that very few got away with committing crime. 
"Mitchell, B. R. British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. By 1925, this ratio had worsened to one prosecution for every 
two Qffences recorded, Judicial Statistics, 1925, P. P. 1927 [Cmd 2811], XXV. 201, 
p. 4. 
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V 
After 1893, the statistics were also used as a managerial tool to increase central 
control and impose uniformity on police forces and magistrates' benches. 
Consequently, the Department demanded the achievement of "greater uniformity in 
the reports of Head Constables" so that forces could be compared". The Introduction 
to the published Statistics then instructed, monitored and publicised details of those 
forces that deviated from the 'norm'. The Home Office used the statistics to monitor 
reports of specific offences, and offenders both locally and nationally, and to 
maintain norms for them, extending over ten, twenty or even seventy years or more" 
For example, when the editor of the Criminal Statistics recorded that a total of 6,777 
motor offences had been reported for the two successive years 1905 and 1906, he 
noted that "the offences in connection with motor cars have reached a level which 
may be regarded as normal"". This was also the case with the proportion of young 
offenders. In 1896, the Home Office extended statistics back to 1836 to 
commemorate the Queen's Jubilee and in both 1836 and 1896 40.58 per cent, of 
indictable offenders were under 2 128. More generally, as late as 1925, the Home 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 68. 
"Re-Dort of the Departmental Committee to revise the Criminal Portion of the 
Judicial Statistics, (1895), p. 10. 
27 Judicial Statistics, 1906, P. P. 1908 CXXIII, p. 16. 
"Calculated from Judicial Statistics, 1896, p. 24. 
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Office described the average of 90,943 'crimes known to the police' for the 68 year 
perlo 1857-1925 was about the "normal" number it expected to be committed in any 
year". When the table was created in the mid- 18 90s 91,671 indictable offences were 
put down as known to the police in 1857 and fifty years later, in 1906, despite a 
trebling of police numbers, a doubling of the population, major changes to criminal 
law and procedure, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, and other enormous 
social upheavals, this had fallen by just 6 crimes to 91,665". 
In other words, after 1893 the Home Office appears to have set up a system whereby 
it could monitor and control very long-term fluctuations in crime over decades, and 
separate local variations from underlying trends and keep them to constant long-term 
norms. Comments as late as the 1925 edition of the Criminal Statistics suggest the 
Home Office was still intending, even then, to maintain crime within the fixed upper 
and lower limits of about 75,, 000 and 100,, 000 crimes a year established in the 1890s 
and with a long-term average of about 90,000 crimes a year". 
"Judicial Statistics 1925, pp. 1-2. 
"Between 1857 and 1918, the standard deviation was 7,300, the mean was 
89,000, and the maxima and minima were 105,000 and 76,000. Perhaps Sir Frank 
Newsam was aware of the irony when he quoted Mr Justice Stephen, 'The King's 
Peace is the legal name for the normal state of society'. Newsam, Sir F., The Home 
Office, New Whitehall Series, George Allen and Unwin, 1954, p. 29. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1925, Introduction. 
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Within the constraints of its long-term budget of 90,000 indictable crimes per year, 
the Home Office had to do the best it could. Behind the headline figures a lot of 
ad ustments were being made in the distribution of crime and police work. The i 
Criminal Statistics were used to help re-prioritise, re-target and reallocate crime and 
criminal justice resources. In the 1890s, the Criminal Statistics provided police chiefs 
and police authorities with tables of normal prosecution rates, conviction rates, 
seasonal indices relating to temperature and so on for the different types of forces. It 
looked at local variations in indictable crime in general, crimes against property, 
violence and drunlc, -enness for different types of areas. It also provided an embryonic 
league table of crime for selected police districts". As with prison administration, the 
official statistics enabled "the effects of 'advanced' and 'backward' regimes" to be 
compared and a considerable degree of uniformity to be imposed on forces" 
The Home Office was not doing anything particularly new by setting police 
authorities crime targets or budgets, these had obviously been put in place in 1857, 
and had probably existed long before that. By the end of the 1860s, the Criminal 
Statistics show that police authorities had already established their normal quotas of 
crime and these were mostly adhered to for most of the rest of the nineteenth century. 
Initially, as the new series of Criminal Statistics was establishing itself after 1857, 
there was, at the very least, some central co-ordination in the share-out of crime 
between the boroughs, the counties and the Metropolis. Further study may show that 
"Ibid. p. 30. 
"McConville, S.,, A History of English Prison Administration, pp. 259-60. 
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crime was specifically allocated according to demographic and geographic 
conditions. 
One particularly crude example illustrates this. In 1866, of 2,708 burglaries for the 
whole of England and Wales, exactly 7/16ths (43.76 per cent) of the total number 
occurred in the area policed by the county forces (1,185 burglaries), an identical 
proportion (43.72 per cent) was reported by the borough forces (1,184 burglaries), 
leaving exactly one burglary in eight (12.52 per cent) for the Metropolis (330 
burglaries in the Metropolitan Police District and 9 in the City of London)". This 
example may signify that the Home Office statistical clerks lacked the resources to 
collate the statistical returns", or that the returns were not forthcoming and so they 
had to make up the figures, but it clearly shows that the Home Office expected that 
crime should be fairly distributed between boroughs, counties and London. 
"Calculated from Judicial Statistics,, 1866, P. P. 1867 [3919], LXVI. 523, p. 
xill. 
"The Judicial Statistics were at this time the "poor relation" of the Home 
Office and staff were over-worked, Radzinowicz, Sir L., and Hood, R., The 
Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian and Edwardian England, p. 94. F. S. Leslie, 
the editor of the statistics in 1862 wrote that he had experienced "much difficulty and 
anxiety" compiling the retums, Judicial Statistics, 1862, P. P. 1863 [3181], LXV. 437, 
p. 3 
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WI-iatever the original geographical allocation of the crime rate, demographic changes 
over the decades meant that by the 1890s there were gross disparities in the local rates 
of crime which had tended to remain fixed at absolute numbers despite both relative 
and absolute population changes. After 1893, it became possible for the Home Office 
to make a realistic attempt to reallocate and maintain crime 'co-efficients' more in line 
with policy and population. 
For example, in 1894, general types of police areas such as the Metropolis, mining 
and manufacturing districts, seaports, pleasure towns, agricultural districts and the 
Home Counties were defined in the statistics and each type was provided with its 
'normal' crime rate, apparently based on the average rates of the forces allotted to 
each type. 'Manufacturing towns' were said to have a rate of 351.54 crimes per 
100,000, 'seaports'had 643.30 and'pleasure towns'had 265.79. The Metropolis was 
described as having 3 economic components; the 'greatest seaport', the 'largest 
manufacturing town' and 'the chief pleasure resort'. The crime rate for the Metropolis 
was given as 416.77 per 100,000 which, on calculation, turns out to be 99.17 per cent 
of the average crime rate (420.24) of its three economic components". Updated 
'norms' for these areas were set again in 1898, to allow for the fall in the amount of 
crime both absolute and relative to the growth in population and, more importantly 
to reflect changes a number of forces had already made to their figures. The 
36 Calculated from Judicial Statistics, 1894, P. P. 1896 [C. 8072], XCVI. I, p. 
22. 
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Metropolis' crime 'co-efficient' in the table fell to 391.36 per 100,000 but was still 
102.67 per cent of its three componentS37. 
Although a detailed study needs to be undertaken to evaluate how successful the 
Home Office was in bringing other forces into line, there seems to have been almost 
complete success in the case of Liverpool's crime rate in the decade ending 1902. 
Although seaports had the highest crime rate of all types, at the beginning of the 
1890s, Liverpool had massively more crime than others. When the new series of 
statistics commenced in 1893, the city had 1034.64 crimes per 100,0003'. This was, 
by a large margin, the highest level of crime in the country. In 1898, the Criminal 
Statistics set a target crime rate of 611.10 for all indictable offences in seaports with 
575.00 for crimes against property alone". Between 1893 and 1902, under the Head 
Constableship of Sir John Nott Bower, the Liverpool rate fell. By 1902, it had 
reached 611.41 crimes per 100,000, or 100.05 per cent of the 1898 target for all 
indictable crimes,, and 566.79 for offences against property (98.57 per cent of 
target) 40 
. 
Thus, by the end of the decade it appeared that the two largest crime- 
producing towns, London and Liverpool, were well under control. Birmingham, too, 
had fallen into line in 1899, showing its ambitions by assuming a Metropolitan rate 
"Calculated from Judicial Statistics, 1898, p. 3 1. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 66. 
"Judicial Sta istics, 1898, p. 3 1. 
40 Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 66. The target had not been revised in the 
Statistics since 1898. 
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of 3 91.66 crimes per 100,000". This was appeared to be a major step towards central 
control of the distribution of reported crime. 
similar effort to produce uniformity can be seen with the two county areas 
identified as having the lowest crime rates in 1894; Cornwall and Cardigan 42 
. 
In 
1899, when most forces succeeded in producing falls in crime, crime in Cornwall and 
Cardigan was allowed to rise by 14 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. 
vi 
Between 1893 and 1899 there was also an effort made to create greater uniformity in 
the proportion between crimes reported by the police and apprehensions. The 
intention seems to have been to set a 70 per cent target nationally. In 1890,74 per 
cent of crimes known to the police led to apprehensions. By 1899 this had fallen to 
70 per cent. However, in London the apprehension rate had been well below the nonn 
at 63.48 per cent. This rose steadily until it reached 69.22 per cent in 1899. In the rest 
of the country the reverse happened and the rate fell over the decade from 78.70 per 
cent to 70.43 per cent in 1899, producing an average of 70.11 per cent. 70 per cent 
continued to remain the official clear-up rate for indictable crime, in the statistics and 
policy statements until the Second World War" 
'Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 70. 
42 Judicial Statistics, 1894, p. 22. 
43 See comments by the Home Secretary, Herbert Samuel, Times, 16 April (continued 
... 
) 
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There was also an attempt to set norms for conviction rates both nationally and within 
the different classes of indictable offences, and for the higher courts and the summary 
courts". The Welsh counties came at the bottom of the league for successful 
prosecutions but, in general, conviction rates had increased since 1860. In the higher 
courts, the conviction rate for criminal offences was identical to that for civil cases 
(about 82 per cent), indicating the close links between civil litigation and crime". 
Vil 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the changes and increased central control of criminal justice 
was also, to a lesser extent, occurring in the civil courts. Sir John Macdonnel was 
closely involved in both developments. He was editor of the Civil Judicial Statistics 
and was closely consulted on criminal matters by the Home Office, to the extent that 
he edited a number of editions of the Criminal Statistics". Underlying both sets of 
reforms was the desire to increase economy and efficiency through central supply- 
side control. In 1898, "for the first time ever" Macdonnell attempted to cost the 
"( 
... 
continued) 
1932, p. 7. 
44 Judicial Sta istics, 1894, pp. 26-32. 
45 Judicial Statistics, (Part II, Civil) 1894, p. 46. 
"Radzinowicz, Sir L., and Hood, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy in 
vi lian England, p. 104. 
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income and expenditure of courts, using Home Office statistical staff as assistantS47. 
The most obvious constraint on growth in the system was that the salaries of judges 
and officers was rising and amounted to 45.31 per cent of expenditure in 1894-8 48 
. 
Without extra judge power, which was rarely granted because of the cost to the 
Exchequer, the system could not expand and this inability to increase supply probably 
accounted for some of the great inflation of litigation costs in the nineteenth century. 
Thus9 with a restricted supply, the volume of litigation had to be controlled through 
the cost mechanism which is probably why only well-to-do litigants could afford the 
law. 
By 1899, the litigation and crime curves were both at the trough of their cycles. The 
crime curve had reached its lower limit at a symbolic marker which was exactly one 
quarter below its peak in 1868. Civil litigation had been at its low since 1896 which 
, appears to have been set at equally symbolic markers using the memorable numbers 
25 and 75. Because the litigation curve was not kept within fixed absolute limits,, 
unlike the crime cycle, its markers had to be placed relative to population. So, Sir 
"Judicial Statistics, (Part 11, Civil), 1898, pp. 45 ff. 
"Ibid. p. 47. Nonetheless, there were always those ready to argue that, unlike 
the unemployed whose benefits should be cut, the judiciary have to "maintain a 
proper standard of life, and that judges are scandalously underpaid"; Brenden 
Bracken, Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 260, (23 November 193 1). 
(176) 
John Macdonnell wrote, "In 1896 there was one case begun for every 25, and one 
case heard for every 75 inhabitants. In 1900 the proportions were much the same. "19 
1900 seems to have been the 'big bang' for the new regime. For the next decade crime 
and litigation curves rose almost continuously. Officials seem to have broken away 
from the traditional linkage of criminal justice statistics with the trade cycle and 
instead set their own ten year target for a half cycle of crime. This was in line with 
the recommendation of the Departmental Committee of 1893 to set a ten or twenty 
year base for the measurement of crime". Between 1900 and 1909 there were exactly 
1500 murders, giving, for the only time, an average of exactly 150 murders per year 
over an entire decade. Between 1900 and 1909, the group of non-indictable offences 
'of a criminal character' fell by a quarter (24.76 per cent from 98,883 to 74,399)" 
Indictable prosecutions peaked in 1908 rather than 1909, however this may have been 
partly due to the severe external unrest in that year provoking private prosecutions. 
Nonetheless,, the 1909 figure appears to have been around target; mirroring the 25 per 
"Judicial Statistics, (Part 11, Civil), I goo, P. P. 1902 [Cd 1115], CXVII. 191, 
18. 
"Report of the Departmental Committee to revise the Criminal Portion of the 
Judicial Statistics, (1895), p. 76. 
"Calculated from Judicial Statistics, 1910, P. P. 1912-3 [Cd 607 1 ], CX. 1, 
10; judicial Statistics, 1898, p. 22. This class of offences were first defined as such 5ý 
in 1898. Retrospectively, they were seen to have fallen only 6.33 per cent between 
1893 and 1898. 
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cent fall in non-indictable offences of a 'criminal character', indictable prosecutions 
rose by a quarter (25.21 per cent, from 53,628 to 67,15 0)52 
The Home Office appears to have been less successfully in controlling the police 
returns and so after 1899 they were no longer regarded as the leading indicator of 
crime. 'Crimes Known to the Police' rose from 76,025 to 105,279 in 1908 which 
surpassed through the previous peak figure of 101,369 set in 1868. This was largely 
due to the action of the Head Constable of Liverpool City Police, Leonard Dunning 
who unilaterally raised the Liverpool crime statistics to record levels after 1902 
because of his stated belief that this would improve their accuracy. According to the 
1905 Criminal Statistics, the Liverpool figures were "exceedingly high... They raise 
doubts whether all the figures here stated have been collected in the same manner" 
The editor reminded him of the conclusion of the 1893 Departmental Committee that 
had revised the Criminal Statistics; "It would often have been better that they should 
all be wrong, provided that they all made the same mistak-e, than that some should be 
right and others wrong"". Despite this, throughout the decade, the Head Constable 
continued to raise his figures until in 1910 they had reached 14,041 or an increase of 
about 10,000 over 1902 1902. Without Liverpool's increase, the crime figures in 1909 
and 1910 would have been in the upper 90,000s, below the 1868 peak. In 1912, 
Dunning was moved 'upstairs' to take over as an Inspector of Constabulary. The 
figures of recorded crime resumed their normal confirmation of the prosecution 
"Judicial SLatistics, 1910, p. 10. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 66. 
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figures. Hermann Mannheim noted that "In 1912, however, the'Crimes Known to the 
Police' somewhat gained in reputation. Although still deemed inferior to the 'Statistics 
of Persons Tried, 'they were used as a valuable confirmation of the conclusions drawn 
from the latter category if they stood in permanent agreement with it. "". 
Between 1909 and the First World War the crime figures declined, possibly with 
intention of completing a planned twenty year cycle. However, it was becoming clear 
that the control of the figure of "Crimes Known to the Police" was a problem. The 
responsibility for the return was in the hands of the police and, unlike the figure for 
trials, the number of crimes Imown could be raised without any financial cost to the 
service. Without a financial sanction,, the Home Office could only rely on its moral 
influence. However,, with Dunning's departure from Liverpool in 1912, it could be 
expected that the second largest force, now reporting about one eighth of the national 
total of crime, would eventually return to the fold and that the total crimes recorded 
would again confirm prosecutions and return to their proper limits. So, by the First 
World War, the Home Office could be reasonably optimistic that its increased central 
control would bring about a further diminution of crime and a growing rationalization 
of criminal justice in the twentieth century. 
54 Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in Englaiid between the Wars, 1940, 
36. 
(179) 
Chapter VII: Murder 
I 
So far, the discussion of criminal justice policy has been conducted at a level rather 
abstract from the problem that the criminal justice system was purportedly addressing 
- 
crime in society. It is now appropriate to ask what the effect of supply side control, 
allied to strict political economy, was on the control of crime in the real world? For 
example, what effect did policy have on the concrete example of the investigation and 
prosecution of the most serious of all offences, murder? 
Serious offences cost serious money to prosecute. Unlike the vast majority of other 
indictable offences, the prosecution of murder was largely the financial and legal 
responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions and, in this case, the level of 
prosecutions became fixed in about 1880 when the Office was instigated. The 
Director "exercised a discretion in dealing with the very numerous applications made 
to him to institute and carry out criminal prosecutions, and also with respect to the 
cases which he has undertaken, a strict supervision and control over the expenditure 
'Bodkin,, Sir A., 'The Prosecution of Offenders, pp. 353-60. 
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of public money in each case; in counsel's fees, solicitors' charges, witnesses' 
expenses, preparation of plans and models, shorthand writers' notes, etc. 112 
It was popularly put about that murder was not a problem because the English people 
were so civilised. The Medical representative on the Prison Commission, Dr 
Norwood East was satisfied to note how, in England and Wales, there were 274 
homicides in 1924 out of a population of 38,700,000, while in Italy there were 1,983 
out of a population of 36,500,000 and in the United States with a population of 
93,000,, 000 there were 7,788 homicides. ' The public were reassured that murder was 
treated very seriously, and "every faculty, every resource of the detective and the 
police force supporting him is brought into play. "'. It was said to be "a remarkable 
testimony to the manner in which coroners and their juries perform their duties", that, 
for example, only one inquest was followed by a second at the request of the High 
Court in 1929'. Stories were told that murder was so firmly under control that "only 
one... baffled the police" in 1937, or that "the number of murders in recent years 
'Retum Showing the Working of Regulations made in 1886 for carrying out 
the Prosecution of Offences Acts, 1879 and 1884, etc., for 1888, P. P. 1889 (135), 
LXI. 13 7, p. 4. 
'East, W. N., Medical Aspects of Crime, J. & A. Churchill, 1936, p. 365. 
'Martienssen, A., Crime and the Police, p. 138. 
5judicial Statistics, 1929, P. P. 1930-1 [Cmd 3853], XXXII-1, P. xxxii. 
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which can really be classed as unsolved mysteries can be counted almost on the 
fingers of both hands 116 . 
In London, Sir John Moylan, the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police assured the 
public that out of a population of 8 million, in 1926 there had been "only sixteen 
murders, the work of fourteen persons, of whom eight committed suicide, and in only 
one case... was the murderer undiscovered"'. Ominously, Dr Norwood East revealed 
that, nationally, the figures conformed to the Metropolitan Police pattern; at least one 
half of all murder suspects were found dead or insane before they could be brought 
to trial,, and of the remainder who were tried, almost a half confessed their guilt'. This 
was a most fortunate saving of prosecution and long-term prison costs. Because of 
the regular non-appearance of so many suspects, there only needed to be about 50 
murder trials in England and Wales each year. 
The reason for severely rationing murder trials was because the cases attracted wide 
publicity, and, in court, the burden of proof was so great that expenses were very 
high, particularly if medical or scientific evidence was needed. Without adequate 
funding and preparation, prosecutions could turn into a farce and become the opposite 
of deterrent. For example, in 18 5 1, out of 74 murder trials, there were 52 acquittals, 
'Times,, I January 1938, p. 9; Times, 28 December, 1922, p. 3. 
'Moylan, J. F., Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan Police, G. P. Putnam, 1929, 
176. 
I_Lancet, 1935, Vol. CCXXVIII, (February 2,1935), p. 266. 
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6 verdicts of insanity and only 16 convictions'. Moreover, with only about I plea of 
guilty for every 27 prosecutions in 1898, murder had about the lowest ratio of 
uncontested offences". So realistic money had to be spent on preparing a proper case,, 
or alternative charges brought "for which a conviction is most likely to be obtained"'' 
or, more cheaply, force could be used to extract confessions". 
In practice, for reasons of cost and availability of evidence, if a murder charge was 
to be brought it normally had to conform to the standard, cheap-to-prosecute 
stereotype so well-known to prosecuting barristers. This is why the Criminal 
Statistics in 1905 discovered that "The short history of a large number of the cases 
91 Crime in England and Wales in 185 F, Journal of the Statistical Society o 
London, 1853, Vol. XVI, pp. 169-173, @ p. 172. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1898, p. 30. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, pp. 34-5. 
"See the allegations made by Sir Patrick Hastings and Arthur Henderson, 
Parl. Debs., pp. ser., Vol. 183, (11 May 1925), pp. 1601-1604; Parl. Debs., 5th ser., 
Vol. 217, (7 May 1928), pp. 1317-8. Concern over police'third degree'methods in 
murder investigations had culminated in the Royal Commission on Police Powers 
and Procedures, 1929. After that, detectives had to be more careful when extracting 
murder confessions. For the decade 1930-9 the average number of murders fell one 
ninth below the non-nal average to 132.9 per year - the lowest decennial average since 
before 1880. The following decade, 1940-9, the deficit was made good when murders 
rose one ninth above the normal average to 166.6. 
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which have been examined might be summed up thus: 
- 
Domestic quarrels and brawls 
; much previous ill-treatment; drinking, fighting blows; a long history of brutality and 
continued absence of self-restraint. This crime is generally the last of a series of acts 
of violence"". 
11 
The figures speak eloquently (Figure 1.1 ). Murders were kept to a running average 
of 150 per year. Between 1880, when the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions was created, and 1966, immediately after the death penalty was 
abolished, the average number of murders recorded each year was 149.91 14 
. 
The 
averages for the quarter centuries 1875-1899,1900-1924 and 1925-1949 were 
respe ctively 149.32,149.40 and 148.76. Between 1900 and 1909 there were 1500 
murders, giving an average of exactly 150 per year for that decade. There were also 
150 murders in 1923 and 1924. The range of the figures are just as remarkable. In 
only 5 out of the 104 years between 1862 and 1966, were there either less than 120 
murders or more than 179, i. e. the number of murders was kept within a tight band 
"Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 54. 
"The following figures are taken from the Judicial Statistics. V. A. C. Gatrell 
also suspects there was a change in policy on homicide in 1879. After that date, 
arrests for homicide rarely exceeded reports of homicide; Gatrell, V. A. C., 'The 
Decline of Theft and Violence in Victorian and Edwardian England', comment at the 
head of Table Al: Homicide. 
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of 20 per cent (30 murders) either side of the average of 150". In 1972, the Home 
Office stopped publishing separate figures for murder. 
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Most commentators have drawn the esoteric conclusion from this that "the aetiology 
of murder must be quite distinct from that of other crimes"". Clearly, a far more 
"Between 1880 and 1966, the mean was 149.91 and the standard deviation 
was 19.17. It appears to have been standard practice for the Home Office to keep the 
crime figures within a range of 20 per cent of the mean, since the statistics for 
'Offences Known to the Police' and those for indictable prosecutions were also kept 
within this range (Figure 2). 
"Morris, T. and Blum-Cooper, L., A Calendar of Murder: Criminal Homicide 
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likely explanation is that prosecutions for murder were among the most strictly 
rationed of all crimes. Sir Archibald Bodkin, an inter-war Director of Public 
Prosecutions, said, "When I frame my Estimate, I cannot possibly guess who will be 
murdered in the course of the next twelve months" ". Be that as it may, it is hard to 
believe that before he applied to Parliament for his Vote, Sir Archibald did not 
already have a very shrewd idea how many would be murdered. For the Director, each 
extra murder over his budget had to involve "questions of increased staff.. and 
consequently increased Parliamentary Vote" ". Moreover, prosecutions were 
undertaken by the Treasury Solicitor who was given a fixed sum for the expenses of 
his department. The Secretary to the Treasury was quite explicit that the Department's 
allowance was cash limited, "the sum allowed is a maximum which in no case [may 
be] exceeded" " 
I'( 
... 
continued) 
in England Since 1957, Michael Joseph, 1964, p. 278. For a recent and completely 
uncritical acceptance of the statistics see Leyton, E., Men of Blood: Murder in 
Modem England, Constable, 1995. In most studies, "the crimes of murder and 
manslaughter" have normally been exempted from more general reservations about 
the accuracy of the criminal statistics. See for example, Howard Journal, 1938, Vol. 
5, (No. 2, Autumn 1938), p. 121. 
"Evidence of Sir Archibald Bodkin, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal 
Commission on Police Powers and Procedures,, (1929), p. 96 (emphasis added). 
"Evidence of Sir Archibald Bodkin, ibid., p. 85. 
"Mr Jackson, Secretary to the Treasury, Parl. Debs., 3rd ser., Vol. 337, (27 
(continued... 
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It was easy for the Office of the Director to enforce quotas on murder. When a 
suspected murder was referred by the police to the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
it was not recorded in the Statistics as a murder 'Known to the Police' until the 
outcome of the investigation or trial was known". Like most of his predecessors, Sir 
Archibald felt that prosecution expenses hould fall on the rates, not come out of his 
Vote 21. So when the Director's budget for murder had been filled, the outstanding 
cases had to go somewhere and many must have been passed back to reluctant police 
authorities to prosecute as less serious charges at the ratepayers' expense (perhaps 
dismissed,, or deals done to reduce charges to wounding, assault etc). These cases did 
not subsequently appear in the statistics as murder. 
III 
Most murders did not get as far as a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The 
Judicial Statistics admitted in 1899; "Coroners' juries return as deaths by accidents 
or misadventure or from natural causes many cases which are really homicides. 
Among the 1,981 'open verdicts' returned in 1899 were no doubt many homicides 
"( 
... 
continued) 
June 1889), p. 888. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1894, p. 27; Judicial Statistics, 1950, P. P. 195 1ý XXVI. Iý 
vi. 
"Evidence of Sir Archibald Bodkin, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal 
Com wers and Procedures, (1929), p. 96. 
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[which] are never cleared up... many of the persons guilty of murder are unImown, 
or, if Imown, are not apprehended"". 
While murders stayed constant in the statistics, violent deaths rose sharply. For 
example, it was noted that "Suicides have increased, out of proportion to the increase 
in population. " They rose from 1,314 in 1856 to 4,054 in 1925 and to 5,054 in 193 923. 
In 1899, it was observed that high rates of actual suicides frequently occurred in rural 
areas where, paradoxically, there were low rates of attempted suicide and 
drunkenness. By contrast, lower rates of actual suicide were often found in highly 
urban districts, such as Liverpool, London, Birmingham and Manchester with high 
rates of attempted suicide and high rates of drunkenness". One explanation is that in 
urban areas subject to high levels of policing, both drunkenness and attempted 
suicides were closely prosecuted. Pathology facilities were also more likely to be 
available in these districts and so many violent deaths, classified as suicides in more 
poorly resourced county areas, were examined more carefully in those towns that 
spent above average on policing whereas many rural areas, that spent less, decided 
cause of death after a preliminary inquiry without holding an inquest, let alone a 
postmortem. 
25 
22 Judicial Statistics 1899, pp. 34-5. 
"Judicial Statistics 1925, Registrar General's Statistical Review for England 
and Wales, 1939, Part I, H. M. S. O., London, 1944, Table 25: Violent Deaths. 
24 Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 38. 
21judicial Statistics, 1901, p. 25. 
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The number of suicides and accidents continued to rise alarmingly while homicides 
fell". In 1939, according to the coroners, there were 618 suicides by solid or liquid 
poisons and not a single homicide; 706 suicides by hanging and strangulation but 
only 29 homicides; 247 suicides and 90 fatal accidents involving firearms but only 
21 homicides; 787 suicides and 813 accidents by drowning but not a single homicide; 
422 suicides and 15 accidents involving cutting or piercing instruments and 22 only 
homi6des" 
Some medical practitioners were concerned at the ease with which murder could be 
successfully hidden. In 1868, it was suggested, "Undiscovered murder, as by poison, 
is practised to a great extent in England... We Imow this by the testimony of 
competent persons, especially doctors... 272 doubled will fall short of the total 1128 . 
Yet, in 1942,, Roche Lynch, the Home Office Analyst, found it "striking" that the 
results of coroners' examinations showed that, in the last 20 years, "despite the great 
number of new drugs and poisons available, it would appear that there is very little 
change in the type of poison used"". Already, in the late 1880s, Dr Richardson, an 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 38. 
" Registrar General's Statistical Review for England and Wales, 1939, Part 
1, Table 25: Violent Deaths. 
2'Elliott, T., 'On the Material Prosperity, Crime and Pauperism of the United 
Kingdom', Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 1868, Vol. XXXI, p. 317. 
"Lynch, R., 'Homicidal Poisoning', Medico-Legal Journal, 1942, Vol. 10, pp. 
196-200, @ p. 197. 
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associate of Edwin Chadwick, had not known of "one medical man of extensive 
practice, who in the course of it, has not met with a case of secret murder"'O. Since,, 
at the time, there were 18,000 practitioners, this was more than enough to fill the 
ration of the Director of Public Prosecutions for a century. 
The Report from the Select Committee on Death Certification, (1893-94), gives an 
horrific insight into what was the result of applying the principles of political 
economy to the office of coroner. Horatio Nelson Hardy was the Divisional Surgeon 
to the Metropolitan Police at Dulwich. He was questioned on the possibility of 
conunercially organised infanticide and his evidence also suggests the possibility of 
serial killers of children; "You tell us that you have come across and reported over 
and over again, cases of children found dead under highly suspicious circumstances 
and that no action has been taken upon the police report? 
- 
Yes". 31 
He revealed that when murders of children followed a "regular pattern", or if their 
skulls were found "battered in", normally no inquest or inquiry resulted. The coroner 
just issued the normal certificate, which possibly said as little as "found dead" or 
"cause of death urilmown"'. The 1899 Criminal Statistics confirmed that "Some 
"Evidence of Mr Sykes, MB, Medical Officer for St. Pancras, Report from 
the Select Committee on Death Certification, P. P. 1893-4 (373,402), X1.195, QQ 
439 
'Ibid., QQ 2595. 
32 Ibid., QQ 2572-80; Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 37. In Liverpool in 1874 
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forms of murder, particularly child murder, are returned as accidental death"" 
Postmortems were not usually held "owing probably in part to the disinclination of 
coroners to pay for medical evidence at inquests 1134 
. 
If they were held, they were often 
conducted inexpertly. In the 1930s a doctor said that "any qualified medical man, 
whether he has ever done a post-mortem examination in his life before or not, can be 
required by the coroner to make such an examination, and if he is in need of three 
guineas he will do it. "". 
Hardy felt the lack of medical inquiry was because "each coroner tries to make out 
that the expenses of his district are less than another; there is a sort of competition 
amongst coroners in that way not to exceed the other coroners in the amount they 
11( 
... 
continued) 
nearly 3 inquests were held daily, yet for the whole year there were only ten verdicts 
of murder or manslaughter, "but in 160 cases the result of the inquiry was the bald 
and ghastly verdict of 'Found Dead ... ; Pulling, Sgt- 'Crimes of Violence: What 
Legislation is Necessary for the Repression of Crimes of ViolenceT, Transactions of 
the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1876, Longmans, 
Green and Co., pp. 345-361, @ p. 345. In 1898 coroners introduced a standard 
classification of verdicts, Judicial Statistics, 1898, p. 19. 
"Judicial St-atistics, 1899, p. 14. 
"Report from the Select Committee on Death Certification, QQ 2565. 
I'Dr W. G. Bamard, Medico-Legal and Criminological Review, 1933, Vol. 1, 
266. 
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spend, because they think that the County Council grudges it"". The 1857 Judicial 
Statistics had confirmed that money was the central issue. It said that only 20,157 (or 
about I per 1,000 of population) inquests had been performed that year because 
Quarter Sessions would disallow costs to coroners who attempted to investigate all 
the cases that came within their reMit37. Moreover, as late as the 1930s and beyond, 
there were many coroners closely involved in the cases they heard. In smaller areas, 
both in business and politics, coroners had close links with local authorities and had 
sympathy with their attempts to limit public expenditure. Many coroners had, directly 
through their own practice or indirectly through their legal firms, other conflicts of 
interest. Their firms might act as prosecuting or defending solicitors in subsequent 
murder cases, or else the coroner might act as magistrates' clerk in subsequent 
committals, or else his firm might act as the solicitors to employers in Worlmen's 
Compensation cases". 
In 1932 'Solicitor' argued that the Coroner's role was largely symbolic. He summed 
up the general opinion that "it is difficult to imagine circumstance's under which a 
coroner's inquest can be of any practical use"". It is doubtful that primarily it was 
intended to be of practical use. In 1867, Dr Farr, the Registrar General, had 
complacently summed up the utilitarian function of the coroner as a deterrent; 
"Report from the Select Committee on Death Certification, QQ 2615. 
37 Judicial Statistics 1857, p. xi. 
381 Solicitor', English Justice, p. 125. 
391 Solicitor', English Justice, p. 118. 
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"Virtually, it is true that of twenty-one thousand inquiries only a few lead to the 
committal and conviction of criminals; but the utility of the inquest is not to be 
proved by the number of crimes committed, but by the number of crimes prevented; 
and it is gratifying that homicide is comparatively rare in England and Wales. " 
IV 
The real decisions as to criminal issues involving death were made by the police. 
Prof J. H. Dible, the Professor of Pathology at Liverpool University, argued that "The 
pathologist's part in the investigation of such deaths is usually limited to verification 
of the cause of death: the evidence as to whether the death was accidental, suicidal 
or homicidal being provided by the circumstances. "I 
. 
'Solicitor' revealed "it is not the 
Coroner,, but the police, who find out the cause. The result of their inquiries is 
communicated, if they think fit, to the Coroner and his jury. It is necessary to 
emphasise this, for some people think- that the police tak-e action as the result of a 
finding of the Coroner's jury. They do not. It is always the police who ascertain 
"Hammick, 'On Judicial Statistics' with Special Reference to the Criminal 
Returns', Journal of the Statistical Society of London, XXX, 1867, pp. 375-426, 
p. 403 
41 Chief Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), 
Annu ef Constable's Association, 1934, p. 58. 
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whether or not there is any question of foul play. If they do not go into the matter the 
Coroner never finds OUt. 1142. 
All insight into the general standard of police investigation of suspicious deaths was 
given by Sir Robert Mark-, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in the 1970s. In 
the late 1930sl he served in the Manchester Police,, "there was a canal lock, a 
favourite place for suicides. Providing that the beat officer found the body and no 
members of the public were present, two shillings would induce the lock keeper to 
open the gates to allow the body to be pushed through into the county"". 
Smaller forces had the least resources available to fund murder inquiries. Officers, 
although mostly from labouring stock were not as stupid as they were portrayed on 
stage, but they were not expected to show much curiosity or zeal. For example, Basil 
Thomson,, the head of the C. I. D., described a case in Hitchen where a local 
superintendent had explained away a murder. The superintendent's account was may 
well have been typical of many other similar non-investigations across the country. 
He reported that "an old woman who was found covered in blood and dead with a dog 
laid out dead,, had met with an accident, that she had first killed the dog, for no reason 
specified, and then fallen down on some pots and pans and fractured the base of her 
skull"" 
421 Solicitor' English Justice, p. 119. 
43 Mark., Sir R., In the Office of Constable, Fontana Paperbacks, 1979, p. 29. 
44 Basil Thomson, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of 
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So, because there was often no medical or pathology facilities available, and no 
money to finance them, and because the discovery of a suspicious death and its 
subsequent investigation and prosecution could mak-e a large dent in a police 
authority budget, it was an open secret that most murders and suspicious went 
uninvestigated. This was part of the social cost that was paid for the 'diminution of 
crime'. 
continued) 
E cotland, p. 34. 
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Part IV: "The Centre Cannot Hold": 1918-38 
Chapter VIII: The Political Background to Interwar Criminal 
Justice 
I 
Well before the First World War there had developed at the Home Office, as 
Radzinowicz and Hood put it, a "very optimistic approach towards crime and its 
control"'. The international prestige and reputation of the Department derived from 
its manifest control of the statistics of crime which, by the outbreak, of the First 
World War had been kept stationary for well over half a century and were decreasing, 
relative to population growth. The international opinion was that "England was 
freeing itself from its crime, a dream entertained in vain by so many European 
countries"'. 
The sporting image of British justice (and for the indigenous colonial population this 
largely meant criminal law) also gave legitimacy to British governance in the Empire. 
It wished to inspire the Empire to emulate the image of the British people as the most 
'Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, R., The Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian 
and Edwardi in England, p. 778. 
Ibid., p. 125. 
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orderly nation on earth, and submit gratefully to her benign rule as the moral 
policeman of the world. On the domestic front, since at least the 1880s the salience 
of crime had been declining as a discrete social problem, encouraged by falling 
statistics. In the early twentieth century, crime was widely seen as one of the lesser 
symptoms of a recently discovered general degeneration "in the quality of the nation, 
the fitness of the race and the efficiency of the Empire"'. The solution to crime, 
therefore, was believed to lie less in prisons than in the general improvement of the 
social and physical condition of the nation and, in particular, of the residuum who had 
been left behind by social progress. Consequently, social policy began "setting its 
course in a new direction away from deterrence and moralization" which had 
traditionally characterized criminal policy'. In their place, general programmes of 
social security, education, and eugenics were advocated to ameliorate real want, to 
prune and reinvigorate the stock, and to tutor the 'inefficient' classes into more 
acceptable ways of living. Across the political spectrum, a progressive agenda 
developed where social progress, often advertised as a gratuitous by-product of 
capitalism or socialism, came to be seen as a more important weapon than the police 
in the defence of society against crime and degeneration'. 
'Garland, D. Punishment and Welfare, p. 13 1; Searle, G. R., The Quest for 
National Efficiency, p. 61; Wiener, M., Reconstructing the Criminal. 
Wiener, M., Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 185. 
'For the origins of 'the Ameliorative Creed' see Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, 
R., The Eme icy in Victorian and Edwardian England, Chapter 3. 
See also Wiener, M., Reconstructing the Criminal. 
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Contrasted with the wide-scale schemes of social reform coming on stream, criminal 
justice appeared old-fashioned and ineffective. It was small-scale, rule-bound and 
obsessed with petty details 
- 
the circumstances urrounding a particular crime and the 
individuals involved. The modern professional flag-ship programmes of social 
reform, such as education, medicine and housing, appeared more efficient. They 
claimed to tackle and even to eradicate 'crime' in the abstract and in the mass, as a by- 
product of increasing national efficiency'. Inevitably, this led to a direct competition 
for funding between social reform programmes and criminal justice. As early as the 
1860s, Mr E. C. Tufnell, one of her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, promised that "if 
schools were universal... in 10 years' time we should have approached to the 
annihilation of one-third of the criminal population... in 20 years we should... have 
gone far towards preventing two-thirds of the crimes committed in this country". 
Education reformers eyed hungrily the f2,000,000 wasted on "repressive penal 
administration"'. Short of promises possibly to reform or incapacitate a few prisoners, 
criminal justice,, with its more modest aims, could not compete against such claims. 
At the level of political ideology, criminal justice was also in retreat. Reformers who 
aimed for the 'social good' were issuing a fundamental challenge to the traditional 
'Scotson, T., An Examination of Crime and Criminal Justice in the Literary 
Utopias of 1880-1914. 
Quoted by Edwin Chadwick in Papers Submitted to the Education 
Committe 
-n 
Half-Time Teaching and Military Drills and on the 
Cost o5 PP. 1862 (120,120-1), XLIII. 1,9 1, pp. 48-9. 
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notion of the state as an external 'Leviathan' which existed only to protect individual 
citizens from high levels of crime and disorder'. In 1851, it had not seemed at all 
eccentric for Herbert Spencer to argue, in Hobbesian fashion, 
Nay, indeed, have we not seen that government is essentially immoral? Is it 
not the offspring of evil, bearing about it all the marks of its parentage? Does 
it not exist because crime exists? Is it not strong, or, as we say, despotic, 
when crime is great? Is there not more liberty, that is, less government as 
crime diminishes? And must not government cease when crime ceases, for 
lack of objects on which to perform its function? '. 
Sixty years later, the situation had been transformed. After involvement in measures 
of social welfare, government presented itself as more inclusive and no longer 
immoral or dependent for its legitimacy upon crime control. It could contemplate 
shedding many of its criminal justice responsibilities. A new situation had developed 
where expansive domestic and foreign policy were both justified by (and partly 
funded out of) the seeming development of law-abidingness among the British people 
'See, most notably, Hobbes, T. Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power 
of a Common-wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, Everyman's Library, 1950. 
'Spencer, H., Social Statics: or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness 
Specified, and the First of them Developed, John Chapman, 185 1, p. 207. For a more 
recent, and extreme, restatement of the case see Nozick, R. Anarchy, State, and 
UtQjýia, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. 
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and the accompanying low and declining rate of crime, as recorded in the Criminal 
Statistics. The statistics allowed Britain, at the turn of the century to imprison only 
I in 1,764 of her subjects, mostly on short sentences comPared with America which 
imprisoned 1 in 759, many for longer terms". 
In these circumstances, it was not surprising that Victor Bailey found that the Home 
Office was presenting an upbeat, progressivist and declining analysis of the crime 
problem at the end of the First World War". Falling crime statistics were now used 
by the state as one of the key indicators of the effectiveness of social reform, and of 
goverment itself, and were partly used to justify relatively low levels of social 
expenditure. There was no political incentive to change this. So, as the state 
increasingly ceased to regard itself as a Leviathan, the institutions of criminal justice 
were being allowed slowly to wither away, using statistical control to focus its 
limited resources on a declining range of targets. It was left to the Home Office to 
deal with the long run-down of criminal justice administratively, cheaply and 
invisibly, and to prevent it re-emerging to the public as a problem out of control 
requiring expensive and impossible political solutions. 
Yet, criminal justice did not wind down, instead, in the interwar years it began to re- 
emerge as a political problem. To understand why this happened it is first necessary 
to consider the political context of criminal justice policy, and particularly of 
10judicial Stat stics, 1899, p. 19. 
"See also Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship. 
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policing, at the end of the First World War. The remainder of this chapter will 
provide this background. 
11 
During the late nineteenth century, career police officers began to define themselves 
11 as members of a nation-wide community "'1. They took some small steps towards the 
creation of a national police service by calling for improvements to their conditions 
and status, which varied from locality to locality, and began a national campaign for 
police authorities to appoint rank-ers to the most senior positions, including chief 
constable". At about this period, Chief Constables, particularly in the larger forces, 
began to gain more autonomy from the magistrate-dominated police authorities that 
employed them". This autonomy was allowed to develop partly because, as the 
Criminal Statistics show, and as Michael Brogden has observed of the Liverpool 
"Steedman., C.,, Policing the Victorian Community, Part 11. 
"Wall, D. S., The Selection of Chief Constables in England and Wales 1835- 
1985ý M. Phil. Thesis, University of York, Department of Social Policy, 1989, pp. 55 
ff. 
"Jefferson, T. and Grimshaw, R., Controlling the Constable: Police 
Accountability in England and Wales, Frederick Muller, 1984, chapter 2; Evidence 
Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England 
Wales and Scotland, p. 79. 
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police, "police operations had become routinized and most issues of contention had 
disappeared"". 
In the early part of the twentieth century a number of political factors concerning 
public order occurred which increased police salience to central government. 
Immediately before the War, there was a great wave of social and industrial unrest 
that revealed local police authorities as unable, or unwilling, to coordinate themselves 
sufficiently to control situations without considerable military assistance. Jane 
Morgan" has shown how the series of major strikes during 1910-14, when the troops 
were much used, encouraged the Home Office to seek much closer national 
co-ordination between police forces, to make mutual-aid agreements, and to build up 
police reserves, especially of the Special Constabulary". This culminated in the 
appointment of a Cabinet Industrial Unrest Committee in February 1914. 
During the War, the police were subject to greater central control given increased 
powers and authority, under the Defence of the Realm Acts (D. O. R. A. ), to maintain 
order and internal security on the Home Front". D. O. R. A. increased co-operation 
"Brogden, M., The Police Autonomy and Consent, p. 71. 
"The following paragraphs are largely based upon Morgan, J., Conflict and 
Order. 
"Seth, R., The Specials: The Story of the Special Constabulary, Victor 
Gollancz, 1961. 
"Morgan, J., Conflict and Order; Bunyan, T., The History and Practice of the 
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between chief constables but it also increased the concern of the Government to 
secure "a more uniform administration of the law generally... [and] to break- down the 
old system of watertight compartments" which were preventing further co-operation 
between police forces particularly in detective and intelligence matters". To war-time 
central administrators, nationalization of the police, or at least mergers of the smaller 
forces,, seemed a tempting solution since, "one source of weakness in our present 
system seems to be beyond question, namely, the multiplication of separate police 
forces,, leading, as it does, to extravagances in administration, loss of time, labour, 
and temper, and embarrassment to those who have dealings with the police"" 
Police funding and conditions rapidly deteriorated during the War, and this was 
aggravated because, for some years previous to the War, pay and promotion prospects 
had been allowed to decline leading to the development of police trade unionism 
immediately before the war". The high ratio of police, relative to population 
necessary for effective preventive policing in Victorian and Edwardian Britain had 
always been obtained by combining numbers with economy but the situation got 
worse. In the early twentieth century, London was supporting "twice as large a force 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Political Police in Britain, Quartet Books, 1977. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1918, P. P. 1919 (38), XXVII. 671, p. 4. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1915, P. P. 1916 (35), XIV. 605, p. 6. 
"Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police: A Study in Manpower, p. 35; 
Judge, A., The Force of Persuasion: The Story of the Police Federation, Surbiton, The 
Police Federation, 1994. 
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at less expense than New York" because it paid them less than half the wages of their 
American counterpartS22. 
By the end of the War police forces had became aged, "sickly" and discontented, and 
pay was eroded by war-time inflation to the point where they were living close to the 
breadline 23 
. 
Prison officers were similarly affected and a trade union was formed in 
1913, the National Union of Police and Prison Officers (NUPPO). This gained 
support during the War, culminating in two police strikes, in 1918 and 1919". Police 
trade unionism was seen by the Government as a great encouragement to industrial 
militancy, particularly in the immediate post-war period which was Britain's most 
sustained and co-ordinated period class confrontation. " With unrest also in the an-ny, 
22MCCaffrey, George H., 'The Boston Police Department', Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology and Police Science, 1911-12, Vol. 2, (No. 5, January 1912), pp. 
672-90, @ pp. 683,690. 
"Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 190. 
"Morgan, J., Conflict and Order, p. 21 ff.; Reynolds, G. W. and Judge, A., The 
Night the Police Went on Strike, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968; Wrigley, C., Lloyd 
George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War Coalition 1918-1922, Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, chapter 4. For a comparison with the 1919 
police strikes in America see Walker, S., A Critical History of Police Reform: The 
Emergence of Professionalism, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1978, 
chapter 5. 
"Wrigley, C., p. 53; Morgan, J., 
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Lloyd George saw this development as a step towards "Bolshevism". He "would not 
have a repetition in this country of what had happened in Russia. "". 
Thus, the political situation in the early twentieth century did much to encourage the 
Home Office in taking a far closer interest in policing than it had previously done. 
However, its main interest in the police was not for crime control, the need for which 
was officially declining, but as a loyal Force for maintaining public order, and 
particularly for repressing class and industrial unrest". 
III 
The 1918 police strike was the precipitating factor leading to increased Government 
intervention in the police service after the War. In the wake of the strike, Sir Nevil 
Macready was appointed Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. This was "in 
effect, a statement of Lloyd George's intent to restore discipline of a military kind in 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Conflict and Order, pp. 21 ff. 
"Judge, A., The Force of Persuasion, p. 6. 
27Michael Brogden has argued, using the Preventive police of Louis XIV as 
a model, the defence of the realm was "high" policing while the "low" policing of 
crime was an "aberration" from the main duty. Brogden, M., 'The Emergence of the 
Police 
- 
The Colonial Dimension', p. 8. 
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the police force"". Macready was the army officer who had put down the South 
Wales miners' disputes before the war and "firmly believed that there was no middle 
way between hierarchical control of the police, of the kind he knew throughout his 
career in the army, and what he saw as NUPPO control of the force. "". Because he 
believed some of his men were fomenting disaffection on a national scale and, more 
ominously, because he thought a number of police authorities were politically 
suspect, he asked other chief constables to keep in "closest touch" with Scotland 
Yard; "the eddies of my agitators' efforts were being felt in most police forces 
throughout the country, and in some cases were aggravated by police authorities in 
which Labour possessed a dominating influence. "10 
He saw central control as the remedy. After receiving "instructions" to "look into the 
matter" he called a secret conference of "certain" chief constables, 
at which we agreed that while any move toward the nationalization of the 
police under a central Government authority would be strenuously opposed 
by county and local bodies certain steps could at once be taken to improve the 
position then existing. Shortly, these were an increase in the number of 
inspectors of police at the Home Office, the existing number being 
"Wrigley, C., Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour, p. 58. 
p. 61. 
I'Macready, Sir N., Annals of An Active Life, vol. 1, Hutchinson and Co., 
1929,2 vols., p. 334. 
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insufficient to keep up effective touch between the Home Office and the 
country police forces, and incidently between the country forces themselves; 
all police questions at the Home Office to be dealt with by one official, 
instead of being passed about to several departments; greater similarity in the 
police uniforms throughout the country, a seemingly small matter but one of 
importance when police are drafted from one district to another, and can be 
recognized by their distinctive uniforms by those who may be disturbing the 
peace; and finally a normal code of punishments throughout the country, it 
being found that punishments for similar offences varied enormously in 
different police forces". 
Effectively, the meeting had drawn up a blueprint for creating a national police force. 
The intention was not only to destroy trade unionism but also to undermine local 
police authority control which might resist, for financial or political reasons, 
Government attempts to deploy the police as a nation-wide quasi-military force to put 
down working class movements. The Inspectors of Constabulary were identified as 
key players in the reform of the police who would act as links both between and 
among the chief constables and with the new man at the centre. The Inspectorate 
reduced the need to include police authorities when the Home Office communicated 
with chief constables or when they communicated with each other. Common 
uniforms and conditions of service would facilitate the control and movement of 
"Ibid., pp. 334-5. 
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forces against dissent and unrest on a national scale. They would also break down the 
sense of local police patriotism. 
Macready wisely held back from provoking local opposition as would have been the 
case if it had pressed for a fonnal nationalization of the police service. Moreover, the 
Home Office and the Treasury Imew nationalization would shift the whole cost of the 
police onto the Exchequer and might also lead to demands from taxpayers for a 
uniformly high level of service leading to a general expansion of policing in such 
expensive matters such as traffic control or even crime". 
In February 1919, shortly after this meeting, the Home Secretary announced the 
appointment of the Desborough Committee to inquire into the urgent problem of 
service conditions. As with Macready, Desborough's most urgent task was to break 
the hold of nascent trade unionism, and remove the fear, expressed by the head of the 
C. I. D. and Special Branch, of the police ever "joining forces with the leaders of strike 
movements"". Inevitably, Desborough awarded large pay rises and banned unions. 
The Police Federation, Imown as the "Goose Club". because it marched in step with 
"Evidence of H. B. Simpson, Assistant Secretary, Home Office, Minutes of 
Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, (1920), 
pp. 5,9. 
"Thomson,, B., The Story of Scotland Yard, Grayson & Grayson, 1935, p. 
300; Lopian, B. J., Police and Punishment 1918-29, Metropolitan Experiences, 
Pe PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1986, pp. 8-14. 
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the authorities, was created as the tame police representative body". Desborough 
implemented much of what Macready, and his "certain" chief constables, had wanted 
by increasing the mechanisms of informal control and co-ordination available to the 
Home Office, and by by-passing, but leaving intact, the appearance of fort-nal control 
and financial responsibility in the hands of local authorities. As Macready had 
suggested, greater central control was principally to be achieved through the 
Inspectors of Constabulary, national conditions of service, and Police Rules. A Home 
Office Police Department was also created to be headed by Arthur Dixon, the 
Secretary to the Desborough Committee and former head of the War Duties Division, 
which had co-ordinated the police during the War". Within ten years, Dixon was able 
to conclude that "the Home Office control is almost a predominating one. "" Thus, 
although the Govemment had had to pay a very high price to buy police loyalty, it 
had got pretty much what it wanted in terms of loyalty and central control. 
One of Macready's fears was that, because of emigration and the decline of rural 
employment, before and during the War, too great a proportion of police officers had 
been recruited from industrial areas, rather than the traditional deferential agricultural 
"Judge, A., The First Fifty Years, the Story of the Police Federation, Police 
Federation,, 1968, p. 2. 
"Morgan, J., Conflict and Order, p. 65. 
"Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, p. 170. 
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areas, and so "were deeply imbued with trade union ideas"". Ideally, by "raising the 
economic, and thus the social, status of the average policeman far above anything he 
had previously achieved", it was hoped that a transformation of personnel would 
occur". Consequently, Desborough was concerned to attract a new and different type 
of career recruit, perhaps ex-servicemen "from rather a superior class" and Macready 
also suggested "some public school boys"". For this a career structure was needed 
and greatly increased pay and pensions were introduced as a first step. Nonetheless, 
the quality of the ranks and officer class was to remain a problem throughout the 
perio 
. 
Desborough was a rushed and somewhat panicky palliative, and because of the 
political pressure to produce the report in "record time", the existing duties of the 
police were accepted largely as given. " The Home Office had long been trying to 
restrict the day-to-day function of policing to the maintenance of order and the 
prevention and detection of crime, but many other duties were still being undertaken 
"Reynolds, G. W. and Judge, A., The Night the Police Went on Strike, p. 22. 
Emigration was believed to have helped dry up the traditional sources of recruitment, 
Inspectors of Constabulary, 1913, P. P. (193), LXVII. 663, p. 54 
"Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police: A Study in Manpowe 
, 
p. 36. 
"Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales 
and Scotland, p. 5. Evidence of Major-General N. Macready, Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police, ibid., pp. 14-16. 
"Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police: A Study in Manpowe 
, 
p. 37. 
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by the police and this was little discussed by Desborough, other than in its 
relationship to remuneration. Desborough's concern was with the 'high policing, role 
of the defence of the Realm and of the established orderg rather than with the 'low 
policing' of crime and other miscellaneous duties". Consequently, the Committee 
was far more concerned with the form of police recruitment, career structure and 
organisation than it was with the content of its daily duties. 
Part of the reason was that the Home Office had shown itself ill-informed and ill- 
prepared to discuss police duties" and so could offer little constructive advice as to 
how the service might develop. Until well after Desborough, the Home Office tried 
to continue controlling the police and criminal justice using remote and abstract 
statistical formula for policy making without relying on experience on the ground. 
The new statistical controls gained after 1893, had only further encouraged Home 
Offic'e bureaucrats to adopt this top-down view of criminal justice management. 
"See above p. 119. 
"For example, in his evidence of how police duties might be affected by 
nationalization,, a Home Office official mentioned traffic control, "which only 
occurred to me this morning", as his "concrete example", Mr H. B. Simpson, Assistant 
Secretary Home Office, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of 
England Wales and Scotland 
, 
p. 5. It had been intended that the permanent 
conferences of chief police officers, initiated by Arthur Dixon of the Home Office 
during 1918, would eventually discuss criminal investigation, but during the war 
D. O. R. A. dominated their discussions, Inspectors of Constabulary, 1918, p. 4. 
(212) 
Officials were aloof, even snobbish, they knew little about the police conditions of 
service, since "At the Home Office one does not get much in touch with individual 
policemen"43 
. 
So the question of how the maintenance of a new,, expensive and 
superior body of semi 
-professional police could be justified, and how their present 
functions and responsibilities could possibly be reconciled with providing a career 
structure sufficient to attract a "superior class" of officers to the police force, was left 
unanswered and largely unconsidered by the Home Office until after the Police 
Department was formed". 
IV 
Post-Desborough, senior police officers began to develop something of an 
independent political agenda. The doctrine of "constabulary independence" was 
greatly expanded after Desborough giving considerable freedom of action for chief 
constables from both local and central control". The District and National 
"Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales 
and Scotland, p. 6. 
"G. P. Davies has argued that this failure to define the police role, and whether 
it was a civilian or a disciplined force affected the events, morale and motivation of 
the force. Davies, G. P., The Police Service of England and Wales between 1918 and 
1964, with Particular Reference to Problems of Personnel, Recruitment and 
Command, Ph. D Thesis, University of London, 1973, pp. 6-7. 
"Lustgarten, L., The Governance of Police, Sweet and Maxwell, 1986; 
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Conferences of chief constables exercised some independent co-ordination of police 
solidarity and action outside the Metropolitan Police area. This was strengthened 
because the Home Office, in agreement with Macready, was deliberately 
marginalising the local control of police authorities by establishing direct 
relationships with chief constables". 
At the same times as local authorities were deliberately being excluded from 
exercising control over the police, lack of central oversight of senior officers was 
being encouraged by Treasury parsimony. Macready had wanted several more 
Inspectors of Constabulary appointed and Sir Llewellyn Atcherley, Sir Leonard 
Dunning's colleague at the Inspectorate of Constabulary, in his evidence to the 
Desborough Committee had argued for at least seven more resident Inspectors in each 
of the chief constables conference areaS47 
. 
Desborough only recommended a third 
Inspector for England and Wales, but even this very modest proposal was resisted on 
grounds of economy and was only implemented between 1927 and 1929 and after 
19.3 38". The Inspectors had no administrative staff, and were not so much as provided 
with a typist from central funds. In 1960, as S. J. Stevenson has shown, the Home 
"( 
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Jefferson, T. and Grimshaw, R., Controlling the Constable. 
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Office admitted "that the strength of Inspectors is inadequate to enable them to survey 
the country"". 
Moreover, because the Inspectors of Constabulary were appointed from the ranks of 
serving chief constables, they were generally sympathetic towards the exercise of a 
greater degree of autonomy by their former colleagues than perhaps officials in the 
Home Office would have liked. They also ensured that the views of chief constables 
carried great weight at the Home Office". That is not to say that the Inspectors were 
without power if they chose to press an issue on behalf of the Home Office. 
Ultimately they could withhold certificates of efficiency 
- 
although this was never 
done. More importantly, they enjoyed strong moral authority and a position of 
leadership in the service. Since there were only two Inspectors and, until at least the 
mid- I 920s, little central direction of their work, it was quite possible for an Inspector 
to exert a great personal influence over policing practices and policy if he so wished. 
V 
In the immediate post-Desborough period the former Head Constable of Liverpool, 
Sir Leonard Dunning exercised that influence over policing policy. In 1912 he was 
"Stevenson, S. J., 'Reflections on the Attempt to Rationalize the Distribution 
of Police in England and Wales, 1942-1974, Twentieth Century British History, 
1995, Vol. 6, (No. 1,1995), pp. 56-77, pp. 68-9. 
IOMorgan, J., Conflict and Order, p. 86. 
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appointed the junior Inspector of Constabulary, in 1918, he became the senior 
Inspector. At the time of the Desborough Committee, the Home Office had no expert 
to rival him". Until Desborough focused the Home Office's attention on routine 
policing duties, the Department had had, as Edward Troup, the Permanent Under- 
Secretary revealed in 1925, "little to do with the ordinary executive duties of County 
and Borough Police 
- 
the suppression of crime, the arrest and prosecution of 
offenders" 52 
. 
In the view of Sir Leonard Dunning; His Majesty's Government, "has 
information about the experience of the Metropolitan Police alone, it knows little of 
what the other 186 police forces in England and Wales are doing, the developments 
in police methods initiated by them and the work which they do which the 
Metropolitan Police does not do. "". 
"A couple of years later, in 1921, H. B. Simpson in his evidence to the 
Departmental Committee on the Employment of Policewomen, admitted most of the 
Home Office evidence was "got through him". He informed the Committee that they 
would have to rely on Dunning's evidence. Minutes of Evidence for the Departmental 
Committee on the Duties of Women Police, (192 1), p. 4. 
"Troup, Sir E., The Home Office, G. P. Putnam Sons (Whitehall Series), 
1925, p. 103. 
"Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the 
Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, p. 86. 
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The main Home Office official who was in a position to direct central control was 
Arthur Dixon", the Secretary to the Desborough Committee who, during the War, 
had taken charge of an embryonic Home Office Police Department, but its main 
concern had not been with crime, but with the policing of the Defence of the Realm 
ACt55 
. 
The Police Department of the Home Office was not formed until 1922, as a 
result of a Desborough recommendation, so in the crucial years after 1919, when the 
direction of the police service was being set after Desborough, Dixon still lacked the 
status, organization, knowledge, and experience to exert a counter-influence over 
such a senior voice in policing circles as Dunning. 
In those years Dixon was still on a learning curve, over-burdened with Desborough 
work and, according to the President of the Chief Constable's Association, he "did not 
then know much about the inner work-ings of the Service.. I heard it said: 'Mr Dixon 
at the Home Office is eating up everything appertaining to the Police""'. Dixon 
inclined towards a scientific management model of policing, emphasising central co- 
ordination and control,, statistics, and the application of the latest scientific methods 
to crime fighting. He later went on to reorganize the fire brigade along similar lines. 
He brought, as he put it, "a new conception of the police as a service, an integrated 
"See obituary Times, 26 September 1969, p. 12. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1918, p. 4. 
"Vote of thank-s to Arthur Dixon by Chief Constable R. Ogle, Chief 
Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), Annual Report 
of the Chief Constable's Association, 1936, pp. 59-60. 
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system, rather than as a collection of separate forces each concerned with its merely 
local requirements and personnel"". 
Quite possibly the second Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, was 
appointed by the Home Office to counter Dunning's influence since the two 
Inspectors profoundly disagreed on so many policing matters. Dunning was the 
leading urban policeman, Atcherley was an innovative county police chief The 
timing of Atcherley's appointment, "a few weeks" before the Desborough Committee, 
suggests that politics may have played a part in his selection". However, if that was 
the case, although Atcherley had long enjoyed great status and prestige in the police 
service,, his appointment appears to have come too late for him to exert a decisive 
influence in the formative period, immediately during and after Desborough, when 
police establishments were under particular scrutiny. 
Almost from the start Dunning and Atcherley clashed over a range of issues; 
"DictionqU of National Biography; Dixon, A. L., 'Some Aspects of Co- 
operation Within the Police Service, Chief Constable's Association (Cities and 
Boroughs of England and Wales), Annual Report of the Chief Constable's 
Association, 1936, pp. 51-60. 
"Evidence of Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on 
the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, p. 337. 
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Dunning was personally "not much in 
favour of the centralisation or 
nationalisation of the police... I do not 
think you should take away too much 
of the responsibilities and duties of the 
1159 local authorities 
Dunning claimed probation was 
properly a part of the preventive police 
role" 
"Ibid. p. 91. 
Atcherley wanted a "pyramid" of 
control from the centre down with 
perhaps four area authorities for 
England and Wales. Ultimately he 
wanted either a "Police Ministry" or 
much increased Home Office power 60 
Atcherley argued it was "magisterial" 
work" 
"Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales 
and Scotland, (1920), pp. 332-7. 
"Report of the Departmental Committee on the Duties of Women Policc 
(192 1), p. 13. 
"Ibid. P. 97. 
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Dunning argued that the police should 
co-operate with voluntary 
organisations. He was particularly 
proud that the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children had 
been founded in Liverpool; "after all, 
the boy saved from crime and the girl 
saved from infamy are the gains, moral 
and material,, of the community, 
whether the saving be done by the 
parson or by the police"". He argued 
that voluntary organisation were 
particularly useftil in the countieS64. 
Atcherley replied that the police 
authority should determine what needed 
doing by way of welfare. "I do not like 
separate voluntary organisations. I do 
not like the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals; I do 
not like the Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Children; I do not like a 
Society for the Protection of Girls. I 
think all these should be comprehended 
in police work and dealt with in police 
practice, and that they should be 
unnecessary, because the policy should 
be a policy accepted by all and under 
proper government. If you get 
voluntary organisations you get cranks. 
When you get that you get people 
hunting hares. " 65 
"Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, ibid., p. 11. 
p. 14. 
"Ibid. p. 99. 
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This clash involved issues fundamental to the future of policing. Atcherley's expertise 
and interest lay in the development, as recommended by Desborough, of co-operative 
arrangements between police forces and in the establislu-nent of crime clearing-houses 
of which he was a pioneer". His main claim to fame was that he had developed the 
system of classifying crimes by the modus operandi of the criminal. Although he had 
previously been the Chief Constable of Yorkshire, West Riding, which was the most 
urbanised of the county forces, he was still a county police chief. His concern was 
with maintaining the traditional order, stopping thieves, 'pests' and outsiders who he 
felt were driven by urban police from one borough to another, plaguing the 
countryside on their travels. Only when forces were grouped into large geographical 
entities,, at county or regional level would it be possible to control travelling criminals 
and stop them roaming across police boundaries with impunity. He believed the 
scope of policing should be limited to the obvious, serious targets and that policing 
was not a social service. Therefore,, it should not waste resources "chasing hares". 
Like most county chiefs he had a military background and felt the police service 
needed a strong central chain of command. 
Dunning's interest lay with an expanded preventive service. He felt that the police 
should be involved in crime prevention in the widest sense. Policing should 
eventually develop into an arm of social service. This priority on prevention meant 
66 inspectors. of Constabulary, 1913, pp. 3-4; Critchley, T. A., A History o 
Police in England 
-and 
Wales, pp. 193 ff, A. L. Dixon, 'Some Aspects of Co-operation 
Within the Police Service', pp. 51-60. 
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that the police should be involved in finding out and tackling the more minor 
offences before the offender had a chance to develop serious criminal habits. This 
implied increased police establishments, increased police activity and, as he had 
already demonstrated in Liverpool, very much larger crime figures. Obviously, this 
form of policing was most appropriate to boroughs, large towns and to urban poverty 
where the police could tap into the philanthropic and civic web. He argued that these 
large towns and cities, with their much greater resources should be allowed to expand 
their forces into the counties and smaller boroughs and provide the policing and 
welfare resources that the counties did not". 
The major differences between Dunning and Atcherley in their policing philosophies, 
naturally led them to hold differing attitudes towards the crime figures and to what 
should be counted as crime. Dunning wanted greatly to widen the scope of policing 
to include petty crime and "those particular offences which directly concern the well- 
being of the community" such as drunkenness". Crime could not be limited to the 
indictable offences. He contended that "the crimes of civilisation and modem life are 
increasing by leaps and bounds"". Atcherley, on the other hand, argued that serious 
"Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales 
and Scotland, (1920), p. 81. 
"Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales 
and Scotland, (1920), p. 86. 
"Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on 
Police lowers and Procedures, (1929), p. 75. 
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crime and drunkenness had both fallen 70 , but greater co-ordination of forces was 
needed to maintain control over crime. 
Certain aspects of this police debate can be seen as yet another example of the three- 
way fight between boroughs, counties and the centre that had been plaguing 
government since the nineteenth century". Although the issues of scope, merger and 
control had been a recurring debate since the new police forces had been founded, it 
would be wrong to discuss them entirely as if they were part of some internal and 
apolitical police management discussion about the most efficient way to run the 
service. The utilities, health, education etc were each being debated in remarkably 
similar terms in this period and the basic issues were economy, efficiency and the 
balance of political power. 
To an extent, borough policemen such as Dunning bid to divide up the counties 
between themselves using the resources of the town and city to aid the prevention of 
crime; county policemen like Atcherley sought to take in the boroughs, to increase 
surveillance but also to reduce the scope and cost of policing; London saw itself as 
the model of efficiency and wanted to control or coordinate the rest; while Whitehall 
proposed regional authorities outside local control and subject to a greater degree of 
central nomination than the counties or boroughs. 
70 Ibid., p. 119. 
71 Waller, P. J. Town. City and Nation. 
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The centralised and limited policing ideals of Atcherley clearly made him much more 
of a Home Office man than Dunning. Unsurprisingly, like most county chief 
constables, he was very supportive towards Dixon's, and the Home Office's, long- 
term goal of amalgamating most of the borough forces into county, or regional forces. 
Both Dixon and Atcherley saw savings in buildings and administration if policing 
was rationalized into larger units. With control vested in the counties, manpower 
could be cut, by perhaps 6 per cent, through taking away beats from the old boroughs 
forces and using county reserves to reinforce the boroughs as and when needed. 
Finally, large county forces would mean more military-style discipline and less local 
political influence since in the counties, chief constables were the disciplinary 
authority rather than the watch committees of the boroughs councils". The 
historiography has remained almost entirely in sympathy with the official view of the 
benefits of large-scale mergers arguing that the "Opposing views were vociferous but 
based more on sentiment than logic"". This needs to be qualified, since clearly 
Dixon, and indeed the government generally, had strong political reasons, over and 
above any gains in "efficiency", for preferring control of the police to rest with the 
counties rather than with the municipalities". 
"Ibid. pp. vii ff. 
"Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the World, p. 38. See also Stevenson, 
S. J., 'Reflections on the Attempt to Rationalize the Distribution of Police in England 
and Wales, 1942-1974', pp. 56-77. 
74 For an historical overview of the clash between town and country, and 
borough and county see Waller, P. J. Town, City and Nation: England 1850-1914, (continued 
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Clearly there were very different models of policing being promulgated. Similar 
contrasting models of policing were also finding expression in America where 
mergers were in the air and professionalism was pulling in the three directions of 
organisational and administrative reform, social work, and crime control". In 
England and Wales, Desborough left most of the issues unresolved. Dunning, 
Atcherley and Dixon had everything to play for. This legacy of confusion as to the 
police role persisted through the inter-war period and beyond. On a visit to the 
Hendon Police College in 1937, the then Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, articulated 
continued official confusion as to the nature of policing when he informed the cadets 
that "the police seemed to stand half-way between the defence Services and the social 
services" 
76 
. 
However,, until Dixon and Atcherley could establish themselves, Dunning was left 
in a very powerful position to preach his vision of large-scale, large-establishment 
urban preventive policing as the model for a new, post-Desborough professional 
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police force". He was the son of a Parliament Street solicitor, a graduate of Exeter 
College, a trained barrister and had formerly served as one of the 61ite District 
Inspe*ctors in the Irish Constabulary". His principled stance and his impressive clarity 
of thought and expression are obvious from his evidence to the Desborough 
Committee. This suggests his 'behind the scenes' political and forensic skills would 
have been equally formidable and have considerably increased his influence. The fact 
that he was twice recalled by Desborough, confirms he had become the leading voice 
of police professionalism in the country and, largely owing to the previous vacuum 
of disinterest in provincial policing at the Home Office,, he was the only witness 
before the Committee who displayed a clear conception of the direction a newly 
professionalised force might tak-e at this critical juncture in police history". 
"He continued to remain highly active after the Police Department was set up 
in 1922, Morgan, J., Conflict and Order, p. 11. 
"Who Was Who, Vol. 4,1941-50. 
"Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the 
-land Wales and Scotland, (1920), pp. 82 ff, I 10 ff Po 
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Chapter IX: Why Crime Started Rising 
I 
When the War began, the number of 'Crimes Known to the Police', fell very sharply 
until 1916, and then rose only moderately after that'. Many police officers had left 
their forces to enter the military, and the fall in the figures was used to allow police 
forces "to reduce the purely preventive duties" and concentrate more fully on war 
work'. Some routine patrol work was taken over by private citizens who enrolled as 
voluntary Special Constables or Women Police. They apparently found that they 
could do much of the job adequately themselves. During 1916, the press contained 
many stories of how crime was diminishing, courts were emptying, and prisons were 
closing'. It was suggested that the decrease in crime "will not end when the war 
ends". The principle reason for this optimism being the restriction of alcohol sales 
which the "experts" said had previously been directly responsible for a "terrible 
'Judicial Statistics. 
'Inspectors of Constabulary, 1915, p. 5; Emsley, C., The English Police: A 
Political and Social Histoly, p. 116. 
'Times Index 1916, 'Crime'. 
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proportion of the crime of the country"'. Immediately after the War, therefore, crime 
was barely mentioned in the evidence given to the Desborough Committee or in the 
Commons' debate on the Police Bill'. 
Sir Edward Henry, the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, further 
encouraged the view that the police had become almost redundant in their daily 
duties. In a politically inept display, he reassured the Desborough Committee that the 
police presence 
gives a sense of security to the public. The man who is sitting in charge of 
some of these [police] stations can read the paper or do anything he likes. It 
is much the same in counties, and it is the greatest possible credit to the 
Police Force that it should be so, because the less there is for them to do the 
better indication it is that they are doing as a Police Force good work. 
The Home Office appear to have had little intention of providing the police extra 
work. In 1921, H. B. Simpson, for the Home Office, could only suggest that the 
"essential function of a constable is to help other people to lead a quiet, orderly, and 
'Times, 6 March 1916, p. 3. 
'Parl. Debs. 
, 
5th ser, Vol. 118, (18 July 1919), pp. 795-843, (Second Reading 
of the Police Bill). 
'Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales and 
Scotland, (1920), p. 96. 
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peaceful life"'. This hardly suggested that the Department would regarded the police 
as a priority for public spending in times of austerity. 
More astute members of the service, such as Sir Leonard Dunning, had already seen 
the writing on the wall, and before the end of the War were fearing for the future 
funding of professional preventive policing; "it remains to be seen whether the altered 
circumstances of the country will call for an increase of police forces, or whether the 
resumption of the police duties by the citizens themselves during the period of the 
war has taught them to rely upon their own powers for the protection of themselves 
and their property instead of leaning on the police"'. 
11 
Commenting on the large Desborough award, Dunning warned; "It is possible that 
the increasing cost of the police service will call for economy in numbers"'. Under 
Desborough, the cost of policing was split equally between reluctant ratepayers and 
a reluctant Home Office. The cost of maintaining the police establishment, at the 
current level, trebled as a result of the Desborough award, from about 0,000,000 in 
'Report of the Departmental Committee on the Duties of Women Police, 
(192 1), p. 4. 
'Inspectors of Constabuliry, 1918, p. 3. 
'Inspectors of ConstabulLary 1918-1919, P. P. 1920 (91), XXII. 463, p. 3. 
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1914 to about f20, OOO, OOO in 1920'0. In addition to finding the cost of the 
Desborough award, many local authorities had still to introduce the large increases 
in police establishments to cover the requirements of the 1910 Police Weekly (Rest 
Day) Act". This Act, if fully implemented, threatened to raise costs by a further 20 
per cent without providing any additional increase in public protection. From both 
left and right, local authorities criticised the "grossly overpaid" post-Desborough 
police and had no great wish to maintain either their numbers or budgets". 
Central Goverm-nent was in its usual ungenerous mood and remained "unwilling to 
pay more than half the cost of the police"". In the opinion of an Assistant Secretary 
at the Home Office, "The Home Office finds it very difficult to get money for 
anything, and I think we have a sort of feeling that it is going to be very much 
harder... The police are always rather a luxury, and some localities can afford the 
luxury more than others" 14 
. 
Throughout most of the inter-war and immediate post-war 
period, this attitude persisted. S. J. Stevenson has argued that there was no evidence 
that "an increase in police numbers was really a matter of overriding Home Office 
"Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 193. 
"Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police, A Study in Manpower, pp. 171 ff. 
"Judge, A., The Force of Persuasion, p. 41. 
"Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police; A Study in Manpowe 
, 
p. 55. 
"Evidence of H. B. SimPson, Assistant Secretary, Home Office, Minutes of 
Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, (1920), 
pp. 9,5. 
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concern". In the years after the War, as demonstrated by the General Strike of 1926, 
it became even clearer to the authorities that fewer regular police were necessary to 
control industrial unrest than had been the case before the war. In 1929, Arthur 
Dixon, on behalf of the Police Department put it succinctly, "The number of Police 
required for the maintenance of order, or the suppression of disorder, is far fewer to- 
day than 20 years ago"". 
With greater co-operative arrangements and a reserve strength of Specials, the Home 
Office no longer needed to maintain, let alone improve upon the rising ratios of 
police, relative to population, that had developed during the Victorian period. In the 
inter-war period, this ratio was allowed to fall". By 1932, Herbert Samuel, the Home 
Secretary, although accepting that "Of course, if the police were greatly increased in 
their numbers, they would probably be much more effective than they are now in the 
suppression of crime", ruled out additional numbers solely on the ground of 
economy; "this very heavy cost of the Police Force has to be tak-en into account, 
particularly in these days of financial stringency, when we consider the possibility of 
"Stevenson, S. J., 'Reflections on the Attempt to Rationalize the Distribution 
of Police in England and Wales, 1942-1974', p. 63; Evidence of A. L. Dixon, Minutes 
of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, (1929), p. 
173. 
16 Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police: A Study in Mmpowe 
, 
p. 47, Table 
111.4. 
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a great increase in their numbers as a means of coping with crime"". He did not 
attempt to quantify the effectiveness of preventive policing on crime because there 
were no resources to incorporate the old ratios of police to population into the 
equation, and the 'low policing' of crime had never been the first priority". 
Until well after the Second World War, as the Economist pointed out, there was "no 
sign of any scientific, statistical calculation of the effect of a definite increase of 
police in reducing or eliminating a Imown volume of crime in any area. "". Only two 
arguments counted 
- 
economy and national security 
- 
demand-side counter-arguments 
based on crime were irrelevant. The police were going to need either to find some 
urgent new work, such as a sudden and large increase in crime or traffic control, to 
justify their new expensive semi-professional status or, as the Inspectors of 
Constabulary feared, expect calls for their numbers to be reduced" 
"Herbert Samuel, Parl. Debs., 5-th ser., Vol. 265, (2 May 1932), p. 856, 
(Supply Committee 
- 
Police). 
"For a discussion of the Home Office's " pre- scientific" attitude see 
Stevenson,, S. J., 'Reflections on the Attempt to Rationalize the Distribution of Police 
in England and Wales, 1942-1974', pp. 56-77. 
19Special Correspondent, 'Need to Recall and Apply the Principle of 
Prevention', Times, 7 November 1952, p. 7. 
'011nnsDectors f Constabulary, 1918-1919, p. 3. 
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These calls were made repeatedly", and for almost the entire inter-war period, police 
numbers and expenditure was subject to constraints and review, particularly during 
the economic crises of 1922 and 193 1. By 1932, even Sir Llewelyn Atcherley was 
complaining that "we have been for so many years economising and economising that 
we have come almost to bedrock. We are even discussing wearing one pair of 
trousers instead of two" 22 
. 
In these circumstances, the police did extremely well to 
keep their manpower virtually stationary throughout the period, the actual strength 
of the police in England and Wales in 1921 was 59,520, in 1935 it was 59,230, and 
by the run-up to the Second World War 1939 it had reached 63,980, but much of this 
increase was in anticipation of civil defence work 23 
"See,, example the comment made by Sir Hugh Bell, a coal owner and 
magistrate, to the Monthly luncheon of the Individualist Bookshop; "he was willing 
to pay a reasonable amount and not the extravagant sums he had to pay now, when 
he did not get that regulation and order that he wanted and when he got a good deal 
he did not want. " The sort of regulation and order he wanted was that maintained in 
Sweden where police had threatened to fire on strikers. This meeting was attended 
by Edward Shortt who, as Home Secretary, had set up the Desborough Committee. 
Times, 27 October 1927, p. 11. 
"Evidence of Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, Report from the Select Committee on 
the A ice Forces , PP. 1931-2 (106), V. 123, p. 157. 
23Martin, J. P. and Wilson, G., The Police; Study in Manpower, p. 47. 
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III 
Gradually, the situation began to transform as crime began to move up the political 
agenda. The reason was that, in 1920, crime indices, which had been relatively static 
for decades started coming to life. Leading the figures upwards was the table of 
'Crimes Known to the Police'. In just two years this reached an all-time high of 
107,000 crimes (Figure 1.1 ). From then on, with remarkable consistency until the 
late 1970s,, with the exception of a brief interlude in the 1950s, this figure almost 
doubled every decade. In his report for 1920-1, Sir Leonard Dunning, the senior 
Inspector of Constabulary had asked; "Can anything be done by central criticism and 
instruction to give this figure of Crimes Known to the Police the value which it ought 
to possess? It does not seem likely that many crimes are wrongly included, but the 
exclusion of crimes which ought to appear is beyond doubt"". 
24 inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-2 1, p. 11. 
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'Crimes Known to the Police, 1857-1995 
5 Year Moving Average (2 years either side of the current year) 
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Figure IX. 1 'Crimes Known to the Police(1 857-1995). Calculated from the Criminal 
Statistics. 
Dunning was well placed and highly motivated to raise the standards of policing and 
to protect its resources. He felt that the official statistics greatly understated the extent 
of crime and,, in particular, that the figures did not show how much crime was rising. 
After he was appointed Inspector of Constabulary in 1912 he wrote; "if the returns 
did really show all the cases which ought to be included, there would be on paper an 
increase of crime, which by its obvious exaggeration would draw attention away from 
the real increase, consistent and progressive for some years past"" 
2'lnsl2ector of ConstabulsqZ, 1913, p. 57. 
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Before the First World War, Dunning had been the Head Constable of Liverpool. His 
predecessor, Sir William Nott-Bower, later admitted, "It is impossible to compare 
Liverpool (as has been attempted) with other towns by quoting statistics"". For most 
years, Liverpool's figures were much higher than anywhere else and they were used 
to justify the highest police man-power levels per acre, and per head of population 
outside London". In the 1890's, when the Home Office began to impose uniformity 
in crime 'co-efficients', Sir William reduced Liverpool's figures in line with other 
cities. By the time he left, he had brought the City's crime 'co-efficient' sharply down 
to exactly the rate of 611 crimes per 100,000, that the Home Office said was 'non-nal' 
for a seaport". He also made an "unparalleled" 75 per cent cut in Liverpool's 
enormous figures for drink prosecutions and brought about a very large decline in 
prosecutions for offences against the person". During 1902, Nott-Bower left to take 
up the chief constableship of the City of London and Dunning, his deputy, was 
appointed the new Head Constable. 
"Nott-Bower, Sir W., Fifty-Two Years a_Policeman, Edward Arnold,, 1926, 
142. 
"Ibid., p. 69. 
"In 1898 the Judicial Statistics provided a table of the normal crime rates for 
different types of districts. Seaports, such as Liverpool normally had the highest 
crime rates averaging 611.10 indictable crimes per 100,000, Judicial Statistics, 1898. 
By 1902, when Nott Bower left Liverpool's rate was 'normal' at 611.4 1. See above, 
177. 
29JU. diCial StatiStiCS, 1899, p. 73. 
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Reviewing Dunning's first years as Head Constable, Francis Caldwell, the then Head 
of C. I. D. and future Head Constable, revealed, "the offence work has increased very 
much in the last five years and is still on the increase"". On I June 1903, Dunning 
introduced a new system of recording crime and, by the end of 1905, the city's crime 
rate had doubled compared with 1902". Dunning's stated aim was to make his figures 
"ftirther reaching and more reliable"". As a result, Liverpool had, by a great margin, 
the highest crime rate in England and Wales. With 1,222 crimes per 100,000, she had 
three times Birmingham's rate of 416, over four times London's rate which had by 
now fallen to 300,, and nearly five times Leeds'rate of 263. The average for England 
and Wales was only 277 33 
What was not commented upon was that Dunning had exactly doubled the Liverpool 
crime rate. Immediately upon his appointment, Dunning began to push the crime rate 
to an all-time high of 1221.68 per 100,0000, an increase of 99.81 per cent in three 
years. This was clearly a bookk-eeping increase, since there was no increase in 
persons apprehended for indictable offenceS34 
. 
Dunning's attitude was, as he later 
admitted in 1919,, "Now, of crimes Imown to the police, the figure is one on which 
to place very little reliance, because it is what I call a discretionary statistic; the man 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1905-6, P. P. 1907 (128), XXXI. 1, p. 97. 
"In England and Wales as a whole it rose about 10 per cent. 
32 Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 66. 
"Ibid. p. 62. 
34 Ibid. p. 66. 
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who has to prepare that f 1135 igure can put down pretty much what he likes 
. 
Liverpool's 
figures continued to rise, from 4,234 in 1902 to 14,041 in 19 10 
- 
an increase of over 
16 per cent per annum. In these eight years, Dunning raised Liverpool's share of 
'Indictable Crimes Known to the Police' from 5 per cent to 13'/2per cent of the total 
for England and Wales, although the City still only employed about 3 per cent of the 
total police force. 
IV 
The reason Dunning had raised his figures in Liverpool was because he had a clear, 
almost missionary, vision of modem professional policing that involved increased 
police activity, numbers and duties". It meant the police taking crime more seriously 
and following up cases, even when they were unlikely to lead to prosecutions. 
Because Dunning wanted this greatly expanded role for the new, professional police, 
when, shortly after Desborough, plans to cut police establishments were revealed, his 
unsurprising reply was that he was "mainly concerned in attaining a result opposite 
to the reduction that is now being sought"" 
"Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee mi tl 
Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, p. 82. 
"See below, pp. 320 ff. 
37 Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-1, p. 4. 
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In 192 1, the publication of the preliminary report of the Census led police authorities 
to discuss in earnest whether so many police were necessary per head of population" 
The following year, the first large attack on the police establishment came with the 
Geddes Axe on Public Expenditure which required a5 per cent saving in police 
numbers. This amounted to a cut of 1,, 000 uniformed beat officers from the 
Metropolitan Police alone". Neither Geddes nor many police authorities believed that 
the existing munbers of police were still justified. In order "that the numbers of Police 
will be adequately reduced" the report suggested, 
a full investigation should now be made as to the strength of all Police Forces, 
beginning with those whose present establishment appears to be on a more 
generous scale than the average, and that the Home Office should at once 
endeavour to arrive at a basis of the numbers required for the adequate 
policing of each area. We think, that such a basis, calculated upon acreage, 
population and ratable value, should be introduced with the least possible 
delay" 
"Ibid. P. 4. 
39Commissionerofthe Metropolitan Police, 1922, P. P. 1923 [Cmd 1904], XII 
Pt. 2.313, p. I- 
"Geddes, Sir E. C. (chm), Second Interim Report of the Committee on 
Natio Lai Expenditure, P. P. 1922 [Cmd 15 82], IX. 173, p. 5 8. 
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Forces were well aware that they had no influence over the variables of acreage, 
population, or rateable value. However, since the 1890s, the Home Office had 
promoted the statistics of indictable crime as the main measure of police efficiency. 
In these circumstances, because police forces had control over the all important 
"discretionary statistic" of the amount of indictable crime recorded". ) naturally they 
began to use it, as S. J. Stevenson has observed, to persuade police authorities to 
endorse calls from the forces for increases in establishments; "Long-term increases 
in reported crime made all Chief Constables, Borough Watch Committees, and 
Standing Joint Committees in the counties exceedingly anxious to retain or increase 
numbers of local police in any urban centre, and always the trend was now to justify 
new requests not in terms of police per head of population but rather in terms of 
police available relative to steady increases in reported crime" 42 
Dunning had long wanted more juvenile crime recorded and the obvious conclusion 
is that senior police officers had followed Dunning's advice. They had gone along 
with him because he offered clear leadership and because by playing the crime card 
"During the early twentieth century, Chief Constables had been tak-ing over 
the production of the criminal statistics from the magistrates clerks who often had 
previously compiled them. By 1930, the large majority of statistical returns were 
under the control of Chief Constables. MacGregor, Det Sgt A. M., 'Criminal 
Statistics', Police Joumal, 1953, Vol. 26, pp. 35-44, p. 39. 
42 Stevenson, S. J. Reflections on the Attempt to Rationalize the Distribution 
of Police in England and Wales, 1942-1974', p. 62. 
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they hoped to undermine Geddes and, by extension, government policy and at least, 
maintain, if not improve their establishments". It is doubtful that many endorsed his 
views on preventive policing. Writing in 1932, James Clayton, the Chief Constable 
of Doncaster, a very experienced representative of the Chief Constables, Association 
who had served at every rank in the service, was quite clear that "the increase in the 
number of crimes is more apparent than real" and that the decision to record crimes 
of a "nominal" value, such as "the stealing of a bottle of milk from a doorstep", 
originated in the "book-keeping" decisions of a number of chief constableS44. 
Geddes was informed, by Dunning, through the medium of the Reports of the 
Inspectors of Constabulary, that the level of crime had to be taken into account when 
deciding police strengths; "if anybody proposes to occupy his time in searching for 
this formula, which has still to be found, there is another figure which he should most 
certainly include in his calculations... the 'crime-co efficient' of the police district"". 
In a classic version of an argument that had been heard before and was to be 
rehearsed many times over the next seven decades, Dunning continued; "One may at 
43 The statistics of traffic accidents and prosecutions, were similarly used in 
an attempt to break the link- between population and the size of the police 
establislunent. For example, Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-1, p. 4. 
"Memorandum submitted by James Clayton DCM MM, Report from the 
Select Committee on the Amalgamation of Police Forces, (1931-2), p. 229. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1923-4, P. P. 1924-5 [Cmd 2316], XV. 177, p. 
9 
once say that the reliability of these figures has improved very much of late years and 
that they now come nearer to a correct representation of facts than they did in years 
gone. by... [this figure is] one reason why vacancies should be filled and, in some 
cases why establishments should be increased"" 
V 
As his arbitrary doubling of the figures in Liverpool shows, Dunning was not 
particularly interested in either the finer points of statistical accuracy, or in the effect 
such unilateral action had on the national statistics. In this he was like most chief 
constables who felt the national statistics applied a bureaucratic classification of 
offences that had little local or practical meaning". They viewed their statistical 
returns to the Home Office as an enormous waste of their time, and this encouraged 
short-cuts,, and a fon-nulaic approach to be taken to their compilation. In other words, 
police opposition to national statistics, "ranged from violent antagonism, through 
active and passive obstruction to complete disregard of their existence and 
revelations"" 
"Ibid. p. 9. 
"Many police chose to "abandon" the scheme of classification used in the 
Criminal Statistics and, like the modus operandi system, employed a classification 
based on that in Dr C. A. Mercier's Crime and Insanity. Report of the Inspectors of 
Constabulary, 1912-13, p. 57. 
"MacGregor, Det Sgt A. M., 'Criminal Statistics', p. 35. 
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For most chief constables, statistics were there to serve immediate practical ends and 
so were principally employed as local bargaining counters rather than as objective 
facts that existed independently of policy. There was an attitude, reflected in annual 
reports of chief constables, that the local police were the experts and they Imew better 
than the figures, whether crime was rising or not. The bottom line was that most chief 
constables ensured the statistics confin-ned and supported policy. The Americans had 
similar problems. James Edward Hagerty wisely noted in 1934; "Under no 
circumstances should those responsible for the administration of the law be given the 
authority to collect and compile facts within their own jurisdiction"". 
As an experienced practical policeman, Dunning would have been perfectly aware 
of his colleagues' feelings. The Criminal Statistics show that, after the war, there was 
no sudden change in the figures of crime across the board, just what appeared to be 
some "fluctuations with an upward tendency"" that had not been present before. Most 
likely, Dunning had compromised by exhorting and persuading individual chief 
constables to report whatever additional small amount they could - some years 
"Quoted in Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England between the 
Wars, p. 38. 
"Report of H. M. ConstabulqLU 1929-30, P. P. 1930-1 (40), XVI. 813, p 11. The 
picture was immensely complex as Hen-nann Mannheim showed in his study of crime 
in the inter-war period, Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England between 
the Wars. A full study of Chief Constable's annual reports, and local archive material 
would greatly illuminate the period. 
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putting the figures up, other years pulling them back, but always maintaining an 
upward trend. As a peripatetic Inspector of Constabulary, who went from force to 
force, he was in an ideal position to adopt this approach. A modest rise might ensure 
that some crime that would not previously have been dealt with, was now tackled,, 
and the police authority was made more aware of the risks it ran if the resources were 
withheld that were needed to do the job efficiently. 
Different police authorities were interested in different things and there were great 
splits in policing practice between the Metropolitan Police, the county forces, the 
borough forces and those with detective departments. Most chief constables shaped 
their police duties, definitions of crime, and statistics to fit local conditions and their 
own and local governing budgets and prejudices". Some forces were more liable to 
cuts than others, and some were more active than others. This was reflected in the 
widely differing contents of their local annual reports to their authorities". 
Dunning may well have preferred a local approach because he associated central 
statistics with the "older attitude" and the "slacImess" engendered by the reporting of 
const . ant crime figures. As he put it, "central control would encourage apathy and 
discourage initiative and elasticity of action"". As the figures began to increase 
"Devon, J., The Criminal and the Community, John Lane, 1912, pp. 191 ff. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 68; 'Chief Constables Annual Reports', Justice 
of the Peace, 1949, Vol. CXIII, (22 January 1949), pp. 61-2. 
1920- 1, p. 10; Minutes of Evidence, Comnlittee "Inspecto 
- of Constabula (continued 
... 
) 
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leaving prosecutions behind, Dunning praised chief constables for coming "nearer to 
a correct representation of facts than they did in years gone by"". This piecemeal 
approach, which threatened, for years and decades to come, to confuse real rises with 
bookkeeping rises was obviously the antithesis of accurate reporting. Consequently, 
when the stopper on the figures was released, some forces, such as those in 
Bedfordshire, began to report very large increases in crime, others, such as some of 
the Welsh county constabularies actually claimed crime was going down. Many 
forces fluctuated up and down. This is probably why although in the aggregate crime 
rose fairly consistently, the local figures in the Criminal Statistics were more chaotic. 
The positivistic assumption, which underlay the revision of the Criminal Statistics in 
1893, that the figures of one force should be tested against, and conform with those 
of other forces with similar social, geographic and economic conditions was 
powerful. This appears to have led to a process akin to a chain-reaction that locked 
many forces into an upward spiral. During the inter-war period, local critical masses 
began to be formed when a sufficient number of forces in a district had reported 
crime rising over a period of time. In a reversal of the Victorian position, other 
neighbouring forces who were not reporting rising crime, were then compelled to 
confirm the majority of their neighbours, by reporting a rise, or else explain why they 
were. unaffected by rising crime all around them. This pressure was increased during 
the depression, when crime and other social surveys abounded and a greater public 
"( 
... 
continued) 
on the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland, p. 86. 
54 abulary, 1923-4, p. 9. 
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expectation developed that the statistics of crime should be related to the local 
statistics of unemployment or other social indices". 
VI 
Dunning's approach was made clear in his discussion of drink convictions in his 
1920-1 Report. He likened the selection process to a machine for grading road metal, 
where the grades of stone used could be changed. To increase its convictions, a police 
force merely increased the gauge of the holes in the machine. He was arguing that 
crime statistics could be made to appear to rise when the statistical base was changed 
from year to year; "In this simile of the machine, one must remember that it is not one 
machine of known and stable gauge which might be expected to give stable results, 
but that the 180 odd police forces represent so many machines of which no two were 
originally of uniform gauge or are kept to gauge from year to year"" 
So, to increase the crime figures, Dunning merely had to persuade a number of forces 
to keep increasing the gauges they used to record indictable crime. Since property 
offences were the main concern of the police, the gauge most forces used was the 
"Ruck,, S. K., 'The Increase of Crime in England: An Analysis and Criticism', 
Political Quarterly, 1932, 
, 
Vol. 3, pp. 206-225; Mannheim, H. Social Aspects o 
Crime in England between the Wars, Part 11. This contains many references to 
surve ys of crime. 
"Inspectors of ConstabulaLy, 1920-21, p. 13. 
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monetary value of the goods stolen. In all forces there was a vast reservoir of 
unrecorded crime since large numbers of smaller property offences went 
uninvestigated and were traditionally "cuffed" from the records or else reduced to 
non-indictable charges. Dunning provided chief constables with arguments to 
persuade their police authorities that some of these should really be treated as serious 
crime requiring augmentations to their establishments; 
the test of mere money value, which is generally accepted, is fallacious. To 
justify one's saying that a crime is serious or not, one must know how it 
affects not only the person who suffers by it, but also the person who commits 
it. The theft of five shillings may not seem serious, but would be so if the five 
shillings stood between the loser and actual want, and it must be remembered 
that the poor, to whom five shillings may mean much, suffer more from crime 
than the rich... Again, if the theft were the first success which started a child 
on a life of crime, it would be serious... Again, such a theft if the work of an 
old hand with not the smallest intention of reform, would not be serious so far 
as he was concerned, it would only add another spot to the leopard's skin. The 
word "serious" will inevitably be used in any discussion on the sufficiency of 
a police force for dealing with crime". 
Traditionally, those who reported crimes to the police were often met with open 
disbelief and, unless they were obviously 'respectable', could face a mini'third. degree' 
57 tabulary, 1922-3, p. 9. 
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to establish their status, credibility and whether they had sufficient finances to fund 
the prosecution themselves, before the police would accept the crime and start an 
investigation. In the 1930s, standard police work-s were still advising officers that 
"The class of person involved should be recorded by the investigating officer" and 
that he should obtain such information as; What is his "financial status"9 "Is the 
complainant genuine"'? Does the complainant have delusions? ". However, by the 
early 1930s, the author of these questions, Major-General Llewelyn Atcherley, 
Dunning's fellow Inspector of Constabulary, had noted, "the disposition now is to 
more. often register a doubtful instance as crime 
- 
in the absence of positive proof one 
way or another 
- 
rather than to exclude it for the same reasons"". 
Before the War, to keep crime figures down, most reports of theft were entered into 
a 'Suspected Stolen Book', rather than into the 'Crime Book', "unless subsequent 
"Atcherley, Maj-Gen L. W. and Brook, Lieut. Col. F., Criminal Investigation 
and Detection, Wakefield, County Chief Constable's Office, 1932, p. 63. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1930-31, P. P. 1931-2 (36), X11.639, p. 6. This 
statement was not true. Vast amounts of crime still continues to be 'cuffed', Young, 
M. An Inside Job: Policing and Police Culture in Britain, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1991, pp. 323 ff. From the vantage point of the 1980s, a senior officer "described the 
period between the wars as equivalent to a'golden age' of cuffing", Bottomley, K. and 
Coleman, C., Understanding Crime Rates: Police and Public Roles in the Production 
of Official Statisli-cs, Farnborough, Gower, 198 1, p. 22. From the vantage point of the 
inter-war period, the nineteenth century would have appeared as the 'golden age'. 
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evidence or the conviction of the person by a Court removed any further possibility 
of doubt"". This kept the figures down and kept crime within fixed bounds,, since it 
placed the onus on the injured party to prove that a crime had been committed, rather 
than on the police to investigate whether or not this was the case. The abolition of 
some of these 'Suspected Stolen Books' was an easy way to raise crime figures at a 
stroke. From the 1920s,, many of the sudden permanent leaps in crime that appeared 
in the local statistics, can most probably be explained by 'Suspected Stolen Books' 
being abolished, either within a division, or within an entire force. 
More gentle and constant increases could be obtained by changing practices in the 
classification of offences. Offences could be classified in any number of ways 
depending on the orders given to charge officers and the way the elements of the 
offence were interpreted. So, a charge officer could reduce an offence to make it non- 
indictable,, or increase it to an indictable crime. To raise a force's figures, it was only 
necessary to set the charge officer a target to increase indictable crimes by a certain 
percentage. Since vastly more offences were classified as non-indictable or suspected 
crime than were recorded as indictable, police forces had an enormous reservoir of 
what had been traditionally dismissed as minor offences that could at any time be 
promoted to make a serious indictable crime. 
IOCommissioner of the Metropolis, 1932, P. P. 1932-3 [Cmd 4294], XV. 319, 
p. 16. For the introduction of the 'Suspected Stolen Book' in Manchester following 
Home Office instructions in 1899 see above, p. 163. 
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For example, the great rise in house and shop breakings, that were a notable and 
alarming feature of the inter-war period, probably largely resulted from changes in 
classification of small offences. There were earlier precedents. In London, in 1878, 
following the formation of the C. I. D. the previous year, burglaries and 
housebreakings suddenly rose 330 per cent due to a change of classification from 
"larcenies or kindred offences". The Criminal Statistics noted in 1899, 
Crimes which at one time and in one district are classified as burglary will at 
another time and elsewhere be classified as larceny, and conversely. Thus, 
opening premises by means of skeleton keys or lifting a window already half 
open or pushing back a catch of a window might be variously described in 
different returns. An apparent increase of burglary and housebreaking has 
sometimes been really ascribable to a sudden application of strict legal 
definitions" 
This was what Dunning meant in his frequent calls for a "more uniform 
administration of the law"". Uniformity in applying legal definitions would mean 
that small thefts would have to be classed everywhere as serious housebreakings or 
shopbreakings, placing pressure on authorities to increase police numbers. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1899, p. 22. 
"See, for example his comments, Inspectors of Constabulary, 1918, p. 4; 
InsDectors of Constabulary, p. 10. 
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Vil 
There still remained one obstacle in the way of chief constables raising their crime 
figures. Most police authorities would not fund an increase in prosecutions and this 
could leave chief constables looking inefficient. As Figure 1.2 shows, the total 
number of indictable prosecutions did not begin to rise until a decade after the police 
figures began to rise, and then reluctantly and at a much slower rate. 
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Criminal Statistics. 
Dunning had an answer. A decision in the new Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. 
Syres (1908), allowed other offences admitted by a prisoner to be taken into 
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consideration by the courts". As a result, the Home Office added a new column to 
the Criminal Statistics in 1910 and expanded it, in 1912, to include other cases of 
'Crimes of which the perpetrators were detected but for which no proceedings are 
shown"'. In his report for 1920-1, Sir Leonard argued how a chief constable could 
use this column to break the traditional lin. 1, -, between prosecutions and crimes known 
to the police; 
a certain Chief Constable. ) who, when his Crime Book was under inspection, 
expatiated on the difficulties caused to the police by persons refusing to 
prosecute, instancing a case in which an employer had complained to the 
police of thefts of raw material and then refused to prosecute an employee 
red-handed. Asked to show the case in his Crime Book he explained its 
absence: 'Why should I show a crime committed without any chance of 
showing a prisoner against iff Though it is seldom so frankly admitted, it is 
understood to be the rule in some places to exclude from the return any case 
in which the injured person refuses to apply for process. Of late years a 
column has been added to the returns for showing the cases in which, though 
the perpetrators have been detected, there has been no prosecution, but the 
Chief Constable in question does not seem to have grasped this as an 
opportunity for preserving, even of improving, his cherished percentage". 
"Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars, p. 44. 
P. 39. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-21, p. 12. 
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Until the end of the First World War this figure remained at around 6,000 to 7,000 
crimes a year or somewhat below 7 per cent of the total number of crimes Imown. By 
1922, the figure of crimes detected but not prosecuted, had risen to 13 per cent of the 
total. 
-By the late 1920s, as the crime figures rose, it was approaching 25 per cent of 
crimes of known to the police" and had absorbed much of the increased crime. 
Vill 
The sudden inflation of the police figures seems to have taken the Home Office by 
surprise. Evidence of this is that the Metropolitan Police, the only force which 
remained directly under Home Office control and also not subject to the influence of 
the Inspectors of Constabulary, continued to follow pre-war practices by recording 
a more or less constant level of between 15,000 and 17,000 indictable crimes in the 
decade 1919-29". Throughout the rest of England and Wales crime rose about 65 per 
cent in this period" 
Until at least the mid- I 920s, the Home Office stone-walled over the police figures. 
Moreover,, the Home Office,, as an institution, had at stake its prestige and reputation 
"Calculated from Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England between 
the Wars, p. 42.; see also Judicial Statistics, 1928, P. P. 1929-30 [Cmd 3581], 
XISIXX. 395, p. xxxi 
- 
I'Moylan, J. F., Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan Police, p. 175. 
"Calculated from the Judicial Statistics. 
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which depended upon the manifest control of crime. Not surprisingly, as Victor 
Bailey has shown, in the 1920s, the Home Office continued to present a progressivist 
and declining analysis of the crime problem". It was important that the public 
accepted their analysis, since the alternative was the admission that their policies had 
not controlled crime. Politicians, of course, were supportive. They preferred that their 
civil servants dealt with crime administratively and invisibly, rather than have it 
presented to them by the press as a problem out of control requiring expensive and 
impossible political solutions during a period of economic retrenchment. 
A very similar crisis was also developing at the Ministries of Health and Education. 
Here the Ministries, in order retain administrative control of policy, had to deny, 
suppress and misrepresent statistical and other evidence reported by Medical Officers 
of Health or else lose control to the politicians by admitting that there was 
malnutrition and declining levels of health and that a change was needed in the 
institutional status quo. Charles Webster wrote, "every major political and 
administrative influence operated to coerce the Ministry of Health and Board of 
Education into adopting the most optimistic interpretation of the available evidence 
Once an impression had been built up of the nation's sound and improving health 
record, it was difficult to undertaIrce any radical reappraisal without prejudicing the 
reputation of the public health administration"". 
"See also Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship: Reclaiming the Young 
Offender, 1914-1948. 
70 Webster, C 
-, 
'Healthy or Hungry Thirties? ', History Workshop Journal, 1982, (continued 
... 
) 
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To contain their problems and retain Departmental prestige, Ministries had to keep 
control of the statistics. The Ministry of Health harassed and threatened Medical 
Officers of Health who dissented from the official policy of OptiMiSM71. It was harder 
for the Home Office to do the same to chief constables. Instead, until at least the mid- 
1920s, the Home Office stone-walled and insisted that the problem would go away. 
They advised the public and politicians, to discount the increased police reporting of 
crime as mere 'statistics' and reassured them that "crime was on the up grade before 
the war, resumed at a lower level after the return of peace, and now shows a definite 
tendency to further diminution"". 
Ultimately, the implication of rising crime was increased expenditure. Most police 
authorities had no more reason to want rising crime than the Home Office. They 
wanted their district's reputation to be kept 'clean' from crime. Politically, there were 
calls for economy during the inter-war depression and all authorities had many other 
pressing spending priorities to meet. There was also great resentment at the 
possibility of having to find more money for a service that, after Desborough, was 
slipping from local authority to central control. Tony Judge has described how, after 
Desborough, "Labour councillors, whose sympathies were with manual workers and 
who tended to see the police as the obedient servants of the bosses, were quite ready 
to make common cause with Tory council leaders in the shires and cities, almost all 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Vol. 13, (Spring 1982), pp. 110-29, @ p. 123. 
" Ibid., p. 112. 
72 Judicial Statistics, 1923, P. P. 1924-5 [Cmd 2385], XXVIII. 63, p. 5. 
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of whom were opposed to the increased central government control of the police 
service resulting from the Police Act. "" 
ix 
At first the Home Office tried to disparage the status of the police figures. It insisted 
that they were unreliable, and that the normal fixed cycle of prosecutions should be 
accepted as the real measure of crime". The 1922 Criminal Statistics explained, "The 
figures of persons for trial for indictable offences are usually regarded as the most 
trustworthy index of the state of crime. Generally, the conclusions drawn from these 
figures are confirmed by those suggested by the figures relating to crimes known to 
the police. Latterly, however, the last mentioned figures have increased, while the 
number of persons for trial has become stationary or has even diminished"" 
In the nineteenth century, whenever this issue was debated, it had been decided in 
favour of the number of proceedings undertaken by police authorities for indictable 
73 Judge, A., the Force of Persuasion, p. 40. 
"Radzinowicz and Hood, The Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian and 
Edwardian England p. 105; Radzinowicz, L., 'English Criminal Statistics; A Critical 
Analysis', in Radzinowicz, L. and Turner, J. W. C. (eds. ), The Modern Approach to 
Criminal Law, English Studies in Criminal Science, vol. IV, Macmillan, 1945. 
75 Judicial Statistics, 1922, P. P. 1924 [Cmd 2265], XXV. 719, p. 6. 
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offenceS76 
. 
At that time this reflected the inferior status of the police relative to the 
magistrates and councillors who comprised the police authorities and who controlled 
much of the administration of criminal justice. This meant that magisterial opinion 
of the seriousness and public importance of a particular crime, as indicated by their 
decision whether to authorise prosecution or not, would be valued more highly than 
the judgement of common policemen who reported offences to them. When the 
statistical returns were made each year, chief constables were expected merely to 
"confirm" the figures of prosecutions with a slightly larger figure of 'crimes Imown'. 
If they did not they were held to be 'inefficient'. 
However, by the 1920s police status had risen and this has to be placed in the context 
of the slow erosion of magisterial status since the mid-Victorian era. In 1880, 
according to a magistrate, 
There were four agencies in the hands of the magistrates for the repression of 
crime: (1) the sentences they inflicted; (2) their control of the police; (3) their 
influence in the workhouse, where they sat as ex officio members; and (4) the 
control and management of gaols. Lately this control and management of 
gaols had been taken from magistrates... and he had no doubt that that was 
"Radzinowicz,, L. and Hood, R., The Emergence-of Penal Policy in Victorian 
and Edwardian England.,. p. 105; Radzinowicz, L., 'English Criminal Statistics; A 
Critical Analysis'. 
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intended as a preliminary towards depriving them of the control of the 
police. 77 
This was a correct assessment. In 1877 the local prisons had been nationalised and 
taken away from magisterial control. Local government changes in the late Victorian 
period also diluted magisterial control of the police by creating police authorities 
which included councillors (although many of them were also magistrates). After the 
First'World War, Desborough deliberately wrested the remnants of oPerational 
control from these police authorities". Police authorities, however, still continued to 
exercise financial control over budgets, that is to say the number of prosecutions. 
By the early post-armistice period, the previously dominant magistrates were clearly 
on the defensive and, shortly after the Desborough Committee had reported, a number 
of leading magistrates came together and, partly for protection, formed the 
Magistrates' Association. Soon after, magistrates began to campaign to rename Police 
Courts as Magistrates' Courts. So, as the centre intervened, the relatively homogenous 
system of local criminal justice administration of the mid-Victorian era, which was 
based upon magisterial dominance, unravelled and fragmented into a number of, 
"Captain Verney, R. N., Transactions of the National Association for the 
Promotion of Social Science, 1880, p. 336. 
"Robert Reiner argues that county chief constables had always been 
independent from local control, Reiner, R., Chief Constables, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1991, pp. 13-14. 
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often. financially, competing institutions each with its own policy agenda, philosophy 
of crime and criminals, and each claiming quasi-professional status. Each also 
produced its own statistics as part of its propaganda supporting its position. 
Thus, as a result of the loss of magisterial dominance over local criminal justice, three 
main diverging and conflicting indexes evolved on which criminal policy might be 
based 
- 
police authority prosecutions, prison statistics and offences known to the 
police. Clearly, the selection of the leading index of imprisonments, prosecutions, or 
crimes,, decided whether policy was to based on falling, relatively constant, or rising 
crime, was a matter of great importance for all aspects of social policy. 
x 
The police, therefore, had to expect very powerful opposition before their figures 
were officially accepted as the best index of the real state of crime. Dunning fought 
strongly. In his Desborough evidence he had expressed the view that the small 
number of trials was no indication of the real amount of crime. Instead prosecutions 
needed to rise; 
where the police authority avoids every possible expenditure of money, the 
police often have to do the same as the injured person - nothing. Central 
control might help here - especially in the direction of assigning the cost. But 
the control would have to be very different from that now exercised by the 
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Director of Public Prosecutions. If all prosecutions which seem to be 
advisable in the public interest were undertaken by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, or if all police authorities acted alike in authorising the police 
to 
-undertake them, a great deal more protection would be given to property". 
However,, he agreed that prosecution was not helpful for many offences and therefore, 
in his opinion, court statistics gave no indication of the real extent of police activity 
against crime. 
Dunning also set about undennining the Prison Statistics. These directly contradicted 
the police by suggesting that crime was declining in seriousness as measured by the 
length of sentences and the quality of im-nates. The Prison Commissioners' opinion 
that "Serious crime, so far as can be judged by commitment to prison, does not seem 
to be increasing" was dismissed in the Report of the Inspectors of Constabulary as an 
"arbitrary" judgement. The police were better placed, he argued, to determine if a 
crime was serious or not'O. Moreover, he suggested that the low prison figures, far 
from being a reliable indicator of increased law-abidingness, were actually indicating 
rising crime, because criminals were obviously out on the streets instead of being 
rehabilitated or locked up in prison. 
"Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the 
Polic6 Service of England Wales and Scotland, p. 86. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1922-23, p. 9. 
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Finally, the figures of the other institutions had not risen for the simple reason that 
the police were being kept short of men and so could not catch criminals; "It may be 
safely assumed that a reduction of the police will lead to a reduction possibly of the 
Assize Calendar figures, certainly of those accepted by the Prison Commissioners, 
because without doubt the fewer the police the fewer will be the people brought to 
trial"81. 
He also skilfully disputed the government's ameliorist argument that rising levels of 
civilization and education had reduced crime. Instead, he argued, "Though crime 
against the person is decreasing, crime against property, the crime of civilization, is 
increasing"". Similarly he doubted that crime had been diminished by drink 
legislation since the War. He warned the Home Office could draw no conclusions 
from statistics of falling drink prosecutions since "the convictions for drunkenness 
bear no known or stable relation to the amount of drunkenness nor provide any 
measure of the result of legislative or administrative changes" 83 
. 
On the positive side, over the next few years, Dunning tried to position the police 
among the modem and expanding medical and social services which claimed to be 
preventing and curing crime, rather than among the courts and penal institutions who 
dealt only with failures. In this vein, he attacked Home Office reliance on the figures 
"Ibid., P. 9. 
"Inspectors-of Constabulary, 1913, p. 57. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-2 1, p. 13. 
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of the courts rather than taking into account wider beneficial effects of police work; 
"it is like measuring the fluctuations of some disease by the number of deaths only 
instead of by the total number of patients"". 
All the time Dunning was insisting that crime really was rising "by leaps and bounds" 
to record leveIS85 . The Home Office continued to deny this, maintaining "The 
proportions that the indictable offences Imown to the police have borne to every 
100,000 
of the estimated population are far safer guides" and concluding "the crime 
rate has fallen greatly since 1857"". 
Slowly, the ground shifted in favour of the police as their figures rose higher and 
higher and Home Office explanations began to sound more and more complacent and 
far-fetched. In 1923, the number of court proceedings were still accepted by the 
Home Office as the leading index, although it was now admitted that the police 
figures "are, however, more trustworthy now than formerly"". For the next few years 
the Criminal Statistics continued to explain away the rise in the police figures as 
'statistical', diplomatically discounting the police figures of rising crime by 
84 Ibid., pII 
"Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, Qs- 1126,1123 
81judicial Statistics, 1924, P. P. 1926 [Cmd 2602], XXIX. 437, p. 2. 
17, judicialStatistics, 1923, p. 5. 
(262) 
suggesting that some of the growth was caused by the increased "numbers and 
efficiency of the police" leading to more crime being discovered". 
The 1925 Introduction issued a call to the police to return the statistics to the low- 
point of 1899; "the efforts of all who are in any way concerned to see that crime is 
prevented or, when it cannot be prevented, adequately dealt with, should be directed, 
first, to securing a speedy return to the best standard recorded, and then to improving 
even upon that standard. "". The Introduction concluded with what was either a plea 
or a warning; "Six years after the Boer War the increase in indictable offences was 
checked, and it may perhaps be hoped that in like manner the similar increase which 
has occurred since the Great War will soon be arrested"". When the figures did not 
fall, the Criminal Statistics, 1927 continued to deny that there was any "permanent 
tendency of serious crime" to rise 
91 
. 
In their Report for 1927-28, the Inspectors of Constabulary were optimistic, and 
predicted that the recent small increase in the size of the police establishment was 
"the trickle before a flood"". The following year they promised "the demands for 
"Judicial Statistics, 1925, p. 2. 
"Ibid., p. 12. 
p. 12. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1927. P. P. 1928-9 [Cmd 3301], XXI. 683, p. 
92 Inspectors of Constabulary, 1927-8, P. P. 1928-9 (50), IX. 1015, p. 5. 
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more men are likely to be heavy in the next few years"". Before the Depression hit 
public expenditure, they had so-Lind reason for their optimism. The Criminal Statistics, 
1928, showed that the Home Office had finally given way after a decade of 
unrelenting police pressure. The Home Office grudgingly conceded at last that the 
police figures were "the best available guide to the volume of serious crime"". In "the 
very long term" the Home Office still maintained crime would not increase in relation 
to population and that it was still the pre-war pattern of crime statistics which was 
"normal". This 1928 edition, which was delayed until 1930 included an uniquely 
lengthy survey of patterns of crime since 1857 which it used to make a final defence 
of progressivism, and social reform policies as the most effective way to deal with 
crime. It restated its policy that the spread of education must have reduced crime 
rather than increased it, and that general improvements in family standards and less 
drunkenness,, "ought" to lead to "a diminution in juvenile crime and petty offences 
in years to come 1195 . 
xi 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1928-29, P. P. 1929-30 (69), XVII. 1, p. 4. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1928, pp. xvi-xvii, li. 
"The idea that education ought to reduce crime had been under challenge 
since at least the 1830s, Radzinowicz and Hood, The Emergence of Penal Policy in 
Victorian and Edwardian England, pp. 54 ff. 
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The 1928 Criminal Statistics marked a watershed in criminal policy when it was 
officially accepted that crime figures would continue to rise and that there were 
"liable to be increases" in the figures every year". In the four years 1929-33 the 
amount of indictable crime recorded by the Metropolitan Police, who were directly 
under Home Office control,, was quintupled from 17,664 to 83,668 so that the force 
now admitted to approximately one third of crime in England and Wales being 
committed within its boundaries. Since the strength of the Metropolitan Police was 
also about one third of the total national establishment this made its crime returns 
proportionate to its share of the national manpower 
97 
. 
It appears that the Metropolitan Police, and other forces, used the general increase in 
the statistics to reallocate their 'crime coefficients' amongst themselves. The aim, 
resembling the attempts before the First World War, may have been to produce a 
reasonable correspondence between the amount of crime reported, and the size of the 
police force. The advantage to police chiefs now was that this might allow a national 
standard that could viably include crime in any future Geddes-style formula for 
assessing police numbers. This would explain why crime rose so little in Liverpool 
in the inter-war period when previously it had risen so rapidly. Dunning, had already 
"Judicial Statistics 1928, pp. x-xi. 
"Lord Trenchard, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police claimed most 
of this rise was due to the abolition of the 'Suspected Stolen Book'; Commissioner o 
the W-tropoilis, 1932, p. 16. 
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so massively raised the City's 'co-efficient of crime' above the amount of crime, per 
officer, of other forces, that the City had to wait for the other forces to catch up. 
So far, no major study has been made of local police statistics in this period. It seems 
clear that such a study would reveal that the statistics were doing more than merely 
following "fluctuations with an upward tendency"" as Atcherley described them, but 
instead were being co-ordinated, to an extent, at a regional or district conference level 
or centrally. It may well have been co-ordinated by senior police officers at local 
conference level since, in A. L. Dixon's opinion, their proceedings were nothing to do 
with the Home Office". 
There is some evidence to support this theory. Between 1955 and 1964, Mclintock 
and Avison examined trends in crime-rates at a number of geographical levels. They 
found "that the national upward trend in crime from 1955 onwards has been reflected 
in the trends in each police conference region. Variations between regions are not 
"Sir Llewelyn Atcherley, Inspectors of Constabulary, 1929-30, P. P. 1930-1 
(40), XVI. 813, p 11. The picture was immensely complex as Hermann Mannheim 
showed in his study of crime in the inter-war period, Mannheim, H. Social Aspects 
of Crime in England between the Wars. A full study of Chief Constable's annual 
reports, and local archive material would greatly illuminate the period. 
lect Committee on the Amalgamation of Police Forces, 
186. 
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great""'. However, taking "The incidence of crime and the increase in crime in each 
of the proposed new police areas.... it is found that for the years, 1955-65, there have 
been considerable variations in crime rates from one area to another"101. In other 
words, at the micro-level, the statistics of the individual police forces that comprised 
each of the nine police conference districts appeared to be showing no clear trend. 
However, when combined together at the macro-level of the police conference (but 
not when combined together in other groupings such as the proposed new police 
authority areas) they showed a close correspondence to the national statistics. 
One possibility is that a national figure was first set for crime each year. From this, 
each of the nine conference areas were alloted a 'budget' of crime and this was 
awarded to individual chief constables after negotiations with their colleagues. 
Perhaps it was the case that those authorities who were currently involved in bids for 
more manpower might be given a sudden large increase whereas those who had 
recently increased their establishments might hand back some of their crimes to the 
conference pool in order to help those forces that needed the extra crime. Detailed 
work remains to be done in analysing the local statistics. 
'I'Mclintock, F. H. and Avison, N. H., Crime in England and Wales, 
Heinemann, 1968, p. 88. 
"'Ibid. p. 89. 
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xii 
Dunning retired in 1930 and Atcherley became the senior Inspector. He immediately 
began to down-play the importance of the statistical rises and to argue, against 
Dunning, that they merely reflected changes in recording practices and not changes 
in the real level of crime. Consequently, he said, "there has been no particular change 
in the amount of work to call for particular comment so far as regards the question 
of strength in relation to crime. ". He went on to claim that the preventive side was 
working efficiently at its present strength and "has been able fairly successfully to 
cope with the needs of the times""'. By 1930 this was too late. Dunning had already 
ensured that crime would not wither away and that minor indictable crime was going 
to occupy an ever increasing proportion of police time. 
"'Inspectors of Constabulary, 193 1, P. P. 1931-2 (36), XII. 639, p. 6. 
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Chapter X: Policing the Motorist in Preference to the Drunk 
I 
After the parsimony of the Victorian period, economy and efficiency became the new 
keywords of criminal justice policy in the inter-war period, following the Desborough 
pay rises in 1920 and the Geddes Committee's Report on National Expenditure in 
1922'. Keeping local streets clean of the residuum of the working class, by closely 
policing vagrancy, drunkenness and local by-laws, using what had now become very 
expensive policemen to put 'social pests' in expensive prisons, appeared more than 
ever to be an overly extravagant use of limited funds. So, in order to reduce the police 
presence on the streets, officials and politicians argued that rising affluence, better 
welfare provision and greater disposable income had made the public 'more civilised' 
and better behaved and so they required less intensive policing'. A. L. Dixon, the head 
of the Home Office Police Department, explained the new economics of policing to 
'Second Interim Report of the Committee on National Expenditure. 
'Parl. Deb., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), (Home Office Supply Estimates), p. 
113 9. For the theory of a 'civilizing process' see Elias, N., The Civilizing Process 
(193 9), 2 Vols, Oxford University Press, 1978 and 1982. 
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the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures (1928-9). He said fewer 
police were now needed because non-indictable offences had fallen; 
The difficulty now is that the constable is an extremely expensive article. To 
keep a beat manned day and night (three tours of duty) costs in the 
neighbourhood of f 1,000 a year, and, consequently, it does not do to be too 
lavish with the distribution of men on the beats... think how many fewer 
convictions there are for drunk-enness, and how much less the Police have to 
be engaged in what I might call repressive duties than they used to be in the 
slum districts of many of the towns. ' 
As argued above, the Home Office had long been trying to reduce the scope of crime 
to the list of indictable offences, to cut down on local authority non-indictable 
prosecutions and to transfer many prosecutions to the private realm of civil 
jurisdiction. It did not want to subside the police patrolling the streets picking up 
vagrants and drunks. This policy evolved particularly after 1877, when it took over 
from local authorities the responsibility for running and funding the local prisons 
which contained mostly short-term prisoners who had been sentenced for non- 
indictable offences or who had defaulted on fines. These short sentences were far 
more expensive to administer, in terms of bureaucracy and staff expenses, than stable 
long-term indictable sentences and also required the maintenance of many small local 
'Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, QQ. 2832, p. 180. 
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prisons to avoid unacceptable costs for transport of these short-termers. 
Consequently, if it wanted to bring down prison numbers and costs, the Home Office 
had to cut down on non-indictable prosecutions'. 
Yet, despite considerable progress in reducing the number of short sentences, by 
1906, the Prison Commissioners estimated that about a quarter of the prison 
population still consisted of short-term vagrants, and vagrants were also clogging 
reformatories and industrial schools as well as the inebriate refon-natories'. Thus, long 
before the inter-war period the Home Office had already decided that its main interest 
in vagrancy was not as a source of potential criminality, but because "the vagrants 
form a class from which a number of the institutions under the Home Office are 
largely filled"'. So, if the initial intention of Dunning and other police chiefs, when 
they raised their indictable crime figures after the First World War, was to get extra 
men and resurrect Victorian preventive policing practices then they were highly 
unlikely to succeed. The Home Office was only too well aware that "the man on the 
beat will account for the majority of charges relating to drunk-enness and other street 
'Fry, M., The Anns of the Law, Howard League for Penal Refonn and Victor 
Gollancz, 195 1, pp. 60- 1; McConville, Sean, English Local Prisons 1860-1900. 
'Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, p. 25. Receptions on 
conviction with sentences not exceeding I month fell by 85 per cent from 111,320 
to 16,295 between 1913 and 1938. Fox, L., The English Prison and Borstal Systems, 
pp. 121-2. 
H. B. Simpson, Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, p, 43. 
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offences" 7 and so the more police there were on patrol, the more drunjý, -s and vagrants 
there would be filling up the prisons. 
11 
The trend was in the other direction. To the Home Office's relief, the War acted as a 
highly effective purgative on the prison system. There was an "unparalleled" decrease 
in the number of convicted prisoners received into prison. Between 1913 and 1919 
the figures were 139,060,118,829,63,218,45,649,35,097,27,787 and 31,032 
respectively and a similar fall in the number of fine defaulters'. Between 1914 and 
1934,29 of the 54 local prisons closed9. By 1934, the Victorian system of local 
prisons, or'county gaols', serving local county Assizes, Quarter Sessions and police 
courts no longer existed and had been replaced by 20 large, national "committal 
areas" which were more sensitive to national rather than local policies on crime". The 
Home Office was rapidly shifting imprisonment towards indictable offenders. The 
Department used a variety of techniques to achieve this, including the propaganda 
that only indictable offenders were serious enough to be described as criminal and to 
'Mr Dodd, Chief Constable Birmingham, Justice of the Peace, 1947, (11 
October 1947), p. 574. 
'Judicial Statistics, 1919, P. P. 1921 [Cmd 1421], XLIAI 1, p. 8. 
'Fox, L., The Modern English Prison, p. 60. 
"Ibid., p. 60. 
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deserve prison and that most other offences had nothing to do with crime. Lionel Fox, 
the Secretary of the Prison Commission, wrote in 1934 
It is not paradox but sober fact to state that the majority of prisoners are not 
criminals and that the majority of criminals do not come to prison: only about 
one quarter of the persons received into prison are convicted of crime in the 
ordinary sense, i. e. of indictable offences, and some two-thirds of those 
convicted of indictable offences are not sent to prison". 
The major reason for the fall in prison numbers and its continuance in the interwar 
period was that, by 1931 the annual number of prison receptions for non-indictable 
offences was "only about one quarter of the pre-war figure"". Most of the decline in 
prosecutions of drunkenness and other non-indictable offences was simply the result 
of policy. During the War, many traditional preventive policing duties were 
abandoned. Lack of manpower and extra duties meant that never before had the 
police force "been so depleted and diverted from its ordinary course of duty" 13 
"Ibid., p. 195. See also the argument used in the 1940s, that the high crime 
statistics in America were due to the police being diverted from crime prevention by 
maintaining high rates of arrest for drunkenness and minor misdemeanours, Justice 
of the Peace, 1943, (18 September 1943), p. 447. 
"Fox,, L., The Modern English Prison, p. 209. 
"Evidence H. B. Simpson, Assistant Secretary Home Office, Report of the 
Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, p. 43; Inspectors of Constabulary 1915, p. 5; 
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Prosecutions for drunk-enness and other non-indictable offences were slashed. Official 
policy was drastically to reduce public house and club opening hours, reduce the 
strength of alcohol and to shift the burden of drink control from police prosecution 
to administrative control". 
Although this appears to have produced some real decrease in drunkenness",, 
politicians were also not going to question the validity of the statistics, or the reasons 
for the drop in statistics since any apparent decline drunkenness served as a 
convenient, face-saving strategy to lose from the political arena, for the duration of 
the war,, the perennially divisive and insoluble issue of drink and temperance at a time 
when inter-party co-operation was needed. 
After the War there little political enthusiasm for reopening the issue and 
drunkenness convictions did not greatly rise despite some easing-off of restrictions. 
In 1924, the Home Office stated that the drink problem had been permanently 
controlled due to the happy coincidence of "the high price and diluted strength of 
. 
"( 
... 
continued) 
For a discussion of the effects of the war on police manpower and on the policing of 
crime see Emsley, C., The English Police, chapter 6. 
"Dixon, D., From Prohibition to Regulation: Boolmaking, Anti-Gambling, 
and the Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 212 ff. 
"Judicial Statistics, 1924, p. 8; Shadwell, A., Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson 
in Control, Longmans Green and Co., 1923; Marwick, A., The Deluge: British 
Macmillan, 1965, pp. 63 ff. 
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intoxicating liquors, to restricted hours of sale, to unemployment, to the increased 
cost of living, and, last but not least, to a gradual change of habit and opinion. "" In 
complete contrast to the American experience of Prohibition, during the 1920s there 
was "a great falling off in work for the police"". Britain had nothing to match the 
costly fiasco of prohibition which left the Federal courts "staggering" under the 
caseload prosecutions, and prisons "near bursting" point" 
Yet, it seems extremely dubious that the British legislature could have been so 
successful in weaning the public from drink-, while, over the same period, the 
American people remained so persistent in their attachment to it, despite the much 
tougher American laws. Some contemporaries were highly suspicious of the police 
figures. Hennann Levy wrote "We are not aware, in the first place, of any data on the 
absolute extent of drunkenness; and the indications concerning heavy drinking are 
even scantier. The trends shown in the statistics give no clues to these. But one thing 
is certain: it is that drunlrenness and heavy drinking are still extensive. "". 
"Judicial Statistics, 1924, p. 8. 
"There was considerable scepticism that the figures of prosecutions showed 
that drunkenness had really fallen. Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England 
between the Wars, chapter 6. 
"Friedman, L. M., Crime and Punishment in American History, New York, 
Basic Books, 1993, p. 266; Jones, M. A., The Limits of Liberty: American History 
1607-1980, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 441. 
'9Levy, H. Drink-: an Economic and Social Study, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
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Nonetheless, Black Marias travelled half empty in London, cells went unoccupied at 
police stations, and injuries to policemen fell by four fifths, apparently as a direct 
result of their antagonising fewer drunks". Metropolitan Police divisional surgeons 
obviously believed that plenty of drunk-s still existed out there to be arrested, since 
they began to offer "bobbies a shilling per drunk as an inducement" in an attempt to 
restore their fees for examinations". 
In similar fashion, vagrancy offences "mysteriously stabilized during the war", to the 
point where the "disappearance" of the vagrant was considered "one of the most 
curious of the minor social phenomena of the time"". Much of the fall may well have 
been genuine, caused by full employment, rises in wage-rates and unemployment 
insurance. Yet, after 1914, J. M. Winter was surely over-optimistic to assert generally 
1123 that "poverty meant deprivation rather than destitution for the working class 
. 
Vagrancy reappeared after the War 24 
, 
but as with drunkenness the number of 
prosecutions remained permanently depressed. Prosecutions for begging averaged 
between 165000 to over 25,000 per annum before the war, but had fallen to 3,634 by 
1920 and only rose to 4,265 by 1929 before being further reduced by the Vagrancy 
"( 
... 
continued) 
195 1, p. 95. 
"Moylan, J. F., Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan Police, p. 290. 
"Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the World, p. 32. 
"Leader article, Times, 4 August 1919, p. 9. 
"Winter, J. M., The Great War and the British People, Macmillan, 1986, p. 21. 
"Times, 4 August 1919, p. 9. 
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Act of 1935 25 
. 
However, a recent historian of vagrancy suspected the statistical 
change might in some way be connected with declining drink- prosecutions and 
suggested that the police were possibly "easing up on prosecutions compared with 
before 1914 whilst begging remained actually at earlier levels"". This seems quite 
plausible when another non-indictable category, offences against police regulations, 
is considered. The Home Office accepted the number of offences "probably does not 
vary from year to year", nonetheless it halved in the quarter century ending in 1924 27 
Some of the decrease in prosecutions for non-indictable offences occurred when 
responsibilities were directly transferred from the police to others, often to charities 
or other public bodies. This was achieved either legislatively or through the policy 
decisions of police and local authorities. For example, pub landlords were made to 
police themselves or face losing their licences and education authorities took over 
policing truancy,, while child abuse cases were usually passed by the police to the 
N. S. P. C. C.. Many of these bodies dealt with the problem administratively without 
recourse to the law. 
"Rose, L., Rogues and Vagabonds: Vagrant Underworld in Britain 1815ý 
1985, Routledge, 1988, p. 167; Judicial Statistics, 1937, p. 8. 
"Rose, L., Rogues and Vagabonds, p. 167. 
27 Judicial S-tatistics, 1924, p. 7. 
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Paradoxically, it is possible to argue from these falling figures that there may actually 
have been a rise in non-indictable offending after the War due to decreased police 
vigilance. In 1906, a Home Office official proposed that there was an inverse, rather 
than a direct, relationship between non-indictable prosecutions and the real levels of 
offending; 
My own impression, from looking at the figures of summary prosecutions 
generally, has been that the number of summary prosecutions is very largely, 
if not mainly, influenced by circumstances other than the number of offences 
committed. Such offences as drunkenness, or offences connected with 
drunkenness, depend a great deal on outside causes, e. g., if there are special 
efforts made to put down drunlý, -enness in particular districts; so that in certain 
cases one has come to the conclusion, it may seem paradoxical, but I think 
there is some truth in it, that an increase in the actual number of prosecutions 
means rather a decrease in the amount of offences committed rather than the 
reverse. 
28 
While the statistics cannot be used as a reliable indication of trends in real levels of 
offending, they do, nonetheless, suggest that the reduction in non-indictable 
prosecutions was coordinated, that is to say that management targets were set. This 
was part of a wider cutting back of certain aspects of police work. For example, 
summons work in the Metropolitan Police appears to have been deliberately cut by 
IIH. B. Simpson, Report of the Departmental Committee on Vagrancy, p. 44. 
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exactly one quarter (25.00%) between 1920 and 1921, from 49991 to 37492 29 
. 
In the 
longer term, arrests collapsed from an average of 120,000 per year in the period 
1904-15, to 81,000 in 1920 and 58,500 in 1928. By 1929 the Metropolitan Police 
officers were arresting fewer people than when they were founded in 1829, although 
there were six times more police and four times more population". 
Moreover, there is evidence that the fall in non-indictable prosecutions was being 
coordinated at the national level. In 193 L, because of the cuts in public expenditure, 
the Criminal Statistics were issued in a new, reduced fonnat and, on the first page of 
the introduction, it prominently compared the average number of prosecutions for a 
selection of disorderly conduct offences in 1910-4 with those in 193 1. When the 
percentages are calculated an extraordinarily regular pattern emerges from every set 
of figures. Overall, there was a drop of 287,701 prosecutions per year during this 
period, or almost exactly two-thirds (66.3 3 %) of the total number of offences in these 
categories in 1910-4. Taking the figures category by category, over the period 1910-4 
to 193 1, offences against the Poor Law, and for begging and sleeping out fell by 
almost exactly four fifths (79.52%). Offences of drunkenness fell almost exactly by 
three-quarters (75-77%), as did offences of cruelty to children (74.1 %) and offences 
against the Education Acts (77.20%). Assaults fell by almost exactly a half (49.14%), 
"Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1921, P. P. 1922 [Cmd 1699], X. 359, p. 7. 
I'Moylan, JR, Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan Police, pp. 283-9. 
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so did offences against police regulations (51.87%). Malicious damage fell by almost 
a quarter (24.60%). " 
The Home Office policy was to take the figures strictly at face value and present the 
decline in police prosecutions as evidence of such "a continued improvement in 
social habits and social conditions" that the population no longer needed such close 
policing or so many prosecutions for minor offences". Later writers have been more 
sceptical, arguing that some of this apparent 'improvement' in social habits was the 
result of a long-term dialectic between a restrictive (respectable) moral code and a 
libertarian morality, that undermined and restrained policing practice from the turn 
of the century33. More likely, the extraordinary regularity of the statistics indicate 
that, by 193 1, the fall in non-indictables had become part of a planned reduction and 
reallocation of court priorities and police duties, coordinated, at a national level. 
"Poor Law from 40,966 to 8,390; Drink from 193,354 to 46,846; Cruelty to 
Children from 3,440 to 891; Offences against the Education Acts from 39,615 to 
9,032; Assaults from 43,032 to 22,317; Offences against Police Regulations from 
98,628 to 47,467; Malicious Damage from 14,673 to 11,064. Judicial Statistics, 193 1, 
P. P. 1932-3 [Cmd 4360], XXV. 767, 
P. 
"Fisher, T., 'Permissiveness and the politics of Morality', Contemporary 
Record, 1993, Vol. 7, pp. 149-65. 
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Effectively, it appears a policy of progressive decriminalization of many of the non- 
indictable offences had been put in place. This had earlier precedents in America and 
would have been known to all voracious readers of police literature such as A. L. 
Dixon in the Home Office. For example, between 1907 and 1908, Chief Fred Kohler 
of the Cleveland police dramatically reduced the number of people arrested for 
drunkenness and disorderly conduct by almost exactly two-thirds, from 30,418 to 
10ý085 (66.8 per cent). He justified his policy on humanitarian grounds, but other 
motives were involved. In the opinion of the Samuel Walker, "Since they did not 
both6r with trivial offences, there was more time to concentrate on serious crime 
Based on his calculation that it cost the city over $52,000 to process the 10,085 
arrests in 1908, he claimed to have saved the city an enormous amount of money. " 34 
- 
III 
How did the Home Office achieve such a large-scale decriminalization of non- 
indictable crime in so short a space of time? One obvious factor is that after the 
Desborough award, when it had taken on responsibility for half of the police costs, 
the Home Office was in a much stronger position to dictate policy to police 
authorities. A senior official in the Ministry of Health said, "a Goverm-nent 
Department, if it pays half the cost, and the Local Authority is keen on getting the 
money, can tell the Authority the way in which it wants the work carried out. "". To 
34 Walker, S., A Critical History of Police Reform, p. 96. 
"Evidence of Mr I. G. Gibbon, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Health, (continued 
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co-ordinate policy it created a Police Department under Arthur Dixon" and, within 
ten years, Dixon was able to conclude that "the Home Office control is almost a 
predominating one. "". 
Sir Leonard Dunning foresaw the likely effect that greater central control would have 
in shifting police work from general preventive policing practices towards the 
reactive policing of indictable crime. He said in his evidence to the Desborough 
Committee, "if central control might help in the matter of indictable crime, I am 
inclined to think that it might have an opposite effect on prosecution for non- 
indictable offences especially in those particular offences which directly concern the 
well-being of the community. "38 
. 
Now the Home Office was an equal paymaster, it had even less incentive to fund the 
general municipal duties that the police had been carrying out. As Herbert Samuel, 
the Home Secretary, explained in 1932, future efforts were to be "devoted to securing 
that the police shall be, to as great an extent as possible, allocated to their primary 
purpose of stopping crime rather than to those minor duties of preventing the more 
"(... continued) 
Minutes of Evidence for the Royal Commission on Local Government, p. 24. 
"Morgan, J., Conflict and Order, p. 65. 
37Minutes 
of Evidence of the Roval Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, p. 170. 
"Sir Leonard Dunning, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police 
Service of Scotland, (1920), p. 86. 
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trivial offences"". The Home Office did not want to pay local authorities to keep high 
standards of decorum on the streets. Nor was it going to finance the police if local 
authorities were going to play the traditional municipal game of 'pass-the-parcel' with 
paupers. Too many local authorities still used laws such as the ancient Law of 
Settlement", simply to move their 'nuisances' from one local authority district to 
another. 
The big problem for the Home Office was that most summary courts relied on the 
fines and fees they received from many classes of non-indictable prosecutions to run 
the courts at a small profit over expenditure on salaries and maintenance 
- 
excluding 
the costs of prosecutions. Police authorities had no reason to reduce most of their 
non-indictable prosecutions since this was how they made their profits. In 1920, 
according to the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks, the income of petty 
sessional courts from fines and fees in the administrative counties exceeded 
expenditure by about f 10,000". The Committee estimated that this balance of income 
over expenditure held approximately true for the boroughs as well. 
"Herbert Samuel, Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 265, (2 May 1932), p. 857, 
(Supply Committee 
- 
Police). 
"In 1901 upwards of 12,000 poor were moved from one Union to another in 
England and Wales; Webb, S. & B., English Poor Law History: Part 11, p. 434. 
'Report of the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks, P. P. 1943-4 
[Cmd 6507], IV. 189, pp. 40-1. 
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For example, in 1903, about E500,000 in fines and fees were paid into police 
superannuation and local authority funds from drink prosecutions alone". 
Prosecutions increased dramatically until 1913 when there were 188,877 convictions 
for drunkenness, or about three times the number of convictions for all indictable 
offences. Clearly, if the Home Office intended to cut-back on these non-indictable 
prosecutions then court finances were going to be undermined and the short-fall 
would have to be made up from the rates. Councillors further argued that it was 
because the summary courts had always been allowed to make a profit from non- 
indictables that central government had traditionally declined to contribute towards 
their costs". If they were no longer allowed to make a profit then the Exchequer 
should make good the loss. 
On the other hand, central government could argue that it already was subsidising 
those profits since, with the prisons financed out of central funds, the courts were 
irresponsibly imposing fines without paying any of the high costs of imprisonment 
of fine defaulters. Moreover, since the Exchequer was paying a full half of the cost 
of the police after Desborough it was entitled to reduce the costs of policing to the 
Exchequer by controlling the type of prosecution the police undertook and also by 
taking some of the profits of prosecutions. Perhaps the Home Office also regarded it 
as no bad thing if the courts were effectively bankrupt, since then they could not 
"Judicial St-at-Ls-tics, 1903,2336, p. 17. 
4'Report of the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks, p. 40. 
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confirm the rising police figures of crime with more indictable prosecutions and this 
might, in turn, force the police to stop. 
Whatever the merits of its case, the Home Office could not expect the summary 
courts willingly to cut-back on lucrative non-indictable prosecutions. So, it out had 
to out-manoeuvre them. The Home Office appears to have succeeded brilliantly both 
in reducing non-indictable prosecutions and in clawing back some of the revenue lost 
to the Exchequer as a result of the Desborough award. On I January 1921, the 
allocation of the fines for road offences, which at that period were not very 
considerable, was transferred to the Road Fund without much debate". After thisq the 
proportion of traffic offences brought to the courts began to expand very rapidly. By 
pumping-in massive numbers of road traffic prosecution other non-indictable 
prosecutions were bled out of the system because the courts did not have the current 
or capital finances to fund the extra traffic prosecution without cutting back on their 
other prosecutions. 
"Ibid. p. 41. 
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Figure X. 1 Prosecutions for Traffic Offences compared with other Non-Indictable 
Offences. Calculated from Butler,, D. and Sloman, A., British Political Facts: 1900- 
1975,4th ed., Macmillan, London, 1975. 
By the mid- 193 Os, offences against the Highway Acts had risen more than five-fold, 
from about 66,000 in 1910-4 to 347,000 in 1934, yet the total number of non- 
indictable prosecutions remained almost constant. In the 15 years after 1919, non- 
traffic, non-indictable prosecutions halved (Figure 1.1 )45. Central government was 
the clear winner. 
45 Judicial Statistics, 1934, P. P. 1935-6 [Cmd 5185], XXV. 437, p. vi. 
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Public opinion had to be re-educated. In 1901 to avoid criticism of the policing of 
drunks the Criminal Statistics had argued that drunks and other offenders were often 
well-to-do who could afford to pay their deserved fines; "Fines for drunk-enness and 
for offences against local by-laws may easily be incurred by people who have a 
reputation to maintain and can afford to pay for it"". After 1921, when motoring 
offen0ers became lucrative to the Exchequer the official line had to be changed. Now 
it was drunks who could no longer afford to pay their fines and motorists who could. 
Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary, explained in 1932 that "Before the War most 
cases of fines were for drunk-enness and fines on poor people, who could not pay. 
Now, a very large proportion of the cases of fines are motorists, who are well-to-do 
people, who can pay and who do pay. " 
He continued his speech by spelling out the additional advantages for the Treasury; 
"The consequence is that whereas in 1913 and 1930 about the same number of 
persons were sentenced to pay fines or to go to prison in default, about 500,000 
people in each year, in the former year, out of the half million, 75,000 were sent to 
prison, and in the latter year only 12,000. In the former year it was 15 per cent. and 
in the latter year only 3 per cent. That is the main cause of the remarkable drop in the 
number of committals to prison', 47 
46 Judicial Statistics, 1901, p. 16. 
47 Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), p. 1143 (Home Office 
Supply Estimates). 
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Non-indictables had been slashed, but in a controlled and targeted in manner (see 
above, p. 278). The nw-nber of short-term sentences, which had briefly begun to rise 
after the War, fell back. In 1935 the Croydon bench, with the backing other Surrey 
benches, went public and read a statement complaining that 65 percent of their fines 
and fees had been taken by the Road Fund the previous quarter. They felt their 
"reasonable and proper representations have been ignored"'. Their rebellion had no 
effect. By 1937-8 the Exchequer was receiving nearly E280,000 a year from road 
offence fines that before 1921 would have gone to local authorities to maintain the 
courts. In 1944, the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks noted that "The 
effect on the financial position of the courts has been to convert a small surplus of 
income over expenditure into a substantial deficit and this deficit has fallen wholly 
on the rates" 
49 
. 
Perhaps many benches shared Croydon's resentment that the fines they imposed for 
traffic offences went straight to the Exchequer, rather than to the maintenance of the 
courts. As Sir Leonard Dunning explained, "These particular fines do not swell the 
resources of the local authority which has to maintain the police, but go to the Road 
Fund, so the offending driver has the satisfaction of Imowing that his money may be 
used in making the road even more like a racing track. "". This may partly explain 
"Magistrate, 1935, (December 1935), p. 972. 
"Re-Dort of the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks, p. 41. 
"Inspectors of Constabulgry, 1928, p. 8. 
(288) 
magistrates' notorious reluctance in this period to impose large fines for motoring 
offences. 
IV 
Obviously, the Home Office strategy had relied on the police to bring charges against 
motorists instead of their more traditional targets. Why did the police co-operate in 
undermining their traditional preventive duties? Although both the police and the 
Home Office wanted officers to concentrate duties on crime control they had different 
notions of what this meant. For the Home Office it meant greatly reducing old-style 
preventive policing of non-Indictables and concentrating reduced resources on 
indictable offences. For many police chiefs crime control still meant large-scale 
manpower intensive preventive patrols targeting non-indictable crime. Both sides felt 
traffic work could help them meet their objectives. The Home Office wanted to flood 
out non-indictables with traffic offences and so cut back patrolling and cut 
expenditure, while the police wanted to use the demands of traffic duties to ring-fence 
numbers until the period of austerity was passed. 
The police strategy, appears to have been to accept that some of their older, local 
authority preventive duties were declining, at least in the short-tenn and that in future 
they would have to find more central government work to protect their numbers. 
When they found these central government duties, which were often replacements 
rather than additions to their work load, police chiefs then used the argument that 
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these extra duties were placing such pressure on resources that they required 
additional men. However, as Sir John Moylan, the Receiver of the Metropolitan 
Police said, "If it were possible accurately to measure the new work taken on against 
the old which has dropped off, it would very likely be found that there has not been 
very much variation in the total volume, say, in the last twenty years"" 
The shift towards more central government work was accompanied, in the interwar 
years, by a broadening of the police definition of their work from "the preservation 
of the peace and the prevention and detection of crime" into the general "safe- 
guarding of the lives and property of the civilian population"". Often this meant 
bringing policing into areas outside the traditional low-status 'criminal' target groups 
of the police. Most of this new work, before the Civil Defence work of the Second 
World War came on stream,, derived from the Ministry of Transport and brought the 
police into contact with relatively high status motorists. Although the new police had 
always been significantly involved in traffic control", after the First World War the 
"Times, 2 August 193 8; Moylan, J. F., Scotland Yard and the Metropolita 
Police, p. 290. 
"Presidential Address by T. Rawson, Chief Constable of Bradford, Chief 
Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), Reports of the 
General Conference and Special General Conference, 1937, pp. 29,28. 
"Emsley, Clive, 'Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren't Any 
Motors? ': The Law,, The Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 
1900-19391,1 Listorical Journal, 1993, Vol. 36, (No. 2 1993), pp. 357-381. 
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situation was transformed. Accident and prosecution statistics soared leading to 
demands for more police manpower. 
Provided no rival body, such as the R. A. C., the A. A. or traffic wardens, took over the 
duties,, traffic work ring-fenced police manpower since the requirements for traffic 
control could not, as the Inspectors of Constabulary pointed out to the Geddes 
Committee, be reduced by linking police numbers to the size of the population 
policed". The Inspectors argued, "the traffic duty man is anchored to one spot and 
has to devote his attention to the prevention of a limited class of offence" and so 
could be claimed to be additional to ordinary requirements". In the interwar period, 
before the widespread introduction of automatic traffic signals, there were ever 
growing demands from the public to increase the number of these new "anchor 
spots". Traffic duties were also said to encroach on police manpower in other ways. 
For example, in 1928, according to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
helping children across the road apparently required that, out of a force of 20,000 
men, "nearly 1,000" constables had to be taken from their beats at fixed times each 
morning and afternoon". Within a few years this had been inflated by an Assistant 
Commissioner to 2,750 men 
57 
. 
"Second Interim Report of the Committee on National Expenditure, p. 58. 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-1, p. 4. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1929, (6 July 1929), p. 428. 
17Evidence of H. Alker Tripp, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Report 
-b-, y 
the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Prevention of Road Accidents, (continued 
... 
) 
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However, many did argue persuasively that using the police for traffic duties was a 
waste of expensive manpower". The Justice of the Peace complained in 1928 that. "it 
does not require young men of strength and stature to take the numbers of motor cars 
causing obstructions in side streets or having no lights, and to stand by until the 
offender appears to have 'particulars taken"' ". In 193 0, the j ournal added that if the 
government were now confronted with the problem of traffic for first time the duty 
would not be given not to the police but to traffic wardens or the R. A. C. who were 
cheaper. Unfortunately, the police had "evolved" themselves into the position of 
traffic controllerS60 
The police replied that they, and not the A. A. or R. A. C., had to control traffic in order 
to prevent new forms of crime, such as motor banditry". The police were also heavily 
involved in propaganda and used the figures to generate great concern about the 
traffic problem and to add an urgency to the issue that might otherwise have been 
"( 
... 
continued) 
P. P. 1937-8 (HL 35ý 192), IV. 481, p. 54. 
"See,, for example the comments of Capt. Macquisten during the debate on 
the Home Office Supply Estimates, Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 265, (2 May 1932), p. 
848, (Supply Committee 
- 
Police) 
"Justice of the Peace, 1928,30 June 1928, pp. 435-6. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1930,5 April 1930, p. 215 
"For example, Judicial Statistics 1928, p. xv. See also the Debate on the 
Banditry Bill, Parl. Debs., 5th Ser., 276, (24 March 1933), p. 655, (Debate on the 
Banditry Bill). 
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lacking. Across the country, Chief Constables became closely involved in 
"propaganda work" about road safety through the local 'Safety First' Committees set 
about throughout the country which normally had the Chief Constable as either 
Secretary or Deputy- Chairman". Senior police officers, such as John Maxwell, the 
Chief Constable of Manchester, claimed that the "only remedy" to cut accidents and 
prosecutions "would be to get a large number of additional men on the roads"" 
Similarly, in 193 1, Sir Wyndham Childs, the late head of C. I. D. made a public call 
for an "automatic increase of the police" to correspond with the growth of the suburbs 
and motor duties". This propaganda helped create a climate where the public 
demanded action. For example, in 1926, a conference on Street Accidents in Greater 
London recommended more police". While a number of pressure groups, such as the 
Pedestrians' Association, consistently supported calls for more police on the 
politically naYve ground that "No demand for economy should override protection of 
life 1166 
. 
"Evidence of Chief Constables' Association (Cities and Boroughs), Report 
by the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Prevention of Road Accidents, 
391. 
"Ibid., p. 399. 
64 Times, 16 December 193 1, p. 9 
"Justice of the Peace, 1927, (26 March 1927), p. 224. 
"Times, 15 December 1930. See also Plowden, W., The Motor Car and 
Politics: 1896-L970, Bodley Head, 1970, pp. 266-7. 
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V 
The historiography has generally treated the rising police involvement with road 
traffic as unproblematic, 
- 
the flooding of the courts with traffic offences was the 
necessary consequence of the inter-war growth in motor car usage and the ensuing 
carnage on the roads. On the face of it, this seems irrefutable. By 1934, the statistics 
of road fatalities were many times worse than the official figures for violent crimes. 
According to the statistics, the total of road deaths and injuries for that year were not 
exceeded in peacetime until 1955, while the figure for deaths alone remained a record 
until 1964 
- 
by then there werefive times more vehicles on the road 67 
. 
However,, although the problem of the motor car, was new, real, urgent, and large- 
scale, it did not necessarily have to be addressed with such an enormous increase in 
prosecutions. Most of the motoring offences brought to the courts were minor 
offences that did not result in injury and, as with all crime, the police had the option 
of exercising discretion before bringing charges, had they so wished. The bottom line, 
according to the historiography is that the carnage of the road forced the police's hand 
and made wide-scale prosecution almost inevitable. 
The problem with this argument is that the statistics of road accidents, which were 
used to justify the flooding of the courts with motoring prosecutions were obviously 
faked. In the period between 1918 and 1934 the accident figures were created simply 
67 Ibid., p. 266. 
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by adding, year on year, one sixth of the police establishment o the previous year's 
total of accidents (Figure 1.2 )". This may be confirmed by comparing the running 
average of one sixth of the average annual establishment of the police forces of 
England and Wales between 1918 and 1934, which amounted to 9,571 officers, with 
the running annual average increase in road accidents over the same period which 
was only 2 greater 
- 
9,57319. 
"The majority of road accidents are probably still classified as too 'minor' to 
be reported. So there will always be an immense reservoir of accidents which can be 
dipped into if necessary. Similarly, with fatal accidents, despite reporting guidelines, 
the length of time between the accident and the death, and the degree to which the 
accident contributed towards the death can be made subject to considerable 
discretion. For a criticism of present-day statistics see Davis, R., Death on the Streets, 
Burtersett, Leading Edge Press, 1992, chapter 1. 
"Modem accident statistics appear to be no more reliable, although now there 
is a downward trend. As in the 1930s, officials continue to feed the public positivistic 
explanations for statistical constancies and straight line graphs. According to the 
Department of Transport, between 1949 and 1988, "The consistency of the falls in the 
casualty and accident rates over four decades is remarkable. Most aspects of road 
traffic have changed markedly during this period, yet the rates have continued. to 
decline by an almost constant proportion each year... This suggests there might be 
some underlying 'law', of the sort widely found in the physical sciences 
Broughton, J., 'Long-term Trends in Road Accident Casualties', Road Accidents 
Great Britain, 1993, Department of Transport, 1994, pp. 27-9, @ p. 28. (continued 
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Figure X. 2 Road Accidents Reported by the Police. Calculated from the Statistical 
Abstract. 
The police seem the most likely culprits. They were responsible for the reporting of 
accidents. In 1929, police chiefs refused to co-operate with a Home Office plan to 
provide more detailed statistics on the grounds that they were too over-worked". This 
prevented the Department checking the details of their reports. The fixed amount of 
one sixth of the establishment by which the statistics were increased annually also 
suggests police involvement. It is unlikely to be coincidental that in 1935,, the year 
"( continued) 
"White, B. M. 'Early Road Accident Investigation: Problems and Priorities 
1909-1933', Road Accidents Great Britain, 1990, Department of Transport, London, 
1991, pp. 25-9, @ p. 27. 
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the accident figures suddenly stopped rising, "an exhaustive inquiry" was completed 
by the Home Office of road traffic duties "to gauge the scale of the problem from the 
police point of view generally. "" The police concluded that "Rather more than one- 
sixth" of the police strength was now employed on road traffic related dutieS72. In 
other words, until 1934 the police raised the statistics, year on year, by one accident 
for each of the officers they wanted ring-fenced for traffic duties. 
Until this inquiry the Home Office had argued that there were "not excessive 
numbers" of police on traffic duties, only about T/2per cent in London, and that the 
introduction of mechanical traffic control devises meant that the "end was in sight" 
for the use of police in these duties". After 1935, the Home Office gave in by 
accepting that more men were needed 74 . 
In the traditional historiography, the sudden stability of the accident figures after the 
1934 Road Traffic Act has usually been attributed to the re-introduction of the speed 
"Evidence of A. L. Dixon, Report by the Select Committee of the House of 
Lords on the Prevention of Road Accidents, p. 24. 
7'lbid., p. 24. A similar survey conducted by the Metropolitan Police in 1935 
claimed one sixth of the force was occupied with these duties in London, 
Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1935, p. 48. 
"Par. Debs, 5th ser., (3 May 1932), (Home Office vote). 
"Evidence of A. L. Dixon, Report by the Select Committee of the House of 
Lords on the Prevention of Road Accidents, p. 24. 
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JiMit75 
. 
This is hard to accept since its previous abolition in the 1930 Act had not 
produced a very significant increase in casualties. An alternative explanation is that 
after the 1930 Road Traffic Act there was a closer collaboration and sympathy 
between the Home Office and the Ministry of Transport over the employment of 
additional police officers. For the Ministry of Transport even a relatively largely 
expenditure on police could appear worthwhile if it meant that the embarrassing 
political problem of road safety could be dealt with as a matter of public morality and 
education without lavish expenditure on new roads and improvements. 
After the 1930 Act, the Ministry of Transport started giving grants to forces to set up 
specialist traffic departments and motor patrols. This provided forces with 1,000 
vehicles and a potential new source of funds". Closer police involvement with his 
Ministry led Oliver Stanley, the Minister of Transport, to speak in proprietorial terms 
in 1934, "whereas the Home Office concentrates on what I might call the old work 
of the police, the Ministry of Transport emphasises in particular, the new... I cannot 
attach too much importance to the energetic and enthusiastic enforcement by the 
police of this country of the laws dealing with the use of the highway"77 
. 
"Plowden, W., The Motor Car and Politics, p. 28 1. 
"Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the World, pp. 65-6. 
"Chief Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), 
Reports of the General Conference and Special General Conference of the Chief 
Constable's Association. 1934, pp. 43-4,46. 
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By the mid- 193 Os the accident figures had led the Home Office and the Ministry of 
Transport to engage in joint consultations about tackling, as a Times leader described 
it, 'the Massacre of the Innocents"'. They discussed applying to the Exchequer for 
"millions" extra for more police separate from Home Office funds. The Ministries 
agreed that county police motor patrols needed to be increased four or five times and 
borough patrols doubled. Some "additional men on foot" were also included". This 
was a victory for police pressure and had it been implemented, in the opinion of 
Barbara Weinberger, "would have meant saturating the roads with police cars and 
increasing the police establishment to a level that would have been financially 
unsustainable" 
80 
. 
After 1937,, the Treasury agreed to fund about 800 extra men in selected areas as an 
experiment which lasted until the outbreak of the war. The police were so enthusiastic 
that in the first six months of the scheme, the Lancashire police produced remark-able 
figures purporting to show that accidents had fallen by forty-six per cent and 
prosecutions by fifty per cent". Although Barbara Weinberger provides good reasons 
to doubt whether this 'courtesy cops' scheme amounted in reality to "more than a 
"Times, 24 April, 1936. 
"F. C. Johnson, Home Office, 'Instruction of Mobile Police Patrols', Chief 
Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), Annual Repo 
of the Chief Constable's Association, 1937, pp. 66-73, @ pp. 68-9. 
1OWeinberger, B., The Best Police in the World, p. A 
'Ibid., p. 69. 
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public relations exercise"", it gave the government a clear indication that the 
provision of extra police would bring the statistics down. 
A revealing insight into senior police thinking was provided in 1937 by T. Rawson, 
the Chief Constable of Bradford. He offered his brother officers his assessment of the 
significance, for their status, of the new broadening out of police duties. In his 
Presidential address to the Chief Constable's Association in 1937 he said, 
at present we could not justify the existence of the modem complex police 
organisation to cope with the small proportion of crimes of violence and 
serious breaches of the peace which are now perpetrated 
Suppose for an instant that Parliament thought fit to set up an organisation 
outside the police forces to administer traffic laws as is the case in certain 
cities in America. There would be an immediate and strong case for a 
reduction in police strength generally, a reduction in status for ourselves as 
Chief Constables, and possibly a reduction in an even more material way. The 
facility with which an entirely new body can be brought into being when the 
apparent necessity arises has been illustrated by the scheme of Traffic 
Commissioners and their staffs now functioning under the Road Traffic Acts, 
and is of too recent vintage not to attract our attention to a possibility. 
82 Ibid. p. 69. 
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If we look round at our local government colleagues we find, for example, 
that the Medical Officer of Health is very jealous of his various spheres of 
activity, and that in all these new branches of 'Public Health, ' covering mental 
deficiency, maternity and child welfare, housing, slum clearance, infectious 
diseases, he has widened his authority and extended his control in every 
appropriate direction. To enable him to deal with the work effectively, his 
staff has increased in all grades, and his department has been reorganised to 
cope with the work. The individual Medical Officer of Health works no 
harder than before,, although his administrative responsibilities have naturally 
grown, and his personal status with them" 
vi 
Yet, despite the opinion of the President of the Chief Constable's Association that 
police numbers could not be justified by the amount of crime being committed and 
that road traffic duties were essential to maintain numbers, nonetheless, the 
Inspectors of Constabulary had for years been using the statistics to claim that traffic 
work and other factors were adversely affecting crime control. 
"Presidential Address by T. Rawson, Chief Constable of Bradford, Chief 
Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), Reports of the 
General Conference and Special General Conference, 1937, p. 27. 
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From the early 1920s, they complained that as the number of road accidents and 
prosecutions rose, traffic duties took more and more men from the beat leaving 
property vulnerable to criminals. Moreover, because police numbers were not 
increasing, as well as rising traffic work, demographic and social factors were also 
eroding the effect of beat work. The 1920s and 1930s saw a rapid suburban 
expansion, in one division of the Metropolitan Police over a seven year period, street 
mileage increased by 226 miles and the number of houses by 53,000. This was said 
not to be exceptional". Many other large cities and towns also had to deal with 
"enormous" increases in population but, unlike in the Victorian period, this growth 
of the suburbs had to be incorporated into beats "without any extra police being 
appointed"". 
The Inspectors claimed that crime prevention was suffering as a result of these factors 
and this could be seen in a statistical scissors effect. The number of prosecutions for 
non-indictable offences fell as police resources declined and as officers were diverted 
to traffic control. At the same time, the number of indictable crimes Imown to the 
police rose showing that criminals had taken advantage of this reduced police 
coverage 86 
. 
Senior police sources suggested that until more men were provided they 
"Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1937, p. 7. 
"Times, I December 1936, p. 13. 
"See P. 316. 
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would not be able to meet their responsibilities and a policy of 'robbing Peter to pay 
Paul' would have to be the order of the day for the service". 
The Home Office, on the other hand, disagreed. They argued that non-indictable non- 
traffic crimes had fallen due to a real improvement in manners and standards of 
living, and that the rise in indictable crime was largely a "statistical" illusion". 
Moreover, as the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police said in 1929, it was because 
there had been a "progressive decrease in crime and disorder" that the police found 
themselves "free to deal with... 'the new crime'... [that] may be more properly 
described as the civil regulation of the community" 89 
. 
In other words, the Home 
Office argued traffic work had not undermined crime control, 
firstly, because there was no significant real increase in crime, 
secondly, because there was a real decline in non-indictable offences due to 
increased law-abidingness, and 
87 Times, 2 August 1938; Moylan, J. F., Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan 
Police, p. 290; Inspectors of Constabulary, 1920-1 onwards. 
"See previous chapter. 
"Moylan, J. F., Scotland Yard and the Metnjýolitan Police, p. xii. 
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thirdly, because the improvement in public manners and morals had preceded 
and progressed independently of the growth in traffic work and so had not 
hindered crime control. 
The only effect of the increase in traffic prosecutions therefore, the Home Office 
argued, had been to mask the extent of the real reduction in crime. 
By 1924, W. J. Farrant, the editor of the Criminal Statistics, was unable, or unwilling 
to risk displeasure by deciding the relative merits of the conflicting arguments and 
so fudged the issue by accepting both. In consecutive sentences he simply reproduced 
first the Home Office argument and then the police; 
The annual number of prosecutions for non-indictable offences shows a 
remarkable diminution during the present century, and the diminution would 
be much greater if it were not that offences by motorists have enormously 
increased during the same period. A large share of the energies of the police 
is nowadays devoted to the regulation of motor traffic, and to this fact must 
be attributed considerable proportions of the increase of crimes against 
property and of the decrease of prosecutions for non-indictable offences' 
Farrant's non-conclusion was perhaps indicative of the uneasy stand-off that was 
reached in the inter-war period between police chiefs and their employers. 
The 
10judicial Statistics, 1924, p. 8. 
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Government and many police authorities tried permanently to cut police numbers and 
failed, the police wanted permanently increased manpower and also failed. As fast 
as vagrants, drunks and other street offenders were cleared from the courts, the docks 
were refilled with motoring offenders while the total numbers of prosecutions and 
police remained the same. 
Vil 
During this stand-off, which was political and economic in origin, the police service 
was clearly undergoing a profound transformation in its functions and organisation. 
In 19385 Samuel Hoare, the then Home Secretary, observed that "There was no career 
that had changed more during the last generation"". The reality was complex. 
Originally, police chiefs had expected to bring about a post-Desborough 
transformation in the status of the police constable from general servant to something 
more comparable in standing to a'general practitioner"'. Most continued to desire, 
however, for the constable to remain on his beat, keeping the streets clean and 
carrying out his traditional preventive duties as before the war. This expectation 
proved unsustainable as unit police costs escalated and both central and local masters 
either wound down or found other services providers for, particularly, the Poor Law 
"Times, 24 July 1937, p. 3 
"Presidential Address by T. Rawson, Chief Constable of Bradford, Chief 
Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), Reports of the 
General Conference and Special General Conference, 1937, p. 23. 
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related duties that had become so intimately associated with preventive policing and 
justified much beat practice. Moreover, indiscriminate and heavy-handed Victorian 
policing methods became less politically acceptable after the franchise extensions in 
the late Victorian period and 1918. 
This does not mean that old style preventive beat work- entirely ceased, rather, as the 
statistics show, it was rapidly undermined in the courts by traffic prosecutions. On 
the streets its raisons detre shrank-, the residuum contracted and the problem of 
pauperism was redefined in the less morally-charged language of unemployment. 
Although the application of the 'sus' clauses of the Vagrancy Act against easily 
identifiable low-status minority group continued into the 1980s and illustrates the 
Act's continuing utility to policing, compared with the Victorian and Edwardian 
period policing practice was transfonned. 
With far less involvement in the regulation of the poor and no longer having a 
realistic role as "the strong arm and the advance guard of municipal reform"", the 
beat began to lose much of its former utility. As non-traffic work dried-up, and a 
relatively more hands-off approach was adopted towards the poor, the physical 
protection of property assumed a larger proportion of the routine, particularly in 
towns. Officers began to feel that they were becoming little more than highly paid 
caretakers rattling locks and conducting "an array of largely meaningless and low- 
status tasks 
- 
checking, checking, and checking again. Patrol officers rarely 
"Cohen, P., 'Policing the Working Class City', p. 120. 
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encoýtntered any 'action"'. By the 1960s even this vestigial function of prevention 
policing was being taken from patrol officers and given to small-scale specialist 
'crime prevention' officers". The beat inevitably became devalued and even "hated" 
by officers for its "tedium and excruciating monotony"91. 
Vill 
With the encouragement of Arthur Dixon, police leaders responded to the new 
situation by applying, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, modern technical and 
managerial solutions. The Home Office began to look very closely at policing 
developments in America. Some time before 1936, Atcherley led a visit to the States 
and reported back that a number of forces were ceasing to employ officers on the 
beat. Instead they were relying on motor patrols and specialist departments. Almost 
every large force there had Homicide, Vice and Forgery Squads". After 1930, similar 
"The broader context of Victorian preventive policing has often been lost 
sight of in recent work on crime prevention. See, for example, Pease, K., 'Crime 
Prevention'. in Maguire, M., Morgan, R., Reiner, R., (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994,683 ff. 
"Brogden, M., On the Mersey Beat, pp. 43,36. See also Rogers, E. F., 'A 
Business Man Looks at the Police Service', Police Journal, 1942, Vol. 15, pp. 306-16, 
pp. 314 ff. 
"Chief Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), 
Annual Re-Dort of the Chief Constable's Association, 1936, p. 65. 
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developments were slowly introduced to Britain. For example, J. Wilson, the Chief 
Constable of Cardiff, claimed foot patrols in residential areas had become obsolete 
and that patrolling was to be done on cycles, motor cycles and eventually radio patrol 
cars 
97 
. 
In 1936, The Justice of the Peace argued "The public are beginning to realise also that 
police protection nowadays is not to be measured by the frequency (or infrequency) 
of the appearance of uniformed officers on foot. The idea of 'going out and finding 
a policeman' should now be out of date. "". With police numbers capped, existing 
beats could no longer be kept manned, and there was little prospect of including new 
suburbs as they were built. Instead, police telephone boxes were slowly introduced 
to replace patrolmen allowing out-lying police stations to be closed". Motor patrols 
and specialist departments were slowly introduced to replace the generalist on the 
beat"'. The Ray Committee on Local Expenditure in 1932 gave further impetus to 
the mechanisation of police work, and other aspects of public authority work, in the 
interests of economy"'. 
"Magistrate, 1935, (March-April 1935), p. 898. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1936, (6 June 1936), pp. 372. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1930, (18 January 1930), p. 34; Inspectors of 
Constabular 
, 
193 3 
-45 p. 11. 
"'See Ernsley, C., The English Police; Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the 
World. 
"'Report of the Committee on Local Expenditure (England and Walesj, p. p. (continued 
... 
) 
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Much of Ray's agenda was shared with and implemented in the Metropolitan Police 
by Lord Trenchard". )M-ien seen in their proper context of the reform of government 
as a whole, Trenchard's reforms, from mechanisation, to management structure and 
information systems, right down to his attack on the cost of Police Federation 
meetings and conferences, were in the mainstream of public sector 0&M reforms 
of the 1930s". Yet they were presented, and have been accepted in the traditional 
historiography as if they were an unproblernatic response to a real change in both the 
quality and quantity of crime and criminals caused by structural changes in society. 
Trenchard wrote, 
Police work has undergone great changes in many directions, most of which 
are perhaps sufficiently obvious. The rough and ready methods of 50 years 
ago are unsuitable to-day. The criminal has become more skilful, more 
mobile, and more scientific, and the methods of dealing with him must not 
only keep pace, but get ahead of him. Supervision and organisation are more 
than ever necessary, and men are needed capable, not only of dealing with 
crime as it arises, but of anticipating developments and adapting the machine 
to meet them in advance. This is only one instance 
- 
and many others could 
"'( 
... 
continued) 
1932-3 [Cmd 400], XIV. 1. 
102 A good, but uncritical account of the Trenchard reforms is in Boyle, A., 
Trenchard,, chapters 19 and 20. Surprisingly he does not mention the Ray Committee. 
"'For conferences see Report of the Committee on Local Expenditure 
(England and Wales), pp. 265 ff. 
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be quoted 
- 
of the need for more enlightened and scientific supervision and 
a higher degree of organisation than was necessary in the days when crime 
was largely local and the main police problems arose out of drunkenness and 
rowdyism. 
This need is recognised in the Defence Forces, in the Civil Service, and to a 
very large extent in industry, and the desirability of applying the same 
principle to the Police Service is now, I believe, generally accepted"'. 
As the crime figures rose, by the 1930s, it was being presented as obvious that 
traditional, preventive policing, based upon foot patrol, was hopelessly old-fashioned 
to deal with what was being described a new breed of motorised property-raiding 
criminals. There was also a rise in the statistics of juvenile delinquency after 1929. 
More men,, better communications and rapid response patrolling, along with better 
detection were presented as the next logical developments"'. Police status and 
leadership also had to rise to deal with higher status criminals, and also to attract the 
professional skills, organisation, and brains needed to combat modern crime"'. 
"'Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis, 1932, pp. 7-8. 
"'See Justice of the Peace, 1930, (18 January 1930), p. 34. 
101judicial Statistics, 1923, pp. 9-10. 
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Co-ordination, co-operation and centralisation were much discussed as organizational 
theory was applied to policing"'. Sophisticated "motor bandits" were not going to be 
deterred from committing crime by a policeman patrolling on foot, armed only with 
a truncheon to throw at the windscreen. Because so many new criminals were said 
to be based in London, but using motor transport to offend elsewhere 108 ý it seemed 
sensible to suggest centralising detection in the Metropolis or establishing a National 
Detective force (or at the least a crime clearing house), perhaps independent of the 
Metropolitan Police"'. The Home Office also suggested amalgamating many smaller 
police units into larger units. Others suggested creating a national police force linked 
by wireless. "' 
As these scientific management techniques began to be applied, the efficiency of 
preventive policing came ever more under question. In Britain, unlike America, there 
was no research into the number and cost of the crimes each beat officer prevented. 
"'See for example, A. L. Dixon, 'Some Aspects of Co-operation Within the 
Police Service', p. 52. 
"'New Survey of London Life and Labour, vol. 1, P. S. King and Son, 1930, 
pp. 392-3. Basil Thomson, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Serv 
of England Wales and Scotland, p. 35. 
"'See, Evidence of T. Davies,, Chief Constable of Portsmouth Minutes of 
Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, p. 156; Letter 
from Reginald Clarke, Times, 19 April 1932; Times, 30 August 1933, p. 7. 
"OTimes, I April 1932, p. 9 
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As modem managerialism spread into the police hierarchy it was found easier to use 
the figures of detection of indictable crime as the main indicator of police 
effectiveness in budgets, targets etc, and to neglect the unquantified worth of 
prevention. Lack of research enabled A. L. Dixon in 1929 to brush aside the case for 
preventive patrolling; "As regards the prevention of crime it is very difficult to say 
to what extent the actual thickness of the patrol, the closeness of the patrol, is 
effective in preventing crime. ""' 
Already the traditional police establishment had failed in the 1920s to provide a 
simple formula incorporating crime to justify police numbers on the beat in reply to 
the Geddes report. Again they failed, in the 1930s, to cost the value of preventive 
policing to the community. In the new managerial climate of the 1930s, if a factor 
was not quantified and costed it tended not to exist for scientific management"'. The 
senior police establishment, many of whom still wished to maintain large-scale 
traditional police beats, did not appear to appreciate that if police chiefs failed to 
undertake their own research, there was nobody at the Home Office, other than the 
"'Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, QQ. 2832, p. 180. 
I "Bunbury, Sir H. N. Rationalisation and the Processes of Administration', 
Public Administration, 1930, Vol. VIII, pp. 275-82, @ pp. 279 ff. 
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grossly under-resourced Inspectors of Constabulary"', who were going to do it for 
them and provide a vested interest with arguments to justify increased expenditure. 
Moreover, they were up against a new breed of police manager, typified by Lord 
Trenchard, who was willing ruthlessly to manipulate the evidence necessary to 
support his managerial goals. The force would be modernized and 'facts' were not 
going to stand in the way. Trenchard wanted to be seen as 'the new broom' who 
brought the service up-to-date. In 1932, he appointed a statistical officer"' who 
provided him with the figures necessary to back up his claims of a sudden surge of 
efficiency. For example, he claimed that his reorgainisation of the Criminal Record 
Office had,, in the single year 1934, doubled modus operandi identifications from the 
Crime Index (from 7,000 to over 14,000) and also doubled definite identifications 
113 Before 1929, when the third Inspector was reinstated, the Inspectorate had 
been reduced to two, for economy reasons. The strength of the Inspectors of 
Constabulary was obviously inadequate to enable them to carry out their primary duty 
which was to survey all 186 forces in England and Wales each year. They had no 
supporting staff, not even a secretary, and, in the opinion of S. J. Stevenson, being 
.1 
former Chief Constables they lacked a scientific approach. Stevenson, S. J., 
'Reflections on the Attempt to Rationalize the Distribution of Police in England and 
Wales, 1942-19741, pp. 68-9. 
114 Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1932, Cmd 4294, p. 8; Commissioner o 
the Metropolis, 1934, Cmd 4866, p. 10. 
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(from 4,000 to 8,000)"'. This remarkable, and numerically tidy, success was 
apparently achieved despite working conditions where, 
the staff are crowded together like warehouse clerks in a Christmas rush; 
many have to work by artificial light in a corridor; criminal records which 
have to be constantly referred to are piled to the ceiling in a passage; senior 
officers whose work is largely confidential sit three or four together in one 
room; interviews go on in corners because there are not enough waiting- 
rooms. In short the position is that of an organization struggling to keep 
abreast of its work' 
16 
. 
However, this 'fact' was alluded to in a different section of Trenchard's report which, 
rather than celebrating the efficiency of the service since the arrival of 'the new 
broom% was giving reasons why its efficiency was impaired and why it needed "more 
spacious and dignified buildings which will be more in accord with the greatly 
improved status of the police service and the new relations in which the police stand 
to the public" 
117 
- 
"'Commissioner of the Metropo 1934, pp. 38-9. 
116 Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1934, p. 8. 
117 Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1934, Cmd 4866, p. 8. 
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ix 
Appropriately Dixon left the Police Department in 1938 to reorganise the fire brigade 
service. By then traditional preventive policing of non-indictable character offences 
had been fatally weakened. All the Inspectors could do was to issue a strong uncosted 
warning, that would not have impressed economists. 
With the modem tendency to improve our machinery for dealing rapidly with 
occurrences and to answer the calls of the public there may well be some risk 
of gradually shifting the original basis of our police organisations more in the 
direction of that of a fire brigade 
Care must be taken not to be entangled in a vicious circle and create greater 
opportunities for crime while at the same time steadily improving an 
expensive machinery for dealing with offences when committed. Otherwise 
we may find that graph showing the percentage of detected crimes rise 
satisfactorily but that the crime graph also shows an upward curve in the case 
of the more common preventable offences... there is probably a sort of 
economic line up to which the expense of improving the general preventive 
organisation is justified on financial grounds alone - an undefined area within 
(315) 
which the cost of unprevented crime may be greater in the long run, or at least 
equal to the expenditure that would be incurred in reducing it' ". 
By the 1930s, the rising figures of indictable offences and the falling figures of non- 
traffic non-indictables show the extent of the police transfonnation (Figure 1.3 ). The 
economic, political and managerial logic of criminal policy had steadily tilted in 
favour of the replacement of large-scale preventive patrolling of the streets with 
rapid-response units and small-scale specialist departments investigating real 
indictable crimes. As in America, "The most portentous development of the decade 
was a redefinition of the police role and the ascendency of the crime-fighter 
image. " ' ". The age of the specialist detective (albeit very cheap and "expeditious" 
whose efficiency could be measured simply by scientific managers using the number 
of 'elucidations' of indictable offences, and his uniformed counterpart whose 
efficiency was measured by response times, had arrived. This was to have profound 
implications for society and for social policy in general. 
"'Inspectors of Constabulary, 1937-8, P. P. 1937-8 (124), V. 139, p. 21. 
"'Walker, S., A Critical History of Police Reform, p. 139. 
IIOGross, H., (ed. Howe, R. M., Assistant Commissioner, Scotland Yard), 
jtdýajtiio-w--A 
-Practical 
Textbook for jagistraws, Police Officers and Criminal lnwýs 
LgMers, 4th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 1949, pp. 23 ff 
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Offences (1920-1950). Calculated from Butler, D. and Sloman, A., British Political 
Facts: 1900-1975,4th ed., Macmillan, London, 1975. 
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Chapter XI: The Rise of Juvenile Delinquency 
I 
In the nineteenth century, to make sense of the decline in the crime figures the image 
of the criminal had become more docile and tractable. Since at least the early part of 
the century it had been a commonplace in the discourse of police reformers that 
"crimes of violence... are, generally, in a course of gradual diminution... the result of 
a gradual amelioration of the morals of the people"'. Well before the First World 
War, the official statistics were used as evidence that, unlike their less civilized 
Scottish and Irish counterparts, English and Welsh criminals increasingly preferred 
the profitable indictable crimes of dishonesty, such as fraud and false pretences, and 
more serious larcenies and breakings, to brutal and gratuitous crimes of violence or 
non-indictable vices such as drunk-enness'. 
'Royal Commission on the Constabulary Force in Counties of England and 
Wales, p. 42. 
'Justice of the Peace, 1938, (5 November 1938), pp. 709. "Statistically, 
indictable crime is practically synonymous with theft or stealing in the broadest sense 
of the words". Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis, 1937, p. 6. 
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Of course, it is impossible to determine to what extent the appearance of reduced 
dangerousness and violence was due to a real change in criminal behaviour occurring 
in society, since the criminal statistics only revealed changes in managerial targets 
and in recording and prosecuting practice. There were numerous contemporary 
accounts of the law-abidingness of the British people,, but the reality was that most 
serious crimes of violence were too difficult, expensive and uncertain to prosecute 
and s"o most charges were either reduced to non-indictable assaults or drunk-enness 
or dropped'. Because the precipitating violent element of many arrests were often not 
pursued, leaving just drunkenness or some other non-indictable offence as the main 
charge, it was possible to characterise these charges as less criminal than indictable 
offences. 
By the end of the First World War, the statistical mildness of crime made the role of 
the police appear so marginal that social workers and other professionals began to 
make considerable inroads into traditional police territory. The'criminal classes', who 
had previously been the preserve of the police, now began to be ascertained and 
neutralised as a 'social problem group' by social workers, eugenically inclined 
medics, and rising standards of living. More and more 'criminals' were being and 
taken out of the ambit of criminal justice. 
So, at the beginning of the interwar period if the police were to regain the major role 
in social control they either had to acquiesce with the image of the criminal as weak- 
'See above, p. 152 
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and irresponsible and somehow compete with the other social services, or else 
reconstruct an image of the criminal that was not weak at all, but was dangerous and 
calculating enough to justify capture and punishment by the strong arm of the law. 
Competition from social work could then be dismissed as unhelpful and a waste of 
resources. In the 1920s, Dunning made a play for both roles, seeking an expanded 
social work role for the police when dealing with 'weak'juveniles and women, but 
detection for the many skilful and hardened criminals who were not weak but 
ordinary and educated enough to use "brain rather than brawn". His priority, though, 
was to expand the status and establishment of policing as a preventive force to 
strengthen the fallen. 
11 
Dunning's argument was that early police action was necessary to prevent crime and 
other social "dangers to public health and national efficiency". In particular, he 
wanted greater policing of women and children; for example, prostitution and syphilis 
were "synonymous" and socially dangerous. The real root of crime, he believed, was 
the "increasing decay of parental control" that had been developing for many years 
before the war'. Prosecution was often not helpful, in his opinion, and in many cases 
Judicial Statistics, 1928, p. xvii. 
'Evidence of Sir Leonard Dunning, ReDort of the Departmental Committee 
on the Duties of Women Police, p. 10. 
(320) 
there was a great need for on-going action in the community by the police to prevent 
delinquency developing into serious crime. He said, 
if the older attitude provided excuses for slackness, the newer attitude must 
stimulate action. In old times a crime by a child, if not thought worth a 
prosecution was in too many places not followed up as it should be by 
enquiries at home and school, and by observation of the child and parents 
with a view to preventing the mischief going further... but prevention of crime 
is the first duty of the police, and anything which tends, however remotely, 
to the prevention of crime is their worle. 
In the Edwardian period, the City of Liverpool adopted this philosophy of preventive, 
welfare policing and, unlike most other authorities, centralised a considerable portion 
of its child welfare work under police control and co-ordination. As Dunning said, 
We worked it in Liverpool to the point where we had everything that affected 
the future welfare of a child dealt with systematically by one department of 
the police. It started many years ago by having two men employed as the 
agents for the Home Office for the collection of parental contributions in 
cases of children committed to reformatories. That went on until the 
Ibid., p. 11 
- 
(321) 
Education Committee of the Liverpool City Council asked us also to take 
over the collection of the contributions in industrial cases'. 
He explained how the police in Liverpool ran a Police-aided Clothing Associated for 
poorer children' and how they had pioneered the licensing of street trading by 
children. "One by one" matters concerning the morals and material welfare of 
children came to the police. The police liaised with other departments and undertook 
visits to the homes of children on all matters relating to welfare'. 
If a child committed a crime then the police recorded it and a constable always visited 
and inspected the child's home since Dunning believed it was the mother "to whose 
neglect the offence of the child is so often due"". This visit was the "deciding factor" 
in determining whether the police would issue a caution or tak-e the child before a 
magistrate in one of Liverpool's pioneer juvenile courts. If, in the opinion of the 
police, the home was 'good' then the parents were supervised and inspected to ensure 
they maintained and brought the child up properly, if not the child was sent before 
Ibid. 
'A number of other cities ran similar organisations. For example Birmingham. 
Reilly, J. W., Policing Birmingham: An Account of 150 Years of Police in 
Birmingham, Birmingham, West Midlands Police, 1989, p. 42. 
'Re-Dort of the Departmental Committee on the Duties of Women Police, p. 
12. 
101bid. P. II- 
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the magistrates for placement in an industrial school a reformatory or a Poor Law 
home. If the police cautioned a child or the magistrates discharged a child, the 
Liverpool police did not close the case. They retained it "for themselves" and 
continued to visit the child's home. In Dunning's words, these children "became, as 
it were, the foster-children of the police"". Dunning had adopted an on-going 
casework approach to policing. Consequently, Dunning saw the Liverpool police as 
the "forerunners" of the probation officer which he regarded as a proper component 
of police work rather than an independent social service in its own right". 
So, Dunning's aim was to tackle the symptoms of criminality early using the police 
to co-ordinate the municipal and voluntary services before the child became an 
habitual criminal. He said, 
Every policeman should be encouraged to interest himself in schemes which 
will give him a wider outlook on his opportunities for doing good. Through 
probation he can help the weak and foolish to put up a better fight against 
temptation; through after care of the convicted he can raise the fallen to their 
feet; active participation in works of charity or social betterment, such as 
Police Aided Clothing Associations or Boys' Clubs, give him influence for 
good over those who otherwise might grow up to regard him as their enemy. 
From all such work he learns much of the remote causes of crime and must 
"Ibid. 
121bid. pp. 13-16. 
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realise how much better it is to remove or minimize those causes than merely 
to prosecute their victims". 
In Liverpool, therefore, so far at least as child welfare was concernedý the distinction 
between police, education and social work was more blurred than was the case in 
most other police authorities. Recording a crime committed by a child in Liverpool 
clearly did not require a conviction since the police had the option of dealing with it 
as a welfare case supported by the resources of the City's philanthropic web. So the 
extremely high number of crimes reported, although accompanied by a relatively low 
prosecution rate, were in Dunning's opinion, evidence that the Liverpool police were 
more efficient and effective in preventing, detecting and actually dealing with crime 
than elsewhere. Dunning admitted that many of the alternatives to prosecution were 
not available to the county forces, with their scattered population 14 
. 
Nor was it 
available to most of the other borough forces. 
A number of senior officers, usually in cities or large towns with a philanthropically 
inclined elite, supported Dunning's approach to preventive policing- Sir Charles 
Rafter at Birmingham agreed with Dunning that "You cannot dissociate crime, 
immorality and vice, and you cannot commence to draw a hard and fast line as to 
"Inspectors of Constabulary, 1922-3, p. 7. 
14 Report of the Departmental Committee on the 
-- 
lolice, p. 
14 
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where Police duty ends and welfare work begins"". There were also a number of 
politicians, largely of the Labour and Liberal parties, who were pushing for a new 
social welfare conception of policing particularly of the 'weaker' criminality of 
women and children, although few went as far as Dunning in their support for an 
expanded police role. For example, in 1928, Ellen Wilkinson, an influential Labour 
M. P., argued against the appointment of Lord Byng as the new Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police because, 
Surely at this time when the whole public attitude towards women, towards 
children, towards crimes against children and towards children's offences are 
altered, we want at Scotland Yard a man who represents the new idea, and 
who can modernise our police. The whole attitude of the police towards the 
public needs modernising and it is required to bring in the medical, and 
especially the psychological attitude towards what is sometimes mistakenly 
called crime. " 
III 
Yet while some other forces ran boys' clubs, some inspected some of the 
homes of 
delinquents, only in Edwardian Liverpool did child welfare work become so closely 
"Sir Charles Rafter, Chief Constable Birmingham City Police. Minutes of 
Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, p. 
244. 
"Parl. Debs 
, 
5th ser., 219, (11 July 1928), p. 2311, (Supply Estimates). 
(325) 
identified with policing. The problem with police welfare work- outside Liverpool, for 
example in Birmingham, was that it was in more direct competition for funding with 
social services which were provided, to a greater or lesser extent, either on a 
voluntary basis or on the rates. It was also in competition with social workers who 
regarded themselves as more competent to do a professional job. Moreover, Home 
Office and most police authorities did not wish to subsidise expenditure on welfare 
from their limited police funds. 
The strength of opposition to funding police welfare work-, whether it was saving the 
child or saving the 'fallen', can best be seen in the post-Geddes debates on the 
continued funding of policewomen who were seen as being at the leading edge". 
Many police officers and chief constables took the view that it was unrealistic, and 
perhaps um-nanly, to attempt to expand police responsibilities in the direction of 
welfare. As George Dilnot, a Metropolitan Police officer, argued, "If it is assumed 
that welfare work and rescue work are among the primary duties of the police there 
is scope for women. Since only a limited amount of money is available for police 
purposes, every woman employed for such purposes means one less man for the 
protection of life and property" ". Dunning clearly saw it differently and he 
maintained that welfare work was a primary police responsibility because it cut at the 
"For a description of the role of the policewoman see Weinberger, B., The 
Best Police in the World, chapter 6. 
I'Dilnot, G., Scotland Yard: Its History and Organisation: 1829-1929, 
Geoffrey Bles, Centenary Ed., 1929, p. 178. 
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root of all crime; "it does not matter if you call it delinquency or crime. It begins with 
the child getting into mischief, which if unchecked, ends in that child growing into 
a criminal" 
19 
. 
The Home Office did not agree with Dunning that was a proper use of the police. It 
was drawing exclusive, rather than inclusive, boundaries between most cases of 
delinquency and those of 'real' crime. It did not want to expand its criminal business 
and, therefore, wanted to exclude the minor crimes of children. These boundaries 
were institutionalised in 1914 when a separate Children's Branch was established to 
deal with the combined problem of delinquent and neglected children and break down 
the boundaries between the two, leaving the Criminal Department of the Home Office 
to deal with the 'real' crime of adults. 
The thrust of official policy was, as far as possible, to keep children and criminals as 
separate problems with separate budgets and personnel both within and without the 
Home Office. Politically, child welfare was a rising concern while crime was "a 
decaying branch of business"". This is probably why, in 1909, just four years before 
the formation of the Children's Branch, the Criminal Statistics argued, "Obviously 
there is no relation between the amount of crime, and the number of children, women 
and aged persons, who together make up three-fourths of the total population. The 
"Minutes of Evidence for the Departmental Committee on the Duties of 
Women Police, (192 1), p. 11. 
'OSee above, p. 157. 
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bulk of crime is committed by a section of the male population within certain limits 
of age. " 21 . 
The main implication of the organizational changes in the Home Office was that there 
would be a slow process of effective decriminalization of juvenile offences. This 
could, and was, being achieved in several ways; by increasing the age of criminal 
liability for punishment and, ultimately, the age of responsibility for crime, and also 
by establishing separate juvenile courts with the implication that, in the future, they 
would be removed from criminal jurisdiction, or at least that an majority of cases 
would be brought under child welfare rather than criminal legislation. 
The process had gone much further in Europe and America than Britain. In some 
countries even 14 to 18 year olds were not held unconditionally responsible for their 
offences". In Britain, social workers, educationalists and criminologists, such as 
Hermann Mannheim, proposed that the age of criminal responsibility should be 
raised, perhaps to 14, and that a special Chancery, rather than criminal, jurisdiction 
should apply juveniles. He explained the logic, 
"Judicial Statistics, 1909. Quoted by Dunning, Minutes of Evidence for the 
Departmental Committee on the Duties of Women Police, p. 10. 
22 Mannheim, H., The Dilemma of Penal Reform, George Allen and Unwin, 
1939, p. 191. 
(328) 
in a Court of Chancery even a criminal charge can be treated on the same 
footing as any other symptom of neglect or moral danger, exposing the child 
to no greater stigma than any other kind of negligent treatment, etc. The child 
would no longer be charged with an offence, because he would have 
committed none; he would have to plead nothing... in no circumstances, 
however, would there be any criminal records, and the result of proceedings 
before the Court of Chancery would never be entered in the list of 'previous 
convictions'23 .
Consequently, in the early- and mid- 1 920s, there was pressure, particularly from the 
Children's Branch of the Home Office, to integrate the legal and administrative sides 
of both child delinquency and neglect cases. The 1933 Children Act followed this 
logic by designating all both reformatories and industrial schools as Home Office 
Approved Schools, thus ending a major distinction between the treatment of the 
neglected child and the criminal child". From the viewpoint of child welfare, existing 
practice in juvenile courts was highly unsatisfactory and left much to be desired". A 
transfer to a new civil jurisdiction, accompanied with funding above the scale 
allowed to police court justice, may have got case hearings more of the interest, 
attention and resources they needed. 
"Ibid. p. 196. 
24 Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 98. 
"Home Office, Third Re-Dort on the Work of the Children's Branch, Home 
Office, 1925, pp. 6 ff 
(329) 
In 1924, Sydney Harris, the Assistant Secretary of the Children's Branch, despatched 
a minute calling for a committee to review all aspects of juvenile policy. He wrote, 
"Juvenile Courts are playing a considerable part in the administration of justice, and 
it would be necessary to consider whether the existing machinery is the best that can 
be devised, or whether it should be given a civil rather than a criminal character as 
in America and some other countries. "". A Departmental Committee on the 
Treatment of Young Offenders was set up in 1925. Since "neglect and delinquency 
often go hand in hand" its object was "to consider the best means of helping those 
young people who, starting life with the handicap of moral wealmess or unhappy 
influences,, specially need the protection of the State. "". Yet, when it reported in 
1927, the Committee expressed doubts about removing the benefits of a legal trial 
since, whether the child was brought to the juvenile court as a 'neglect' case or as a 
delinquent, the result could be removal from its parents. It was thought the parents 
and the child should have a'fair' opportunity to rebut the evidence. Consequently, the 
Departmental Committee did not recommend a change of jurisdiction". 
26 PRO, H045/11959/445305/3 quoted in Bailey, V., Delinquency and 
Citizenship, p. 19. 
27 Re-Dort of the Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young 
Offenders, P. P. 1926-7 [Cmd 283 1 ], XII. 959, p. 6. 
"Ibid. P. 19. 
(330) 
IV 
However, perhaps more importantly, by 1927 it had been noticed that the crime 
figures were rising and, although this was not being reflected in the courts, it was 
clear that much of the increase was in the minor sort of offences most likely to be 
committed by juveniles. In other words, the effects of the statistical rises in police 
crime figures were beginning to be felt. Had police establishments not been 
threatened with economy cuts, most chief constables probably would not have 
bothered to start recording more minor delinquencies as indictable crimes as Dunning 
was urging them to do". A jaundiced inter-war Liverpool bobby was representative 
of a large body of police opinion that did not want to formalise the policing of 
children; "Children were the normal target of street policing... There was considerable 
pressure for actions against them from a sanctimonious middle class, some of whose 
members held extraordinary delusions. The due process of law could be a bit of an 
ass when you arrested someone under age"". Many officers would have preferred to 
keep most "common childish naughtiness", in Cyril Burt's much quoted phrase, off 
the record". 
"See chapter IX. 
IOBrogden, M., On the Mersey Bea, p. 100. 
'Burt, Sir C., The Young Delinquent, University of London Press, 4th ed., 
1944, p. viii. 
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But establishments were threatened. As the amount of recorded crime rose, the 
average value of goods recorded as stolen fell. By 1936, four out of every five 
recorded property crimes in England and Wales was involving goods valued at less 
than f 5, while in the Metropolitan Police District, nearly one third of indictable crime 
involved goods worth under El". The inevitable result of this tampering with the 
traditional practice of 'cuffing' minor offences from the record was that crime, and in 
particular juvenile delinquency, was pushed up the political agenda. 
Until the late 1920s officials did very little about it. They still expected to regain 
command of the police statistics and revert to their long-standing policy, reformulated 
in the 1890s, of maintaining deterrence without an expansion, and perhaps with even 
a reduction, in the machinery of criminal justice. One way out would have been to 
allow police chiefs some of what they wanted. But, given the economic stringency 
of the period, the Home Office and police authorities did not have the option to grant 
them, extra resources. Had they been able to do so, it is interesting to speculate 
whether chiefs would have reversed the trend by capping the statistical rises, and 
perhaps even reporting regular falls in the crime figures as was achieved with road 
accident figures after the Second War". 
32judicial Statistics, 1936, P. P. 1937-8 [Cmd 5690], XXVII. 493, p. xv. 
"See above, p. 296 
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Figure X1.1 Percentage of Recorded Crime that was Prosecuted (1857-1990). 
Calculated from the Criminal Statistics. 
By the late 1920s, the rising reports of crime had escalated into an urgent problem for 
the Home Office. During the course of the 1920s, while the Home Office had still 
been entertaining hopes of bringing the crime figures down, the proportion of 
reported indictable crime to prosecutions had been allowed to slump (Figure 1.1 ). 
Prosecution slots were not increased partly because the summary courts were being 
bled by the Exchequer of much of their revenue from non-indictable fines and fees. 
(333) 
In just over the decade of the 1920s, the prosecution rate collapsed from over two- 
thirds to under one third of reported crime. This began to be noticed" 
Sir Alexander Maxwell, an assistant secretary at the Home Office, later observed that 
about 1930,, the public discovered with "a great shock" that indictable crime was 
rising". This was not surprising. Because the Metropolitan Police accounted for a 
third of all police numbers, when they brought their crime figures in line with other 
forceS36 this reverberated throughout the system. Indictable offences rose from 
159,278 in 1931 to 208,175 in 1932, almost the entire increase being due to the 
Metropolitan Police". The previous year, 1930, for the first time, the national crime 
figures had broken the important psychological barrier of 150,000 crimes a year. The 
following year, the increased figures for the Metropolitan Police pushed them through 
the 200,000 barrier. To the public, of course, it appeared that they were in the middle 
of great a crime wave caused by the onset of the Depression, with London crime 
trebling and national crime figures rising over 40% in just two years. 
"See for example, Carr-Saunders, A. M., 'Current Social Statistics: Crime and 
Punishment', Political Quarterly, 1930, Vol. 1, pp. 265-73, @ p. 266. 
"Howard Joumal, 1933, p. 24. 
36 See above, p. 264. 
"Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in ie Wars, pp. 
72 ff. 
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Of course, sociological explanations helpful to the Home Office began to be 
formulated to account for the post-war rise, usually involving the after-effects of the 
First World War followed by unemployment". These explanations were 
unsatisfactory to the wider public who did not want to hear theories but wanted action 
to be taken. Sir Leon Radzinowicz, then a Whiggishly inclined criminologist, 
described how he and many other intellectuals had constantly to refine their theories 
to maintain their faith in the progressive eradication of crime, 
It was in the post-war depression that a sustained trend became discernable. 
Through the years of economic upheaval, unemployment and another great 
war, it gathered pace inexorably, though the yearly accretions were small 
compared with those we take for granted today. There always seemed some 
reason,, some social evil to account for them. There always remained the hope 
that if we could achieve peace and plenty, they would stop. " 
Radzinowicz., like many other liberal intellectuals, managed to retain some optimism 
until the 1970s. Public opinion (in the inclusive sense of the term), although 
dismissed and disparaged by the governing and progressive elite, became 
disenchanted with their 'ameliorative' policies very much earlier and, from the mid- 
"For example, Ruck, S. K., 'The Increase of Crime in England: An Analysis 
and Criticism'. 
"Radzinowicz, Sir L., The Growth of Crime, p. 4. 
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1920s, substantial sections of the press and the dernotic public began to express their 
concern at the figures of rising crime. 
Outside governing and intellectual circles, there was fairly wide spread anxiety over 
the rapid evolution of the criminal encouraged by some alarmist police comments and 
by the number of crimes going unpunished. It seemed the criminal was triumphing 
over the forces of justice. The Justice of the Peace, observed; "New and powerful 
agencies are available for the criminal, and it is felt that preventive methods have not 
kept pace with the use made of these agencies. "". This fear spread to backbenchers 
and put the government under pressure. For example, Commander Marsden, a 
Conservative MP, complained, in one of the more hysterical interventions in the 1933 
debate on the Banditry Bill, how the unchecked violence of the new breed of 
criminals was destroying the traditional English way of life, "People talk about the 
lack of domestic servants. We cannot get servants because many of them fear to live 
in this country"". Even the Labour Party, with its continuing campaign against police 
"militarisation" and centralization, advocated refonning the police service since "the 
professional criminal is years ahead of the police and Imows the game better than 
they do"42 
. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1930, (5 April 1930), p. 215. 
41 Parl. Debs., 5th Ser., Vol. 276, (24 March 1933), p. 655, (Debate on the 
Banditry Bill). 
"Rhys Davies, Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), p. 1160. 
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Out of a fear that deterrence was failing, 'reactionaries', as Victor Bailey has 
portrayed them, began to call for tougher sentences". Many of the 'reactionaries' were 
magistrates and their logic was clear if ill-informed; if the more troublesome children 
and adults were locked up for longer or else were given a cheap and painful flogging 
there would be less crime and, hence, less demand for court hearings which were 
already greatly underfunded and subject to "scandalous congestion"". So by 1930 it 
was clear to politicians and officials that there would have to be more prosecutions 
of indictable offences if deterrence was to be maintained. In the late 1920s,, the Home 
Office began to respond with new policies clearly based on the assumption that 
reported crime would continue to rise. This can be seen across the range of its 
statistics; 
The 1928 Criminal Statistics conceded that there were "liable to be increases" 
in the crime figures every year". 
In 1929,, the Metropolitan Police commenced a three-year quintupling of their 
indictable crime figures to bring their crime rate into line with provincial 
forces". This was the final symbolic break with the Victorian practice of 
reporting constant crime and was a defeat for the Home Office. 
4'Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, pp. 118 ff. 
"Howard Joumal, 1927, Vol. 2, p. 78 
45 Judicial Statistics 1928, pp. x-xi. 
46COMMIssioner of the Metropolis, 1929-1933. 
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About this time a campaign for greater 'zeal' was inaugurated in the 
Metropolitan Police which was "in danger of being interpreted as success in 
bringing home prosecutions against people"". 
In 1929, the statistics of juvenile convictions started to rise". 
In 1930, both summary hearings and trials of indictable offences also began 
to rise". 
Although less than the 10 demanded by chief constables, in 1931 two new 
King's Bench judges were appointed". 
The most visible change was that in the 1930s, official statements of 
complacency about the police began to disappear as efficiency, modernisation 
and, above all, detection were moved rapidly up the agenda. 
"Morgan Jones, Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 265, (2 May 1932), p. 846, (Supply 
Committee 
- 
Police). 
"Bailey, V., Delinquency and Citizenship, p. 62. 
49Mitchell, B. R. British Historical Statistics, pp. 780 ff 
10justice of the Peace, 193 5, Vol. XCIX, (22 June 193 5), p. 3 97, Ibid., 193 1, 
Vol. XCV, (28 February 193 1), p. 129. 
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Having now accepted that they could not prevent crime statistics rising, officials had 
to define a nemesis who could not demand either a large increase in expensive 
punishment or open the flood gates to a massive rise in police numbers. The problem 
was that the Home Office could not easily scapegoat any traditional criminal type 
such as the residuum, drunkards, vagrants, defectives or aliens for the statistical rise 
in indictable crime. These groups would have figured prominently in any discourse 
-'-out crime before the First World War. However by 1932, it would have been very aLj 5 
hard for Home Secretary both to claim, in the same speech, that these groups had so 
withered away" during the previous decades that they were now committing vastly 
less minor, non-indictable crime if he was then going to argue that they had also 
caused the doubling of indictable crime since the war. 
So, by the interwar period, all that was left as the main suspects for the increase in 
indictable crime were children, the unemployed and also the mass of the normal, 
respectable population. When Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary in the new 
National Government, made an important 1932 speech on the Supply Estimates, he 
offered Parliament three inter-linked explanations to account for the increase 
in 
indictable crime; 
"Except aliens who formed a small, but disproportionately large proportion 
of the prison population. 
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firstly, the allocation of crime between older and younger offenders had 
changed and, primarily due to the earlier disruption of family life and 
education in the First World War, juvenile delinquency was increasing. 
secondly, unemployment and the economic depression had led temporarily 
to increased stealing. The effect was focused geographically in the depressed 
districts and demographically, again, in juveniles. 
thirdly, improved communications, and in particular the introduction of the 
motor car allowed the urban population to scatter out of a much wider area 
and left many houses isolated and unprotected. The car also gave the criminal 
access to these locations and provided them with a ready means of escape. 
This greatly increased the long-term opportunity for crime and made it harder 
to deteCt52. 
V 
Children came at the top of the list. Children were the cheapest and easiest target for 
prosecution and, moreover, were the actual culprits for most of the minor crime that 
"Herbert Samuel, Parl. Debs., 5-th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), pp. 1140-1. 
For an early formulation of the theory that the First World War caused delinquency 
through loss of parental control see Leeson, C., The Child and the War, Howard 
Association, 1917. 
(340) 
the police had never before bothered to record. Also, if crime figures were to continue 
to rise, it made more sense to begin with children now, and then progress to the 
prosecution of more adolescents and then adults at a later date as this generation. of 
children grew up and advanced through the criminal justice machine. Moreover, a 
sudden surge in adult criminality would have been hard to explain since the 
conventional wisdom was that criminality normally emerged before the age of 21. 
Consequently, the Home Office suggested juvenile crime might be modernizing with 
the result that the younger generation was beginning "to transfer its more wayward 
activities from the older fields of drunkenness, vagrancy and so on into other 
spheres",, such as indictable property crime" 
Sir William Clarke Hall, an influential magistrate and writer on children's courts,, had 
written in 1926 that "with sufficiently increased vigilance, the number of charges in 
any particular Juvenile Court could be doubled, trebled or quadrupled"". Few 
policemen should have been surprised at this, since, as the Criminal Statistics noted, 
"The detection of child offenders is seldom difficult if police inquiries are instituted, 
and the more attention the police give to the investigation of minor crimes, the larger 
will be the number of child offenders charged before the Courts"". This was verified 
historically. During both World Wars, the number of juveniles arrested for indictable 
"Judicial Statistics, 1928, p. Ixii. 
54 Hall, Sir William Clark-e, Children's Courts, Allen and Unwin, 1926, pp. 43- 
4. 
51judicial Statistics, 1934, p. xiv. 
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offences rose sharply as forces maintained their arrest rates by switching their targets 
from the adult males who were way in the forces to the juveniles and women at 
home". Moreover, it was an efficient use of police resources to arrest juveniles since 
they were easy to take in bulk. In the Metropolitan Police District in 1935, in "two- 
thirds" of the cases which involved juveniles, two or more were arrested at the same 
time 57 
. 
Trial and punishment costs of child prosecutions were extremely low, This was 
largely because the Children Act, 1908 ('the Children's Charter'), which was 
introduced by Herbert Samuel, the then Home Secretary, introduced less formal 
juvenile court procedure and prohibited the imprisom-nent of children up to and 
including 13 years old, and limited it for the under 16s". When combined with the 
provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907, which allowed cheap probation 
and which, for many years was often unsupervised, to be substituted for detention, 
it became far more acceptable to the public and to police authorities to prosecute 
under 17 and, in particular, under 14 year olds. 
"See the remark-able graph in Judicial Statistics, 1925 where the dip in adult 
arrests is met with a corresponding bulge of juvenile apprehensions. After the War, 
the lines return to normal. 
". Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1935, P. P. 1935-6 [Cmd 5165], XIV. 369, 
13. 
"Fox, L., The Modern English Prison, p. 39. 
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The abruptness with which the 'problem' of 'juvenile delinquency' emerged was 
startling; "at the end of the 'twenties' the juvenile delinquency rate was not 
particularly high and was tending to fall. "". The 1928 Criminal Statistics had 
suggested there "ought" to be "a diminution in juvenile crime and petty offences... in 
years to come"". In the late 1930s, Winifred Elkin, a leading expert on juvenile 
courts, described how the situation was transformed in just ten years; 
Nowadays one may hear cases in which children are charged with stealing 
twopennyworth of sweets or a propelling pencil worth a few pence. A few 
years ago such cases would probably not have been reported to the police at 
alt, and if they had been reported, would have been dealt with by a caution. 
To-day they help to swell the figures of juveniles guilty of indictable 
offences" 
The Lord Mayor of Bradford confessed to chief constables in 1937, "that many of the 
things that children are charged with, I and my fellows of a previous generation were 
certainly guilty of "'. In Liverpool, it was found that a quarter of eight to thirteen year 
"Elkin, Winifred A., English Juvenile Courts, Kegan Paul, 1938, p. 291. 
"The idea that education ought to reduce crime had been under challenge 
since at least the 1830s, Radzinowicz and Hood, The Emergence of Penal Policy in 
Victorian and Edwardian England, pp. 54 ff. 
61 Ibid. p. 283. 
"Chief Constable's Association (Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales), (continued 
... 
) 
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olds, convicted of crime, had stolen goods worth a shilling or lesS63 
. 
An MP was 
explicit, the increase in juvenile crime was, "due to the over-excessive zeal of the new 
police forces in the past 15 years rather than to the criminal tendencies of juveniles 
of the present generation"". Winifred Elkin provided the example of the newly 
appointed chief constable of Sunderland who had made it his policy "to send all 
juveniles charged with larceny to the juvenile court 1165 . 
Much of the increase in convictions was said to have resulted from the workings of 
the 1933 Children's Act. W. H. Bagot noticed a statistical factor in common. Both the 
1908. and the 1933 Children's Acts had been introduced when Herbert Samuel was 
Home Secretary. Both'Children's Charters'had led, "almost exactly", to a 100 per 
cent rise in prosecutions of children in the six years between 1907 and 1912 and 
again in the six years between 1933 and 1938". Clearly, Samuel's main interest in 
criminal policy was limited to the child offender. He was an ideal Home Secretary 
to front the new Home Office policy inaugurating rising levels juvenile delinquency 
before the courts. In 1932 he explained his'child saving' philosophy of crime to the 
"( 
... 
continued) 
Annual Report of the Chief Constable's Associatio , 1937, p. 10. 
"Brogden, M., On the Mersey Beat, pp. 130-1. 
"Mr Pike, Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 276, (24 March 1933), p. 655. 
65 Elkin, Winifred A., English Juvenile Courts,, p. 284. 
66 Comment by J. H. Bagot during the discussion of Rhodes, E. C., 'Juvenile 
Delinquency', p. 396. 
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House, in a speech that marked a major u-turn in criminal justice policy and set the 
scene for the remainder of the century; 
When it is said that at one time 50 per cent. of criminals are over 30 and 50 
per cent. under 30 years of age, and that at another time 33 per cent. are over 
30 and 66 per cent. under 30, that is regarded as a very grave phenomenon. 
But the point of importance is not the percentages but the numbers. I should 
like to see the percentages of offenders over 30 falling and falling until they 
became nil. I should like to see a state of society in which no one committed 
a crime over the age of 30. That would be the greatest possible tribute to the 
efficiency of our penal system, both as a method of reform and as a deterrent. 
The worst feature would be if as people grew older they committed more and 
more offences. It is better to catch them young and to reform them, so that 
they adjure a life of crime" 
It appears that a ten per cent target was set to increase the proportion of juvenile and 
adolescent convictions relative to those of adults. Previous to the 1930s,, those under 
21 had normally occupied just under 41 per cent of all persons found guilty of 
indictable offences. In 1836 this group comprised 40.58 per cent of those found 
guilty, sixty years later, in 1896 it was again 40.58 per cent68 
. 
By 193 1, it had risen 
"Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), pp. 1145-6, (Home Office 
Supply Estimates). 
See also the evidence of Edward Troup to the Gladstone Committee that 
(continued 
... 
) 
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two percent to 42.07 per cent. However, during the 1930s, as more juveniles were 
arrested, particularly following the Samuel's Children's Act 1933, the percentage 
swiftly rose until it was 50.43 per cent of all convictions in 1938'9 
Although the overall percentage of prosecutions of under 21s remained relatively 
static at 41 per cent until 1929, since Victorian times there had been considerable 
changes in targeting within that age group. The Gladstone Committee on PrisonS70 
agreed with the statistics that 16 to 21 year olds were the most criminal group. It 
decided in 1895 that crime was an adult, or at least young adult phenomenon, and so 
Borstals for the 17-21 year olds were introduced a decade later to prevent the young 
from becoming habitual criminals". However, in the early twentieth century the most 
criminal age as judged by convictions, fell to 13, largely due to the work-ings of 
Samuel's original 'Children's Charter"'. Again in the 1930s it was the under-14s who 
were almost exclusively targeted for increased prosecutions. 
. 
"( 
... 
continued) 
41% of convictions were of under 21s, Report of the Departmental Committee on 
Prisons, (1895), p. 409. 
69 Calculated from Judicial Statistics, 1896, and Criminal Statistics, 1938, pp. 
xxix-xxx. 
"Report of the Departmental Committee on Prisons, (1895). 
7'Fox, L.,, The Modem English Prison, p. 38. 
"Carr- Saunders, A. M., Mannheim, H., Rhodes, E. C., Young Offenders: An 
EnquiKy into Juvenile Delinquency, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1942, 
appendix. 
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So, within twenty-five years of making its 1909 statement hat crime did not usually 
concern children", the Home Office had made a fundamental policy u-tum. The new 
bureaucratic problematization of crime was that it no longer primarily concerned 
adults. In 1934 the riminal Statistics said that "the criminal problem is largely a 
problem of the training and discipline of youth"". The official rhetoric, and in all 
probability Samuel genuinely believed it, was that the welfare of the child had 
become paramount. 
Winifred Elkin correctly concluded in 193 8 that "the point of view that the juvenile 
courts should partake not less, but more, of the nature of criminal courts is at present 
very much in the ascendant. "". In practice many of the special juvenile courts had 
very little to do with juvenile welfare. This was because deterrence remained the first 
priority of the Home Office". As Samuel said, the "Certainty of detection and 
punislunent is, of course, the greatest deterrent, and no severity of penalties can take 
the place of that"77 
. 
Since the aim was the classical Beccarian notion of deterrence 
through certainty of detection and not through "severity of penalties", many 
magistrates found it cheaper and easier to record a conviction and "to give a few 
"See above, p. 326. 
74 Judicial Statistics, 1925, p. viii. 
"Elkin, Winifred A., English Juvenile Courts, p. 40. 
76S 
ee the discussion of clear-up rates, below p. 365. 
77 Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), pp. 1147, (Home Office 
Supply Estimates). 
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kindly words of advice and a homily about behaving better in the future, than to 
grapple with the individual problems presented by each case"". They often then 
dismissed the case or handed the problem over to grossly under-staffed probation 
officers. 
More children, in ever increasing batches, were first rubber-stamped with criminality 
before their'welfare'. if it ever did, came into consideration. By 1938, it appears that 
the court machinery had been targeted nationally at a new average of 700 convictions 
per week for male juveniles and young adults below the age of 2 1. If the Criminal 
Statistics are to be believed, in that year exactly 36,500 boys and adolescents under 
the age of 21 were convicted, or exactly 100 per day". The number of convictions for 
boys in the age range between eight and thirteen, started at about 700 convictions for 
age 8 and were increased by about a further 700 for each year of age until 13. This 
makes it quite clear that bureaucrats set up a system to rubber-stamp criminality on 
a pre-determined quota of children each year Table 1.1 
. 
Despite the complacent, 
civilized Home Office rhetoric concerning the welfare and the 'individualization' of 
treatment of children, these children were harvested in bulk largely to be used as 
examples to frighten and deter other children. 
"Elkin, Winifred A., English Juvenile Courts, p. 294. 
"Calculated from Judicial Statistics,, 1938,, P. P. 1939-40 [Cmd 6167], XI. 25 1, 
App 3(A), p. xxxiii. 
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Table X1.1 Indictable Convictions of Boys in Juvenile Courts, 1938. Source: 
Criminal Statistics, 1938, App 3 (A), p. xxxiii. 
Age 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Indictable 
657 1,354 2,109 2,862 3,513 452 
Convictions of Boys 
vi 
So far as the policing and uplifting of 'weak-' and 'fallen' criminals went, Dunning had 
achieved mixed success. The new professional police forces did not expand 
massively into welfare work as Dunning had attempted in Liverpool, they did, 
however succeed in creating a crime-fighting role for themselves against juvenile 
delinquency. By ensuring that juvenile delinquents remained under the criminal law 
and were held liable for punishment for their acts, the logic of child welfare policy, 
which wanted to place the welfare of the child at the centre, was undermined. 
On the other hand, as Herbert Samuel had intended, the more serious crimes which 
were often committed by adults over 21 or even over 30, did not rise much in the 
statistics. In 1934, the Criminal Statistics drew the false conclusion that Government 
policies had been effective in preventing juveniles from going on to become career 
criminals. "The contrast between the figures of juvenile offenders and the figures of 
older offenders may support the view that one of the best methods of attacking the 
(349) 
criminal problem lies in the work of the Juvenile Courts"". What had really happened 
was that extra court slots had only being been made for children and not adults and 
this, proportionately, squeezed out serious adult crime from the courts. Statistically, 
this made juvenile courts appear more effective, than they were in reality, in stopping 
juvenile offenders continuing their crimes into adulthood. The crimes of 'strong' 
mature criminals were not being dealt with while the 'weak' were arrested in 
increasing numbers. 
80JUdiCial StatiStiCS, 1934, p. xv. 
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Chapter XII: The Shift to Detection 
I 
Traditionally, the political and economic implications for the state of increasing its 
involvement in the detection of crime have been left out of the historiography. Crime 
control has been presented as being largely demand-led with the police simply 
responding to that demand. It has usually been argued also that until the twentieth 
century, when police forces 'modernized' in response to wider social changes, there 
was a Constitutional reluctance to use detectives because, detectives were associated 
with the French State and its spies and agents provocateurs, and these foreign 
practices were held in contempt by the freeborn British public'. 
This seems dubious since it was in those areas that most impinged upon the political 
liberties of the British citizen that the detectives were most likely to interfere'. The 
British state had a long tradition of pervasive secret intelligence operations including 
agents provocateurs extending back at least until Elizabethan times. Trade unionists, 
political dissidents and aliens were subjected to the close attention of detectives long 
'Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, pp. 160 ff. 
'See Bunyan, T., The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain. 
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before 'criminals' were. Moreover, although detectives may not have been used to spy 
extensively on 'criminals', much of the utilitarian agenda in the nineteenth century 
involved extremely close surveillance and inspection of the poor using uniformed and 
plain clothes police officers in addition to a host of other agents of the state'. 
Clearly, there was no great official tenderness towards the rights and privacy of the 
British people, particularly when they were poor or unimportant. From the 
commencement of the new police it had been accepted that when patrolling in 
crowded public places "one man employed in plain clothes, on such occasions, was 
worth many in uniform"'. Many police chiefs would have been happy to have had 
many more of their officers in plain clothes but, originally, police uniforms had to be 
adopted principally to let ratepayers know that the police were actually reporting for 
duty,. and to provide them with a number so that complaints could be made about the 
officer's conduct'. 
When in the twentieth century, Ireland, the Russian Revolution, and the First World 
War, provided the state with some major political reasons to inaugurate or increase 
detective establishments, it was seen how wealc were the Constitutional restraints. 
The government simply gave extensive powers to the police under D. O. R. A. and 
'Brundage, A., England's "Prussian Minister". 
Evidence of Sir Richard Mayne, Re-Dort from the Select Committee on the 
Petition of Frederick Young and Others, P. P. 1833 (627), X111.407, Q3997-9, p. 176. 
Ibid., Q4012 p. 177. 
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trampled over any residual notion that plain-clothes detectives spying on the 
population was alien to the tradition of British liberty. Moreover, as if to emphasise 
that 'foreign' practices of detection were, after all, acceptable in Britain, police forces 
adopted the German, Hans Gross' Criminal Investigation as their standard Bible for 
conducting criminal investigations'. After the war it was presented to the public as 
natural and perhaps unobjectionable that detectives should build upon their war-time 
experience. Major-General Sir Wyndham Childs, the framer of the D. O. R. A. 
regulations noted the almost seamless transition that took place in the interwar years; 
"the C. I. D. in the War vented their spleen on a spy, whereas they now vent their 
spleen on a criminal"'. 
This was not entirely true since the international and industrial situation in the 
interwar period continued to provide detectives with a great deal of political work on 
which to "vent their spleen". However, what could have been a clear distinction 
between political and criminal work was usually blurred over. There was a general 
characterization of political dissent as simply another manifestation of criminality and 
this helped overcome public queasiness about the wide-scale introduction of 
detectives. Tony Bunyan noted how crime and subversion had become inter-mixed 
in the war; "During war the dividing lines between 'crime', 'political opposition', and 
'Times, II January 1950, p. 4. 
'Evidence of Major-Gen Sir Wyndham Childs, Assistant Commissioner 
Metropolitan Police, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police 
Po rers and Procedures, p. 13 1. 
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'aiding the enemy' are hard to draw for agencies of state, and throughout the war the 
CID and the [Special] Branch operated as one unit"'. 
This wartime widening of the traditional boundaries of criminality was maintained 
and led to the development of the widespread interwar presentation of political 
dissent as potentially criminal and the propaganda that the "criminal elements of the 
country will ever exploit political situations, to the detriment of the good name of a 
nation"'. Consequently, "agitators, conscientious objectors, fanatics, Publicists, 
cranks, vagabonds and others" began to be included in lists of those defined as 
psychopaths and potential criminals in the interwar period". Since detectives tended 
to present their targets to the public apolitically as 'criminals', opposition to the 
emergence of the detective was generally muted although the rise of such 
organisations as the National Council for Civil Liberties testifies to the growing 
effect this had on political liberty and the opposition it aroused amongst some 
intellectuals " 
'Bunyan, T., The History and 
-Practice of 
the Political Police in Britain, p. 
112. 
'Inspector John Peake, 'The Co-operation between the Police and the Public 
in the Detection and Prosecution of Crime', p. 396. 
10H. S. Hulbert, quoted in East, W. N., Society and the Criminal, The Home 
Office, 1949, p. 42. 
"See, for example, Kidd, Ronald, British Libert3jin Danger: An Introduction 
to t Le Study of Civil Rig-hts, Lawrence and Wishart, 1940. 
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So, rather than some high-principled respect for civil liberty, or a detestation of 
'foreign' practices, or even a British reticence to pry into private lives, it was, more 
likely, the state's fear of pushing up the cost of criminal justice, by detecting and 
investigating a larger number of crimes, that inhibited the employment of the 
detective against criminals in the nineteenth century. In 1856, the Select Committee 
on Public Prosecutions feared that if the police became involved in investigating 
crime there would be "often a needless accumulation of evidence, the sole object 
being to swell the costs"". They made the point that the police had a vested interest 
in finding crime; 
That the investigation of crime should in any way depend upon the accident 
of the wealth of the person injured; that it should be left to the discretion of 
policemen belonging to an inferior class of society, and of course open to 
temptation; or to attorneys among whom are found many instances of men 
n'k capable of bribing policemen, and of embezzling money, are circumstances 
that spread a taint over the administration of justice, and tarnish the honour 
of the country in which they are tolerated". 
However, after the First World War the large Desborough pay award undennined the 
traditional economics of policing which had previously worked to the advantage of 
cheap low-paid preventive patrols rather than specialist detectives. It is doubtful that 
12 t Committee Public Prosecutions, (1856), p. xx. 
P. xv. 
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this was intended by Desborough or the many police chiefs who began to push up 
their crime figures to create what can best be described as some supply-led 'demand' 
for their services. Nonetheless, the new economics began to make it cheaper to switch 
an increasing proportion of police resources away from expensive mass patrol work 
and into smaller-scale detective units. As the example of nineteenth century New 
York confirmed, successful prevention depended greatly upon the visibility of many 
uniformed men and when it was too expensive to provide them a smaller number of 
detectives were used instead" 
11 
By the late 1920s inter- and intra-service tensions had risen in the police service with 
the result that morale had become "dangerously low"". The official answer to this 
loss of direction and morale was the standard Royal Commission. Ostensibly it was 
a handful of public allegations against the police, such as the use of the 'third degree' 
in the Savidge case that led to the setting up of the Royal Commission on Police 
Powers and Procedures in 1928. However, a close reading of the evidence given 
before most of the interwar committees and commissions, most notably the 
Desborough Committee and, ten years later, the Royal Commission on Police Powers 
and Procedures, reveals how divided senior officers were and how much they 
blamed 
14Miller, W., Cops and Bobbies, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977, 
36. 
"Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 203. 
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each other for police failures and the growing loss of public support for their services. 
The Royal Commission, in this light, could usefully have been used to find a balance 
between the competing elements of the service and to provide guidelines for its future 
development or demise. 
Had there been the political will, it could also have acted as a check on the 
development of a post-D. O. R. A. police mentality manifested by unaccountability and 
a bullying arrogance and self-importance, particularly in the detective sections of the 
service but also seen in the welfare policing of morals and families. This was greatly 
encouraged by increased bureaucratic control and decreased local accountability after 
Desborough. In some forces new recruits were made to recite that "Law, as defined 
by Blackstone, is a rule of action prescribed by a superior which an inferior is bound 
to obey. "" The new mentality displayed itself in many ways. A minor example was 
the bullying and contemptuous way shoppers in north London were subjected to 
police loudspeaker vans driving up and down informing them, as if they were a flock 
of sheep, that "The best way to shop in Kentish Town Road is to walk along one side, 
then use a pedestrian crossing and walk back on the other side. Do not keep crossing 
backwards and forwards. "" Ominously, what often underlay such displays was a 
eugenic self-image of the police such as that utilised by John Peak-e, an Inspector with 
Sheffield City Police, to win the 1929 King's Gold Medal. His essay showed an acute 
awareness that policing was in a state of change but disclosed only the vaguest notion 
"Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the World, p. 28. 
17JUStice 
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of where it was going or what values should inform it. What mattered was that the 
policeman was looked up to as the ideal type of the race. He wrote, 
crime is a danger to the national evolution... the definite purpose of each 
police officer is so to act as to convey the fact that he stands for the best in 
British manhood... the efficient discharge of his duty is related to the 
improvement of the race... The machinery of the law will come to be looked 
upon not as an annoying necessity, but as an assurance of national evolution 
on progressive lines". 
Peake's essay showed little respect for the boundary between the liberty of the 
individual and the needs of the community. In a perceptive article, the Solicitor's 
Journal saw these constitutional issues arising and unsuccessfully pressed the 
Commission to address them; "The present Royal Commission is, in essence, a 
boundary Commission... The Commission has a difficult task; if it be not recognised 
for what it essentially is, that task becomes an impossible one. " 19. 
III 
"Peake, John, 'The Co-operation between the Police and the Public in the 
Detection and Prosecution of Crime', pp. 383-411, passim. 
19SOlicitors' Journal, 1928, (1 December 1928), p. 803. 
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The evidence to all the interwar commissions and committees gives an insight into 
the internal politics and fragmentation of policing. Perhaps it was not surprising that 
in a service that deals with wrong-doing there was much blaming but less 
understanding. Certain detectives felt themselves to be a cut-above the rest. In his 
evidence to the Desborough Committee, Basil Thomson, the Head of the 
Metropolitan Police C. I. D., tried to distance detectives from lower class uniformed 
officers, particularly those who had gone on strike in 1918 and 1919 and had 
allegedly brought the service into disrepute. He compared the professional 
relationship of the chief inspector and the detective constable to "the leader at the bar 
and his junior" and noted how this superior status allowed them to go into an A. B. C. 
and drink tea together which would be unthink-able for a mere uniformed constable 
and his superior officer'. This argument must have had considerable effect in a 
period when the police were trying elevate their professional status. It was also 
designed to show that detectives were more respectable than their uniformed 
counterparts, less liable to corruption and could, therefore be trusted to act in 
plainclothes. 
By 1932, James Clayton, the Chief Constable of Doncaster, was claiming that "the 
Detective Department is the mainspring of a Police Force"" 
- 
Others agreed that 
"Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of England Wales 
and Scotland, (1920), pp. 30-35. 
21 Statement by James Clayton, Chief Constable, County Borough of 
Doncaster, Report. from the Select Committee on the Amalgamation of Police Forces, 
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detection should be given priority. Mr R. L. Matthews, the Chief Constable of Leeds 
City Police revealed the strain the reporting minor juvenile crime was placing on 
detectives; 
it has decreased the chances of the detection of crimes, because the 
investigating officers of the Criminal Investigation Department (with more 
crimes to deal with), have now less opportunity of spending sufficient time 
in investigating them, there being no latitude in the establishment of the force 
to adequately increase the staff of the Criminal Investigation Department 
I say that if a Policeman undertakes any form of welfare work he is exceeding 
his duty. A Policeman ought never to interfere unless he sees some crime 
committed or about to be committed... I am not opposed to the Police 
Authority paying for the welfare work, but welfare work is not Police work" 
However,, Sir Charles Rafter, the Chief Constable of Birmingham City Police 
complained that detective officers "forget that their principal duty is the prevention 
"( continued) 
(1931-2), p. 230. 
"Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Proc-ecdlures, (1929), pp. 217,221. 
(360) 
of crime. They get so much kudos for detecting crime, and are made heroes. "". He 
claimed 
It is detective work,, which causes a great stir and a great reputation for the 
man, but the principal work of the Police is preventive. It is silent work, and 
it does not get the reward or recognition that the detective department gets, 
but it is more important worl<... I regard the work the Women Police are doing 
as preventive work... They are removing persons from the streets who would 
be criminals in a very short time". 
On the other hand, the Recorder of Hythe, Mr St. John Hutchinson,, was 
condemnatory of the direction of Dunning's preventive policing. He saw the potential 
for corruption; 
In moral offences, whether on the street or in the parks, there is a growing 
tendency to use the Police to protect and support morals rather than merely 
to see that the law is upheld. The use of the Police as a moral enforcing force 
is open to grave criticism, when the enforcing of morals means that the Police 
go out of their way to discover vice, and sometimes to encourage it, in order 
to suppress it. It leads to scandalous public cases, and subjects the Police 
"Evidence of Sir Charles Rafter, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal 
Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, (1929), p. 243. 
24 Ibid. p. 242. 
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force itself to dire temptation in the form of receiving bribes and levying 
blackmail. The increase of this form of Police activity is marked since the 
W. 
ar 
25 
. 
Sir Leonard Dunning saw corruption instead coming from detectives and their post- 
D. O. R. A. use of unfair techniques that brought the service into disrepute. He 
questioned the practices and ethics of many detectives. He believed that; 
D. O. R. A. shifted the burden of proof to the defendant... If I was told that I 
might question a prisoner, I should certainly not question him in such a way 
as to make me think he was telling me something which he did not mean to 
say... I must own that I look with great suspicion on the nicely coherent 
statements which are sometimes produced... Some of those statements do not 
appeal to me as having been written down in the manner in which I was 
instructed: 'Listen carefully to what the prisoner says and write it down in my 
notebook as soon as possible in the very words used by him'... Sometimes the 
statements strike me as being in answer to questions, and not part of a 
coherent and considered statement"" 
Major-General Sir Wyndham Childs, the Head of C. I. D. totally disagreed with 
Dunning. He, personally, had framed the D. O. R. A. regulations and he had no 
25 Ibid., p. 138. 
26 Ibid., p. 68. 
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sympathy for traditional moral scruples or for the kid-gloves approach. He claimed 
that in seven years he had never heard of a single complaint against the C. I. D. and 
consequently his understanding of the term "third degree" was in reference to the 
"Three Degrees of Master Mason". He felt that the C. I. D. did not act unfairly but 
sometimes had to help those whose "memory may want assisting" during 
questioning. Even in murder cases, 
the class of so-called confession that we have to deal with is the statement 
made by the accused person, after warning, which is intended to be a defence, 
and only becomes a confession to this extent, that, not being an expert, the 
man concerned has made some terrible slip... which has proved his undoing 
That is where the trained lawyer comes in; he sees that it is not a defence at 
all; it is a confession". 
Childs' evidence perhaps suggests why many provincial police chiefs so obviously 
believed the Metropolitan Police were using unscrupulous tactics which were creating 
a low public opinion of the police. In 1928, George Anson, the Chief Constable of 
Staffordshire claimed "the fact remains that the Police in the whole Kingdom are now 
on their trial, because of certain things that have happened in the London District 
As far as the County Police are concerned the Savidge case throws no more light 
27 Ibid., p. 131 
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upon what might possibly happen in a County force than if it had happened abroad 
in a foreign Force"" 
IV 
However, although the divisions within the police were fundamental, and the rival 
shifts towards detection, welfare and nationalization were raising serious 
constitutional issues, the remit of the 1928 Royal Commission made it clear that 
detective forces were going to increase and that the establishment of ground rules to 
make the detection of crime publicly acceptable was its priority. Consequently, the 
Commission was accompanied by greater informal control over the press". 
The bottom line was that officials viewed traditional preventive policing as 
uneconomic and old-fashioned and this meant that more detection was inevitable. 
Whether the target was to be'weak'juvenile criminals or 'strong' mature criminals, 
selective detection and rapid response was a cheaper alternative to large-scale 
policing and, in particular, to welfare case-loads. The retirement of Sir Leonard 
Dunning in 1930, shortly after the report of the Royal Commission was symbolic that 
things had changed; that preventive policing was on the decline and that the axis of 
Atcherley and Dixon had risen to dominate policy. 
"Evidence of G. A. Anson,, Chief Constable of Staffordshire, ibid., P. 374. 
19Howgrave-Graham, H. M., Light and Shade at Scotland Yard, pp. 16-17. 
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The logic for shifting resources into detection was greatly enhanced by the 
dominance indictable offences were achieving in the interwar statistics due to the 
scissors effect of the Home Office cutting-back on non-indictable prosecutions at the 
same time that the police were swelling the reporting of indictables. The result was 
that while, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the police reported only about 
one indictable offence for every nine non-traffic non-indictable offences, by 1950 
they were reported about seven indictable offences for every three non-indictable. 
This reversal of the traditional trends in the crime figures meant that by the end of the 
war it really was becoming true to say that "Broadly speaking, the police definition 
of the terms crime and criminal seems to be bounded by the area of responsibility of 
the Criminal Investigation Department"". 
Detection was particularly convenient for dealing with the new phenomenon of 
incessantly rising indictable crime. Since prosecutions and punishments were not 
getting extra funding they could not rise significantly, and therefore it was immensely 
helpful to politicians and managers to be able to point to figures from detectives 
showing they had 'cleared-up' this mess of unprosecuted crime. However, 'clear-ups', 
without prosecutions or other useful action had very little effect on crime in the real 
world. 
30Willett, T. C., The Criminal on the Road: A Study of Serious Motoring 
Offen ) Commit Them, Tavistock, 1964, p. I 10. 
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Originally, when detectives started being added to police establishments, police 
managers had to evolve their own internal, quantitative targets and criteria for 
evaluating detective success since many cases did not come to court. These criteria 
were necessarily abstract and inconclusive, since the detectives wanted to be able to 
claim success when there was no trial. The result was that detective 'success' was 
came to be expressed in terms of 'elucidations' which were often accepted without 
any independent scrutiny of the evidence and without any obvious social utility or 
other qualitative benefit accruing to society from the investigation. This was not of 
great political importance so long as 'elucidations' remained as an internal measure 
of the quality of detection. However, 'elucidations' were of wider political importance 
if the public were going to be invited to judge the success of a police force upon the 
strength of them. For examPle, in 1929, Mr R. L. Matthews, the Chief Constable of 
Leeds City Police, argued that it was his force's duty "to elucidate crimes" and that 
the number of his detectives' elucidations, rather than the number of prosecutions, 
should be taken as the measure of his force's success". 
In the Victorian period with so few detectives, 'elucidations' played little part in the 
public measurement of police success. During the 1890s with an effective limit to 
prosecution and reports of crime, the Criminal Statistics measured police success 
simply in terms of the percentage of apprehensions to 'crimes Imown'. A norm of 70 
per cent was set for apprehensions in 1899 (see above, p. 173). In the interwar period 
"Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
procedures, (1929), pp. 214,223. 
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this 'success rate' should have gone down, since apprehensions were kept more or less 
constant while crime reports rose sharply. Instead the 'clear-up' rate was introduced 
and this new figure enabled Herbert Samuel to make the traditional claim as late as 
93 1 2 that police successes "are still as many as 70 per cent... that anyone who 
commits a serious crime may feel that he has odds of 10 to 7 against him that he will 
be found out and brought to book"" 
How was this possible? On at least three occasions between 1899 and 1937, the 
Home Office extensively widened the definition for'clear-ups"'. As the proportion 
of 'apprehensions' tumbled, the bulk of the 'clear-ups' became unverified detective 
'elucidations' which often consisted largely of a dubious list of crimes 'taken into 
account'. By the interwar period, the definition of a'clear-up'had become so broad 
and contrived that even the statistically invalid practice of adding columns of crimes 
to columns of criminals was adopted 34 
. 
So, in order that the public should continue 
to believe that the 'normal' 70 per cent success rate still held good, and that the 
normal number of people were still deterred from committing crime, the obvious test 
"Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 1932), pp. 1147, (Home Office 
Supply Estimates). 
"Mannheim, H. Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars, pp. 
33,44. Parallels may be drawn with changes in the base of the unemployment 
statistics. 
"Evidence of Sir A. L. Dixon, Report from the Select Committee on the 
Am 11 amation of Police Forces, (1931-2), pp. 180-1. gý 
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of apprehensions to 'crimes Imown' was replaced by a contrived and meaningless 
bureaucratic fonnula that had to be periodically revised by civil servants if it was to 
continue producing the required figure. A further reason that the 'clear-up rate', i. e. 
the percentage of 'clear-ups' to the number of crimes recorded, was an almost 
meaningless figure was that the crimes described as 'cleared up' were not necessarily 
the same crimes as those that had originally been recorded. Many of the crimes 
recorded as committed were entered by the uniformed branch after information from 
the public, whereas many of the crimes described as 'cleared up' came from the 
detective branch when suspects confessed to crimes that had not previously been 
reported. 
V 
Since so many of the 'clear-ups' were merely booldweping crimes'taken into account', 
and there were also so few prosecution slots available, very little extra could be done 
to punish or'treat' offenders as a result of these increased detections. It was, therefore, 
hard to argue that any great increase in 'efficiency' in detection necessarily led to any 
socially useful results. Nonetheless, in April 1931 Arthur Dixon called a central 
conference of chief constables to discuss detective work and its organisation. It 
proposed the establishment of a detective branch in each force". Following this 
conference, in 1932, Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary, announced that he was 
"Ambage, N. V., The Origins and Development of the Home Office Forensic 
Science Service, 1931-1967, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1987, p. 3 1. 
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setting up a committee to discuss detective cooperation and coordination, which was 
a further "great impetus" to investigation". The same year, a letter from Reginald 
Clarke in the Times argued for the setting up of a national detective force". 
As the crime statistics continued to rise, success in the detection of indictable 
offences,, rather than in prevention using non-indictables, was becoming used as the 
measure of police efficiency, and whether management arguments were framed to 
support the status quo or to support change they had to address the issue. For 
example, even traditionally-based preventive forces with strong welfare commitments 
such as that at Birmingham, had to protect their uniformed establishment by claiming 
that the ordinary beat constable was playing an increasingly important role in 
detection. In 1936 only ten to fifteen per cent of indictable offences were dealt with 
by uniformed officers. Ten years later, the Mr Dodds, the Chief Constable, claimed 
that this had risen to 50 per cent of crimes" 
This new dominance of detection as the functional priority of policing was evident 
when the interwar search for police economies prompted "the serpent" of police force 
mergers to raise its head again following the May Committee Report on National 
"Home Office Supply Estimates, Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 264, (15 April 
1932), pp. 1145-6, (Home Office Supply Estimates); Report of H. M. Constabulary 
1937-38, p. 29. 
37 Letter from Reginald Clarke, Times, 19 April 1932. 
"Justice of the Peace, 1947, (11 October 1947), p. 574. 
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Expenditure in 193 V9. The Home Office interlinked the issues of detection,, 
economies of scale and centralization. Norman Ambage showed "the external stimuli 
of rising crime and falling detection ratios, together with problems of economy, and 
the internal troubles involving the general inefficiency of detectives" was blamed by 
the Home Office, and particularly by Arthur Dixon, on the "fragmented organisation 
of the police service in general"". 
In other words, Dixon used the perceived need to improve detection as a means 
towards obtaining efficiency savings from a more centralized police system. On 
grounds of economy, the merger of at least the smaller borough forces into the 
counties would have saved on buildings and administration. Manpower could have 
been cut, by perhaps 6 per cent, by reallocating beats between the county and the 
boroughs allowing county reserves to reinforce the boroughs as necessary. Finally, 
larger county forces would have meant less local political control since, in the 
counties, chief constables were the disciplinary authority rather than the watch 
committees of the boroughs councils". 
"Evidence of C. L. des Forges, Town Clerk of Rotherham on behalf of County 
Boroughs of under 75,000 population, Report from the Select Committee on the 
Amalgamation of Police Forces, (1931-2); Departmental Committee on National 
Ex, Denditure,, P. P. 1930-1 [Cmd 3920], XVI. 1. 
"Ambage, N. V., The Origins and Development of the Home Office Forensic 
Science Service, p. 58. 
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Although wide-scales mergers were seen off until the Second World War, the impact 
on detective success, rather than the traditional argument of economy of scale which 
had been used by the Desborough Committee, was the major justification employed 
by all sides for or against merger". Nonetheless, in the 1930s, the need for more 
detective efficiency was a major argument used by the Home Office for pushing 
ahead with the development of regional police organizations that increased central 
control". 
As the Home Office firmed up its ideas on the form of police organization it wanted, 
police managers came under pressure to conform. Managers were expected to 
produce figures to show increasing detective success. Consequently, some of the 
more ambitious managers changed theirTacts' of crime in order to claim success and 
to support whatever organizational changes they wanted to push through. For 
example, in late 1933, Lord Trenchard, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
wrote to the Home Secretary, Sir John Gilmour underlining the economic advantages 
of detection; "personally I am more than convinced that if I only had the courage to 
do so, I could safely knock off a thousand men, add 200 to the C. I. D. and have less 
41( 
... 
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crime"". That year, Trenchard began to divide crime into the two classes of 
preventable and detectable in his Annual Reports. For the rest of his service as 
Commissioner, the total number of indictable crimes recorded remained almost 
constant yet, within that constant figure, the total number of crimes described as 
preventable by the uniformed branch fell by 22.33 per cent while the number that 
were described as detectable rose by 21.66 per cent (see Table 1.1 ). 
Table XILI Preventable and Detectable Crime in the Metropolitan Police District,, 
1933-1938. Calculated from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police. 
Year Class of Crime Total of All 
Preventable % of 
total 
Detectable % of total Indictable Crimes 
19 33) 46,075 55.07% 37,593 44.93% 83,668 
1934 40,916 49.28% 42,120 50.72% 83,036 
1935 36,304 45.19% 44,032 54.81% 80,336 
1936 35,787 42.72% 47,990 57.28% 83,777 
1937 38,705 41.98% 53,487 58.02% 92,192 
1938 41,506 
1 
43.56% 53,774 56.44% 95,280 
In the opinion of Trenchard's biographer, Andrew Boyle, this was "another broad 
indication of rising police efficiency" under Trenchard's command since these 
statistics seemed to show a significant decline in the number of crimes of the type 
44 Trenchard to Sir John Gilmour, quoted in Boyle, A., Trenchard, p. 641. 
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that it was possible to prevent with more efficient police organization. Unfortunately,, 
he believed, this decline just happened to coincide with a rise in the sort of crime that 
it was beyond the power of Trenchard or any police force to prevent". Crime was 
rapidly modernizing, but Trenchard was flexible enough as a manager to Imow how 
to respond. 
Far more likely, Trenchard had made the managerial decision to rig the statistics in 
order to get the 'right' type of crime accepted and processed by the Metropolitan 
Police, that he needed to win support for his policy of organisational change. He 
simply held the total crime statistics level while he pushed up the proportion of 
detectable crime. In all probability, there was no sudden 'modernization' of crime 
between 1933 and 1935. Probably the same mix of criminal activities continued to 
be reported by the public to the police throughout the mid- 193 Os. Yet by a judicious 
selection and classification of the same old mix Trenchard was able to claim to the 
public that, although his reforms were already very effective, the nature of criminality 
was so very rapidly changing that he had no option but to concentrate his resources 
on the detective organization. 
Thus, although it was a particularly crude example, Lord Trenchard's blatant fixing 
of the crime statistics shows how important it was for any ambitious police manager 
who wished to regarded as efficient to select and control the quantity and quality of 
crime he recorded in order to support and create the necessary demand 
for his 
45 Ibid., p. 659. 
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policies. As Trenchard said, the duty of the statistician was to present his results "in 
such a way as to be easily seen and remembered by those whose business it is to act 
on the results obtained. "" 
The importance of statistical control of rising crime after the First World War, meant 
that in many police forces battles began to be fought over possession of the Crime 
Book in order to gain the power to create supply-led demands for particular services 
or forms of organization. Across the country, ambitious officers as well as managers 
were actively rigging the statistics. Before the First World War, uniformed officers 
had traditionally tried to minimise reported crime in order to demonstrate their 
efficiency in prevention", whereas detectives had usually wanted more crime reports 
in order to establish a role for themselves. After Desborough the situation reversed 
and it was the detectives who tried to slow down the rise in the recording of crime 
because they did not want to get overloaded with a mass of unsolvable petty crime 
that brought down their detection rates whereas the uniformed branch wanted more 
crime to show that more men were needed 
48 
. 
The uniformed branch tried to record large numbers of the sorts of crimes that might 
have been prevented had there been more officers on patrol, but could not easily be 
"Commissioner of the Metropolis, 1933, p. 14. 
47 See above, p. 100 ff. 
48 See the evidence of James Clayton, Chief Constable of Doncaster, Report 
from the Select Committee on the Amalgamation of Police Forces, (1931-2), p. 7 1. 
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detected after the event. Barbara Weinberger interviewed Sergeant Minch of the 
Birmingham uniformed branch who said, "We wanted to say at the end of the year 
that crime's gone up ten percent because we haven't got enough policemen. And the 
CID, because their gaffers kept saying 'we're having too much crime', they tried to 
write it off ". The detective branch tried to remove from the statistics, or "write off' 
many of the crimes the uniformed branch wanted to enter. They wanted to limit the 
record of crime to those types of crime that could not easily be prevented by 
uniformed officers but could be detected relatively easily after the event. 
Detective Inspector Ellworthy was also interviewed by Barbara Weinberger. He said 
that in the 1950s, "Because we always used to make a point of looking good on paper 
at detection... we recorded a thousand crimes a year, but our true figure would have 
been half as much again, if we put the real figure in, but we didn't. "". Consequently, 
as reports of minor crime went up, some detectives tried to lock away crime books 
from uniformed officers in order to stop their departments being swamped and also 
to prevent unsolvable crimes being recorded". Depending on the ratio of preventables 
to detectables, a chief constable might make out a case for either increasing the 
detective or the uniformed establishment. This happened in the Metropolitan Police 
"Quoted in Weinberger, B., The Best Police in the World, p. 87. 
511bid., p. 87. 
51 Young, M, An Inside Job, pp. 323' ff. 
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in the early 1920s when the strength of the CID was increased from 800 to 900 by 
cutting back the uniformed branch by an equal number 52 
. 
vi 
Changing the crime statistics had to involve changing the public image of the 
criminal. Different police and political interests constructed different criminal 
archetypes to support their arguments for particular organisational structures. The 
powerful were able to reify these archetypes through their selection of the target 
groups for policing, their selection of the victims they recorded, their manipulation 
of the statistics and their privileged status in the formation of public opinion. This 
helped the Home Office and police managers publicly to misrepresent their supply- 
side 'efficiencies' and organizational initiatives as if they were simple responses to 
demand-side changes in the nature of crime. 
As the Home Office bled out the non-indictable vices of drunkenness, poverty, 
vagrancy, cruelty and assault from the criminal courts, and they became less and less 
the business of the policeman, the image of criminality strengthened. Magistrates, 
who traditionally have considered themselves an informed and important component 
of public opinion, saw fewer drunkcs and vagrants in court and so they came to believe 
that what they saw in court was a reflection of changes in the real world. They began 
"Evidence of Brig-Gen. Sir William F. T. Horwood, Minutes of Evidence of 
sion on Police Powers and Procedures, (1929), p. 45. 
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to reinforce the Home Office pressure on the police to divert their resources 
elsewhere. The result was that sober and largely shorn of his characteristic defects, 
the image of the twentieth century criminal emerged as the modem, calculating 
indictable criminal. 
This was most noticeable in the composition of the prison population where there was 
a great decline in short-term non-indictable prisoners. By the early 1920s, in the view 
of Basil Thomson, the former head of the C. I. D., "ten per cent. of the convicted 
criminals in any prison have been predestined to commit anti-social acts through 
some mental or moral defect... The other ninety per cent. are the ordinary men and 
women 
103 
. 
Even enthusiastic eugenicists such as the Prison Commissioner, Dr 
Norwood East, accepted this view that the modem criminal was often not the product 
of a defective inheritance. He wrote in the 1930s that 
It is by no means unusual to hear offenders referred to still as if they were a 
group of individuals marked off from the general population by atavistic or 
"Quoted in Gross, H., (ed. Howe, R. M. ), Criminal Investigatio 
, 
p. 60. See 
also the comments made the Chief Constable of Cardiff, in 1899, that habitual 
criminals were now "almost extinct", and by the Chief Constable of Leeds, in 1905, 
ed that "the more serious class of offenders are not confined,, as is often suppos ý to 
habitual criminals, but that the criminal classes are being recruited by an increasing 
number of persons whose character has hitherto been clear, at least of crime. ", 
Judicial Statistics:, 189 
, 
p. 77; Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 68. 
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psychological anomalies. The problem of crime, however, is not so 
conveniently and easily dismissed. Whereas it is now recognised, more often 
than formerly, that men of robust constitution may become subjects of 
functional nervous disorder, as well as the defective, unstable and 
constitutionally inferior; so, too, it must be admitted that the criminal may be 
no mental weakling, but a man of courage, determination and superior 
intellect. He is, in fact, the man on the street; we are all potential criminals". 
As the criminal dealt with by the courts became more 'normal' he was assumed to be 
more responsible for his actions. To emphasise this in 1905 Leonard Dunning noted 
that far from becoming weaker but more moral, many criminals had been 
strengthened by education; "Education certainly has had an effect upon crimes of 
dishonesty in that it has to a certain extent eliminated personal violence as an 
accessory circumstance, acts of violence only add to the dangers of the burglar's or 
1155 thief s enterprise 
Many detectives wanted to draw a more powerful conclusion. They argued that some 
modem criminals were extremely violent but their violence was no longer mindless. 
Criminals were potentially more dangerous than before because they did not show 
respect for the police or'play the game' by the old rules". They no 
longer knew their 
"East, W. N., Medical Aspects of Crime, pp. 232-3. 
"Leonard Dunning, quoted in Judicial Statistics, 1905, p. 18. 
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place. After the War, according to one head of C. I. D., Imown criminals would no 
longer touch "their hats" to detectives, nor would they meekly give themselves up 
without a fight, as they used to, apparently saying, "All right, guvnor, I'm coming 
quietly"". Instead, they used violence in a calculated way. Arresting officers were 
"knocked about a good deal" and, more ominously, there was said to be an alarming 
increase in the use of guns, often "in conjunction with motor cars"" 
The conclusion was that detectives were trying to create an image of a new-found 
'toughness' in the criminal and a new-found disregard for the 'rules of the game' in 
order to create a 'demand' for them to be allowed to retaliate in kind and become 
tougher, themselves. They used the 'demand' of the changed image of the criminal, 
to justify their bid for some of the rough and ready measures allowed them under 
D. O. R. A. to be extended into peacetime. Detectives argued that "There is a strong 
body of opinion that the caution should be done away with altogether. The detection 
"( 
... 
continued) 
see Brogden, M., On the Mersey Beat, chapter 4. 
"Basil Thomson, Minutes of Evidence, Committee on the Police Service of 
England Wales and Scotland, (1920), p. 30. 
"Judicial Statistics,, 1923, p. 9; Evidence of Major-Gen Sir Wyndham Childs, 
Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan Police, Minutes of Evidence of the Ro 
ice Powers and Procedures, p. 13 l.; Police Journal, vol 4,193 11 
p. 2. 
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and punishment of criminals it is said, is not a game to be played according to a code 
of technical rules"". 
By the interwar it was also being argued that the modern criminal had benefitted 
sufficiently from mass education to utilise developments in modem technology and 
communications to move around the country preying on the isolated and unprotected 
suburban and rural middle classes". This new crime appeared to have no respect for 
existing police boundaries and seemed to call for greater police intelligence, 
centralisation and co-ordination. Of course in the past, travelling vagrants and 
criminals had concerned the police", but by 1919, Basil Thomson, the then head of 
C. I. D. at Scotland Yard, theorized that public transport had revolutionised crime; "If 
a pickpocket lived, say, in Walham Green, he robbed people on Walham Green 
buses.... [now] The travelling criminal is all over the country"". 
"Justice of the Peace, 1928, (24 November 1928), p. 759 
"Justice of the Peace, 1928, (19 May 1928), p. 333; Shore, W. T., 'The Motor 
Age', in Shore, W. T., Crime and its Detection, Gresham, 1934,2 vols. 
"Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, R., The Eme 
_ 
[cy in Victorian 
and Edwardian England, chapter 11; Petrow, S., Policing Morals, 
Part 11. 
62 mental Committee on the Duties o Women Police, 
(1920), p. 3 1. 
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Soon, the newspapers were providing (probably with Thomson as a major source) 
further instances of 'Up-to-date Criminals' using motor cars". By the late 1920s the 
'new' criminality that undermined existing police boundaries was an official fact. 
The motor car enables the criminally-minded in the great towns to travel 
faster and farther afield into regions where they are not Imown. and the 
chances of interference with their criminal activities before they return, or of 
subsequent arrest, are less. The motor car also enables more people to live in 
the country... their new dwelling places... tempt the criminal and strain the 
resources of the police... The temptation to the idle or criminally disposed in 
the town areas is two-fold; first to 'borrow' a car and, secondly, to 'do a job' 
with it5 and the chances of doing the job successfully and getting away are so 
much greater in the country that only the most daring prefer the more 
dramatic 'smash-and-grab' raid or 'bag-snatching' in the middle of a town. " 11 
The aim of this change in the image of the criminal was to support Dixon's and 
Atcherley's desire for amalgamations of police forces. If criminals disregarded 
boundaries then, it could be argued, those boundaries had to go. In 1932, the Select 
Committee on Police Amalgamations summarised the evidence of the Home Office, 
"For example, 'Up-to-date Criminals: Motor-cars as Part of their Equipment', 
Times, 21 January 1920, p. 14. Thomson probably inspired the article since Walham 
Green is again used as the location. 
64JUdiCial StatiStiCS 1928, p. xv. 
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two of the Inspectors of Constabulary, the County Councils' Association and the 
County Chief Constables who were in favour of amalgamating the smaller forces into 
the counties. They argued that improvements in communications and, particularly the 
car had "widened the area of criminal investigation. The local Imowledge required for 
the detection of crime must be the knowledge of a much wider locality than was 
formerly the case, and the criminal records of the smaller areas are nowadays of 
hardly any use. "". The Metropolitan Police similarly argued that although most 
professional criminals were based in London, their low crime statistics proved that 
they had committed their crimes outside the Metropolitan Police District because of 
their fear of the formidable efficiency of Scotland Yard detectives. Consequently 
senior officers proposed setting up a national police force headquarters in London, 
utilising C. I. D. records and link-ed closely to the provinces by wireless. " 
The bottom line was that in the inter-war period, and particularly after 1930, the 
image of the criminal changed so that potentially almost anyone could belong to the 
breed of new criminals without disclosing any obvious medical, moral or social 
stigmata. Criminals appeared to be roaming widely and freely, and because of this it 
was presented to the public as obvious that detection, and not preventive patrols, 
would in the future be the only way to discover the modern criminal. 
p. vi. 
66 Times, I April 19. )2, p. 9. 
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Vil 
It is doubtful that the growth of detective departments had a significant effect on 
controlling crime. There was no vast increase in expenditure to fund detection and 
until after the Second World War there was little intention of providing extra 
punishment slots. Most of the more serious crimes that required detection remained 
beyond police budgets. So, as the Audit Commission said in 1996, "The idea that a 
detective can solve a crime by studying a spent match in an ashtray is a myth. The 
majority are solved by someone going to the police and telling them. "" The outcome 
of shifting policing towards detection without was almost inevitable; the cheapest and 
easiest crimes were the ones that detectives tended to investigate. Juvenile crime shot 
up. 
For example, a proportion of the juveniles who came before the courts ended up in 
approved schools and other institutions. It was standard practice to train girls for 
domestic service and boys for agriculture or other low status work. Consequently, 
when juveniles were eventually freed, many became servants of one description or 
another, but did not regain their good name. During the 1920s and 1930s, as detective 
departments expanded, larcenies by servants increased dramatically. The Criminal 
Statistics for 1927 noted that the 3,701 larcenies committed by servants that year had 
been easy to detect. By 1934 5 per cent of all larcenies were being committed by 
servants, and by 1948 there were nearly 11,000 such offences which, by then, were 
"Guardian, 5 September 1996, p. 5. 
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increasing colossally by between 10 per cent and 20 per cent per year 68 
. 
At the end 
of the Second World War, the Head of the C. I. D. revealed in a training manual that 
"among numerous false charges the most frequent are, without contradiction, those 
brought against domestics, and we Investigators must try to make amends for old sins 
thus committed by others"'9 
More generally he placed detection in its supply-side context, 
the struggle with crime is after all only a war for which the first necessity is 
plenty of money; money is the best aid for the conduct of criminal justice. But 
if the service is undermanned and the pecuniary allotment is insufficient, what 
is to be done? In answer to this query we have the invention of the 
'Expeditious Officer'. Every inquiry may be closed extremely quickly if one 
wishes; if one considers it unnecessary to talce the evidence of certain persons 
who have been named, there is no need to enter their names in the list of 
witnesses for the prosecution, and if they are no on the list, there is no 
necessity to question them; here is time gained at once! Let some ignorant 
persons be asked whether a visit to the spot will help to clear up the case and 
"Criminal Statistics, 1927, p. vii; Criminal Statistics, 1934, p. ix; Criminal 
Statistics, 1946, p. vi; Criminal Statistics, 1947, p. v; Criminal Statistics, 1948, pp. 
V-vi. 
"Gross, H., (ed. Howe, R. M., Assistant Commissioner, Scotland Yard), 
)9 
, 
p. 28 
. 
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they will reply no; here then is sufficient excuse for not paying the visit and 
here again time is saved. A band of thieves is accused of having committed 
a dozen burglaries. There is quite enough evidence to get them convicted and 
one is not absolutely obliged to start the police upon investigations which 
may perhaps bring to light another dozen which the same band has 
committed; here again is time saved... These examples may be multiplied 
without end; a little time saved in each inquiry ends in the gain of a 
considerable amount in the long run; the inquiries run on all right and when 
our artistic Investigator is sufficiently skilled in suppressing the difficulties 
and obstacles that may prove troublesome in quick work, he will well deserve 
the title of 'expeditious'. 
Let the Investigator who has no qualms of conscience when gathering such 
laurels,, act thus if he has so desires... Whether he will be able to look back 
without remorse upon his work even though his fame for being 'expeditious' 
has brought him many substantial advantages, is another question 
70 
. 
70Gross,, H., Criminal Investigation, pp. 23-4. 
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Conclusion 
Conclusion 
I 
At the end of the 1940s, the crime figures suddenly began to fluctuate. The 
explanation commonly advanced was that the late 1940s and early 1950s were "a 
period of social adjustment following the aftermath of the war and the consolidation 
of the welfare state... At the time these oscillations were taken too indicate that the 
upward curve in crime had reached its peak and would shortly fall and become 
stabilized at a pre-war level"'. In 1949, Ronald Howe, the head of the Metropolitan 
Police C. I. D. hinted that he also believed a turning point had been reached. That year 
the figures fell enormously. He wrote, "Now, and especially where I work in the 
largest City of the world with all the problems that follow a great war, our detectives, 
as they move from case to case, sigh for the time for detailed investigation... now I 
feel that, after a long period of overwork since the war, we are gradually getting back 
to proper investigation, which will lead to proper results"'. It appeared that after three 
decades, the Home Office had regained control over the statistics and stabilized them. 
'Mclintock, F. H. and Avison, N. H., Crime in England and Wales, Heinemann, 
1968, P. 19. 
Gross, H., (ed. Howe, R. M., Assistant Commissioner, Scotland Yard), 
criminal Investigation, 1949, p. v. 
Yet, in 1977, Sir Leon Radzinowicz, without providing his readers with any further 
evidence, speculated; "Could the short-lived respite enjoyed in the nineteen-fifties be 
attributed to a sudden police go-slow? "'. 
It appears Radzinowicz's speculation was well-informed. The late 1940s and early 
1950s were a time of intense competition between the political parties. At the end of 
the war, the police claimed that the combined effect of the Depression and of the War 
had led to their pay and status being eroded. Officers called for another Desborough- 
type pay award ora new police charter'. In 1945 the crime figures rose sharply and 
began to push crime, which had not "immediately" pressed itself "upon the 
goverm-nent's attention", up the political agenda4. In September 1946 the police 
received a pay rise on condition that pay would remain frozen for three years during 
which there would be "a comprehensive review of police conditions of service" 
Grievances built up. By 1948, "there was mounting discontent in the police service, 
criticism in Parliament, and a serious problem of inadequate recruitment"'. Detective 
departments, in particular, were over-loaded and needed either more men, or a 
reduction in crime. The Police Federation pressed for an independent pay review. 
'Radzinowicz,, Sir L., The Growth of Crime, p. 6. 
Morris, Terence, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945,74. 
'Judge, A., The Force of Persuasion, pp. 100-1. 
'Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 250. 
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The Government responded by passing a series of acts bringing some institutional 
change to the administration of criminal justice. Crime was clearly back on the 
agenda and the 1948 Criminal Justice Act provided a few extra long-term prison slots 
and the opportunity for courts to award short, sharp shocks for juveniles. 
Nonetheless,, the 1948 statistics shot up to reach a record 522,684 crimes. Never 
before had the number of recorded crimes passed the symbolic figure of 500,000. 
Police concerns over pay and recruitment had obviously to be met with more money 
if the statistics were to be controlled. In May, the Govermnent agreed to set up the 
Oaksey Committee on Police pay and recruitment'. The following year recorded 
crimes fell back by an astonishing 62,815 to 459,869. Since 1916, the crime rate had 
only previously fallen twice, each time by about 6,000, in 1927 and 1946. The 1949 
fall was, therefore, 1,000 per cent greater than any other ever recorded. In this light, 
it was perhaps significant that the total actual strength of the police in England and 
Wales at the end of 1949 was 61,166 or 97.37 per cent of the 62,815 total fall in 
crime'. Since they were forbidden to take industrial action, the police appear to have 
given the Government a most impressive display of power and solidarity by re ucing 
the crime figures by almost one crime for every serving officer. 
Report of the Committee on Police Conditions of Service, Part 1, P. P. 1948-9 
[Cmd 7674], XIX. 25 1; Part 11,1948-9 [Cmd 783 1 ], XIX. 379. 
'Annual Abstract of Statistics 
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Nonetheless, the Oaksey Committee, which reported in 1949 during a pay freeze9, 
recommended only a 15 per cent rise whereas the police had asked for between 33 per 
cent and 54 per cent. The police remained dissatisfied and recruitment remained a 
major problem. In 1951 the police again came back for a pay rise, and the crime 
figure for 1951 went back up massively by about 14 per cent to 524,506, a rise of 
63,071. The number of serving police officers at the end of 1951 had by now risen 
to 63,. 116,, or 100.07 per cent of the total rise in crime. Again the police were granted 
a pay review. In August 1951 constables were given another 20 per cent on top of the 
Oaksey award". The crime figure for 1952 fell back slightly to 513,559. Early in 
1952, Chief Constables and all grades above superintendent were in their turn 
awarded a back-dated flat rate increment of E150". The crime figure for 1953 fell 
back about 7 per cent to 472,989. In 1954 a further 9 per cent was awarded to the 
police. The crime figure again fell back over 8 per cent to 434,327 and rose less than 
4,000 the following year. It appeared that the police establishment had been bought 
off by a combination of extra pay and an increase in court and punishment slots and 
that there might now be a return to the stability of the Victorian period. 
'Reiner, R., The Blue Coated Worke 
, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1978, p. 30. 
"Parl. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 498, (24 March 1952), pp. 12-3. 
"Parl. Debs., 5th series,, Vol. 498, (24 March 1952), pp. 12-3; (10 April 
1952), pp. 261-2. 
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"1954 saw the end of the temporary recession in crime"". In the 1955 general 
election, the Conservatives gained the clear electoral ascendency over Labour. 
Between then and 1960 the police submitted three further claims for pay rises, but 
there was no longer the same political pressure to meet police demands and each time 
no agreement was reached and the claims had to go to arbitration". Over the next few 
years the crime statistics rose at a massive rate. In 1956 they went up nearly 10 per 
cent to 480,000. In 1957 they rose nearly 14 per cent to 546,000, after that they 
continued to rise at around 10 per cent per annum until the early 1960s and then at 
a slightly lower rate after that. 
11 
The Desborough award transformed the politics of crime for the rest of the twentieth 
century. By triggering rising crime statistics, it moved crime control back onto the 
political agenda as a major competitor for precious resources against social services. 
In the early 193 Os the ominous direction criminal justice was taking had already been 
noted by Dan Griffiths, a member of the Departmental Committee on the Persistent 
Offender. He warned that crime 
has been raised to the status of an institution and has become a profession and 
a kind of vested interest to a host of respectable people who make a living out 
"Critchley, T. A., A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 254. 
13 Ibid., p. 25 1. 
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of criminal law administration. Many successful lawyers, detective-story 
writers and film-producers owe the criminal far more than a debt of gratitude. 
Crime is also one of the best-sellers of newspapers and, far more than 
incidently, one of the best providers of advertising revenue... We are not 
likely to recruit such persons in a campaign against crime. It is not natural to 
expect people who live on crime, rather than by crime, to be willing to 
jeopardise the source of their own livelihood". 
Terence Morris has described how "increasingly after 1945... popular sentiment was 
often prone to suggesting that the increased provision of welfare resulted in sapping 
of the moral fibre of the nation... it was but a short step to including increased 
criminality, and especially juvenile criminality, as one of the perhaps unintended but 
nevertheless inevitable consequences"". So, as the police establishment continued to 
widen the base of its statistics, and as it dishonestly misrepresented changes in the 
frequency of crime in order to obtain more resources for itself, it convinced 
politicians and the public that crime was really increasing by 'leaps and bounds'. This, 
in turn, misrepresented the outcome of welfare and educational policies as at best 
ineffective sentimentality and at worst a foolish and profligate transfer of resources 
to the lowest moral strata of society. 
"Reservation by Mr Dan Griffiths, Report of the Departmental Committee on 
the 3ersistent Offender, P. P. 1931-2 [Cmd 4090], XII. 553, p. 69. 
"Morris, Terence, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945, p. 37. 
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As the welfare state expanded after the second world war, its political foes of the 
right increasingly found common cause with the police establishment, who were its 
funding foes. At Police Federation and Conservative Conferences attacks were 
frequently made on the sloppy and dangerous sentimentality of social welfare 
legislation. In this light, it is probably no coincidence that the crime figures rose most 
steeply after 1956 when R. A. Butler was appointed to the Home Office. Butler's aim 
was to establish a political consensus based upon welfare and social security and in 
this understanding, social policy, education and religion were the key to crime 
control. He started to apply Home Office funds to crime research in the hope of 
understanding more and condemning less". He also started to bring a small 
proportion of police corruption into the open". 
The long-term result of police tampering with the statistics of crime was been that. by 
the 1990s crime had replaced poverty and the welfare of the nation as a major 
political problem. It is not surprising that in 1927 Brigadier-General F. T. Horwood, 
the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police should have blamed the growth of 
complaints of discourtesy against the police on "the growing sense of equality among 
the classes" 18 
. 
'Criminal' is a label that is almost exclusively applied hierarchically to 
"Butler, R. A-ý'The Foundation of the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge. 
17 Morris, Terence, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945, p. 62. 
18 
-, 
8 January 1927, p. 3 1. 
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put people in their proper places and this can only be done if those policed are of 
lower status than the police. By the 1990s, the limited equality of the mass of 
citizens,, and the grudging respect the state had found for their capabilities and worth 
since the second world war, had largely evaporated. Labour politicians who once 
wouI4 have spoken of freedom, growth and goodness, were seeking to tag and 
impose curfews on children. In place of the grand public vistas of reconstruction town 
planning, restricted areas with surveillance cameras and security screens in public 
places were erected to protect officials and bureaucrats from the demotic public and 
to protect the demotic public from itself The legacy of the self-seeking actions of the 
police establishment had been to corrode the trust of government in the worth and the 
morality of the citizens they ruled and which had been the fragile basis of the limited 
grants of democracy allowed them. 
III 
Unsurprisingly, most official research continues either to ignore or marginalize the 
influence of political and supply-side factors on the administration of justice. The 
official line remains that the crime statistics are unambiguously demand-led and are 
primarily influenced by external social factors, such as demographic change and 
economic cycles. A very influential recent Home Office statistical analysis of 
the 
post-war crime figures applied a simple regression analysis to nearly a 
half century 
of criminal statistics without any consideration, whatsoever, of social, political, or 
historical factors. One reading of this work by a medium-grade senior civil servant 
(394) 
is that the official statistics were officially compiled and, therefore, they had to be 
taken, by this grade of official at face value. Just as in similar research by the 
Department of Transport, undertaken at about the same time, the official's remit 
seems to have been to provide "some underlying 'law', of the sort widely found in the 
physical sciences" to explain the statistics'. The findings of the research officially 
validated the Home Office's statistics as a true representation of crime in the real 
. 
world and absolved the Department from any supply side responsibility in the 
creation of them; 
The main feature of the models of crime developed here is a dependency of 
crime on a combination of economic and demographic factors. It follows that 
the models permit future levels of crime to be predicted on the basis of a 
combination ofpredicted future economic and demographic circumstances. 
The behaviour of the economy can be predicted for two or three years ahead 
with some reliability, while demographic circumstances can be predicted with 
accuracy rather further ahead... Such forecasts have a direct administrative 
value in that recorded crime is an important element in the demands which 
are placed on the police and the criminal justice system, and an element 
"Broughton, J., 'Long-term Trends in Road Accident Casualties', Road 
Accidents Great Britain, 1993, Department of Transport, 1994, pp. 27-9, @ p. 28 (see 
above p. 294, note 69). 
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which needs to be taken into account when planning 
- 
in advance 
- 
the 
allocation of resources to these bodies". 
From this it appears that the Home Office, mirroring its attempts after 1893, may 
again be trying to control the police figures by setting individual forces norms and 
targets for crime, but this time linking funding to these figures. Although it is difficult 
to be certain of longer trends from only three years figures, after 1993, the Criminal 
Statistics have begun to fall, indicating that the Home Office may have succeeded, 
at least in the short-term, in regaining control of the statistics. 
IV 
None of the thesis intends to imply that crime was ever unimportant to citizens, or 
that its effects should be minimized. It is merely saying that it is impossible to lmow, 
from the dishonestly compiled police statistics, whether or not crime is more or less 
of a problem than it was in the past. This was particularly true after the state greatly 
restricted the scope of 'real crime' to indictable offences and bled many reports of 
non-indictable crime out of the system. The state's resPonse has been self-interested 
rather than dis-interested, and un-interested rather than concerned. It has shown scant 
respect for either individual victims or criminals. This thesis suggests that in the past, 
"Field,, S., Trends in Crime and their Inteil2retation: A Study of Recorded 
Cri ie in Post-War England and Wales, Home Office Research Study 119, H. M. S. O., 
1990, pp. 54-5. 
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and also in the present, vastly more parties have been damaged to varying degrees by 
crime than has ever been admitted by the police or by the government. The thesis also 
suggests that criminal justice, despite its normative rhetoric, has not been genuinely 
respo . nsive to damage done to individual citizens, but has instead first regarded the 
social standing of injured parties and has also functioned according to what elite 
bureaucrats considered to be 'the public good' which was generally shaped in their 
own image. The obvious implication is that little evidence was found of widespread 
equality before the law. 
The bureaucratization of crime occurred during the course of the nineteenth century, 
when the state transformed the image of the active, prosecuting, injured party into 
that of the passive victim of a crime 'against the state' who was more amenable to 
bureaucratic manipulation and discretion. As a result, the nature of the problem was 
also changed and crime assumed its modem utilitarian problematization. To state 
bureaucrats, crime tended to be viewed as an impersonal series of statistics, each one 
petty in itself On the other hand, as democratic expectations of citizenship rose the 
public began to believe that all crimes would be investigated and treated seriously. 
This was greatly encouraged by the rhetoric surrounding the development of detective 
departments and rapid response policing after 1930. By the post-war period it was 
commonly believed that the purpose of criminal administration was to provide a 
service of equal justice for equal citizens. However, some people accepted that this 
must be balanced by the need of the state to protect its interests and revenues, 
sometimes at the expense of the individual. 
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The issue became crystallised in public debate after the second world war when the 
growth of democratic sentiments and the rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the 
'welfare state' enlarged the belief that ordinary citizens had entitlements from the state 
as well as obligations. The two sides of the issue were raised in comments made in 
the Times and the Daily Telegraph in October 1950. The Daily Telegraph argued. "a 
basic principle of the rule of law [is] that the operation of the law is automatic 
where the offence is known or suspected". The Times disagreed and took a statist 
line; the law must only be enforced "in appropriate cases at the appropriate time 1121 . 
This is the crux of criminal justice. If the intention of administrators is not to provide 
every individual with justice, then what are their intentions and what does this say 
about the value of an individual citizen in a bureaucratically administered 
democracy? The evidence suggests the Times was closer to the reality of criminal 
justice. The Rev. William Paley, in his Moral and Political Philosophy of 1785, 
provided a characteristically limpid exposition of the issues. The book was much 
admired by Victorians and still remains, in most respects, one the clearest 
introductions to the philosophy of modern British criminal justice administration. 
From his point of view, individual justice was not the primary concern of the state, 
what he termed the "security of civil life" was what mattered. Therefore, even the 
extreme example of a miscarriage ofjustice leading to a wrongful execution was not 
primarily a matter of individual justice; 
"Times and Daily Telegra 
,7 October, 1950. See also Parl. Debs., 
5th ser.,, 
Vol. 483, (January 28 195 1), pp. 679-87. 
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The misfortune of an individual (for such may the sufferings, or even the 
death of an innocent person be called, when they are occasioned by no evil 
intent) cannot be placed in competition with this object. I do not contend that 
the life or safety of the meanest subject ought, in any case to be Imowingly 
sacrificed... But... he who falls by a mistaken sentence, may be considered as 
falling for his country" 
Paley was clear and consistent, "The proper end of punishment is, not the satisfaction 
of justice, but the prevention of crimes... What would it be to the magistrate, that 
offences went altogether unpunished, if the impunity of the offenders were followed 
by no danger or prejudice to the Commonwealth? "". So prevention, or the general 
and individual deterrence of future crimes against the collective security, not 
retribution for past crimes against individuals, was the reason for state involvement 
in criminal justice. If individuals wanted "the justice of God" they had to wait 
patiently for the Day of Judgement, or else fund a private prosecution themselves 
- 
caveat emptor 24 
. 
But even if a private prosecution succeeded, the purpose of state 
punishment was not the satisfaction of the injured party. It was to make examples of 
"Paley W., The Works of William Paley, D. D. with a Life by Alexander 
Chalmers, Esq., 5 volumes, London, 1821, p. 27. 
"Moral and Political Philosophy, Book VI, chapter IX in Paley W., The 
Wor ý, D. D. with a Life by Alexander Chalmers, Esq., 5 volumes, 
London, 1821, v. 11, pp. 1-2. 
24 Ibid. p. 5. 
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offenders particularly against a small range of offences, mostly property crimes"; 
"crimes are not by any government punished in proportion to their guilt, nor in all 
cases ought to be so, but in proportion to the difficulty and the necessity of 
preventing them"". 
Since ancient times, military justice had worked on the principle that a specimen 
number must be punished to serve as examples for the rest of the community. By the 
late eighteenth century it appeared that Britain had a 'bloody code' and that capital 
punishment was freely awarded, but of those sentenced to death it was carried out 
"only upon a few examples... scarcely one in ten is executed... By this expedient, few 
actually suffer death, whilst the dread and danger of it hang over the crimes of 
many... these laws were never meant to be carried into indiscriminate execution"" 
The Roman name for this policy was decimation (the putting to death of one in every 
ten soldiers guilty of a crime or mutiny as an example to the others). Whether, or not, 
Paley was statistically accurate, the logic of his account suggests that at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, a version of the ancient system of decimation was in operation 
in Britain and this would have been widely appreciated amongst the classically 
educated gentlemen who administered justice and granted reprieves". The logic of 
"Ibid. pp. 10 ff. 
26 Ibid. p. 2. 
27 Ibid. pp. 6,8 (emphasis added). 
"See Hay, D., 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law' in Hay, D., 
Linebaugh, P., Winslow, C., Rule, J. G., Thompson, E. P., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime 
(continued 
... 
) 
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decimation would also have been understood by the military men who controlled the 
new police forces when they were set up in the nineteenth century. They knew that 
their ends could often better be achieved by not punishing every crime but by making 
examples of the few that they selected. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, a mechanical application of the 'usual average' to 
prison quotas, norms and budgets had replaced the personal drama of private 
prosecution, condemnation and reprieve. Bureaucrats increasingly trivialised the 
importance of the individual and disparaged justice as merely primitive "retribution". 
Officials and politicians cloathed themselves in the rhetoric of the enlightenment and 
used aloof but high-minded humanitarian terms to express their contempt for those 
injured by crime who wanted the state to punish, at its own expense, those who had 
offended against them. In 193 1, George Benson, the Labour M. P., future chairman 
of the Howard League for Penal Reform and also a Treasury expert, spoke 
approvingly that "The whole tendency of our penal code has been to get rid of the 
idea of retribution, which is the old instinctive form of justice.... our penal code to- 
day exists, not for the purpose of inflicting retribution or for the purpose of making 
A 
the punishment fit the crime, but for two purposes only - to deter, and, if possible, to 
bring about the reformation of the criminal. "" 
... 
continued) 
and th-Century England (1975), Peregrine, London, 1977. 
29Abolition of Corporal Punishment Bill, Parl. Deb., 5th ser., Vol. 247 (30 
January 193 1), p. 1403, 
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Despite much rhetoric about the developing individualization of sentencing, the 
ancient rationale of selecting and punishing a small sample of offenders to mak-e an 
example to others clearly remained dominant and this was, for example, seen clearly 
in the quotas set for child offenders in the 1930s'o. Because it did not intend to 
encompass most criminals, criminal justice did not, other than in a rhetorical sense, 
become an arm of state welfare provision. In 1935, Sir Arthur Dixon explained his 
policy in terms that could have been endorsed by Paley; 
successful prosecution is not in itself the end to be sought, but it is one of the 
means of securing the real purpose of the police service - the prevention of 
crime... the cases which do come before the Courts are really no more than 
a representative selection of the whole number, and include, of course, any 
cases which the police deliberately bring forward for proceedings because 
they involve the more serious offences or offences which have been repeated, 
or those in which the police consider it necessary to prosecute instead of 
having recourse to a caution in order to check a prevalent abuse' I 
The following year,, as normal, the courts punished by quota. The budget for 1936 
allowed Assize courts to send two in three (66.5%) of those convicted to prison, 
quarter sessions to send one in two (49.8%), summary courts one in four (23.8%), and 
"See above P. 347. 
'Dixon, A. L., 'Police Procedure in Courts of Summary Jurisdiction', 
Magistrate, November 1935,963-66, pp. 964,966 
(402) 
of those under 17, one in ten were packed off to Home Office schools". If the 
common notion of 'justice' was the "the retribution of so much pain for so much 
guilt... which we are accustomed to consider as the order of things that perfect justice 
dictates and requires"", then this arbitrary, 'discretionary' and impersonal machine 
was a very long way from providing 'justice'. 
V 
This thesis has sought to repoliticize the historiography of criminal justice by 
establishing the supply side principles that guided its practices and policies. It has 
also 'Sought to expose how changes in the power and economic balance of the 
institutions of criminal justice, that occurred during and immediately after the First 
World War produced a fundamental discontinuity with Victorian policies and that 
these changed policies can be understood from a contextualized reading of the 
statistics produced by these institutions. 
Of course, the thesis is limited by its concentration on the supply side analysis and, 
in particular, its concentration on the police. Much more work needs to be done on 
providing a more detailed supply-side historical analysis of the remaining criminal 
32 Judicial Statistics 1936, pp. vii-xiv. 
"Moral and Political Philosophy, Book VI, chapter IX in Paley W., The 
Paley, D. D. with a Life by Alexander Chalmers, Esq., 5 volumes, 
London, 1821, v. 11, p. 1. 
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justice institutions, principally the courts and prisons, and also far more local studies 
are needed. Work needs to be done to find out what policies were set for particular 
crimes and groups of crimes. The reasons why some crimes were selected, and others 
were'not, was probably greatly influenced by prosecution costs, but other political, 
cultural and social forces must also have shaped policy. As David Garland and Martin 
Wiener have recently shown, the full range of such forces is larger than the 
historiography has usually encompassed". For example, Borstals, remand homes and 
approved schools intended to force the young male to conform to particular notions 
of masculinity. How far was this attempt to recreate the boy influenced by the 
reformers' biographies and by their own concepts of gender and sexuality and did this 
contribute to the institutionalization of sexual abuse in these establishments that is 
now becoming public knowledge? Other questions might involve the historical 
development of racism within police culture, particularly among seaport forces. 
Perhaps, initially, further progress could be made if historians adopted a more 
interdisciplinary approach. For example, powerful analytical tools to help understand 
criminal justice were developed in the social sciences after the 1960s. In particular, 
models of criminal justice ideologies were developed following Herbert Packer's 
pioneering interpretation of the criminal justice system in America as a conflict 
34 Wiener, M., Reconstructing the Criminal Culture; Garland, David, 
Puni e. 
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between two value systems, those of due process and of crime control". One of the 
most powerftil models was that of Michael King, who distinguished six ideological 
or social vantage points and traced the differing assumptions and practices implicit 
in each". At the very least, using these as a starting point, an inter-disciplinary 
approach might assist historians to render less "inchoate" the historical opposition to 
criminal justice policy". Nonetheless, the thesis argues that an understanding of the 
supply side politics is fundamental to any understanding criminal justice politics 
- 
quotas had to be set before it was known who would fill them. 
3'Packer, H., The Limits of Criminal Sanction, Stanford University Press, 
1969. 
3'King, Michael, The Framework of Criminal Justice: Theoretical Approaches 
to Criminal Justice, Croom Helm, 1981, (especially chapter 2). His six process 
models are; Due Process with its presumption of innocence; Crime Control with an 
implicit presumption of guilt; Medical with an emphasis on prevention or treatment; 
Bureaucratic with an emphasis on speed, cost and efficiency; Status Passage with an 
emphasis on reinforcing community values; and Power or Class with an emphasis on 
the differences between judges and judged, and deflection of attention from class 
issues. 
37 For a short review and application of criminal justice models to derive the 
it working credos 11 of present-day criminal justice professionals see Rutherford, 
Andrew, 
-C. riminal 
Justice and the Pursuit of Decency, Winchester, Waterside Press, 
1994. 
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The thesis has also been limited by the almost total historical neglect of the 
development of management and administrative practices and ideologies in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If the results of this examination of criminal 
justice bureaucracies are anything like representative of managerial development in 
the public and private sector over the last two centuries it is perhaps not surprising 
that the subject has remained largely without a history. Nonetheless, as 
managerialism becomes the dominant ideology and form of social organization of 
the early twenty-first century, and as 'neutral' statistical presentations of depoliticized 
'facts' become the dominant form by which 'inevitable' policies are justified to the 
public, it becomes a matter of some urgency that historians should critically examine 
the historical, and particularly the military origins of this ideology and its relationship 
to the development of democratic theory. Similarly, many social scientists, if some 
of the more uncritical criminological analysis is representative of their methodology,, 
would benefit from adopting a much more cautious, critical and politically informed 
approach to the utilization of official statistics and official normative rhetoric. 
vi 
There are also implications for the practice and historiography of democracy in this 
country. Clearly, whatever fora of decision making were created during this period, 
senior Treasury and Home Office bureaucrats, senior policemen and other 
institutional managers knowingly misrepresented the 'facts' of crime to the public and 
politicians alike. If 'democracy', which came to be presented as a political virtue of 
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the Constitution during the course of the nineteenth century, was to have any meaning 
at all then it required that 'public opinion', even in the exclusive sense, should have 
beeninformed, rather than misled, by officials. 
Instead, Home Office bureaucrats, protected from necessary scrutiny by the Official 
Secrets Act, appear consistently to have misinfonned the public, and this has ensured 
that its snobbishly aloof hierarchy, where each grade communicates only at its own 
level unless requested from above, continues to exclude infonnation from and to deny 
information to, the common mass of the public. Because information is progressively 
filtered out of the system at each grade it has been possible for the Home Office to 
retain, in almost pristine form, the utilitarian problematization of crime that was 
formulated in the early nineteenth century before the Constitution was 'democratized'. 
As Derek Lewis,, the former head of the Prison Service, noted in 1997, "The Home 
Office civil servant, at least at the senior levels, has been bred to a high degree of 
homogeneity by long years in the tradition-bound and insular culture of the 
Department"". Discussion at the Home Office, if Derek Lewis is to be believed, 
continues often to revolve around the disparagement of ministers and their policies 
and the pay and public honours sought by officials". This does not inspire confidence 
that much disinterested service has been rendered to the state. In this light, a 
'politicization' of the civil service, that is to say the introduction of outside personnel 
"Lewis, D. Hidden Agendas, p. 39. 
"Ibid. pp. 33-4. 
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wishing to effect change, rather than to preserve the nineteenth century utilitarian 
status quo, could be seen as a welcome development. 
This thesis must raise the question whether Home Office policies have had any 
significant effect on crime over time. In the past, many politicians and officials have 
taken credit for the efficiency of their criminal justice administration but there is little 
convincing evidence apart from the dishonestly produced statistics that either policies 
were properly implemented or that they produced any worthwhile results. The Home 
Office is not the only Government Department recently accused of creating false 
statistics to fit bureaucratic and supply side side convenience. The falsification of the 
unemployment figures is a notorious example, but the practice seems endemic within 
Whitehall,, and probably within British management circles generally. Recently 
Professor Ted Wragg criticised the Ofsted School Inspectorate; "If you start with the 
premise that there is a problem with a proportion of schools, you end up fitting the 
figures around it"". 
Many works have praised the efficiency of the civil service, and the honourable 
traditions of public service, but this work swims against that current. In doing so it 
finds itself in company with A. J. P. Taylor who should appropriately have the last 
word on the British Establishment; 
flnkný-ndent, 24 July 1997, Education Supplement, p. 9. 
(408) 
The very word, so plummy, so ponderous, so respectable, tempts us to 
acknowledge the moral superiority of 'the Establishment'. It conjures up 
benign, upholstered figures, calm, steady, reliable. They would never pass a 
dud cheque or cheat at cards. Not intellectually dazzling perhaps, but patient, 
understanding, and tolerant 
- 
above all tolerant. Anyone who challenges them 
is disarmed by the quizzical superior smile and the enquiry: 'Well my little 
man, what is it nowT It was a great blunder to take the Establishment at its 
. own valuation. We ought to have revived Cobbett's name: THE THING. That 
suggests much better the complacency, the incompetence and the selfishness 
which lie behind the fagade. THE THING exists for the sake of its members, 
not for ours. They look comfortable because they are comfortable. They are 
upholstered because they are well fed. Their air of moral superiority is really 
an assumption that someone else will always cook their dinner - and a good 
dinner at that. 
... 
Is THE THING any use? None at all except for its members. Most people 
lead industrious decent lives without the moral guidance of the Archbishop 
of Canterbury... It would be a great improvement in every way if we got rid 
of THE THING. The country would be more alert, more receptive to new 
ideas, more capable of holding its own in the world. THE THING is on the 
(409) 
surface a system of public morals. Underneath it is a system of public 
plunder. 41 
4'Taylor, A. J. P. 'The Thing'in Taylor, A. J. P. (edited by Chris Wrigley), From 
the ýcond International. Essays on Nineteenth- Century Europe., 
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1993, pp. 52-4 
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Appendix 1: The Origin of the 'Principles of Policing' 
The origin and content of the "sacred principles" which governed the way Britain was 
policed, was a matter of considerable doubt, with different writers claiming to have 
identified between two and nine principles being "strictly observed". Worryingly, the 
Secretary and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police each had different 
formulations of their "sacred" principles. The original transformation of Melville 
Lee's theory of the police into nine "Principles" seems to have been undertaken by the 
police historian Charles Reith. He claimed they had been "adopted and evolved, 
almost unconsciously" since the formation of the new police'. 
By 1947, the Secretary of the Metropolitan Police, Howgrave-Graharn, was casting 
much shade and very little light on the matter. He claimed the origins of the nine 
principles could be traced back to Saxon times, although it was Peel who "hatched 
the egg" and Rowan and Mayne who, somewhat surprisingly, then "incubated it". 
According to Howgrave-Graham, when the "man-made plan" for the new police was 
devised in the early nineteenth century, it laid down that there would be a "gradual 
evolution of a police practice based on the principles". Unfortunately, the principles 
did not exist at that time, since, according to the same author, they "had evolved 
'Reith, C., British Police, p. 3 
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gradually during the nineteenth century" and it was only "recently" that they had 
come to be referred to as "Police Principles"'. 
The following year, Sir Harold Scott, the then Commissioner, of the Metropolitan 
Police stated that there were only six principles and they had been formulated by 
Rowan and Mayne, the first Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, although they 
had never been laid down officially'. Six years later, Anthony Martienssen described 
only five principles, said they had been laid down by Mayne, and had ever since 
"been strictly observed"'. By the following year, Sir Harold Scott had transformed 
and condensed his earlier version of the principles to just two, again claiming they 
had been laid down by Rowan and Mayne, and were still valid today. He now 
included a new,, and unlikely sounding, principle for 1829, that the Police must 
administer the law "whatever the political, religious, racial or social complexions of 
the persons" 
Most formulations of the principles bear some resemblance to Peel's original 
instructions to the new police'. 
'Howgrave-Graham, H. M., Light and Shade, pp. 120-126. 
'Scott, Sir H., 'The Organisation of the Metropolitan Police, p. 86 
'Martienssen, A., Crime and the Police, London, Penguin, 1953, pp. 13-16 
'Scott, Sir Harold, Scotland Yard, p. 18 
'Critchley, T. A., A History of Police, pp. 52-3). 
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